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ABSTRACT 
Tax evasion represents one of the major problems facing transition and developing economies. It 
imposes several economic costs: it slows down economic growth; it diverts resources to 
unproductive activities; it provides an incentive for firms to remain small and invisible; and it 
generates inequity between the evaders and the honest taxpayers.  
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the determinants of business tax evasion for transition 
economies. We do so by adapting the individual theory to the case of businesses; that is by 
assuming that the behaviour of businesses is similar to the behaviour of individuals, and that the 
determinants of business tax evasion may be similar, at least qualitatively, to the determinants of 
tax evasion by individuals or households. More specifically, beyond theoretical and empirical 
review of the tax evasion literature, this thesis provides three related empirical investigations: a 
panel investigation of tax evasion at the country level; a pooled-cross section investigation of 
firm-level behaviour across the transition economies and a cross-section investigation of 
business tax evasion and tax morale in Kosovo. For the firm-level investigation we use the 
BEEPS data for the years 1999, 2002 and 2005; and, for the investigation of business tax evasion 
in Kosovo, we generate primary data by developing a questionnaire and conducting a survey of 
businesses in Kosovo. Our econometric findings suggest that, first, regardless of the theoretical 
and previous empirical ambiguity, when it comes to transition economies the relationship 
between tax rate and tax evasion is positive; second, the macroeconomic environment has only 
minor effects on business tax evasion, suggesting that the decision to evade or not must depend 
on other non-economic factors; third, even if a country is performing well in general economic 
terms, the presence of negative institutional phenomena exert a dominant and immediate 
influence on the relationship between businesses and government; fourth, business tax morale, as 
is the case with individuals, has a strong and negative relationship with tax evasion; fifth, 
moreover, given that the same considerations on morality apply to both individuals and 
businesses, policies in the  individual context apply also to businesses; sixth, lower corruption, 
higher trust and better treatment of business taxpayers improves significantly both tax morale 
and tax compliance; and, seventh, because levels of tax evasion vary across firm characteristics, 
audit strategies should be set accordingly. Finally this thesis provides a set of corresponding 
policy recommendations intended to reduce either the possibility and/or the inclination to evade. 
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Introduction 
Tax, from the Latin word taxo, meaning “rate”, is a fee that is charged by a government on a 
product, income or activity. Through taxes government finances its expenditures and uses them 
for purpose of stabilization, distribution and allocation. Evasion on the other side, from the Latin 
word evadere, meaning “escape”, is an illegal action which entails the refusal of individuals and 
businesses to comply with tax requirements.  
Taxes and evasion have coexisted from ancient world to the modern times. From the corvée and 
the tithe - the earliest and most widespread forms of taxation - to the very modern taxes on cars, 
tobacco and other luxury goods, mankind was inclined to resist, hide and underreport wealth. 
Conversely, from the scribes – the Egyptian Pharaonic tax collectors – to the contemporary 
collecting mechanisms, governments and tax administrations have tried to prevent them from 
doing so. As the fight goes on, perhaps endlessly, tax evasion remains one of the most commonly 
found problems in the developed and developing countries. Recent estimates in 2013 show that 
the direct financial costs of tax evasion worldwide surpassed 5% of the world’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP); while the indirect costs remain unaccountable given the extensive impact of tax 
evasion on economic growth, provision of public goods and/or research and development 
(Murphy, 2013).  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a general introduction to the topic of tax evasion, its 
definition, history and the costs it entails. In addition, through this chapter we define the scope 
and objectives of this research. We do so in order to set the platform for the following chapters 
of this thesis, which provide a theoretical and empirical discussion of business tax evasion in 
transition economies. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a discussion on the definition of tax 
evasion and its relationship with three closely related topics. Section 2 discusses the evolution of 
taxes and tax evasion throughout the history of mankind. Section 3 discusses tax evasion in the 
context of transition economies; while Section 4 highlights the main objectives of this study. The 
last section concludes.  
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1.1 Definition 
Taxation is a central topic in the field of public finance. Tax evasion however, is studied through 
a combination of the social sciences and the economics of crime. The Oxford Dictionary defines 
tax evasion as “the illegal non-payment or underpayment of tax”. Her Majesty's Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC), the United Kingdom’s (UK) non-ministerial department responsible for tax 
collection, provides a similar definition; it considers tax evasion as “a deliberate underreporting 
of tax obligations”.  
The broad tax literature addresses the need to differentiate between evasion and three closely 
related topics; that of tax avoidance, informality and criminal activities. These boundaries are 
summarized by Cowell (1990); hence are referred to here as Cowell’s boundaries.  
The first boundary, evasion versus avoidance, is the most misinterpreted relationship amongst 
non-researchers of tax evasion. A former British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey 
said: “The difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion is the thickness of a prison wall”; 
however, both terms and the actions that each entail are unquestionably not the same. The classic 
distinction between avoidance and evasion is made by Holmes (1916, p.240), who wrote: 
When the law draws a line, a case is on one side of it or the other, and if on the safe side 
is none the worse legally that a party has availed himself to the full of what the law 
permits. When an act is condemned as evasion, what is meant is that it is on the wrong 
side of the line...  
A general understanding of this interpretation is that the difference between evasion and 
avoidance is rather on legal consequences that each act entails separately, with the latter being 
arguably non-punishable. Kay (1980, p.136) offers the following definitions for evasion and 
avoidance:  
Evasion is concerned with concealing or misrepresenting the nature of a transaction; 
when avoidance takes place the facts of the transaction are admitted but they have been 
arranged in such a way that the resulting tax treatment differs from that intended by the 
relevant legislation.  
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Sandmo (2004) argues that when the taxpayer abstains from reporting income which is in 
principle taxable, he engages in an illegal activity that makes him accountable to administrative 
or legal action from the authorities. Tax avoidance, on the other hand, is within the legal 
framework of the tax law. It consists in “exploiting loopholes” in the tax law in order to reduce 
the taxpayer’s tax liability. The principal difference is that whilst taking the first action the 
taxpayer is worried about being caught, whereas while undertaking the second action he has no 
worry, or quite the contrary, because “it is often imperative that he makes a detailed statement 
about his transactions in order to ensure that he gets the tax reduction that he desires”. Cowell 
(1985) goes beyond legal definitional differences by making the distinction in terms of the 
agent’s perceived budget constraint when the decision to evade/avoid is made. He argues that 
avoidance implies certainty of taxpayers while making the decision to report, while evasion 
implies activities that are taken under uncertainty; assumptions over certainty/uncertainty affect 
the risk behaviour of individuals which, in turn, affects the amount to be evaded/avoided. At the 
same time, he argues that the difference can be concluded only after the final outcome of each 
decision is known. In other words, if the law “effectively turns a blind eye” to tax evasion then 
from the taxpayer’s perspective there is no difference between evasion and avoidance; in both 
cases taxpayers will maximise non-reporting. Equally if avoidance is subject to legal doubt, or 
liable to penalty, then as far as economic consequences are concerned (to the taxpayer) the final 
outcome is similar to tax evasion.  
While one can also look at the Slemrod (2007) sarcastic perspective where “the poor evade and 
the rich avoid”, we note the importance of distinguishing between tax evasion and tax avoidance. 
This distinction has mainly to do with the illegitimate and punishable nature of evasion; as 
compared to avoidance. The Oxford English Dictionary defines tax avoidance as "the 
arrangement of one's financial affairs so that one only pays the minimum amount of tax required 
by law". By definition, paying the minimum amount required by law is within the law. It is 
always legal. However, as far as the economic function is concerned these occurrences have very 
strong similarities and very often they can hardly be distinguished (Feldman and Kay, 1981; 
McBarnet, 1992; Franzoni 1999). Moreover, from the moral point of view the outcome of both 
actions is the same. Some even argue that for the purposes of analysis evasion and avoidance 
should be treated as the same.  
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The second boundary relates to the relationship between evasion and informality; with two 
groups of views largely defining this relationship. The first group enforces beliefs that both 
evasion and informality move in the same directions, hence in terms of determinants, what 
defines one should also define the other. After all, one would not normally expect an informal 
business to report tax liabilities (Schneider 2012). The second view argues that informality is a 
much broader topic than tax evasion, and as such should be treated separately. Informality after 
all includes also illegal activities (for instance prostitution or drugs) which would normally cease 
to exist if detected (through audit) and thus would generate zero tax revenues (Fuest and Riedel 
2009). Moreover, informality also includes noncompliance with labour regulations, production 
standards, or other legal (non tax) requirements which go beyond tax evasion. Cowell (1985) 
argues that the boundary between evasion and informality does not generate any new obstacles 
for the analysis of the economic behaviour beyond those raised in evasion versus avoidance 
discussion.  
The last boundary emphasises the relationship between evasion and other criminal activities. The 
association of tax evasion to the economics of crime is widely studied (Anderson, 1976; Heinke, 
1978; Pyle 1983; Karlinsky et. al, 2004). The question made here, is whether we should isolate 
the issue of evasion as a special case of the economics of crime. Cowell (1990) argues in favour 
of treating tax evaders as a special case of the rational economic behaviour of criminals for two 
reasons. First, because tax evasion is a fraud that is committed against a very special economic 
agent: government. Government is a special agent as it can set the “rules of the game” by which 
economic relationships are supposed to abide; as well as structure and tax rates. Above all, 
government has ultimate control over mechanisms to track wrongdoers. On the other side, in any 
given crime, let’s say theft or business fraud, companies and individuals do not normally have 
any of the resources that government has. Second, in some cases the decision between tax 
compliance and tax evasion clearly involves the contents of a report to the tax authorities, a 
feature that is not present in other forms of crimes. This means that the filed report can be used 
by examiners as a useful signal of “what may be going unseen”. The third reason is linked with 
the special relationship between evasion and other core topics of public economics; and, hence, 
the necessity to differentiate this topic from the standard economics of crime. Contrary to other 
illegal activities, evasion is related to fiscal control that the government tries to use in execution 
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of its economic policy. Thus the search for effective public policies towards taxation makes the 
topic of evasion interesting in its own right. 
Reflecting on the discussion above, tax evasion is defined as an intentional underreporting of 
taxable liabilities to tax authorities; an act with apparent boundaries separating it from avoidance, 
informality and other criminal activities. Further, tax evasion is a decision that includes incorrect 
reporting and non-timely reporting of taxable income, as well as underreporting due to non-
mistakes in filing taxes. If taxpayers fail to provide their correct taxable liability to the tax 
authorities, then they are assumed to be evaders; if taxpayers fail to report on time, then they are 
assumed to be evaders; and if taxpayers’ underreporting is not made due to mistakes in filing 
taxes (such as miscalculations or overestimation of deductions) then they are assumed to be 
evaders. 
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1.2 Evolution of Taxes and Evasion 
Although regarded as a necessary evil, taxes have existed since the earliest days of civilisations. 
Burg (2004) dates the history of taxation in ancient Egypt from around the years 3000-2800 BC, 
in the first dynasty of the Old Kingdom where two forms of taxes were commonly found: corvée 
and tithe. Corvée was a state imposed forced labour on rural inhabitants too poor to pay other 
forms of taxes. Indeed, according to Webber and Wildavsky (1986), in the ancient Egypt 
language, the word “labour” was actually a synonym for these taxes. Tithe on the other side was 
a contribution of one tenth of the amount of something being taxed. Today the most advanced 
form of tithe is the income tax.  
According to Adams (2006), the earliest records of regulated tax systems, as well as anti-evasion 
apparatuses, date too from the Egyptian culture where the Pharaohs established a tax collecting 
mechanism at the core of which were the highly paid tax collectors known as scribes. At some 
period of Pharaonic ruling, a tax on cooking oil was introduced. In order to ensure compliance, 
scribes audited households to verify the amount of cooking oil being consumed and that 
households were not using leavings generated by the other cooking processes as a substitute for 
the taxed oil.  
Indeed, the evidence on audits carried out by scribes proves the coexistence of tax evasion ever 
since the birth of taxes. Punishments for tax evasion on the other side were ruthless as they 
included even death penalties. Death sentences were not a common form of punishment in 
ancient Egypt; suggesting that the treatment of tax evasion back then was considered as greatly 
important. According to the ancient Greek historian Herodotus, whose works are considered 
today as the founding works of history in the Western literature, Amasis I, the Pharaoh of Egypt 
around the year 1500 BC, established a law that every year each Egyptian should declare to the 
ruler of his district from what source he received his livelihood. And, by the written request of 
Amasis I, if someone did not make the declaration of an honest way of living “...he should be 
punished by death”. Babylonians on the other side applied a more sophisticated approach. 
According to Webber and Wildavsky (1986), in case of noncompliance in ancient Babylon, tax 
collectors would send the following notice: “Why have you not sent to Babylon the 30 lambs as 
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your tax? Are you not ashamed of such behaviour?” Indeed, notices as such might be the first 
evidence of non-deterrent tax collection mechanisms. Slemrod (2007) argues that similar 
patriotic appeals to induce citizens to comply are common in recent times. 
Burg (2004) considers written records which reveal that grain was first taxed in Ch’in, an early 
Chinese state, in the year 408 BC. According to him, this is a hint of a considerable shift from 
peasants providing labour services (the corvée) for overlords to instead paying them land taxes. 
Earlier than that, in 594 BC, in the Chinese state of Lu, new forms of taxation, apparently 
peasants making payments in kind to their overlords were introduced. Burg (2004) further argues 
that such records suggest that taxation has been a part of human history in both the East and the 
West for at least 2500 years. 
Around the year 500 BC, in the Persian Empire, the emperor Darius I the Great introduced a 
more advanced system of taxation, which obliged each Persian province (known as Satrapies) to 
contribute according to their potentials. This could be, perhaps, the introduction of the first 
progressive tax principle. For instance, Babylon was known for its richness in commodities, 
hence was obliged to contribute with silver and four months supply of food for the army; India 
was known for gold, and supplied gold in turn; Egypt was known for crops and hence provided a 
preassigned amount of them.
1
 In each Satrapies were Satrapas, or provincial governors, who 
were entitled to a certain percentage of the collected goods as a reward for their collecting 
efforts. Rewarding, as an incentive to increase tax collection, was applied to tackle specifically 
tax evasion and increase tax compliance. 
Adams (2006) mentions ancient Greece as another example of tax evolution and sophistication. 
There, in times of war, the Athenians imposed an emergency tax on property and wealth known 
as eisphora; no one was exempt from compliance and evaders were punished with 
unprecedented harshness – including death. He further argues that Greek civilisation is amongst 
the few that managed to rescind the tax once the emergency was over. Indeed, most of the 
                                                          
1
 On a separate note, the Rosetta Stone, one of the most famous ancient Egyptian stones, is a tax concession issued 
by King Ptolemy V in year 196 BC, which led to the world’s most important decipherment of hieroglyphics; given 
that it was written in three ancient languages. 
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modern taxes today have their origins in times of war; inability and/or unwillingness of 
respective governments to rescind them made these taxes permanent. 
Further on in history, in the Roman Empire, the earliest taxes were custom duties on imports and 
exports known as portoria. Two emperors are distinguished as great tax strategists throughout 
the glorious Roman era; Ceasar Augustus and Julius Ceasar. While the former is remembered 
for the introduction of inheritance tax, which today is referred as the Augustus Tax by both 
English and Dutch modern governments; the latter is remembered for imposing the one percent 
sales tax; today perhaps most commonly known as Value Added Tax (VAT). According to 
Bartlett (1994), the latter taxes included a modest contribution on all forms of wealth, including 
land, houses, slaves, animals, money and personal belongings. Although the basic rate was 
symbolic, roughly 0.01 percent, tax evasion was a notable problem in the Roman Empire. 
Slemrod (2007) cites works that have identified tax evasion around the third century, when 
Romans buried their jewellery or gold coins to evade the luxury tax.
2
 
In England, the first tax assessement was during the occupation by the Roman Empire. 
Following the fall of the Romans, the Saxon kings were the one that inherited the right for tax 
enforcement. Kings introduced, amongst many of them, the tax on land and property known as 
the danegeld (Green, 1981). The end of the medieval era was characterized by enforcement of 
progressive taxes by the Crown and, hence, a shifting of the tax burden from poor to the rich. 
According to Adams (2006), the 1377 poll tax noted that the tax on the Duke of Lancester, for 
instance, was more than five hundred times the tax levied on the common peasant. With the 
breakdown of medieval structure and decline of the monasteries, Parliament took a more 
prominent role in setting tax policies. In 1628, for instance, the Petition of Right was passed 
which, amongst many measures, prohibited the Crown from creating and imposing arbitrary 
                                                          
2
 Different types of taxes were also applied by religious institutions throughout history. These institutions indeed, at 
times, have rivalled or even surpassed the political ones in regards to the material obligations. Christians for instance 
applied (similar to the ancient Egyptians) the tithe, or the one tenth of what the faithful produces. Muslims on the 
other side applied the khums or one twentieth of their wealth; they even today consider giving the small percentage 
of one’s income for charity as zakat, or one of the five main religious pillars. Orthodox Jews continue to contribute 
for charity with ma’aser kesafim, or one tenth of earnings. Both Hindus and Buddhists sustain similar practices 
today. 
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taxes without the preliminary approval of Parliament (Boynton, 1964). Under the Kingdom of 
Great Britain, in 1798, in preparation for the Napoleonic Wars, income tax was introduced for 
the first time, with a rate of only 2 pence in the pound (Cooper, 1982). Subsequent tax evolution 
is a modern history with variations in tax rates and groups of individuals being taxed according 
to political views and beliefs enacted in place. 
In the United States (US), following the war against the British of 1775–1783 which, after all, 
began because of taxes, the new government was reluctant to levy taxes on very specific goods, 
such as liquor, tobacco or sugar. Subsequent taxes were set mainly because of the needs to 
finance wars; as Forbes would later put it, “War is Hell, but Taxes Last Longer”.3 Contrary to the 
ancient Athenians, who rescinded taxes after the war, a war with France in 1790 enforced 
property taxes until the present time. Similarly, following the American Civil War in 1872, in the 
aftermath of major devastations and disastrous events, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 
1861, which not only introduced the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and, hence, today’s most 
advanced tax enforcing mechanism, but has also served as a core foundation for the current 
modern tax system in the US. 
 
1.2.1 From necessity to resistance 
So why do we need taxes? Perhaps the best way to answer this question is by going back to 
1941, when the economist William Beveridge published a report for the British Government. In 
this report he recommended that the government should find ways to fight the five “Giant Evils”; 
i.e. those of “Want”, “Disease”, “Ignorance”, “Squalor” and “Idleness”. The “Want” evil was a 
synonym for the standard of living; “Disease” signified the importance of health; Ignorance of 
education; “Squalor” of poverty; and “Idleness” of employment. According to Beveridge, in 
order to cure these “Giant Evils” government needs sustainable financing, which can be 
generated only through taxes. With another touch of class argumentation, a US famous judge 
Holmes, in 1904 described taxes as “a price we pay for a civilized society”.  
  
                                                          
3
 http://www.forbes.com/2010/04/14/tax-history-law-personal-finance-tax-law-changes.html  
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So, why would individuals continuously evade? How is it that governments have had to fight tax 
evasion ever since the times of Persia, Egypt, Greece, and Rome right up to modern times? Why 
the resistance and why evasion?  
Frederick the Great, the 18th century King of Prussia, once said: "No government can exist 
without taxation. This money must necessarily be levied on the people; and the grand art consists 
of levying so as not to oppress.''
4
 The “grand art”, however, often lacked grandeur in practice. 
Governments sometimes “oppressed”, and sparked resistance by “the oppressed people”. Indeed, 
resistance towards taxes was often the basis for social movements and even revolutions for 
freedom.  
Adams (2006) argues that historically excessive taxation led not only to evasion, corruption, 
bribery, inefficiency; but also, in some cases, it led to war or conflict, sometimes even to 
revolutionary changes. For instance, according to Ralph (2003) a combination of high taxes with 
unsuccessful wars led to the rebellion of English feudal barons against King John of England and 
the creation of the Magna Carta Libertatum or The Great Charter of the Liberties of England; an 
important part of the historical process that led towards constitutional law. Similar movements 
arising from dissatisfaction with heavy tax burdens occurred also in France, during the Great 
French Revolution, and in North America in 1773 during the Boston Tea Party uprisings. Burg 
(2004), in a quite thorough review of historical tax uprisings, summarises cases of reaction 
against excessive and cruel taxation/enforcement dating from the Hamurabi era in Babylon 
(1792-1750 BC), to the Later Han dynasty in Asia (AD 25 – AD 220), and to the Roman Empire 
(27BC- AD 337) in Europe. He argues that taxation often provides the ostensible reason for 
resistance, especially since taxes afford a ubiquitous, detested and identifiable target of 
opposition. 
The tax burden might be one reason behind resistance and/or tax evasion, but so also can be the 
perceived fairness of the system, treatment by governments, or even moralistic views of 
individuals in regards to both taxes and tax evasion. In regards to the relationship between 
taxpayers and institutions, Hanousek and Palda (2004) examined tax evasion as a form of 
legitimate protest by citizens against negative phenomena within governments. Tirole (1996) 
                                                          
4
 This quote was taken from the IRS web site: http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Quotes   
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explains that when taxpayers see their government as corrupt and irresponsible, evasion is seen 
as a “vote of dissent”. Morality on the other side relates to the ethics of individuals in regards to 
taxes in general and tax evasion in particular. At times, driven by individual opportunism, 
egoism or other non-altruistic values, tax evasion is and will always be relentless.  
For others, tax resistance, similar to tax evasion, has been seen as a fair opposition of 
government policies; a form of civil disobedience. Rothbard (1982, p.3), for instance, when 
discussing the moral status of relations to the state, argued that taxation is theft and that tax 
resistance is therefore legitimate: "Just as no one is morally required to answer a robber 
truthfully when he asks if there are any valuables in one’s house, so no one can be morally 
required to answer truthfully similar questions asked by the State, e.g., when filling out income 
tax returns”. Similar views are shared by other well-known individuals. Indeed, Gross (2008), 
summarizes a list of taxation opposers, which included violent revolutionaries such as John 
Adams and pacifists such as John Woolman; communists such as Karl Marx and capitalists such 
as Vivien Kellems; solitary anti-war activists such as Ammon Hennacy and leaders of 
independence movements such as Mahatma Gandhi.  
In short, there are many sources of evasion and resistance to tax compliance, and each of these 
sources has been effective in their own way ever since the existence of taxes; hence the ongoing 
fight of institutions to tackle one of the oldest economic crimes in human history. The individual 
views and reasons for evasion, in turn, make it difficult to classify, from the moral point of view 
at least, tax evasion as either an always justifiable or unjustifiable act. But regardless of its 
justifiability or not, tax evasion entails several economic costs which damage, in turn, the core of 
each system worldwide. The costs and current levels of tax evasion are discussed in the 
following section. 
 
1.2.2 Current levels and costs of evasion 
Benjamin Franklin once wrote that “nothing is certain in this world except death and taxes”; yet 
throughout the history of taxation mankind has been inclined to resist and evade taxes. Indeed, 
much to Benjamin Franklin’s displeasure, today one can fairly argue that tax evasion is simply 
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inevitable. As Cowell (1990) would put it in one of the most prolific reviews of tax evasion 
behaviour, only the most fanciful thoughts can dream of a world whose citizens inspired by 
altruism, pride or even religious passion and beliefs are willing to fully comply without the need 
for institutional enforcements.   
Evasion today is a global disease. In 2013, the British accountant Richard Murphy by comparing 
World Bank data to Heritage Foundation data estimated global tax evasion to be around 5% of 
the world GDP, or roughly around 3.100.000.000.000 (3.1 trillion) US dollars (Murphy, 2013)`. 
The report uses data for more than 98% of the world’s GDP and over the 92% of the world’s 
population. It first estimates the absolute size of a country’s shadow economy (from the World 
Bank), then it the calculates tax share to GDP for each country (from the Heritage Foundation) 
and, finally, it applies the same share to the shadow economy in order to reveal the estimates of 
lost taxes by each country. The assumption made in this study is that all the economic activity in 
the shadow economy is subject to tax evading. We note here, however, the importance of 
distinguishing between “lawful” and “unlawful” activities within the shadow economy; with the 
latter representing zero potential tax income if detected given their “unlawful” nature (such as 
prostitution, gun trafficking and/or drugs). Their detection, at best, cannot yield any additional 
income in taxes; it will rather just terminate them. Unfortunately, this distinction is not taken into 
the account in the Murphy (2013) report. Still the estimates provide a good indication that tax 
evasion costs are substantial. 
Murphy (2013) found that the USA (337.3 billion $; or 8.6% of GDP), Brazil (280.1 billion $ or 
39% of GDP), Italy (238.7 billion or 27% of GDP) are the top three countries with the largest 
levels of evasion worldwide. These figures are even higher in transition countries, with tax 
evasion ranging from 30% to 60% of country’s GDP (Johnson et al, 2000; Cobham, 2005; La 
Porta and Shleifer, 2008; Shneider, 2012). Further Murphy (2013) argues that more than one 
dollar in every six in the world is not subject to tax, because their respective earners successfully 
hide it from the world’s tax authorities. This ratio is even higher in Europe, with one in five 
dollars being hidden, while in countries such as Greece and Italy, where the recent economic 
crisis was felt more, the ratio is one in four.  
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In May 2013, given the alarming levels of tax evasion worldwide and particularly in Europe, the 
Council of the European Union (EU) held a meeting in which individual Member States were 
urged to take effective steps to fight tax evasion. Given the current debt crisis around the 
European countries, the fight against evasion –as a source for additional governmental revenues - 
became even more important. 
The presence of tax evasion imposes several economic costs. First, tax evasion is more likely to 
slow down economic growth as the government’s ability to provide adequate public goods, 
market supporting institutions, infrastructure, human capital development, or research and 
development will be weakened (Johnson et al. 2000). Second, tax evasion diverts resources to 
unproductive activities such as establishing financial subsidiaries to cover-up evasion (Slemrod, 
2007). Third, it causes inefficiencies in firms’ production as they tend to stay small and invisible 
to facilitate evasion and also miss growth-enhancing opportunities from the formal economy 
(Nur-tegin, 2008). Fourth, tax evasion causes inequity between evaders and the honest taxpayers 
by shifting the burden to the latter group and, thereby, creating an incentive for further evasion 
(Feinstein, 1991).   
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1.3 The Context of Transition Countries 
A transition economy (TE) is an economy undergoing transformation from central planning to 
free markets. According to the International Monetary IMF (2009) there are four components of 
the transition process. The first component includes the liberalisation of the market; a process 
which, contrary to the controlled economies, allows most prices to be determined in free markets 
and correspondingly lowers trade barriers that had shut off contact with the price structure of the 
world's market economies. The second component is macroeconomic stabilization, primarily a 
process of fiscal and monetary discipline through which inflation is brought under control and 
lowered over time, after the initial burst of high inflation that follows from liberalization and the 
release of pent-up demand. The third component is restructuring and privatisation, which 
includes creation of a viable financial sector and reforms of the state owned enterprises; most 
notably the transfer of their ownership into private hands. The last component is legal and 
institutional reform, which largely covers the rule of law aspects. The transition process has been 
undertaken in the Communist bloc countries of Europe, the former Soviet Union, as well in 
many third world countries. According to IMF classifications, in Europe, the TE countries are 
considered to be the following: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Kosovo, Macedonia FYR, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, the Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia – known as the Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEE); Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania – known as the Baltic Countries; and  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
– known as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  
Tax evasion becomes an important subject to study in TEs given that these countries face 
enormous institutional, behavioural and cultural changes during the transition process. These 
changes, in turn, affect compliance levels and, hence, the tax revenues that constitute the main 
source of finance for the respective governments. In something of a vicious circle, restricted 
ability to raise tax revenue across these countries undermines the financial support for public 
institutions and deterrence mechanisms, the performance of which ultimately affect tax evasion. 
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Moving from a central planned to a market economy involves the accomplishment of numerous 
yet unique tasks in many areas of the economy as well as in the way of life. Centralised 
economies were characterized by a system where the state made decisions over production and 
consumption of goods and services. These economies provided social services and benefits 
(education, health, etc) by using the resources generated by the profits and taxes of state owned 
enterprises. The State’s full control of economic activities ensured that tax collection was not a 
problem. Given the relatively small number of taxpayers, the tax administration could conduct an 
audit rate of 100% and, hence, ensure zero evasion (Kodrzycki and Zolt, 1994). Indeed, the 
auditing process during centralised governments was just a routine. Bakes (1991) argues that 
most planned economies in Europe had similar tax systems to the Soviet Union; apart from  the 
“reforming socialist” countries - namely Poland and Hungary - which during the 1980s used 
taxes as a tool for economic development rather than for managing cash flows and fulfilling the 
budget plan. Indeed, according to Martinez-Vazques and McNab (2000), taxes in TEs were often 
adjusted retroactively in order to meet perceived expenditure needs. Moreover, in most of the 
cases in these countries, the final tax liability of an enterprise was more dependent upon its 
ability to negotiate with the financial administration than on the tax law. Martinez-Vazques and 
McNab (2000) further argue that private activity was taxed at very high rates, while citizens were 
commonly unaware of taxation. On the other side, tax administration, as a collecting force, was 
marginalised by the central role of the government in the economy and the control over the 
payment system.  
Moving towards a market economy was in general a challenging task as TEs had to build new 
institutions from scratch, change the legal and the juridical system, regain trust in state 
institutions, or secure market mechanisms that support individual freedom. For the same 
economies, the need to provide social services and benefits remained present while the resources 
to finance these went continuously down as the state itself was no longer the owner of enterprises 
and the controller of the market. The profits were kept by private owners while tax collection 
was no longer guaranteed, as it was based fully on voluntary compliance, which understandably 
was low.  
There are several reasons behind high levels of tax evasion in TEs. Perhaps, Alm et al. (2004) 
summarize best the context of tax evasion in TEs, by introducing four main arguments. They cite 
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Kornai (1990) to develop the first argument: namely, that the major reason behind undutiful 
behaviour characteristic of transition societies can be found in citizens’ lack of experience in 
paying taxes at the onset of the transition process. In the vein of transformations from centralised 
to market economies and, consequently, massive changes in policies, it is understandable that 
individuals have reacted evasively to unfamiliar demands for taxes. This perhaps relates to 
Martinez-Vazques and McNab (2000) argument that pre-transition, individuals were simply not 
aware of tax requirements. 
The second argument relates to the relationship of individuals with institutions. Alm et al. (2004) 
argue that the connection between tax payments and the supply of public goods was largely 
disproportional in transition countries, which might have reduced the identification with the state 
and thus the willingness to pay taxes. This has consequently led to the rejection of most state 
systems. By the time the institutions improved their performance the undutiful behaviour had 
become a common social norm; the undoing of which presented one of the greatest challenges 
for transition governments. As North (1994) argues, institutions may change overnight yet social 
norms change gradually. Kornai (1990, p. 118), while foreseeing the future processes in TEs, 
argues: 
People in general consider it a laudable act, rather than something to be ashamed of, if 
someone defrauds the state, appropriates its wealth, or shuns its obligations. Those who 
refrain from this kind of behaviour are seen as dupes … Consequently, when we 
contemplate budget revenues we should be prepared to face the fact that many citizens 
will try hard to dodge taxes. 
Indeed, Kornai (1990) introduces risk from the negative peer influences in TEs, which eventually 
evolve into social norms. The role and impact of social norms in tax evasion is further discussed 
under Chapter III of this thesis. From there we understand that the caution and prediction cited 
above has been proved to be absolutely to the point. 
The third argument relates to the collapse of deterrence structures during the transition process. 
As Kasper and Streit (1999) argue, in TEs there was a complete lack of a “rule of law” tradition. 
In most of the TEs, the deterrence mechanisms against tax evasion were simply inadequate or, 
even worse, non-existent. Essentially, in newly created market economies, there was no 
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infrastructure in place to monitor the private sector, with tax administration being fragile and 
eventually corrupt; according to Levin and Satarov (2000), the level of corruption in the early 
years of the Russian transition exceeded the total expenditures on science, education, health care, 
culture, and art. On top of everything, with cash being the main mean of exchange no one had a 
real track of actual tax liabilities (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2000; Tanzi and Zee, 2000; 
Lorie, 2003; Stepanyan, 2003). Pirttila (1999) reminds us that in TEs the tax system had to be 
build up from scratch, and given the uncertainties arising around this built up, the process was 
rather learning by doing and therefore long and difficult. In addition, given that communist style 
taxation was based mainly on direct extraction of resources from state owned enterprises – which 
are largely considered to be non-tax revenues – a post-communist tax administration essentially 
was required to shift from collecting non-tax revenues to raising tax revenues. Martinez-Vazques 
and Wallace (1999) argue that prior to transition taxpayers were “large in size and small in 
number”, while during the transition period the transformation of the taxpayer structure 
happened fast, with tax payers becoming large in number and small in size. Institutions and their 
deterrence capacities on the other hand were unable to parallel these changes. Shifting to a 
market system required the creation of new tax institutions and new approaches to collecting 
revenue.  
The last argument relates to the rise of social costs as well as worsening of income inequality and 
poverty in times of transition this, in turn, increased evasive behaviour by taxpayers; as Stiglitz 
(1999) points out, over the decade beginning in 1989 Russia’s GDP almost halved. Similarly, 
Katz and Owen (2011) argue that all economies in transition suffered immediate drops in output, 
with real GDP falling in all of these countries up until 1994. Moreover, only Poland, Slovenia 
and Slovakia had equal or higher real GDP in 1999 than they did a decade before that, in 1989.  
So far we have elaborated the definition, birth and evolution of tax evasion, as well as its 
particular nature under transition. Its size, proportion, trend and consequences have highlighted 
the importance of treating, through research at least, the subject of tax evasion. In the next 
section we provide a brief overview of what we know about the topic, as well as the general 
objectives of this thesis. 
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1.4 Objectives of the thesis 
Although tax evasion has been present ever since the first day of taxes and regardless of its 
devastating consequences across the world - especially to less developed and developing 
countries - only during the past forty years has it attracted the attention of researchers. At the 
beginning of the 1970s, taxation was a prominent area of interest amid theoretical economists. 
Inspired by suggestions of the Mirrlees (1971) work on taxation and risk taking, Michael G. 
Allingham and Agnar Sandmo considered the economics of tax evasion. In what later would 
became the magnum opus of tax evasion literature - the standard model - their work combines 
studies in the economics of criminal activity (Becker, 1968; Tulkens and Jacquemin, 1971) and 
studies in the area of optimal portfolio and insurance policies in the economics of uncertainty 
(Mossin, 1968; Arrow, 1970) in order to provide a model of the decision of the taxpayer to 
comply. The model, put simply, portrays the decision of the rational taxpayer to comply as 
depending on tax rates, penalty rates and the probability of audit, in a world of uncertainty. It 
shows that the level of evasion of income tax depends on the level of punishment provided by 
law, the probability of audit by tax examiners, and the tax rate set by governments – although the 
impact of the tax rate was argued to be ambiguous. Business modelling has given rise to 
comparative static analysis similar to that of the individual traditional model; namely, the firm 
evades less with higher probability of detection and larger fines, while the impact of tax rates is 
ambiguous (see Marelli, 1984; Marelli and Martina, 1988; Virmani, 1989; Sandmo, 2004; 
Crocker and Slemrod, 2005).  
The traditional model was often criticized for its simplicity. Subsequent analysis has extended 
models in a number of dimensions; mainly relating  to inclusion of numerous factors beyond the 
standard model that relate to institutions, individual characteristics, morality, ethics, culture and 
social stigma. These extensions tried to solve, as Torgler (2007a) puts it, “the puzzle of tax 
compliance”; a condition where levels of tax compliance do not correspond to the levels of 
enforcements that the traditional model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) would predict. 
The literature on the factors shaping tax evasion is fairly well developed (reviews include: 
Jackson and Milliron, 1986; Cowell, 1990; Andreoni, et.al, 1998; Franzoni, 2008; Torgler 2011). 
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However, most of it relates to individuals. As Torgler (2011) argues, “...business tax evasion in 
general, has received very little attention. Work in this area is therefore highly relevant (p.6)”. 
The lack of research on tax evasion by businesses is unfortunate, especially given the fact that in 
most countries the bulk of taxes is paid by firms and firms account for the bulk of tax evasion too 
(McCaffery and Slemrod, 2004; Crocker and Slemrod, 2005; Chang and Lai, 2004; Nur-tegin, 
2008). Arias (2005, p.2) argues that the interest of researchers in individual tax evasion as 
opposed to business tax evasion has been predominant because:  
... in a micro level analysis, any economic agent (such as a firm paying taxes) could be 
reduced to an individual, the only decision makers that we could think off, and therefore, 
the direct (individual) tax evasion could be applied easily to an entrepreneur.  
Three additional neglected issues are associated with the lack of business research on tax 
evasion. First, the context of business compliance for transition economies has received very 
limited attention (Nur-tegin, 2008). This is perhaps due to the lack of data for these countries. 
Second, cross-country investigations (of both business and individual tax evasion) are even less 
common. In one of the most insightful reviews of tax evasion, Andreoni et al. (1998, p.855), while 
concluding and providing directions for future research, argue that “…a broadening of the empirical 
database will improve the power of statistical tests of theoretical models, and spur comparative 
analysis across countries”. Third, though the context of tax morale – or the intrinsic motivation 
of individuals to comply – has been substantially developed for individuals, and consequently 
accepted as an important determinant of tax evasion, it has been completely neglected for 
businesses. As Torgler (2011, p.55) argues:  
In general, in most of the studies on tax morale and tax compliance, research has focused 
on personal income tax. Business tax evasion has received very little attention. This is a 
surprise taking into account the economic importance of the business sector and the 
importance of business taxation for tax administrations. Work in this area is therefore 
highly relevant for transition economies ... 
In a very recent attempt to provide some evidence on whether values, social norms and attitudes 
have measurable effects on the economic behaviour of firms, most notably on tax compliance, 
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Alm and McClellan (2012, p.6), while stating that up to their work there was “no evidence on tax 
morale of firms”, argue that:  
The potential importance of firm tax morale has been ignored, perhaps because of the 
absence of firm level information that would allow a firm’s tax morale to be measured. 
The aim of this thesis is to fill this gap by providing empirical research on the determinants of 
business tax evasion for transition economies. In this thesis we investigate the business, cross-
country and transition contexts of tax evasion, as well as the impact of tax morale in business tax 
evasion for the case of Kosovo. We do so by making use of BEEPS (Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey), an EBRD and World Bank dataset, which provides firm-level 
data on a broad range of issues about the business environment and the performance of firms.
5
 In 
addition, we collect primary data for Kosovo (with a sample of 600 SMEs) in order to investigate 
the relationship of business tax morale with tax evasion, as well as the determinants that shape  
business tax morale. 
The starting assumption in our work is similar to the assumption made generally in the current 
literature on the tax behaviour of businesses, which is that the behaviour of businesses is similar 
to the behaviour of individuals, and that – as a corollary - the determinants of business tax 
evasion may be similar, at least qualitatively, to the determinants of tax evasion by individuals or 
households. As Slemrod (2007, p.36) points out, the literature on business tax evasion "adapts 
the theory of tax evasion, which for the most part concerns individual decision makers, to the tax 
compliance decisions made by businesses”.  
In addition, we argue that this is particularly true of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
(SMEs) in which the decision making entrepreneur makes compliance decisions as both an 
individual and as a manager. Decision making by managers in large firms, including decisions on 
tax reporting, is far more complicated – because it is subject to formal, bureaucratic processes – 
and, consequently, entails potentially different outcomes from decision making by managers in 
                                                          
5 The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) is part of the ongoing work of the EBRD 
and the World Bank to investigate the extent to which government policies and public services facilitate or impede 
the environment for investment and business development in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (including Turkey) 
and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
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SME’s. Thus the decision to evade, amongst others, could be quite complex in large firms 
(formal and bureaucratic) but much simpler in SME’s (informal and individual).6 Additionally, it 
may also be different as managers in larger firms have different risk behaviour attitudes 
compared to managers/owners of SME’s. This could be significant because, as we argue later in 
this thesis, the differences in risk assumptions may imply different evasive behaviours.  
We note that the data used in this thesis are largely representative of SMEs. The BEEPS data for 
1999, 2002 and 2005 on average have 91% of their respondents as SMEs. In the case of Kosovo, 
moreover, our survey was completely focused on SMEs. Accordingly, the overwhelming 
representation of SMEs in the survey data used in our study is consistent with the assumption 
that findings from the literature on individual tax evasion can be adapted to our analysis of 
business tax evasion in transition economies. While the topic of possible differences in the 
evasion/compliance behaviour of SMEs and large firms is not pursued in depth in this thesis, 
firm size does figure as a control variable in our analysis.  
Beyond the necessity to focus on general business tax evasion, the motives to concentrate on TEs 
are threefold. First, the alarming levels of tax evasion worldwide, as well as economic costs it 
entails – especially for TEs – deserve ongoing research and contribution from researchers. 
Second, this specific group of countries has been largely neglected by the current tax literature; 
hence, our contribution to knowledge and literature can be more evident by making use of 
available data to analyse evasive patterns of businesses in TEs. Third, the focus on TEs can 
provide us with results and findings that are not only valid in the context of transition, but can be 
generalized to other countries and/or groups of countries with similar characteristics, and which 
too suffer from tax evasion.  
In addition, the focus on Kosovo is threefold. First, such focus contributes substantially to 
knowledge by targeting a country with little or no similar research. Second, by being the last 
country to enter the transition process and, arguably, by being still in the early transition process, 
                                                          
6
 This is even true for the process of data collection. From our own experience, collecting primary data from banks, 
for instance, requires fulfilment of a set of very complicated procedures, in order to secure only access for an 
interview; let alone answers on more sensitive issues (perceptions for instance). For SME’s, on the other hand, the 
access decision simplifies to the will and readiness of the owner/manager.  
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for a specific group of determinants (such as tax morale) the data collected at present are the only 
available data from an actual and ongoing transition process. Third, the ability to construct the 
questionnaire (and consequently conduct the survey) according to the needs of this research, 
enables us to investigate the most recent theoretical considerations in the business tax evasion 
(and tax morale) context. 
This thesis is organized in seven chapters (the first being this general introduction). In Chapter II 
we provide a general theoretical discussion of the tax evasion traditional model as well as 
subsequent extensions that built upon it. The theoretical discussion in Chapter II enables us to 
summarize in a model specification and, hence, empirically investigate in subsequent chapters 
the determinants of business tax evasion.  
In Chapter III we provide a detailed review of current empirical literature on the determinants of 
tax evasion. We include studies making use of actual tax programmes, laboratory experiments as 
well as surveys, in order to inform hypotheses in regards to the potential determinants of 
business tax evasion. The next three chapters are empirical investigations.  
In Chapter IV we conduct a cross-country investigation of business tax evasion. We make use of 
the BEEPS data for the years 1999, 2002 and 2005 in 25 transition economies. We build initially 
upon the pioneering work of Riahl-Belkaoiu (2004) and Richardson (2006) who analyzed 
individual tax evasion in, respectively, 30 and 45 countries.  
In Chapter V we focus on micro level determinants of business tax evasion. This is done in order 
to capture firm related determinants of tax compliance that cannot be captured in the macro 
investigation in Chapter IV. Again, we make use of BEEPS firm level data, covering 16,321 
firms, in 26 transition economies for the years 2002 and 2005. Throughout this chapter we built 
on two,  and to our knowledge the only, works on the micro determinants of business tax 
compliance for TEs, those of Nur-tegin (2008) and Joulfaian (2009). By combining determinants 
and estimation methodology used in one but not the other paper, we set out to improve both 
model specification and empirical strategy. 
In Chapter VI we focus on tax morale. Frey (1997) defines tax morale as the “intrinsic 
motivation” of tax compliance, which due to “civic virtue” makes taxpayers comply; as opposed 
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to “extrinsic motivation”, known also as deterrence impact, in which taxpayers pay because they 
fear punishment. Motivated by recommendations from the very recent and leading literature on 
tax evasion and tax morale we developed a questionnaire and conducted a survey with 600 SMEs 
in Kosovo – the last country to enter the transition process. Collection of primary data enables us 
to construct our models and conduct our estimations according to very recent recommendations.  
Finally, Chapter VII of this thesis provides an overall summary of the research and findings 
derived from this thesis. It ends by providing a set of policy recommendations to help tackle tax 
evasion in transition (and similar) countries, as well as directions for future research. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter we provide a general introduction to the topic of tax evasion as well as the aim 
and objectives of this thesis. We start by discussing the definitional issues in regards to tax 
evasion as well as the need to differentiate tax evasion from tax avoidance, informality and other 
forms of crimes. We then commence by portraying the coexistence of taxes with evasion since 
the early civilizations. The perpetual efforts of individuals to conceal their taxes, alongside 
persistent efforts of institutions to detect wrongdoers, have characterized human society from 
ancient Egyptian times to the present day.  
Today tax evasion represents a global disease, threatening the integrity of every tax system 
worldwide. The alarming levels of tax evasion have increased the attention of policymakers to 
produce and coordinate policies that will tackle one of the oldest unlawful habits. 
Though much research on individual tax evasion has been conducted worldwide, the business 
context has been surprisingly neglected. The aim and purpose of this thesis is to contribute to 
knowledge by conducting a thorough empirical investigation of the determinants of business tax 
evasion in transition economies. The starting assumption in our work is similar to assumptions 
made in the current literature on the tax behaviour of businesses, which presumes that the 
behaviour of businesses is similar to the behaviour of individuals, and that the determinants of 
business tax evasion may be similar, at least qualitatively, to the determinants of tax evasion by 
individuals or households. We further make use of aggregate and firm level data for transition 
economies and collect primary data to observe business tax evasion and tax morale in Kosovo. 
This thesis is organized in seven chapters. Following the general introduction in this chapter, the 
second and third chapters provide a theoretical and empirical review of the tax evasion literature. 
This is done in order to set a framework for our own empirical investigations for transition 
economies in the fourth chapter (cross-country investigation) and in the fifth chapter (firm level 
investigation); as well as a particular empirical investigation for Kosovo in Chapter 6. The last 
chapter concludes by providing a summary of findings as well as a set of policy 
recommendations to help combat tax evasion. 
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Introduction 
Tax evasion is inevitable. Only most fanciful thoughts can dream of a world whose citizens 
inspired by altruism, pride or even religious passion and beliefs are willing to fully comply 
without the need for institutional enforcement (Cowell, 1990). The perpetual survival of evasion 
throughout the history of taxation, as well as the economic consequences it causes, are the main 
reasons why this sub-branch of public finance has always fascinated the world of researchers and 
academics. This fascination however, for more than four decades of research, failed to fully 
answer why people pay or do not pay taxes. Answers provided illustrate both the difficulties and 
weaknesses of studying and understanding tax evasion.  
We have already argued that the presence of tax evasion imposes several economic costs. First, 
tax evasion is more likely to slow down economic growth as the government’s ability to provide 
adequate public goods, market supporting institutions, infrastructure, human capital 
development, or research and development will be weakened (Johnson et al. 2000). Second, tax 
evasion diverts resources to unproductive activities such as establishing financial subsidiaries to 
cover-up evasion (Slemrod, 2007). Third, it causes inefficiencies in firms’ production as they 
tend to stay small and invisible to facilitate evasion and also miss the opportunities from the 
formal economy (Nur-tegin, 2008). Fourth, tax evasion causes inequity between evaders and the 
honest taxpayers by shifting the burden to the latter group, and by that creating an incentive for 
further evasion (Feinstein, 1991).  
The need to understand determinants of tax evasion remains as important as ever with tax 
evasion being a globally spread disease that threatens the integrity of every tax system 
particularly of those that are more fragile. In 2013, the British accountant Richard Murphy by 
comparing a World Bank Report to a Heritage Foundation report estimated global tax evasion to 
be at 5% of the global economy. Moreover he found that the USA (337.3 billion $; or 8.6% of 
GDP), Brazil (280.1 billion $ or 39% of GDP), Italy (238.7 billion or 27% of GDP) are the top 
three countries with the largest levels of evasion worldwide. These figures are even higher in 
transition countries, with tax evasion ranging from 30% to 60% of country’s GDP (Johnson et al, 
1997; Shneider, 2002; Cobham, 2005; La Porta and Shleifer, 2008).  
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While, as argued in Chapter I, the individual tax evasion studies have dominated the theoretical 
modelling, business studies were less common. This was perhaps because the decision on 
evasion is made by individual managers or entrepreneurs who, in essence, act as individuals 
(Arias, 2005). As Slemrod (2007, p.36) points out, the literature on business tax evasion "adapts 
the theory of tax evasion, which for the most part concerns individual decision makers, to the tax 
compliance decisions made by businesses”. In this chapter, we start by assuming that the 
behaviour of businesses is similar to the behaviour of individuals, and that the determinants of 
business tax evasion may be similar, at least qualitatively, to the determinants of tax evasion by 
individuals or households.  
We begin by portraying the theoretical modelling of tax evasion which was introduced in 1972, 
when Allingham and Sandmo adapted Becker’s (1968) economics of crime methodology to the 
field of tax evasion. Their magnum opus model portrays the decision of the rational taxpayer to 
comply as depending on three determinants: tax rates, penalty rates and the probability of audit. 
The traditional model was often criticized for its simplicity. Subsequent analysis has extended 
models in a number of dimensions. Two extensions are particularly important for the focus of 
this thesis. The first one relates to the adaption of the traditional model to the sphere of business 
tax evasion, which largely leads to similar comparative statics for the traditional determinants 
(tax, audit and fine rate). The second extension, relates to inclusion of numerous factors beyond 
the standard model of economics of crime that relate to institutions, individual characteristics, 
morality, ethics, culture and social stigma.  
The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical background for the subject of tax evasion in 
order to set the necessary background for the empirical investigation in the later chapters. This 
chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 provides an overview of the basic model of tax 
evasion. Section 2 expands on the traditional business modelling; while Section 3 provides an 
overview of theoretical modelling incorporating morality, relationship, fairness, social norms and 
culture. The last section concludes.  
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2.1 The Traditional Model 
At the beginning of 1970s, taxation was a forefront area of interest amid theoretical economists. 
Inspired by suggestions of Mirrlees (1971) work on taxation and risk taking, Michael G. 
Allingham and Agnar Sandmo considered the economics of tax evasion just the right topic for 
research. In what later would became the magnum opus of tax evasion literature, their work 
combines studies in the economics of criminal activity (Becker, 1968; Tulkens and Jacquemin, 
1971) and studies in the area of optimal portfolio and insurance policies in the economics of 
uncertainty (Mosin, 1968; Arrow, 1970) in order to provide a model that portrays the decision of 
the taxpayer to comply. The model itself is built upon numerous assumptions that simplify the 
model to the point where the taxpayer makes his decision to comply or evade living in a 
Robinson Crusoe type of world. Although this simplicity has been widely criticized in the past 
four decades, the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model remains the cornerstone of the income 
tax evasion literature. In the following we discuss the main attributes of this model. 
2.1.1 Core Assumptions 
The tax declaration choice is a decision under uncertainty. The reason for this is that failure to 
report one’s full income to the tax authorities does not automatically provoke a reaction in the 
form of a penalty. The taxpayer has the choice between two main strategies: he may declare his 
actual income or he may declare less than his actual income. If he chooses the second he faces 
only two possible outcomes: completely successful or unsuccessful tax evasion. Either the 
taxpayer escapes detection and enjoys an after tax income greater than honest declaration or he is 
caught, convicted, and punished in which case the after tax income is smaller than in the case of 
honest declaration.  
According to the traditional model, we start by analysing the choice problem of a rational 
taxpayer who is inclined to dishonesty. We say rational in order to signify that the choice of 
how, why and how much to evade is made in the same manner as the rational consumer choice; 
consequently we say inclined to dishonesty in order to rule out environmental impact, 
relationship to state and community, regrets, guilt or shame (hence the simplicity of the model). 
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We assume that the taxpayer would evade if he thinks that doing so is financially beneficial. We 
shall also assume that the taxpayer’s behaviour conforms to the Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
axioms for behaviour under uncertainty; i.e in the presence of risky outcomes, a decision maker 
could use the expected value criterion as a rule of choice: higher expected value investments are 
simply the preferred ones. His cardinal utility function has income as its only argument and rules 
out the presence of other forms of wealth. In other words, the taxpayer’s initial resources and all 
gains and losses can be measured in terms of a single consumption good, which can be 
interpreted as income. We also assume that this utility is concave, which consecutively rules out 
the phenomenon of the risk lover, or someone who would accept unfair gambles. Marginal utility 
will be assumed to be everywhere positive and strictly decreasing, so that the taxpayer is risk 
averse.  
The model focuses on only one type of tax, which is income tax and ignores other types of taxes. 
Moreover, no account is made of the taxpayer’s “real” decisions such as his labour supply and, 
therefore, his gross earnings are taken as given, and the same is true for his income from capital 
(Sandmo 2004). The tax rate is not progressive but proportional; real taxable income is known 
only to the taxpayer but not to the tax authority, unless the latter spends some time and trouble 
finding out for itself; there is a probability of audit that is unaffected by the taxpayers’ reporting 
behaviour (exogenous probability of detection); there is a single penalty based only on the 
amount of income underreported; the taxpayer has zero compliance costs; and no intermediates 
agents or advisers are assumed to exist. Above all, time is compressed into a single period within 
which the taxpayer has to decide.  
Elffers (2000) in an attempt to describe an individual’s process of making a decision to evade, 
defines three steps that each potential evader needs to go through before making the final verdict. 
In the first step the individual must have a will to evade. Once there is a will, ability to transform 
will into action is needed (second step). Finally, with will and the ability in place, individual 
must have the opportunity to execute the action (third step). The standard theory of tax evasion 
assumes that taxpayer has the will, ability and opportunity. Similar restrictive assumptions are 
very common in the pioneering work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972). 
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2.1.2 Possible Outcomes 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) start their theoretical analysis by assuming that a rationale 
taxpayer has an actual exogenous income which is known only to the taxpayer but not to the tax 
administration. The tax administration on the other side, has a constant fine rate at its disposal, 
which would be enforced in case of occurrence of undutiful activity and detection of such 
activity. The detection of evasion can occur under some probability that the taxpayer will be 
subjected to audit. Such a presentation of the taxpayer’s choice situation, as acknowledged by 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972), implies simplification of the real world situation with respect to 
three main parameters: fixed tax rate t; fixed probability of audit p; and a fixed fine rate F.  
Under such simplification, the taxpayer is required to declare his true income Y to the tax agency 
and pay a constant income tax rate t. If the taxpayer is honest he will fully comply with this 
requirements, report amount Y and pay taxes t. In this case his after tax (net) income, which we 
will refer to as after tax consumption Ca will be:  
Ca = Y(1-t) 
where, 
Ca = after tax consumption 
Y = income reported 
 t = tax rate 
However , the taxpayer may cheat and report an amount which is less than his true income Y. Let 
Z be the amount evaded. His after tax consumption will be subject to uncertainty as he may 
either be audited or not. In the case he is not audited, then he will have an after tax consumption 
Cb, where:  
Cb = Y(1-t) +tZ 
where, 
Cb = after tax consumption if not audited 
Z = the amount of income not reported 
(1) 
(2) 
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However, if audited and assuming post audit the Z will be discovered, the tax payer will have to 
pay a fine F proportional to the amount of income evaded Z. That makes his after tax 
consumption Cc1 = Y(1-t) – FZ.  
For the sake of sustainable explanation throughout the chapter, we introduce here the 
modification made by Yitzhaki (1974) who assumed that fine rate F is set actually proportional 
to tax evaded tZ rather than income evaded Z. Having that in mind, in the case of audit, the 
taxpayer’s consumption Cc will be: 
Cc = Y(1-t) – FtZ 
where, 
Cc = after tax consumption if audited 
F = fixed fine rate 
 
We will explain the implication of Yitzhaki (1974) modification later in this chapter. For now we 
note that a generalized form of the after tax consumption can be expressed also as:  
C = Y(1-t) + rtZ 
where,  
C = after tax consumption, depending on Z and audit  
r = the rate of return from tax evaded with values 1 or –F, depending on audit. 
The after tax consumptions alternatives and all potential outcomes from general  Equation (4), 
are shown on Fig.2.1 where declared income is measured along the horizontal axis while the 
consumption in two states (caught and not caught) is measured along the vertical axis. If the 
taxpayer decides to declare all the declarable income, then the final consumption will be at point 
Ca. Alternatively, for every pound underreported he faces a risk of occurrence of audit and 
consequently fine rate, which in turn determines new consumption points and hence the ‘blue’ 
and ‘red’ lines. 
(4) 
(3) 
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Our intention in this section is to explain how the decision to evade is made and how does it vary 
with the changes of parameters. In order to do so we first use Fig.1 to construct the taxpayer’s 
budget set which consist of all feasible outcomes given the taxpayers income Y and other 
parameters, namely the tax rate, audit probability and fine rate (Fig.2.2).  
Figure 2.1 Possible outcomes 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Budget set 
 
 
 
On the horizontal axis we place all the possible outcomes under the assumption of “if not 
caught” while on the vertical axis we set the net income “if caught”. Assuming that the taxpayer 
Consider a situation where taxpayer prior to 
reporting has three choices. He can fully comply 
by reporting Y and thus have after tax 
consumption of Ca; or he can evade amount Z 
and declare income Y’=Y-Z and have after tax 
consumption of Cc or Cb depending on whether 
he is caught or not. If the taxpayer is completely 
dishonest and reports Y”, or zero income, then 
he faces the after tax consumption of either 
Cb’=Y or Cc’=Y(1-t)-FtY, depending on audit.  
Source: Cowell (1990) 
The area 0,α,Ω,Cc’ represents the budget set. 
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represents absolute honesty. Point omega Ω with 
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budget line α – Ω represent the payoffs in the 
two states corresponding to different amounts of 
income reported. 
Source: Cowell (1990) 
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hides his true income and declares zero income (Y”) and escapes the punishment then his after 
tax consumption is Cb’=Y. But if the tax authority observes the evasion then we assume 
immediate punishment to occur which reduces his consumption to Cc’=Y(1-t)-FtY. These two 
situations indicate the coordinates of omega Ω in the graph. For every pound reported we move 
gradually to the other extreme or the point of full compliance alpha α. The alpha-omega line is 
the linear boundary of an opportunity set showing the achievable allocations of income between 
the two states.  
 
2.1.3 The Optimal Choice 
 
Once the budget set is constructed, the utility function is introduced. This allows us to analyze 
the taxpayer’s optimal evasion decision given his preferences and the constraints from the budget 
set. Assuming the alternatives of reporting and non-reporting, a taxpayer must choose the 
amount to declare by weighting the probability P of each outcome that might occur once the 
underreporting is done, and maximise the expected utility (Hindriks and Myles, 2006)
7
:  
 
   maxEU = (1-P)U[Y(1-t)+tZ]+ PU[Y(1-t) – FtZ]  
maxEU = (1-P) U(Cb) + P U(Cc) 
 
Seeking to maximize his expected utility, the taxpayer will choose to underreport the actual 
income (i.e. evade) if the expected utility from doing so exceeds the expected utility from 
truthful declaration (i.e. full compliance). This would be the case if the potential gain (in 
expected utility terms) from underreporting exceeds the potential loss (in expected utility terms).  
Yaniv (2009) provides a summary of taxpayer’s considerations on the gain and loss from 
underreporting the actual income by one monetary unit (let it be pound). Assuming that cheating 
is successful, the gain of t pounds from the amount evaded Z, will increase taxpayers utility by 
                                                          
7
 Expected Utility Theory (EUT) states that the decision maker chooses between risky or uncertain prospects by 
comparing their expected utility values, i.e., the weighted sums obtained by adding the utility values of outcomes 
multiplied by their respective probabilities. 
(5) 
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tZMU(Ca) units and will increase his expected utility for the next pound by (1-P)tZMU(Ca). 
Accordingly, if the taxpayer is audited - thus cheating is unsuccessful - he has to return the 
evaded tax and in addition pay a net penalty F on concealed amount of tax tZ. That will decrease 
his utility by (FtZ)MUCa and will decrease his expected utility by P(FtZ)MU(Ca). Let’s consider 
an additional pound underreported. After evading the first pound, the expected utility gain from 
evading the second pound would be (1-p)tZMU(Cb) while expected utility loss would be 
P(FtZ)MU(Cc). Note that for every additional pound evaded the expected utility gain increases 
while the expected utility loss decreases. Additionally, the marginal utility from Cb decreases 
with increasing marginal utility from Cc. The taxpayer will cheat if and only if the expected 
payoff of his gambling decision exceeds the expected loss, or if (1-p)t>P(FtZ). Eventually, the 
tax payer will reach the optimum amount to declare when (1-p)tZMU(Cb) equals 
P(FtZ)MU(Cc). In that optimum, the taxpayer will make his final decision over the amount to 
report. This is known as the taxpayer’s optimum condition, and states that the optimal level of 
underreporting is that for which the expected-utility gain from the last pound concealed is just 
equal to the expected-utility loss from concealing that pound. 
 
Figure 2.3 The Optimal Choice 
 
 
 
 
The solution to this choice problem can also be derived graphically. From the utility function we 
derive a set of indifference curves where the points on an indifference curve represent the 
income levels in the two states that give the same level of expected utility. Including the 
indifference curves of the utility function completes the diagram and allows us to portray the 
This figure shows the optimal decision made by 
the taxpayer. Given all of the above assumptions in 
this section, the taxpayer will decide to declare the 
income at point β which represents the point where 
the indifference curve is tangent with the budget 
line. 
Source: Cowell (1990) 
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(7) 
taxpayer’s choice. The taxpayer whose preference I1 is shown in Fig. 2.3 chooses to locate at the 
point beta. This is an interior point with 0<β<Y some tax is evaded but some income is declared. 
There are also two other “extreme solutions” each being tangent either on α or Ω and suggesting 
full or zero compliance.  
 
2.1.4 The Comparative Statics 
 
The next step is to explain how the decision to evade changes with changes in parameters. These 
parameters, as argued already, are audit, fine and tax rate. In order to observe the changes in 
optimal levels of tax evasion, one has to observe how the changes in parameters change either 
indifference curves or the budget set and, hence, the optimal choice of taxpayer. And in order to 
understand changes in indifference curves and budget set, one has to understand their respective 
slopes.  
From Equation (5) we understand that the slope of indifference curve I1 from Fig.2.3 (which acts 
as the base figure for the comparative statics hereafter) is the ratio between expected value of 
probability of not getting caught with the expected value of probability of getting caught: 
    
   
 
 
This also means that all the indifference curves when crossing the 45° line have similar slope. 
Again, from the Fig.3 we observe that the slope of budget set is:  
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In other words the slope of the budget set is the amount of fine paid (where F equals the range 
from 0-1). Given the slope of the indifference curves and of the budget set we can now derive 
(6) 
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relevant comparative statics (the following section is based on Cowell, 1990 and Hindriks and 
Myles, 2006).   
First we analyze the impact of a change in probability of audit in tax evasion levels (Fig.2.4a). 
Note that model assumes a fixed probability of audit. An increase in the probability of audit does 
not affect the budget set (Equation 7); however, it does affect the utility function and thus 
preferences (Equation 6) by making them flatter where they are tangent to the budget set. Note 
that with higher audit probabilities, the full reporting alternative becomes more attractive than 
non-reporting. The new optimal choice moves closer to full compliance α. This is not surprising 
as an increase in the probability of audit makes the decision to evade more risky. Under the 
assumption of a risk-averse individual it means that increasing the audit rate increases 
compliance. 
Figure 2.4 Changes in the ‘Probability of Audit’ and ‘Fine Rate’ 
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Second we observe changes in penalties and the impact they have in compliance levels 
(Fig.2.4b). The Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model argues that an increase in the penalty rate 
increases compliance as it gives rise to the same change, in effect, as the probability of audit i.e. 
The left side graph (A) shows how changes in probability of audit makes the indifference curves flatter thus shifting 
the optimal choice closer to full compliance. The left right sided graph (B) shows how an increase in F makes the 
budget line steeper and with the utility function remaining same the compliance rises. 
Source: Cowell (1990) 
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making evasion more costly. An increase in F does not affect the indifference curves (as was the 
case with the probability of audit) but it does however, affect the budget set by making it rotate 
around α, thereby becoming steeper. Therefore an increase in fine rates leads to a new optimum 
point which is again closer to the full compliance point α. 
The final parameter is the tax rate. This part of the literature has received much of the attention 
as several controversial conclusions have been established according to the assumptions made. 
According to Allingham and Sandmo (1972), increasing t has both an income effect and a 
substitution effect.  
The income effect caused by a rise in the tax rate means that the taxpayer becomes poorer, given 
that the new after tax income is lower as compared to the base case. Changes in income, 
however, are also linked with the assumptions on decreasing absolute risk aversion underlined in 
subsection 2.1.1 of this Chapter. What absolute risk aversion measures is the willingness to 
engage in small bets of fixed size. Given the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion, an 
individual who holds a mixed portfolio of safe and risky assets would increase his share of the 
risky asset if his endowment were to rise (see Arrow-Pratt measurement of risk aversion
8
), and 
would decrease them if they were to fall. In other words, wealthier individuals are more prone to 
engage in small bets, while poorer ones are less likely to do so. Hence, with decreasing absolute 
risk aversion, a rise in tax causes a fall in income, making the taxpayer poorer, which in turn 
decreases the absolute amount of tax evasion.  
Graphically speaking (Fig.2.5) this would mean that an increase on tax rate moves the budget set 
inwards with the slope unchanged (-F) and with unchanged Ω coordinates on the assumption of 
not getting caught. Assuming that the original solution to the optimization was at point β, then 
under the assumption of diminishing absolute risk aversion optimal choice (from the income 
                                                          
8
 There are two standard measures of risk aversion that are considered in expected utility theory. One is absolute risk 
aversion A(I), equal to -U"(I)/U'(I). The second is relative risk aversion R(I)/-IU"(I)/U'(I). It is typically assumed 
that A(I) decreases with income, while R(I) increases with income. Note that the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk-
aversion implies a relationship between the degree of concavity of the utility function and the degree of risk-
aversion. In the space of random variables, this implies that there is a relationship between the degree of convexity 
of indifference curves and the degree of risk-aversion - with more risk-averse agents having more convex 
indifference curves and vice versa. 
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effect) should be at a point β’ in new budget set, such as β’ is to the left of β. The optimal choice 
moves closer to full compliance with an increase in the tax rate.   
Figure 2.5 Tax Rate 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Income and Substitution Effect Illustrated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The substitution effect has a contrary effect. As t increases, the return to cheating goes up as the 
relative price of consumption in the audited state of the world has increased; moreover, if the 
individual cheats and escapes the punishment the return from such action is much bigger as 
This graph how an increase tax rate affects the 
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inwards (i.e. to the left). The model predicts that 
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result has received much discussion as it is 
contrary to what seems reasonable. 
Source: Cowell (1990) 
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opposed to any state of the world with a lower tax rate. Under such assumptions, a rise on the tax 
rate increases also tax evasion. Graphically speaking (Fig.2.6), this means that as t rises the 
relative value of the fine paid falls, therefore the budget line would not only move inwards (from 
the income effect) but it would also become flatter (from the substitution effect). The presence of 
both income and substitution effects means that the amount of taxes evaded cannot be 
determined according to the occurrence of each effect independently; hence the net effect is 
ambiguous.  
In 1974, Shlomo Yitzhaki, made a minor yet distinctive change. Starting from tax systems in the 
US and Israel, he argued that ambiguity was a result of an unrealistic assumption over the fine 
imposed F; which, according to Allingham and Sandmo (1972), is assumed to be on the amount 
of income evaded Z. This in turn gave rise to the wrongly assumed substitution effect and hence 
wrongly assumed ambiguity. If instead the fine rate was imposed on the evaded tax tZ, the 
substitution effect would disappear; consequently, there would remain only the income effect and 
a negative (though surprising) relationship between tax rate and tax evasion. It will be so as 
increasing a tax rate does not necessarily increase the return from evading. With the fine F being 
set on amount of taxes evaded tZ instead of just Z, the expected penalty from getting caught 
increases proportionally too; offsetting thus the return from evading. 
In other words, since in Allingham and Sandmo (1972) the fine is assumed to be imposed on the 
amount of income evaded rather than on the tax evaded, then the penalties are not affected by tax 
changes. An increase in the tax rate increases only the return from evasion, while the cost of 
evasion remains the same as in the pre-increase period. Take for instance a taxpayer who faces a 
tax rate of 10%, and a fine rate F on the amount of income evaded Z. Assuming that the amount 
evaded is £100 – and consequently the “earned” tax from evasion is £10  – then the fine paid if 
caught is determined upon the concealed amount of income 100£. Now assume that the tax rate 
increases from 10 to 20%.  From the taxpayers perspective the return from evasion has doubled 
if £100 (same amount) are concealed, as the “earned” tax from evasion is now £20, instead of 
£10. The penalty however, remains the same, as in both cases the amount of income concealed is 
the same (£100). This in turn means that a tax rate increase will increase only the return from 
evasion. Hence the substitution effect – i.e. from reporting income (compliance) to non-reporting 
(evasion). In the Yitzhaki (1974) modification, however, the fine rate F is assumed to be 
Page | 42        Chapter Two: The Theory of Tax Evasion 
imposed on the amount of tax evaded. So, for instance, if a taxpayer conceals £100, under a tax 
rate of 10%, he “earns” £10 but risks losing F pounds determined by the 10% of tax evaded. 
Assuming that tax rate increases from 10 to 20% then the returns from evasion increase 
proportionally (if the same amount of income, £100, is concealed). This, however, means that the 
fine rate F has too doubled as it is now determined from the new tax rate, which is twice that of 
the previous one. This in turn means that a tax rate increase will increase not only the return from 
evasion but also the cost of evasion. Hence, there is no longer any substation effect. 
In a retrospective view, more than three decades after introducing the traditional model, Sandmo 
(2004, p.8) argues that though non-ambiguity “in theoretical models is often considered to be a 
good thing” there is a paradox involved in the Yitzhaki (1974) analysis. This paradox goes 
directly against most people’s intuition about the relationship between tax rate and tax evasion, 
that the higher tax rates would incline agents towards more evasion (given the returns)
9
. He 
further argues that: 
                                                          
9 The relationship between tax rate and tax evasion – consequently income collected – is implied by the Laffer 
Curve. Considered to be one of the main theoretical constructs of supply-side economics, Laffer Curve was invented 
by economist Arthur Laffer, and is a quadratic relationship between tax rate and the income generated by the 
government. The Laffer Curve postulates that zero tax income will be generated at the extreme tax rates of 0% and 
100%; and that there must be at least one point where the tax rate dictates the optimal level of income generated. 
The Laffer Curve is typically presented through a rather simple graph, with tax rate set on the horizontal axes and 
income generated on the vertical one. The curve starts from the zero income, if the tax rate is set at 0%, reaches its 
peak at a certain t* rate – which is considered to be the optimal tax rate – then falls again to zero revenue at a 100% 
tax rate. The Curve predicts that at the rate of 100%, all people would choose not to work as everything they earned 
would go to the government. The interpretation of the Laffer Curve is that there is a positive relationship between 
tax rate and tax income, up until a certain point; however, increasing tax burden beyond this certain point will be 
counter-productive for raising further tax income, hence a negative relationship between tax rate and tax income will 
be observed. The theory of tax evasion, notably the findings from the traditional Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
model, largely overlook the relationship established in the Laffer Curve. Indeed, the principal conclusion of 
traditional model – as well as other major expansions – is that higher tax rates, contrary to intuition and expectation, 
are associated with lower levels of tax evasion (because of the prevalence of the income effect over the substitution 
effect). Alternatively, in case that income effect prevails the over the substitution effect, then a positive relationship 
between tax rate and evasion (that is a negative effect between tax rate and income) is concluded. Such a linear 
positive relationship between tax rate and tax evasion at the micro level would provide a foundation for the macro 
quadratic relationship between tax rate and income generated, which is established in the Laffer Curve. 
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It is worth noting that this substitution effect would be present under the more general 
but weaker assumption that the penalty rate increases less than proportionately with the 
tax rate. Perhaps the theoretical ambiguity in this case is more representative of popular 
beliefs and possibly even of actual tax systems.  
We also note that the impact of the tax rate on tax evasion also depends upon risk assumptions. 
Changing such assumptions provides various results, which in turn give again raise to ambiguous 
tax rate comparative statics.  Related to this Allingham and Sandmo (1972, p.329) conclude that: 
 
… when actual income varies, the fraction declared increases, stays constant or 
decreases according as relative risk aversion is an increasing, constant or decreasing 
function of income. It is not easy to select one of these hypotheses about the relative risk 
aversion function as the most realistic one. We shall therefore be content with adding this 
result to those of a similar nature that already exist in the economics of uncertainty. 
However, it is of some interest in itself to observe that even a model as simple as the 
present one does not generate any simple result concerning the relationship between 
income and tax evasion.  
Variations in risk assumptions are not the only variations that provide far from simple results. 
Indeed, the traditional model has assumed that the audit probability is exogenous to tax 
reporting; that is the rate of audit is set independently from tax reports submitted by taxpayers. In 
the real world we observe much more efficient techniques than just random auditing. These 
techniques make audit probability endogenous to tax reporting.  
The considerable advantage of the traditional model is the fact that it does not take into 
consideration the relationship between tax rate, fine rate and audit rate. In the real world the tax 
rates are set by governments, audit probability by tax administration, while fine rates are set by 
courts – within parameters set by legislation. In most cases these institutions pursue independent 
objectives from each other and these objectives are most likely not part of a common strategy; 
which in turn affects taxpayer’s perception about the impact of each parameter.  
While exercises involving variations in assumptions may lead to ambiguous results, and given 
that these results are very sensitive, the empirical investigation in tax evasion literature becomes 
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highly important. But in order to establish the theoretical ground for empirical investigation, we 
summarize the theoretical predictions of tax evasion as following: higher audit probabilities and 
higher fine rates are more likely to reduce tax evasion; while the impact of tax rate in tax evasion 
could be either positive or negative depending on the occurrence and intensity of income and 
substitution effects. 
While the vast majority of tax evasion theoretical research has treated the decision to evade 
through the expected utility theory, there are alternative theories, amongst which we note the 
prospect theory and the principal-agent problem, which can be used in this context.  
The prospect theory is a behavioural economic theory which describes the decision of 
individuals amongst the probabilistic alternatives that involve risk, but where the probabilities of 
the outcomes are known. For a reminder, one of the core assumptions of traditional tax evasion 
model (as underlined in page 30) is that the tax declaration choice is a decision under 
uncertainty; and the decision on the amount evaded is made under such conditions. According to 
the prospect theory, developed by Daniel Kahneman – which later won a Nobel Prize in 
Economics for the work – individuals make decision based on the potential value of losses and 
gains rather than the final outcome. Moreover, individuals will evaluate losses and gains using 
certain heuristics certainties. Heuristics certainties in psychology are considered to be simple and 
efficient rules used by individuals to form judgements and make decisions (Lewis, 2008). They 
involve simplification of complex problems and, consequently, focusing on one aspect of the 
problem by ignoring everything else; hence often deviating from the rational choice theory 
(again, rationality is one of the core assumptions in traditional tax evasion model). The standard 
model of the prospect theory tried to elaborate real life choices rather than optimal decisions; in 
an attempt to provide more accurate description of decision making compared to the expected 
utility theory. It did so by dividing the decision process in two main stages, that of editing and 
evaluation. In the first stage, individuals order outcomes of a decision according to a certain 
heuristic; in particularly the individual chooses a specific outcome (considered to be the most 
comparable) as a reference point and then compares other outcomes to it in terms of lesser or 
greater gains. In the second stage, evaluation, the individual computes a utility based on the 
potential outcomes and their probabilities; and thus chooses the outcome with higher utility.  
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The principal-agent problem concerns the situation where two parties have different interests and 
in the vein of asymmetric information the principal cannot directly ensure that the agent is 
always acting on its (the principal’s) best interest. In cases as such, conflicts of interest and moral 
hazards issues arise. In the economic theory, the moral hazard presents a case where agent is 
willing to take risks because the costs that could incur will not be felt by agent itself; more likely, 
the potential costs or burdens related to the risk taken will be borne completely (or in part)  by 
others. There are various mechanisms that may be used to align the interest of the agent to those 
of the principal, but most of them relate to the creation of incentives by the principal for the 
agent. While common examples of principal-agent problem have usually involved the 
relationship between owners and managers, its application has also been discussed in various 
non-business contexts. For the topic of tax evasion, a good example of principal-agent problem 
would be the relationship between tax agency and taxpayer. Tax administration, acting as a 
principal, and taxpayer, acting as agent, have different sets of information in regards to the 
taxable liability of the agent. Having said that, taxpayer – in our case firm – will tend to take the 
risk of underreporting by engaging itself on undutiful activities; knowing that any disposal of its 
actual tax liability would require additional costs from the principal. The principal, in this case 
the tax administration, can reduce asymmetry of information by increasing the audit rate i.e 
inspections. Alternatively, tax agency and government can also provide incentives for 
compliance by improving their performance and by improving the treatment towards taxpayers. 
So far we have summarized the theoretical implications of the traditional model. These results, 
however, arise from a theoretical analysis of individual behaviour. The next section provides a 
review of the business context.  
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2.2 Business Extension 
The traditional model has been often criticized for its simplicity. After all, the decision to evade 
or not is made in a complex world. Subsequent analysis has extended the model in a number of 
dimensions such as analyzing tax evasion jointly with labour supply (Weiss, 1976; Andersen, 
1977; Pencavel, 1979; Cowell, 1985); how individuals respond to greater uncertainty concerning 
income tax policies - i.e. other sources of uncertainty (Alm, 1988; Scotchmer and Slemrod, 
1989); or, although to a lesser extent, risk allocation where taxpayers face more complex 
“portfolio” set-ups offering other risky activities and alternative forms of evasion (Alm and 
McCallin, 1990; Landskroner et al. 1990; Yaniv, 1990; Lin and Yang, 2001). Since such 
extensions are beyond the scope and interest of this thesis, we choose not to elaborate them 
further. 
Of special interest however, is adoption of the traditional model for the businesses context. To 
start with, we argue that the core assumption of the business theoretical background is that the 
decision on evasion, or compliance, is made by individual managers or entrepreneurs who, in 
essence, act as individuals (Arias, 2005); hence the theoretical understanding within the 
traditional model, should apply to businesses as well. As Slemrod (2007, p.36) points out, the 
literature on business tax compliance:  
...adapts the theory of tax evasion, which for the most part concerns individual decision 
makers, to the tax compliance decisions made by businesses.  
This was perhaps the reason why the business modelling has received lesser attention compared 
to the individual one. Arias (2005, p.2) argues that the interest of researchers in individual tax 
compliance business tax compliance has been predominant because:  
... in a micro level analysis, any economic agent (such as a firm paying indirect taxes) 
could be reduced to an individual, the only decision makers that we could think off, and 
therefore, the direct tax evasion could be applied easily to an entrepreneur.  
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This is particularly true of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) where the decision 
making entrepreneur makes compliance decisions as both an individual and a manager.
10
 The 
adaption of individual modelling to businesses is one of the strongest assumptions made 
throughout this thesis.  
Regardless of similarities, some other studies while building on the Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) individual model, have considered business modelling separated for two main reasons. 
One reason is the nature of internal organizations with separation of ownership and control and 
hence variations in risk assumptions, which in turn affect important aspects of business external 
activity including tax reporting. The other reason is found in the nature of firm external activities 
in the market, in particular in the relationship between output of the firm and tax evasion. 
Figure 2.7 Predicted outcomes and variations in assumptions made 
 
 
Fig.2.7 presents potential outcomes as assumptions change; as well as similarities/differences 
between individual and business modelling following such changes. While variations on risk 
                                                          
10
 This may be different for large public companies where the compliance decision is made by one of the directors 
who is likely to be risk-neutral when it comes to tax compliance decisions (whereas the individuals are generally 
assumed to be risk averse). The directors’ compliance decisions also depend on whether their remuneration is linked 
to the after tax profit of the company. 
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assumptions derive similar static results for the tax rate, audit probability and fine rates similar to 
the case of variations for risk assumptions for individual taxpayers, that is ambiguity, the second 
feature of business tax compliance is far more complicated. If the level of the firm’s output is not 
determined by the decision to evade or not, that is, the decisions are made independently, then 
we say that separability holds; and vice versa. If separability holds then in the case of a risk 
averse firm static analysis provides similar results to the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
individual model for tax, fine and audit rate. It also provides similar but ambiguous static 
analysis to individual modelling if the assumptions on risk behaviour change. However, if 
separability does not hold, then the static analysis provides different results compared to those 
from the individual modelling; that is an ambiguous relationship of tax, audit and fine rate with 
tax evasion.  
In this chapter we review some of the most important works on business modelling to understand 
the comparative statics established in such studies, and whether or not they differ from those 
obtained from individual modelling. But before we do so, let us first elaborate the topic of 
separability. 
 
2.2.1 Separability 
 
Wide tax compliance literature (for formal modelling, see Cowell, 2002) argues that opportunity 
for tax evasion does not influence the firm’s output decision or pricing policy (tax shifting), 
hence the business extension of comparative statics established in Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
and Yitzhaki (1974) does not provide any additional information.  
It suggests so, because in equilibrium the expected Marginal Revenue (MR) as the benefit from 
tax evasion equals the expected Marginal Costs (MC) in terms of the utility loss caused by the 
penalty if caught. According to this, marginal revenues (from evasive gain) just offset marginal 
production costs (from penalty loss). This condition for the firm’s optimal output is the same as 
the respective requirement in the absence of tax evasion (MR=MC); hence, opportunity to evade 
does not impact the firm’s output, i.e there is separation between evasion and output.   
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(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
 Let us consider a profit-maximisation firm that sets a level of output at Q*, once: 
      
 A decision to evade taxes increases potentially (if not caught) the firm’s real revenues, hence: 
                    
where           is marginal revenue from taxes evaded. At this condition the previous profit 
maximisation point becomes: 
       
suggesting that the profit maximisation conditionality is not fulfilled and there is another output 
level that optimizes profit-maximisation. Hence, because of gains from evasion, our firm will 
increase its output and set a new output Q**, where Q**>Q*, only when        . Under 
these assumptions, separability does not hold as the firms’ decision to evade impacts the output 
level. Assuming however, that the MU (marginal utility) from the amount of taxes evaded is 
exactly offset by the perceived risk of being caught, then potential increase of MR will be offset 
by the perceived risk of penalty. In other words, considering the risk of being caught: 
                    
where MCpenalty is the perceived marginal cost from penalties if being caught. Under this 
assumption the profit maximisation point remains unchanged, as in Equation (8), where    
   and new output, set at Q** equals the previous one, Q*. In this case separability holds and 
the decision to evade does not impact the level of output. In the presence of separability, the 
comparative statics of tax rate, audit and fine rate are similar to those of the Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) model; the penalty rate and the probability of detection reduce the optimal level 
of tax evasion, while the impact of tax rate is ambiguous or negative; depending on whether we 
are referring to the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) or to the Yitzhaki (1974) interpretations.
11
  
                                                          
11
 Given the separability of firms output and tax evasion, Sandmo (2004) concluded that if the tax rate has been set 
with the aim of achieving some specific policy objective, like for instance to reduce the consumption of a good with 
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2.2.2 Business Modelling 
To our understanding, Marelli (1984) was the first who studied in a theoretical framework the 
subject of firms and tax compliance by extending the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) income tax 
compliance model to the case of a risk-averse monopolistic firm subject to ad valorem and profit 
taxes. The monopolistic nature of the firm allowed Marelli (1984) to examine the relationship 
between output and evasion, both when probability of audit was fixed and variable. When 
probability was taken as fixed, he found that there is separability between the monopoly’s output 
and tax evasion; in other words, tax evasion has no influence on the output, and, therefore, the 
after-tax marginal conditions for profit maximization are the same as those taking place in the 
absence of any evasion. Marelli (1984) established comparative statics similar in nature to those 
of the traditional model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972); the firm evades less with higher 
probability of detection and larger fines, while the impact of tax rates is ambiguous. In a further 
extension of same analysis, probability of audit was considered to be a function of the tax base 
declared, i.e. is endogeneus. The function was assumed to be increasing, meaning that the higher 
the base declared, the higher the probability of detection. Under this assumption, tax evasion and 
output lose their autonomy while the profit maximising output depends on the optimal interior 
rate of tax declaration; a monopolist will produce and declare less than it will under a fixed 
probability of detection. If the function assumed to be decreasing, however, the results are more 
efficient as the monopolist will both produce and declare more compared to a fixed probability. 
Wang and Conant (1988), also study a risk averse monopolistic firm that can evade profit tax 
liability by overstating costs. They reach the conclusion of separability holding and that the fine 
rates, the probability of detection and profit tax rate all reduce the evasion levels (as in Yitzhaki 
1974 model). 
Marelli and Martina (1988) are the first to extend the analysis to non-monopolistic markets, by 
analysing an oligopolistic market with strategic interaction between firms. Their findings show 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
negative external effects, the optimal tax rate is unaffected by the opportunities for evasion. Separability, according 
to Arias (2005), means that since evasion has no effect on output, inefficiency (caused by evasion) implied when 
firms with higher production costs than average remain in the market because of sales concealment, is inexistent. 
From that perspective, the pure economic regress derived from evasion is revenue lost by government. 
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that separability is even stronger than in the case of monopoly and that with the assumption of 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, the effect of profit tax rates on evasion is negative and may 
also be negatively related for the sales tax (ad volorem tax) and unit tax (as predicted in the 
Yitzhaki 1974 modifications). Here again, standard expectations that increased probability of 
detection and higher penalties reduce evasion are confirmed.   
Contrary to Marelli and Martina (1988), Goerke and Runkel (2006) argue in favour of non-
separability under oligopoly with endogenous market structure. They argue that prior to the 
decision about the level and the amount of evasion on profit tax, firms make choices regarding 
their entry in the market. Tax evasion increases the expected payoff from production; hence 
more firms find it profitable to enter the market. Under such circumstances, aggregate supply in 
the whole market rises since the increase in output by the number of new firms entering the 
market more than compensates the reduction in output by other firms.  
We note at this point that although business modelling across various types of markets might add 
robustness to the traditional model, some of the cases (such as monopolistic and oligopolistic 
markets) are less relevant for SMEs; which largely operate in the competitive markets.  
Another treated area of business tax compliance is that of the withholding tax system.
12
 Yaniv 
(1988) in his model considers a competitive and risk averse employer who should report the 
proportion of total wage payments, considering the presence of profit tax, i.e. understatement of 
the wage bill means overpayment of the profit tax bill. The main results established here suggest 
that the optimal employment level is separate from evasion as long as the latter is optimal; i.e. 
separability holds. Further, increasing deterrence parameters discourage tax evasion, as expected. 
In his later work Yaniv (1995) presents a general model of the risk averse firm that is applicable 
to any type of tax. The model comes to similar findings such as the activity decision of the firm 
is independent from evasion (separability holds) and that an increase in the tax rate will always 
increase tax evasion under the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion (as in the 
Allingham and Sandmo, 1972 model). 
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 Where employers are required to withhold a portion of each employee's income and pay it directly to the tax 
authority 
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Virmani (1989) models the decision of risk neutral entrepreneurs in a much complex world with 
an ad valorem tax system, competitive market, free entry and ‘U’ shaped average cost curves; 
under the assumption that the probability of detection depends on firms output and that evasion 
costs depend on the proportion of sales declared. Due to these assumptions, the static 
comparative analysis is different from previous studies. Here, evasion is related to production 
inefficiency thus separability does not hold. Virmani (1989) argues that evasion may increase 
with a rise in penalties and it may be positively and production negatively related to tax rates. In 
addition, he argues that evasion will always occur if such it holds low costs, regardless of tax 
rates. These non-conventional results are established mainly because of the assumption of risk 
neutrality, which in turn affects separability and the comparative statics. Sandmo (2004) argues 
that the assumption of risk neutrality may not always be applicable for firms having individual 
taxpayer characteristics; which includes largely SMEs.  
Arias (2005) does an extension of the compliance model of the firm for various types of markets 
and draws conclusions that support separability only under the assumption of fixed probability of 
detection. He further argues that a key feature of separability in the tax evasion literature is that 
results are very divergent according to the assumptions made. Indeed, some assumptions are not 
always explicit and it is not clear what would happen with results under different key 
assumptions; many questions would arise and one could think of many different theoretical 
exercises. 
Table 2.1 Traditional Determinants in Business Modelling 
 
Model Tax Rate Audit Rate Fine Rate 
Marelli (1984) Ambiguous Negative Negative 
Wang and Conant (1988) Negative Negative Negative 
Marelli and Marina (1988) Negative Negative Negative 
Virmani (1989) Positive Positive Positive 
Yaniv (1995) Positive Negative Negative 
Cowell (2003) Positive Negative Negative 
Arias (2005) Ambiguous Ambiguous Ambiguous 
Expectations Ambiguous Negative Negative 
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Table 2.1 provides a summary of the comparative results established in the reviewed business 
works. We note that regardless the divergences in assumptions to separability and risk behaviour, 
there is general affinity that supports the theoretical results as established in individual 
modelling.  
To sum up, we argue that that the tax evasion literature has adapted individual behaviour models 
to the business context. Some, however, have treated the business context separately in order to 
observe whether changes in separation between either ownership and management or output and 
evasion affect the comparative statics established by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Following a 
review of works in this area we argue that for even if business modelling is treated separately 
from the individual context, the implications for the three traditional determinants (tax, audit and 
fine rate) remain largely similar. Firstly, the variations on risk assumptions drive similar 
comparative statics as obtained for individuals when risk assumptions vary. Secondly, because 
the vast majority of businesses models have established separation between output and evasion, 
suggesting thus again similar comparative statics as in the case of the individual traditional 
model.  
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2.3 Beyond the Traditional Model 
Following the introduction of the traditional model of tax compliance by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972), consequent tax research has identified and brought forward various extensions in an 
attempt to solve, as Torgler (2007a) puts it, “the puzzle of tax compliance” (the term was initially 
introduced by Andreoni et al, 1998). The puzzle itself refers to a condition where levels of tax 
compliance do not correspond to the levels of enforcements. As Torgler, (2011, p.12) argues, the 
issue of tackling tax evasion is “not simply a matter of applying penalties and/or increasing the 
frequency of audits”.  
Instead, different levels of deterrence factors have produced two very different types of 
outcomes. First, when audits and fines rates were set at high extremes, low levels of compliance 
were observed. This was mainly because oppressive tax enforcement and harassment of 
taxpayers through unremitting audits and visits decreased individual perceptions of institutional 
legitimacy and so increased voluntary resistance to payment. Extreme penalties on the other side 
provided the basis for the corruption of tax officials, hence causing generally low levels of tax 
compliance. In such cases, questions as to “why people evade taxes?” were raised. Second, when 
audit and fine rates were set at low extremes, contrary to intuitive expectations, high levels of 
voluntary compliance were observed, hence questions as to “why people pay taxes?” were 
counter-raised.  
Feld and Frey (2007) discuss studies that defend the traditional model. These studies contend 
that the gap between theory and compliance/evasive evidence might be closed by assuming 
sufficiently high risk aversion of taxpayers, which is largely driven by an overestimation of 
actual audit and fine rates. Feld and Frey (2007), however, argue that such claims are not 
convincing as the risk aversion that is required in order to raise compatibility is not supported by 
the observed rates of compliance/evasion in the US in studies conducted by Alm et al. (1992) 
and Graetz and Wilde (1985).  
Almost three decades from the introduction of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model, 
Sandmo (2004) argues that explanation based on the taxpayer’s subjective probability, which is 
not necessarily equal to the frequency of actual audit rates, is not entirely convincing to describe 
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the puzzle between empirical investigation and theoretical predication. He further argues (p.11) 
that: 
Common sense and everyday observations tell us that people refrain from tax evasion - 
as well as from speeding, shoplifting and polluting the environment - not only from their 
estimates of the expected penalty, but for reasons that have to do with social and moral 
considerations.  
Frey and Feld (2002) argue that tax evasion/compliance is driven by a psychological tax contract 
between citizens and tax authorities and that, in order for the contract to be upheld, incentives 
such as rewards or punishment need to be provided; in addition loyalties and emotional ties that 
go well beyond transactional exchanges must be taken into account. In order to explain the 
puzzle of tax evasion/compliance Frey (1997) argues about the importance of “intrinsic 
motivation” of tax compliance, which due to “civic virtue”, makes taxpayers comply; as opposed 
to “extrinsic motivation”, known also as deterrence impact, in which taxpayers pay because they 
fear the punishment. This “intrinsic motivation” is known today as tax morale. 
The role of tax morale in tax compliance has been the subject of research since the 1990s. Yet 
the pioneering work in this field was done much earlier, by the Cologne School of Tax 
Psychology back in the 1960s, who tried to link the concept of taxation as an economic sub 
discipline to social psychology (see Strümpel, 1969 and Torgler, 2007a for more). This linkage 
had subsequent consequences on the necessity of inclusion of other factors that shape the 
compliance decisions of taxpayers, beyond the tax, audit and fine rates. Spicer and Ludstedt 
(1976) argue that the taxpayer’s choice is not made solely on the grounds of penalties and fines 
but also on the grounds of attitudes, values and norms. Long and Swinger (1991) have argued 
that it is natural to expect cases when taxpayers are simply predisposed not to evade; hence they 
are predisposed to not even search for ways to cheat on taxes.  
In one of the most prominent tax evasion reviews, Andreoni et al. (1998, p.850) have argued in 
favour of incorporation of morals and social dynamics, beyond the traditional determinants:  
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...it has been suggested that factors such as a moral obligation to be truthful, or the social 
consequences of being a known cheater, may add further enforcement incentives that are 
not accounted for in our models.  
Further they elaborated three main groups of factors that are important when treating tax evasive 
models that are beyond the traditional determinants. The first group involves moral rules and 
sentiments that directly guide and impact decisions to comply or not. Morality in tax compliance 
has attracted the attention of tax researchers quite recently (for an extensive review see Torgler 
2007a). Torgler et al. (2010) when discussing moral rules and sentiments summarize also a set of 
views that take into account even an altruistic approach; such an individual’s behaviour that is 
interested not only about his/her own welfare but also in the general welfare. Other views are 
related to a ‘Kantian’ morality approach, and they see taxpayers as having anxiety, guilt or even 
inferiority if their share of taxes paid is lower than what is defined as fair.  
Within the moral rules and sentiments, a few other studies have argued in favour of incorporation 
of socio-cultural factors (Benjamini and Maital, 1985; Gordon, 1989; Myles and Naylor, 1996; 
Kim, 2003). Grasmick and Scott (1982) and Chau and Leung (2009) indicate that respondents 
with peers involved in unlawful activities are more likely to be non-compliant. Franzoni (1999) 
argues that when most people evade, the stigma effect is small and evasion is not in fact 
discouraged; however when few evade the stigma effect is great and evasion is discouraged. The 
change from one equilibrium to the other takes the form of a “non-compliance epidemic” such 
that if more people start to cheat then the social stigma decreases and evasion spreads to an ever 
larger fraction of the population. Cummings et al. (2005) and Chan et al. (2000) see peer 
influence as part of the cultural characteristics of specific groups of individuals or nations; i.e. as 
social norms.  
The second group proposed by Andreoni et al. (1998) relates to the fairness of the tax system, 
enforcement of which affects extensively individuals’ willingness to comply (Cowell, 1990; 
Bordignon, 1993; and Falkinger 1995). Jackson and Milliron (1986, p.137) argued that tax 
fairness consists of at least two different dimensions: “One dimension appears to involve the 
equity of the trade - the benefits received for the tax dollars given...” as defined by effectiveness, 
 Chapter Two: The Theory of Tax Evasion      Page | 57  
“...the other dimension appears to involve the equity of the taxpayers’ burden in reference to that 
of other individuals”.  
Last, the third group, includes taxpayer’s evaluations of government within the standards of 
performance, corruption and transparency. Tyler (1997) argues that the way people are treated by 
the authorities affects their evaluations of authorities and their willingness to co-operate. Frey 
(2003) recognizes the importance of transparency and treatment by the fiscal authorities towards 
citizens. If individuals feel as partners then honesty among them will be higher compared to the 
case when they feel inferior. Torgler (2007a) on the relationship between taxpayers and 
institutions argues that those governments that pre-commit themselves with direct democratic 
rules themselves impose restraints on their own power and thus send a signal that taxpayers are 
seen as responsible persons. These signals may create a social capital stock since the citizens 
understand their role in society and their influence on government through votes. Hanousek and 
Palda (2004) looked at tax evasion as a form of legitimate protest by citizens against their 
governments; perception towards which were negative. Tirole (1996) explains that when 
taxpayers see their government as corrupt and irresponsible, evasion is seen as a “vote of 
dissent” on the government.  
Inclusion of non-traditional factors in tax evasion knowledge completes also the theoretical 
framework of this thesis. Beyond tax, audit and fine rate there are a set of other factors that shape 
both individual and business compliance decision. Accounting for a combination of both 
traditional and non-traditional factors is a necessity in the quest of understanding why people pay 
or evade taxes. 
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Conclusion 
Through this chapter we provide a theoretical foundation for investigating the factors that shape 
tax evasion. This is done in order to better understand and better direct both empirical literature 
review as well as our own empirical investigation in the following chapters.  
We start by providing an overview of the traditional model introduced by Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972), its core assumptions, outcomes as well as comparative statics of tax, audit and 
fine rate. In the traditional model the level of income tax evasion is negatively related to the level 
of punishment imposed by law and the probability of audit by tax examiners.  When analysing 
the impact of tax rates on evasion, the model predicts an ambiguous effect with the occurrence of 
both an income effect (as tax rates rise, people become poorer and, in the presence of decreasing 
absolute risk aversion, they evade less) and a substitution effect (rising taxes means that the 
return from evasion is higher, thus the taxpayer prefers the risky choice to the safer one). 
However, Yitzhaki (1974) argued that the ambiguity was a result of an unrealistic assumption of 
the model that the penalty is imposed on the amount of income not reported; if instead it is 
imposed on the evaded tax the substitution effect disappears and thus a tax rise will reduce 
evasion.  
Next we review the adaption of the traditional model to the business context, as well as further 
non-traditional extensions provided to both the individual and the business theory of tax evasion. 
The most important finding of this chapter is that the adaption of individual tax behaviour to the 
case of businesses is a common and reasonable practice. The determinants of business tax 
evasion may be similar, at least qualitatively, to the determinants of tax evasion by individuals or 
households. The decision on evasion, or compliance, is made by individual managers or 
entrepreneurs who, in essence, act as individuals (Arias, 2005). Such assumptions are sufficiently 
enforced by business modelling. For even if business modelling is treated separately from the 
individual context, the final implications on three traditional determinants (tax, audit and fine 
rate) remain similar. Firstly, because the variations on risk assumptions drive similar 
comparative statics as for individuals when risk assumptions vary. Secondly, because the vast 
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majority of businesses models have established separation between output and evasion, 
suggesting thus similar comparative statics as those yielded by the individual traditional model. 
While exercises involving variations in assumptions may lead to ambiguous results, and given 
that these results are very sensitive to the assumptions, empirical investigations in the tax evasion 
literature become particularly important. But in order to provide initial orientation for 
investigating the empirical literature, we conclude our review of the theory as follows: the 
theoretical predictions of tax evasion suggest that higher audit probabilities and higher fine rates 
are more likely to reduce tax evasion; while the impact of tax rate in tax evasion could be either 
positive or negative depending on the occurrence and intensity of income and substitution 
effects. 
We also review other non-traditional factors influencing tax evasion. Given that different levels 
of deterrence factors have produced two very different types of outcomes, most notably when set 
at high extremes low levels of compliance were observed; and vice versa, when set at low 
extremes high levels of compliance were observed, subsequent theoretical research on tax 
evasion has argued in favour of incorporation of “intrinsic motivation” for tax compliance. This 
“intrinsic motivation”, known as tax morale, due to “civic virtue”, inclines taxpayers to comply 
as opposed to “extrinsic motivation”, known also as deterrence impact, in which taxpayers pay 
because they fear punishment.  
Inclusion of non-traditional factors in tax evasion knowledge, additional to traditional 
determinants from the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model, completes also the theoretical 
framework of this thesis. Beyond tax, audit and fine rate there are a set of other factors that shape 
both individual and business compliance decisions and, according at least to the leading literature 
review of individual tax evasion, these non-traditional determinants are grouped in three main 
categories: moral rules and sentiments; fairness of the tax system; and the relationship between 
taxpayers and institutions. Accounting for a combination of both traditional and non-traditional 
factors is a necessity in the quest for understanding why firms – especially SMEs - pay or evade 
taxes. 
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Introduction 
Following the theoretical set up introduced by the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model and its 
subsequent extension, empirical investigation begun to thrive. Research, while still deficient, has 
provided empirical evidence for both traditional and non-traditional determinants of tax evasion. 
Notably the vast majority of the empirical research has dealt with individual tax evasion, while 
the business and cross-country context was less common. The investigation of these aspects was 
suggested frequently by most prominent authors in the field of tax evasion. For instance, 
Andreoni et al. (1998, p.855) in one of the most profound tax evasion reviews, while concluding and 
providing directions for future research, argue that “…a broadening of the empirical database will 
improve the power of statistical tests of theoretical models, and spur comparative analysis 
across countries ”. Torgler (2011, p.6) on the other side suggests that “...business tax evasion in 
general, has received very little attention. Work in this area is therefore highly relevant”.  
As argued in Chapter I, the purpose of this thesis is to fill the gap on the business, cross-country 
and transition contexts of tax evasion. In Chapter II we argued that this will be done by adapting 
the theory of tax evasion of individuals to businesses (Slemrod, 2007). Consequently, in this 
chapter, we review the empirical investigation conducted so far. This review is largely focused 
on individual studies, given that the bulk of research is in this area. Under the assumption that 
that the behaviour of businesses is similar to the behaviour of individuals, the determinants of 
business tax evasion may be similar, at least qualitatively, to the determinants of tax evasion by 
individuals or households. Having said that, the empirical findings for individuals reviewed in 
this chapter may indicate potential determinants for the business context that we intend to 
investigate in Chapters IV, V and VI. Reviewing the empirical literature on individual tax 
evasion enables us to set hypothesis and expectations for these chapters. 
Today there are several reviews of the individual tax evasion literature, amongst which we note 
the ones from Jackson and Milliron (1984), Cowell (1990), Andreoni et al. (1998), Franzoni 
(1999) and Torgler (2007a). The common feature of these reviews is the lack of consensus on 
grouping the determinants of tax evasion investigated throughout 40 years of research. This is 
perhaps in line with Cowell’s (2003) observation that there is no specific and generalized 
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modelling of either individual or business tax evasion developed so far. The review conducted in 
this thesis has identified determinants that are most commonly found across the literature. These 
determinants are then grouped into five main categories, which are: traditional; institutional; 
socio-cultural; macroeconomic; and firm-characteristics. 
The first category includes the pioneering determinants of tax evasion, namely the tax rate, the 
audit probability and the fine rate. These determinants are commonly found in early studies post 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) theoretical model. Notably the audit and fine rate are less 
observable in non-US studies given the lack of actual tax administration data apart from US. The 
second category includes the institutional determinants of tax evasion. Amongst many, proxies 
and variables determining trust towards institutions, perception about the level of corruption and 
compliance costs of taxpayers are most commonly found and investigated across the literature. 
These determinants capture also aspects of the fairness, performance, transparency and 
accountability of institutions; as underlined under Andreoni et al. (1998) and elaborated under 
Section 2.4 of Chapter II. We group and name these determinants as institutional given that their 
scope and magnitude is related exclusively to the behaviour of institutions. The third category 
includes socio-cultural determinants of tax evasion. Within this group we capture individual 
social, economic, demographic and behavioural characteristics of taxpayers. Age, gender, 
education, social norms, income level, income source, marital status or/and religiosity are the 
most commonly observed determinants in the literature. Some of these determinants are less 
important and/or less observable for business and cross-country context. The fourth category 
includes macroeconomic determinants of tax evasion, usually found in cross-country (though 
rare) or within country time-series investigations of tax evasion. These determinants include per 
capita income, inflation, unemployment and/or other macro environment proxies. Finally, the 
last category includes firm-related characteristics, such as size, legal status and sectoral 
activities. These determinants, as elaborated already in Chapter I, are rare and found only in a 
small number of studies (hence the motivation for this thesis). We elaborate more on previous 
business investigation for transition economies in Chapter V of this thesis. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a review of the empirical literature on tax evasion as the 
platform for further research in Chapters IV, V and VI. The empirical review conducted in this 
chapter is related accordingly to the theoretical structure elaborated in the Chapter II. We start by 
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recapitulating the main techniques applied to measure and analyse the level of tax evasion and its 
determinants; then we proceed by reviewing the determinants of tax evasion investigated so far 
for both the individual and the business context. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses advantages and disadvantages of three 
most commonly applied techniques to estimate and analyze tax evasion. Section 2 reviews the 
empirical findings of the traditional determinant (tax rate, the audit probability and the fine rate); 
while Section 3 and 4 summarize findings related to institutional (trust, corruption and 
compliance costs) respectively socio-cultural (age, gender, education, social norms and other 
individual characteristics) determinants of tax evasion. Section 5 and 6 review less commonly 
studied determinants of tax evasion, namely macroeconomic determinants and firm-level 
characteristics. The last section concludes. 
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3.1 Methodological Considerations 
A major obstacle to analyzing tax evasion is the nature of evasion itself. Individuals and 
businesses are simply predisposed not to disclose cheating behaviour given the punishable 
consequences from the confession. Researchers and governments on the other side had to come 
up with ways and techniques that enabled them to estimate and analyze tax evasion; regardless of 
its nature. To date the literature recognizes three main approaches that capture the level of tax 
evasion as well as determinants that shape it. These include: tax measurement programmes – or 
actual audit data collected and provided by tax authorities; laboratory experiments – or 
controlled and simulative economic environments; and surveys – or qualitative information 
obtained through (usually indirect) interviewing.  
To date the most careful and comprehensive estimates of tax evasion anywhere in the world have 
been made for US federal income tax. The IRS in an attempt to measure the tax gap (how much 
tax should be paid voluntarily in a timely way), established a special audit programme for the 
years 1963-1998 known as the TCMP (Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program). The 
programme measured what taxpayers report and compared it with what examiners found while 
auditing randomly selected tax reports. Although the programme was shut down by Congress in 
1995 due to its heavy costs (and perhaps this was the reason why we do not find similar 
programmes outside US), the database created throughout the years has served as a solid base for 
many researchers who have produced the greatest body of empirical findings in the field of tax 
evasion and its determinants. The advantage in using TCMP data is the opportunity to observe 
personal tax-reporting behaviour rather than having to rely on indirect measures of self-reported 
compliance behaviour. The major drawback however, lies in the limitations provided in 
accounting for other non-deterrence elements of the decision to comply; particularly when the 
importance of such elements has been acknowledged by non-traditional theory (Chapter II). One 
finds it impossible to derive the behavioural characteristics of taxpayers by simply looking at the 
information found in such or similar tax forms. Scepticism also rises on the TCMP inability to 
reflect information on taxpayers who did not file returns at all. Based on IRS data, non filers 
accounted for an estimated 36% of unreported income in 1976, thus it is fair to believe that much 
of the substance of evasion is not even observed with TCMP data.  
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Considering pros and cons of actual audit programmes, tax researchers have applied other 
alternatives that in general act as close substitutes or complementary to tax records. Laboratory 
experiments are amongst such alternatives. Experiments involve a technique that would simulate 
an environment where people – experimental subjects – make choices in a repeated dynamic 
world. They allow researchers to have accurate and unambiguous measures and these measures 
are also derived in a setting that controls explicitly for extraneous influences on individual 
taxpayer behaviour (Alm et al. 1992). Basic experimental design is as follows: subjects receive 
income, voluntarily pay taxes on income received, face probability of audit known to them and 
pay a penalty if they are caught cheating. They also receive a public good that depends on 
aggregate tax payment in order to capture the relationship aspects of the decision to comply or 
not. Then changes across various variables occur and compliance is compared in a variety of 
scenarios. There are however, some serious reasons for caution in the use of and especially 
generalization from these estimates. They are based upon somewhat artificial behaviour, they are 
derived from students, they are generated from small samples and the effects on compliance of 
the various policy variables are often not large. Experiments after all face some constraints in 
their inability to simulate proper socio-behaviour determinants. In order to tackle a few of these 
disadvantages, recently some researchers (Feld et al. 2006) have applied field experiments, 
which compared to laboratory experiments involve real tax authorities and real taxpayers. This 
technique helps to better test the effects of various instruments in the real situation of filling out 
the tax form and paying their taxes (for more on field experiments see Harrison and List, 2004). 
The third, and perhaps most commonly used alternative in studying tax evasion, is the survey 
approach. Through interviewing a representative sample of respondents, tax researchers can 
observe both traditional and non-traditional determinants of tax evasion; hence investigate a rich 
set of hypotheses associated with non-traditional determinants. Surveys often include many 
socioeconomic, demographic and attitudinal variables that cannot be observed from tax returns 
or audit data (Andreoni et. al. 1998). Surveys however, have many methodological problems that 
make findings very suspect (Gërxhani, 2006). Surveys of tax evasion are even more complicated, 
because tax evasion is perceived to be a criminal activity and socially stigmatized thus making 
individuals quite reluctant to admit any illegal behaviour. In addition, there is a fear from threat 
of penalties and other sanctions which, in turn, induces respondents to either provide untruthful 
answers about their compliance behaviour or refuse to answer at all. Moreover, data provided in 
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surveys related to tax evasion are based on perceptions of individuals therefore the outcomes are 
subjective and subject to measurement errors. Response and non-response biases in a survey 
sometime affect the validity and usage of survey results. Hellman et al. (2000) argue, for 
instance, that often respondents have a tendency to either complain or show pride, which again 
sheds some doubt in the truthfulness of answers provided.  Vogel (1974) while discussing survey 
techniques on tax evasion brings into the picture the social-psychological balance theory where 
the individual often reorders his attitudes and appraisal of a given situation in order to conform to 
the behaviour pattern chosen. In addition, he argues that the conduct of the individual is different 
with respect to the moment of choice between deviant and conformist taxpayer compliance 
behaviour compared to the moment of answering the questionnaire, thus resulting in potentially 
different answers.  
Some of the survey weaknesses are tackled through avoiding direct questions. Non-direct 
questioning increases the likelihood of having fearless and honest answers. They have been most 
commonly used in the tax evasion literature (for more on how to conduct survey questionnaires 
for tax evasion see Hanousek and Palda, 2004 and Gërxhani, 2006). World Bank (WB), 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and other prestigious 
institutions/reports (such as IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook and World Economic Forum 
Outlook) have all applied indirect questions on tax evasion. According to Gerxhani (2006) direct 
questions such as “Did you pay taxes, last year?” may intimidate the respondents who in turn 
may provide untruthful answers (or no answers at all).  
While there are substantial difficulties in collecting meaningful compliance information through 
surveys, this type of data does have some unique advantages (Witte and Tauchen, 1987). First of 
all, the data collected from surveys provide additional information on taxpayer’s characteristics, 
socio-economic attributes and other relevant institutional surroundings, a feature clearly ignored 
by other forms. Second, survey data compared to actual audit reports reflect only on intentional 
evasion. The likes of TCMP data combine noncompliance reflecting intentional behaviour with 
noncompliance arising from mistake or ignorance. For most of the countries complying with tax 
laws is quite a difficult procedure in terms of documentation requirements and other paperwork. 
In addition to that, there is a lack of information by individuals on deductible expenses, leading 
to their exaggeration while tax reporting. For economic aspects of tax evasion differentiation 
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between two types of underreporting (intentional vs. mistakes) is essential as the factors 
determining them may be quite different and, therefore, they should be treated separately. Third, 
perceptions provided in surveys sometimes do represent a more reliable picture of evasion, 
particularly in developing countries where audit reports are unreliable due to considerable 
involvement of tax administrators in corruptive habits.  
Alternative sources of information on tax evasion are data collected from tax amnesties. The 
measures obtained by self-reporting amnestied individuals represent perhaps the most complete 
and most accurate information one can obtain in the field of evasion. An obvious difficulty with 
such data, however, is sample selection. Andreoni et al. (1997, p.854) argue that “only a subset 
of all evaders is likely to participate in tax amnesty, and this subset may not be representative of 
the overall population”. In addition, tax amnesties are rare and the data provided for research are 
even rarer. A less commonly used approach is a combination of various indirect measures of 
evasion, such as the discrepancy between income reported on tax returns and actual income in 
the national income accounts. Unfortunately such measures are aggregate and approximate, 
leaving no room for taxpayer related findings; clearly a strong disadvantage in understanding the 
determinants of tax evasion. The discrepancy approach serves, however, as a strong tool in 
measuring the scale of tax evasion. 
So far we have reviewed the techniques applied to estimate and analyse tax evasion. Next, we 
review the most important determinants of tax evasion investigated through these techniques. We 
group these determinants into five main categories: 
- Traditional (tax, audit and fine rate); 
- Institutional (trust, corruption and compliance costs); 
- Socio-cultural (age, gender, education, social norms and other characteristics); 
- Macroeconomic (per capita, unemployment and inflation); and 
- Firm characteristics (size, ownership and sector) 
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3.2 Traditional Determinants 
The first group of determinants consists of parameters involved in the traditional model by 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and subsequent extensions. These parameters are: tax rate, audit 
rate and fine rate. Under theoretical investigation in Chapter II we argued that the impact of audit 
and fine rate in tax evasion is negative; though non-traditional considerations of tax evasion 
argued that oppressive tax enforcement and extreme penalties can sometimes backfire and 
produce counter effects. In the theoretical roundup we noted that the impact of tax rate is unclear 
as depending on assumptions on how fines were imposed (whether on the tax evaded or the 
amount of income evaded) one could establish negative, positive or ambiguous effect on tax 
evasion. Indeed, similar variations on assumptions in regards to risk behaviour and separability 
produce generally ambiguous results (Chapter II). Having that in mind, the empirical 
investigation of traditional determinants of tax evasion becomes highly important. In this section 
we review the most important works on tax, audit and fine rate.    
 
3.2.1 Tax Rate 
In Chapter II we argued that the standard economic model of tax evasion provided two 
counteracting effects: income and substitution effects; both connected with the increased risk 
aversion and increased incentive for gambling, which together produce ambiguity on the 
question as to whether higher tax rates decrease or increase tax evasion. As with the theory, the 
empirical evidence on the impact of tax rates is quite controversial.  
Clotfelter (1983) appears as the first author to make use of TCMP data (the sample included 
around 47,000 individual tax returns for the year 1969) to investigate how evasion responds to 
changes in the environment. Using a standard Tobit model, his work specifically looks at the 
relationship between marginal tax rates and tax evasion. The information gathered on each 
declarer represented the difference between what was originally stated and what was deemed as 
correct reporting by the tax authority. His empirical analysis produced positive and significant 
coefficients on both the after-tax income and marginal tax rate variables with tax evasion; in 
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other words, a 10% increase in tax rate would result in an expected 5-8% increase in evasion. 
These results were consistent with the theoretical considerations established in Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972), but inconsistent with the Yitzhaki (1974) modifications, which, as argued in 
Chapter II, represent the non-ambiguous theoretical consideration on the relationship between 
the tax rate and compliance. The study by Clotfelter (1983) is amongst the most cited works in 
the tax evasion literature. 
Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996) use an unbiased estimate of tax evasion: the 
discrepancy between income measures derived from tax return data and those derived from 
national income accounts, and look at the impact of tax rates on tax evasion in Switzerland. Their 
result of the pooled cross-section/time series analysis for the absolute amount of income 
concealed showed that there is a strong and positive relation between marginal tax rate and tax 
evasion.  
Alm et al. (1992) support a similar finding while using data from laboratory experiments to 
estimate individual responses to tax rates, penalty and audit rate changes, as well as to changes in 
government expenditures.
13
 During several sessions of the experiment, tax policy changes were 
introduced, including a change of tax rate (10%, 30%, and 50%). The results showed that when 
the tax rate increased the participants’ compliance decreased i.e. evasion increased. Similar 
results were reported by Friedland et al. (1978) from an experiment where tax rate varied 
amongst subjects (from 25% to 50%); and by Collins and Plumlee (1991) while changing tax 
rates from 30% to 60%. Moser et al. (1995) however, found that increasing tax rates reduces 
compliance only for those who view the tax system as unfair.  
                                                          
13
 The basic design is simple: subjects receive income, they voluntarily pay taxes on income received, face a 
probability of audit known to them and pay a penalty if they are caught cheating. They also receive a public good 
that depends on aggregate tax payment. Then various policy changes occur and compliance is compared in the 
absence and in the presence of policy. Seven sessions are developed. In the first session (basic) there is a tax rate of 
30%, probability of audit 0.04 and penalty rate of 2$ (amount that subjects receive before sessions varies from 2 to 
3$). Session two introduces a public good, that is a proportional share amongst subjects of surplus funds gained 
from session one. In session three, tax rates are reduced to 10%; and increased to 50% in session four. In session 
five and six, the fine rate equals 1 and 3 and in the seventh session the audit rate is reduced to 0.02, and increased to 
0.06 in the last session.  
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Caroll (1998) uses a panel consisting of annual tax returns that spans a period when tax rates 
increased during the 1990 and 1993 US Tax Acts.
14
 His findings show that a tax rate increase in 
both years resulted in lower reported incomes of taxpayers facing the higher rates. Similar results 
were found in Sillamaa and Veall (2000) while estimating the response of gross reported income 
to a significant change in marginal tax rates that occurred in Canada in 1988 (due to the 
Canadian Tax Act of 1988). Fisman and Wei (2004) by examining the relationship in China 
between the tariff schedule and the ‘evasion gap’ - which they define as the difference between 
Hong Kong’s reported exports to China at the product level and China’s reported imports from 
Hong Kong - find that an increase in the tax rate is associated with an increase in tax evasion. 
Chiarini et al. (2008) by using official time series of the Italian evaded Value Added Tax (VAT) 
base for the period 1980-2004 investigate empirically the long-run characteristics of tax evasion 
and the relationship with the tax burden; the results show a positive relation between evasion and 
tax rate. Trehub and Krasnikova (2006) develop a methodology that uses microeconomic data 
from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (2000-2002) of households to explore tax 
evasion patterns in Russia. Their findings show that ceteris paribus a tax rate cut and other 
measures undertaken in compliance with the personal income tax reform have led to the situation 
where households began to report more than they had done before the reform and tax cuts. 
Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) use micro-level survey data to examine the effect of Russia’s largest 
tax reform, namely the introduction of the flat tax. Their work uses the gap between household 
expenditures and reported earnings as a proxy for tax evasion using data from a household panel 
for the period 1998-2004. Their innovative methodology in tax evasion research (difference-in-
difference and the regression-discontinuity-type approach) finds large, significant and negative 
changes in evasion following the flat tax reform; i.e reduction of the tax burden through tax rates 
caused lower levels of tax evasion in Russia.  
The same positive relationship between tax evasion and tax rates is observed in Mason and 
Calvin (1984), Pommerehne and Frey (1992), Christian and Gupta (1992), Alm et al. (1992) and 
in most studies related to developing countries (see Torgler, 2007a).  
                                                          
14
 Focusing on a period of rising tax rates is important because it avoids the criticism that the observed changes in 
taxpayer incomes are merely the result of long-term trends of increasing income inequality that have little to do with 
changes in tax rates. 
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Contrary to the above findings, a negative relation of tax rates and evasion, as concluded by 
Yitzhaki (1974), is less often reported. Perhaps the biggest challenge to Clotfelter (1983) comes 
from Feinstein (1991) using the same data source (TCMP), pooled data for the years 1982 and 
1985, in times of tax rate changes in the US. He did so in order to address also one of the main 
critiques against Clotfelter (1983) at the time, i.e the inability to separate the joint effect of the 
marginal tax rate and income level. When a pooled model was run over both years by Feinstein 
(1991), the two effects could be separated because two filers with identical incomes filing in the 
different years faced different marginal tax rates. In the pooled model, income exerted a very 
small and insignificant effect on tax evasion, while the marginal tax rate exerted a substantial 
negative effect, i.e. the negative relation between tax rates and tax evasion was established.  
Alm et al. (1995) apply experimental techniques to explore the major factors that affect tax 
evasion in Spain. The subjects were faced with three different levels of proportional tax rate 
(10%, 30% and 50%). Their results show that higher tax rates lead to somewhat greater levels 
compliance (respectively, 14%, 24% and 31%). Similar negative results were found in Alm et.al 
(1990) for Jamaican taxpayers.  
Kamdar (1995) uses micro data from individual tax returns audited during the 1971 cycle of 
TCMP to find that evasion decreases as the marginal tax rate increases. One must note that his 
result must be interpreted with caution as the 1971 sample did not include high-income taxpayers 
who face a higher tax rate and consequently higher tax burden.  
To make the empirical investigation of the impact of tax rate on evasion even more ambiguous, 
no effect of the tax rate on tax evasion was found in an experiment by Baldry (1987) and in a 
study by Porcano (1988). Joulfaian and Rider (1996) also find that misreported income is not 
affected by tax rates.  
Table 3.1 provides a summary of studies investigating the relationship of tax rate and tax 
evasion. To sum up, most of the empirical evidence supports a positive relationship between the 
tax rate and tax evasion, although there are also a considerable number of studies that establish a 
negative relationship. Perhaps a Meta Regression Analysis on the impact of tax rate on evasion 
would provide clearer insights to the ambiguity of the tax rate effect. However, this suggestion is 
not pursued in this thesis.  
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Table 3.1 Tax Rate and Tax Evasion 
        
Determinant Theory Empirics Reference 
Tax Rate 
AMBIGUOUS 
Increasing taxes has 
both an income effect 
and, possibly, a 
substitution effect; 
hence ambiguity 
(Allingham and 
Sandmo, 1972). If 
penalty is imposed on 
the evaded tax the 
ambiguity will fade 
away leaving only the 
income effect, i.e. a tax 
raise will decrease tax 
evasion (Yitzhaki, 
1974). 
POSITIVE 
Clotfelter (1983)  
Masson and Calvin (1984) 
Alm et al. (1992) 
Pommehrene and Frey (1992) 
Christian and Gupta (1992) 
Alm et al. (1993) 
Pommerehne and Weck (1996) 
Caroll (1998)  
Sillamaa and Veall (2000)  
Fisman and Wei (2004)  
Trehub and Krasnikova (2006)  
Torgler (2006) 
Chiarini et al. (2008)  
Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) 
Nur-tegin (2008) 
Bernasconi et al. (2013) 
NEGATIVE 
Alm et al. (1990) 
Feinstein (1991)  
Christian and Gupta (1993) 
Alm et al. (1995)  
Kamdor (1995)  
Joulfaian (2009) 
NO EFFECT 
Baldry (1987)  
Porcano (1988)  
Joulfaian and Rider (1996) 
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3.2.2 Probability of Audit 
The second traditional determinant of tax evasion is the probability of detection, or the likelihood 
that the tax collecting agency will discover a taxpayer’s noncompliance (Jackson and Milliron, 
1986). As already discussed in Chapter II, an increase in the probability of audit, or the audit 
rate, makes the decision to evade riskier. Under the assumption of risk-averse taxpayers this 
means that increasing the audit rate reduces tax evasion. There is general consensus amongst 
most studies (for a review see Fischer et al. 1992) that detection probability has a strong, 
negative and significant relationship with evasion; although the critical question of to what 
extent raising the probability of detection will increase compliance remains unanswered 
(Andreoni et al. 1998).  
Witte and Woodbury (1985) analyze TCMP data from the year 1969 and find out that evasion is 
inversely related to the probability of being audited. Crane and Nourzad (1986) use the 
percentage of total tax returns audited as a measure of the probability of detection. Their analysis 
found that increases in the detection probability, on average, leads to lower underreporting of 
income. Dubin et al. (1987) analyzed time series data to further test the hypothesis regarding the 
effect of detection probability. They too concluded that higher probabilities were associated with 
increased levels of tax reporting. Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996) compared data 
from Swiss cantons and reported that compliance was higher in cantons where more audits 
occurred in the given observed period. Spicer and Hero (1985) through an experimental approach 
argue that individuals who have been audited previously will perceive the probability of 
detection as higher and, consequently, will become more compliant in post-audited periods. 
Chang et al. (1987) establish a positive relationship while experimenting on the compliance 
behaviour under various levels of detection probabilities. Similar results are found by Beck et al. 
(1991). Alm et al. (1995) in their experiment change the audit rates (5%, 30% and 60%) to 
observe the corresponding change in compliance, while Trivedi et al. (2004) apply a two scale 
audit probability (0 and 25%); both studies established a negative and significant relationship 
between audit rate and tax evasion. Feld et al. (2007) report a negative significant relationship of 
audit probability on German tax evasion. 
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Tax audits are also considered to have dual effects on compliance: first with deterrent effect on 
the taxpayers actually audited; and second with indirect deterrent effect on those who do not 
receive audit, yet perceive its rate to be higher than it actually is. The increased perception of 
audit rates can be achieved either due to asymmetric information between tax agencies and 
individuals with the latter perceiving the rate much too highly; or through individual perceptions 
caused by the audits on the certain group, part of which is that individual.  
Slemrod et al. (2001) observe increased compliance in 1700 randomly selected Minnesota 
taxpayers, who were only informed by letter that the tax returns they were about to file would be 
“closely examined”. Kleven et al. (2010) analyze a randomized tax enforcement experiment in 
Denmark. In the base year, a stratified and representative sample of over 40,000 individual 
income tax filers was selected for the experiment. Half of the tax filers were randomly selected 
to be thoroughly audited, while the rest were deliberately not audited. The following year, 
"threat-of-audit" letters were randomly assigned and sent to tax filers in both groups. Using 
comprehensive administrative tax data, they find that prior audits substantially increase self-
reported income, implying that individuals update their beliefs about detection probability based 
on experiencing an audit. In addition, “threat-of-audit” letters also have a significant effect on 
self-reported income, and the size of this effect depends positively on the audit probability 
expressed in the letter. Guala and Mittone (2005) suggest that the occurrence of detection 
induces a learning process for evaluating audit probabilities. Participants on their experiment, 
prone to audits in the initial stages, recorded higher compliance rates in future periods. 
There were cases, mainly in tax experiments, when compliance decreased weakly soon after the 
audit was conducted (Mittone, 2006) suggesting thus (though surprising), a positive relationship 
between tax evasion and audit rate. Kastlunger et al. (2009) suggest that the decrease of 
compliance found after an audit is most likely caused by misperception of chance, while loss-
repair tendencies are of moderate relevance.  
Lastly, no effect was observed in Schram and Gërxhani (2006) while conducting experiments in 
Albania and in the Netherlands. Participants in Albania were not affected by audit rates (16.6% 
and 50%), but Dutch participants evaded more when audit probability was low. In addition, 
Falsetta et al. (2010) find that the audit probability only influences taxpayer compliance 
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decisions when there is support for the government’s use of tax money. When taxpayers do not 
support government programs, their compliance is lower regardless of the audit probability.  
Table 3.2 provides a summary of empirical studies treating the relationship between the audit 
rate and tax evasion. These studies overwhelmingly support the hypothesis set under theoretical 
consideration in Chapter II that higher audit rates increase compliance. 
Table 3.2 Audit Rate and Tax Evasion 
        
Determinant Theory Empirics Reference 
Audit Rate 
NEGATIVE  
An increase in the 
probability of audit 
makes the decision to 
evade more risky. 
Under the assumption 
of a risk-averse 
taxpayer it means that 
increasing the audit 
rate reduces tax 
evasion 
POSITIVE Mittone (2006) 
NEGATIVE 
Witte and Woodbury (1985) 
Spicer and Hero (1985) 
Crane and Nourzad (1986)  
Chang et al. (1987)  
Dubin et al. (1987)  
Beck et al. (1991) 
Alm et al. (1995) 
Pommerehne and Weck (1996)  
Slemrod et al. (2001) 
Trivedi et al. (2004) 
Kleven et al. (2010) 
NO EFFECT 
Gërxhani and Schram (2006) 
Falseta et al. (2010)  
 
In addition, these studies also suggest that uncertainty does lead to taxpayers’ overestimation of 
the probability of being caught which, in turn, increases compliance. Perhaps this is one of the 
main reasons why compliance level in most of the countries is higher than expected with applied 
audit rates.  
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3.2.3 Fine Rate 
The basic model, while it provides a fairly sophisticated description of taxpayers’ evasion 
decisions, leaves very little scope for enforcement policy. The latter is essentially reduced to two 
parameters: the penalty rate and the audit rate. Generally, these two parameters are seen as close 
substitutes. The Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model argues that an increase in the penalty rate 
increases compliance as it has the same change in effect as the probability of audit i.e. making 
evasion more costly. In support to the traditional model, Witte and Woodbury (1985) report a 
significant negative relationship between the harshness of criminal sanctions and tax evasion. 
Similarly, Crane and Nourzad (1986) found that increases in the fine rate, on average, lead to 
lower underreporting of income, as do Tittle (1980) and Grasmick and Scott (1982) who also 
suggest that respondents prone to evasion are more likely to become more compliant given 
harsher penalties.  
Alm et al. (1992) in their experiment found a positive yet weak effect of fines on compliance. 
The experimental studies performed by Hasseldine et al. (2007), Friedland et al. (1978), and by 
Park and Hyun (2003) also show that severity of sanctions has significant effects on tax evasion. 
However, Alm et al. (1995) point out that fines reach their optimum effectiveness only combined 
with detection probability. Similar results are obtained by Becker et al. (1987) and Beck et al. 
(1991). 
Contrary to intuition, increasing the fines can have the opposite effect by initiating tax evasion 
among other taxpayers. Fjeldstad and Semboja (2001) report a positive relationship from a 
survey study they conducted in Tanzania, where oppressive tax enforcement and harassment of 
taxpayers increased resistance to pay taxes.  
Quite a few studies failed to establish any kind of support for the deterring nature of fine rates on 
individuals’ decisions. For instance, Ali et al. (2001) while looking at US taxpaying behaviour 
between 1980 and 1995 found that although the penalties had increased considerably their 
impact was arguably irrelevant on the levels of tax evasion; though, the reaction to fines by 
groups of taxpayers according to the level of income was notable with high-income earners 
improving slightly their dutiful behaviour. Pommerehne and Weck- Hannemann (1996) found 
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also no impact of the penalty rate in their comparison of tax evasion in different Swiss cantons. 
Baldry (1987) and Webley et al. (1991) in their experiments found also that evasion was 
unaffected by the penalty rate.  
Table 3.3 summarizes studies investigating the relationship between fine rate and tax evasion. 
These studies show that the fine rate as described by the conventional theory has a clear positive 
effect on compliance; though in cases harsh treatment of taxpayers can provide quite contrary 
results. 
Table 3.3 Fine Rate and Tax Evasion 
        
Determinant Theory Empirics Reference 
Fine Rate 
NEGATIVE  
An increase in the 
penalty rate reduces tax 
evasion as it makes 
noncompliance more 
costly 
POSITIVE Fjeldstad and Semboja (2001) 
NEGATIVE 
Friedland et al.(1978) 
Tittle (1980) 
Grasmick and Scott (1982) 
Witte and Woodbury (1985) 
Crane and Nourzad (1986) 
Becker et al. (1987) 
Beck et al. (1991) 
Alm et al. (1992) 
Alm et al. (1995) 
Park and Hyun (2003) 
Hasseldine et al. (2007) 
NO EFFECT 
Webley et al. (1991) 
Baldry (1987)  
Pommerehne and Weck (1996) 
Ali et al. (2001) 
 
Of special interest remains the interaction between the fine and the audit rate. The more complex 
empirical investigations could provide further evidence on this regards. Alm et al. (1992) in one 
of the most reliable tax experiments find that when these two variables are set at levels consistent 
with those from the real world, their deterrent effect is symbolic. This again relates to the need to 
understand the optimum level of fines and audit rates. However, this task is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
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3.3 Institutional Determinants 
In Chapter II we introduced theoretical considerations that favoured inclusion of non-traditional 
determinants. As Frey and Feld (2002) argue, tax evasion/compliance is driven by a 
psychological tax contract between citizens and tax authorities and, in order for the contract to be 
upheld, incentives such as rewards or punishment need to be provided. In addition, loyalties and 
emotional ties that go well beyond transactional exchanges must be taken into account.  
In this section we review some of the most important studies that have empirically investigated 
institutional aspects of tax evasion. We group these studies into three categories, namely trust, 
corruption and costs of compliance. Such categorization is commonly found across the literature 
and with these we capture the fairness, performance, transparency and accountability of 
institutions, which are highlighted by Andreoni et al. (1998). 
At this point we note that most studies treating the impact of trust or corruption on evasion or, 
for that matter, treating the impact of other institutional variables on tax evasion, have focused 
on tax morale or the intrinsic motivation to comply as the dependent variable. In contrast, we 
argue that although tax morale is closely linked to tax evasion, they do not equate to each other. 
They are different given that tax morale is attitude while compliance is behaviour (Torgler, 
2007a). Tax morale is a measure of the extent that citizens consider compliance as their moral 
obligation. Considering it as a moral duty in other words means that there are justified reasons to 
pay taxes besides the legalistic ones introduced in the traditional model (Kirchgassner, 2010). 
Indeed, though the concept of morality in tax evasion was introduced during the 1960s, the 
empirical investigation of such a relationship began quite late, notably since the year 2000 and 
onwards, following a decade of intensive theoretical suggestions during the 1990s (see for 
instance Long and Swinger, 1991; Erard and Feinstein, 1994; Frey, 1997; Andreoni et al. 1998; 
Frey and Feld, 2002). These studies have continuously suggested that moral obligations to be 
truthful as well as the social consequences of being undutiful may add further incentives to 
compliance/noncompliance and hence improve the understanding of decision to evade. These 
factors in turn would solve, the puzzle of tax compliance, or a condition where levels of tax 
compliance do not correspond with the levels of enforcements. 
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The pioneering empirical work on tax morale (such as Torgler, 2007a; and McGee, 2005) has 
treated tax morale as a close substitute for tax evasion. This was done mainly because of the 
difficulties in measuring tax evasion given the individual incentives to conceal cheating. The 
assumption was that, at least qualitatively, the determinants of tax morale could produce relevant 
results for tax evasion; and what could explain tax morale could in fact explain the levels of tax 
evasion. The estimations with tax morale as the dependent variable had both traditional and non-
traditional determinants as independent variables; quite similarly as for tax evasion modelling 
applied, for instance, in Frey and Feld (2002). 
Quite recently however, tax morale has been used an independent determinant of tax evasion. 
We argue that this treatment occurred given the availability of new data to proxy both tax 
evasion and tax morale separately, and hence estimation of tax morale as an independent variable 
in models of of tax evasion. Note that, usually through surveys, tax morale is proxied by 
“justifiability” of taxpayers towards evasion, while tax evasion is measured through perception 
of concealed sales by other firms/individuals. 
In two very recent studies by Torgler et al. (2010) and Alm and McClellan (2012) – arguably the 
leading authors in the field of tax morale – tax morale was treated as an independent variable of 
tax evasion. In Torgler et al. (2010) the research was divided into two stages. In the first stage, a 
model estimating tax evasion as the dependent variable was introduced. Here traditional 
determinants and tax morale were used as independent variables (a similar approach was applied 
in Alm and McClellan, 2012). In this case tax morale acted as a “catch all concept”, reflecting 
and aggregating the linked effects of trust, corruption and other institutional factors. 
Accordingly, given the inclusion of tax morale in the model, other institutional determinants 
were not included. The second stage in Torgler et al. (2010) introduced a model with tax morale 
as the dependent variable, in order to investigate the characteristics that shape the morality of 
compliance. The independent determinants of tax morale were proxies capturing the quality and 
performance of institutions as well as individual characteristics of taxpayers.  
In our empirical investigation for transition economies (Chapter IV and V) the estimated models 
have tax evasion as the dependent variable, while the institutional proxies are introduced as 
independent variables. Tax morale, on its own or as an explanatory variable of tax evasion is not 
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observed in these chapters given the data limitations. In Chapter VI however, we follow the same 
strategy as suggested by the very recent literature. Collection of primary data for Kosovo enables 
us to construct a questionnaire that measure both tax evasion and tax morale; and hence to 
investigate both the relationship between tax morale and tax evasion as well as between tax 
morale and its determinants.  
In this section, given the close relationship between tax morale and tax evasion, we review also 
studies that have treated the impact of institutional determinants on tax morale; which ultimately 
impacts tax evasion. By doing so, we enrich our understanding with respect to institutional 
influences on compliance levels.  
 
3.3.1 Trust  
Torgler (2011) argues that taxpayers perceive their relationship with institutions not only as 
coercive, but also as a necessity for exchange. In case that the exchange does not occur, then 
taxpayers will consider themselves as cheated. If however, taxpayers perceive the way their taxes 
are being spent as efficient, their interests as being represented properly, and the public goods 
they receive as sufficient, then both their identification with the state (national pride) and tax 
morale (voluntarily compliance levels) will increase. This in turn reduces significantly tax 
evasion. Other authors (Jackson and Milliron, 1986; Eriksen and Fallan, 1996; Frey, 1997; and 
Torgler, 2003) have introduced fairness, transparency, fiscal knowledge and treatment as 
relevant factors in establishing trusty relationship between taxpayers and institutions. 
Kucher and Gotte (1998) using Swiss data found that trust does significantly raise the ratio of 
reported tax declarations. Similarly, Frey and Feld (2002) in their empirical analysis for 
Switzerland show that respectful treatment by the tax administrations reduces tax evasion. 
Alm et al. (2005) examine Russian attitudes toward paying taxes. A special feature of their work 
is that it studies tax morale before (1991) during (1995) and after the (1999) transition using data 
from World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Survey (EWS). The dynamic 
changes in Russia offer an excellent opportunity to examine the ways in which the attitudes are 
affected by/reflected in changes in government policies and institutions. They find that all trust 
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proxies have a positive and a statistically significant impact on tax morale. An increase in trust in 
government and an increase in trust in the legal system had considerable marginal effects on tax 
morale.  
Torgler et. al (2008) report that positive attitudes towards tax authorities in Turkey improve 
significantly tax morale. Similar results on the relationship between trust and tax morale are 
found in in Torgler (2003) for Transition Economies; Torgler and Murphy (2004) for Australia; 
Torgler (2005a) and Gavira (2007) for Latin America; Torgler (2007b) in Central and Eastern 
European Countries; Torgler (2011) for Europe; Torgler (2005b) investigating the relationship 
between tax morale and direct democracy; Torgler and Schaltegger (2005) investigating the 
relationship between tax morale and fiscal policy; Torgler (2007a) investigating the relationship 
between tax morale and tax compliance; Torgler and Shneider (2007a) investigating 
determinants of tax morale; Torgler and Shneider (2007b) investigating the relationship between 
tax morale, shadow economy, governance and institutions; Torgler et al. (2010) investigating the 
relationship between compliance, morale and governance; Daude and Melguizo (2010) 
investigating links between representation and compliance; and Alm and McClellan (2012) 
investigating business tax morale. 
Jackson and Milliron (1986, p.137) on the other side recognize the importance of fairness in 
creating a sustainable relationship between taxpayers and institutions. They further argue that tax 
fairness consists of at least two different dimensions: “One dimension appears to involve the 
equity of the trade - the benefits received for the tax dollars given. The other dimension appears 
to involve the equity of the taxpayer’s burden in reference to that of other individuals”. Spicer 
and Becker (1980) in an experiment with around 60 US students found that the percentage of 
taxes evaded was the highest among those who were told that their tax rates were higher than 
average, and lowest among those told their tax rates were lower than average (this relates to the 
“equity in reference to others” as predicted by Jackson and Milliron, 1986). Similarly, Verboon 
and van Dijke (2011) while looking at the relation between fairness considerations and tax 
evasion attitudes using data from a large panel survey among small business owners in 
Netherlands, found that the equally distributive fairness positively affects both compliance 
attitudes (tax evasion) and intentions to comply among entrepreneurs with relatively low 
personal norms (tax morale). Torgler and Murphy (2004) on the other side report a strong 
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increase in tax morale in Austria during the 1990s, as compared to the early 1980s when 
government faced numerous complaints about the existing unfair burden of tax system compared 
to the benefits received (this relates to the “equity of the trade” from Jackson and Milliron, 
1986). A number of other survey research studies have also reported positive correlations 
between perceptions of fiscal inequity and tax evasion (Spicer, 1974; Song and Yarbrough, 
1978). Grasmick and Scott (1982), Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) and Alm et al. (2005) also 
indicate that respondents who believe that the tax system is fair are more likely to commit to 
compliant behaviours.  
Eriksen and Fallan (1996) introduce the importance of fiscal knowledge. They reveal that more 
fiscal knowledge tends to increase perceptions of the fairness of tax systems; hence shrink 
evasive behaviour. The importance of fiscal knowledge for perceived fairness was also reported 
by Okada (2002) when investigating tax evasion in Japan.  
Torgler (2003) on the other side introduces treatment as an important factor in trust relationships 
and evasive behaviour. He argues that those governments that pre-commit with direct democratic 
rules impose restraints on their own power and thus send a signal that taxpayers are seen as 
responsible persons. Studies in this regards (Alm et al.,1999; Feld and Tyran, 2002; Torgler and 
Schaltegger, 2005) have highlighted the importance of voting on tax issues and, consequently, 
for improvements in levels of tax evasion. Similarly, Frey and Eichenberger (1999) argue in 
favour of decentralization as a political tool towards reaching citizens’ needs and improving the 
relationship between both agents. Hug and Sporri (2011) even argue in favour of allowing for 
referendums in order to strengthen the link between trust and tax morale, hence institutions and 
tax compliance. 
Table 3.4 provides a summary of studies treating the relationship between trust and tax evasion 
and/or tax morale; with all of them revealing that the perceived fairness, treatment, transparency 
and accountability all impact the trust of individuals and businesses towards institutions, which 
in turn influences both tax evasion and tax morale.  
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Table 3.4 Trust and Tax Evasion 
        
Determinant Theory Empirics Reference 
Trust 
 
NEGATIVE 
Bordignon (1993) 
NEGATIVE  
An efficient and fair 
system will spawn 
trust; and trust will in 
turn spawn 
compliance. 
Eriksen and Fallan (1996) 
Kucher and Gotte (1998)  
Alm et al.(1999) 
Frey and Eichenberger (1999) 
Feld and Frey (2002) 
Feld and Tyran, 2002 
Okada (2002) 
Frey (2003)  
Torgler (2003) 
Torgler (2004) 
Torgler and Murphy (2004) 
Torgler (2005a) 
Torgler (2005b) 
Torgler and Schaltegger (2005) 
Alm et al. (2005) 
Hanousek and Palda (2006) 
Alm et al. (2006) 
Richardson (2006) 
Gavira (2007) 
Torgler (2007a) 
Torgler and Schaffner (2007) 
Torgler and Shneider (2007a) 
Torgler and Shneider (2007b) 
Nur-tegin (2008) 
Torgler et. al (2008)  
Verboon et. al (2010)  
Torgler et al. (2010) 
Daude and Melguizo (2010) 
Hug and Sporri (2011) 
Torgler (2011) 
Alm and McClellan (2012) 
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3.3.2 Corruption 
According to Adams (2006), the relationship between corruption and tax evasion dates since the 
existence of taxes themselves. Thousands of years ago, Egyptian pharaohs introduced scribes - 
or highly paid tax collectors - in a hope to provide disincentives for bribes and reduce thus 
opportunities for evasion. Even more, a group of special and even highly paid scribes was 
assigned to monitor and control the ordinary scribes working in the field.  
The impact of corruption on tax evasion is twofold; first, if it is related specifically to tax 
administration, it provides more opportunities for taxpayers to exert their noncompliant 
behaviour given the corruptive intention of tax officials. Second, if widespread, corruption 
affects the perception of individuals towards the institutions which, in turn, increases evasive 
behaviour. Tirole (1996) explains that taxpayers that see their government as corrupted see 
evasion as a “vote of dissent”.  
Corruption may arise from both tax payers and tax administration. Gaddy and Ickes (1998) on 
the one hand argue that in some cases taxpayers may opt for developing their “relationship” 
capital with tax the authorities. Hindriks et al. (1999) on the other, argue that corrupt examiners 
may also extort the taxpayers by overstating their real tax liability. In such cases, taxpayers can 
only verify their true liability through very costly (time and monetary) appeals; instead they opt 
for providing bribes.  
The general consensus across the studies is that corruption is positively related to tax evasion. 
Torgler (2003) while investigating the relationship between tax morale and corruption for TEs 
concludes that higher corruption leads to lower levels of tax morale, consequently higher evasive 
rates.  
Similar results on the relationship between corruption and tax morale are found in Torgler (2004) 
for Asia; Torgler and Murphy (2004) for Australia; Torgler (2005a) for Latin America; Torgler 
(2007b) for Central and Eastern European Countries; Torgler et al. (2008) for Turkey; Torgler 
(2011) for Europe; Torgler (2005b) investigating the relationship between tax morale and direct 
democracy; Torgler and Schaltagger (2005) investigating the relationship between tax morale 
and fiscal policy; Torgler (2007a) investigating the relationship between tax morale and tax 
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compliance; Torgler and Shneider (2007a) investigating determinants of tax morale; Torgler and 
Shneider (2007b) investigating the relationship between tax morale, shadow economy, 
governance and institutions; Torgler et al. (2010) investigating the relationship between 
compliance, morale and governance; and Alm and McClellan (2012) investigating business tax 
morale. 
According to Tanzi and Davoodi (2001), economies characterized by higher perceived levels of 
corruption are also characterized by higher levels of noncompliant behaviour. Picur and Riahi-
Blekaoui (2006) find that tax evasion internationally is positively related to the levels of 
institutional bureaucracy and negatively related to the successful control of corruption. A similar 
relationship is found in Pashev (2005) while studying Bulgarian tax evasion and corruption 
opportunities. Joulfaian (2009) while investigating the relationship between corruption and 26 
transition economies argues that business evasion rises with the frequency of tax related bribes; 
moreover evasion rises with bribes to tax officials. Lopez-Claros and Alexoshenko (1998) while 
explaining the problems of the Russian tax system emphasize that the corruption of the Russian 
tax system provides fertile ground for noncompliance. Chattopadhyay and Gupta (2002) while 
studying the income tax compliance of Indian corporations, find also a strong and significant 
influence of corruption. 
Imam and Jacobs (2007) study the impact of corruption on the revenue generating capacity for 
different taxes in the Middle East. They find that countries with the low revenue collection as a 
share of GDP are usually those that have high rates of corruption. Another interesting finding in 
their work is that certain taxes are more affected by corruption than others. Taxes requiring 
frequent interactions between the tax authority and individuals, such as taxes on international 
trade, seem to be prone more to corruption than most other forms of taxation.  
A strong, positive and significant relationship between corruption and evasion is found also in 
Bowles (1999), Sanyal et al. (2000), Fjelsdad (2006), Richardson (2006), McGee and Maranjyan 
(2006), Nur-tegin (2008) and Riahi-Belkaoui (2009). Sanyal (2002) investigates the impact of 
alternative reward schemes on the behavior of corrupt tax officials and the level of corruption, 
concluding that such rewards reduce substantially the level of corruption within tax inspectors. 
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Table 3.5 provides a summary of studies on the relationship between the corruption and tax 
evasion and/or tax morale. Obviously the studies conducted so far support without any doubt the 
theoretical considerations, that higher corruption levels are associated with higher tax evasion. 
Table 3.5 Corruption and Tax Evasion 
        
Determinant Theory Empirics Reference 
Corruption 
 
POSIITVE 
Tirole (1996)  
POSITIVE 
Provides more 
opportunities for 
taxpayers to exert 
their noncompliant 
behaviour 
as well as affects the 
perception of 
individuals towards 
the institutions  
Coddy and Ickes (1998)  
Hindriks et al. (1999)  
Lopez and Alexoshenko (1998)  
Bowles (1999) 
Sanyal et al. (2000) 
Tanzi and Davoodi (2001) 
Chattopadhayay and Gupta (2002)  
Sanyal (2002)  
Torgler (2003) 
Torgler (2004) 
Torgler and Murphy (2004) 
Torgler (2005a) 
Torgler (2005b) 
Pashev (2005) 
Picur and Blekaoui (2005) 
Fjelsdad (2006) 
Richardson (2006) 
Anderson (2006) 
Fjelsdad (2006)  
Mc Gee and Maranjyan (2006) 
Torgler (2007a) 
Torgler (2007b) 
Torgler and Schaffner (2007) 
Torgler and Shneider (2007a) 
Torgler and Shneider (2007b) 
Imam and Jacobs (2007) 
Nur-tegin (2008) 
Torgler et al. (2010) 
Belkaoui (2009) 
Joulfain (2009) 
Torgler et al. (2010) 
Torgler (2011) 
Alm and McClellan (2012) 
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3.3.3 Compliance costs 
Arthur Laffer, the author of the Laffer Curve, in a very recent publication Laffer et al. (2011) 
argues that the complexity of the tax code in the US has increased substantially compliance costs 
given that businesses, large and small, hire teams of accountants, lawyers and tax professionals 
to track, measure and pay taxes. This in turn causes individuals and businesses to change their 
behaviour in response to tax policies, starting from the composition of their income, location, 
timing, volume and eventually reporting i.e. evasion. Besides complexity, there are of course 
other sources of compliance costs. For instance, in transition and /or developing countries, the 
bureaucracy of public administration, specifically of tax administration, also makes compliance 
costly. Franzoni (2008) argues that high compliance costs not only tilt the cost-benefit analysis 
towards evasion, but they may also generate antipathy, distort taxpayers moral considerations 
towards evasion or even make them respond with evasion as a form of punishment for the tax 
administration. Further he argues that when taxpayers turn to tax experts, their attitudes towards 
evasion can be influenced given the superior knowledge of enforcement patterns by such experts. 
Slemrod (1985) argues that taxpayers may eliminate compliance costs (in the short run) by 
simply not filing returns. Krause (2000) argues that tax complexity also undermines the ability of 
tax collectors to distinguish between intentional evasion, honest misinterpretation of the tax code 
and legitimate tax avoidance; hence increasing audit costs too. In this regards, Gale and 
Holtzblatt (2000) elaborate a broader concept of compliance costs, which accounts not only for 
costs related to the taxpayer’s reporting but also for institutional and societal costs. Andreoni et 
al. (1998) on the other side, underline the difficulty in setting the optimal cost of compliance 
(note, no compliance has zero cost). If the tax laws are vague and ambiguous taxpayers find it 
difficult to comply intentionally or non-intentionally; similarly if the laws are detailed and 
precise to the point of being unwieldy and difficult to learn, taxpayers incur additional costs in 
time or money.  
The empirical investigation on the relationship of the complexity and costs of the tax system to 
compliance is scarce, although the vast majority of studies have supported the theoretical 
expectation that higher compliance costs increase evasive incentives. Clotfelter (1983) is 
amongst the first to empirically reveal that the complexity of the tax system is associated with 
greater underreporting of tax in US. Klepper and Nagin (1989) have found that in the US tax 
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assistants, present given the complexity, encourage compliance with regards to clear items but 
discourage it with regards to ambiguous ones. Potas (1993) suggests that the simplification of 
Australian tax laws would result in a more efficient tax collection system. Sklenar and Burger 
(2006) while investigating the implications of Slovak tax reforms oriented towards simplification 
of the tax system, find significant improvements on the level of tax evasion. Richardson (2006) 
in a cross country investigation of the determinants of tax evasion finds that complexity was the 
most important determinant of tax evasion and that the lower the level of complexity the higher 
the compliance. Nur-tegin (2008) while investigating the determinants of business tax evasion in 
transition economies finds that the complexity of the tax system, or the cost of compliance, 
confirms general expectations although the size of the effect is very small. A positive 
relationship between compliance costs and tax evasion is found in Milliron (1985), Milliron and 
Toy (1988) and Collins et al. (1992). 
Contrary to intuition and theoretical background, Christie and Holzner (2006) while investigating 
tax evasion in 29 European countries find that complexity is negatively related with tax evasion 
for personal income tax. They reach such results by comparing compliance levels in two Baltic 
states that have adopted less complex taxes i.e. a flat tax, with two Western Europe states that 
apply more complex systems. Table 3.6 provides a summary of studies investigating the 
relationship between compliance costs and tax evasion. Again, the vast majority of investigations 
support the theoretical considerations.  
Table 3.6 Compliance Costs and Tax Evasion 
        
Determinant Theory Empirics Reference 
Compliance 
Costs 
NEGATIVE  
Compliance costs tilt the 
cost-benefit analysis 
towards evasion, and may 
also generate resentment, 
distort taxpayers moral 
considerations towards 
evasion 
POSITIVE Christie and Holzner (2006)  
NEGATIVE 
Clotfelter (1983) 
Milliron (1985) 
Milliron and Toy (1988) 
Klepper and Nagin (1989)  
Collins et al. (1992) 
Potas (1993) 
Franzoni (1999) 
Richardson (2006) 
Sklenar and Burger (2006) 
Nur-tegin (2008) 
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3.4 Socio-Cultural Determinants 
The third group of determinants consists of social, cultural, demographic and individual 
characteristics of taxpayers. The importance and the relationship of individual characteristics on 
compliant behaviour has been acknowledged and developed mainly by social psychologists 
(Torgler and Schaltegger, 2005). These studies have argued that social stakes vary according to 
individual characteristics and with them varies also the compliant behaviour; taxpayers with 
higher stakes in social capital tend to be more compliant (Title, 1980).  In this section we review 
studies that have considered the impact of age, gender, education, social norms and other 
individual characteristics (such as income, religion and marital status) in the context of tax 
evasion. As argued so far, the vast majority of empirical investigation relates to individual tax 
evasion; however, evidence on individual characteristics can be adapted to the business context. 
We argue that this adaptation is particularly appropriate both for our source of data (responses to 
questionnaires) and for SMEs (accounting for most of the respondents in Chapters IV and V and 
all of the respondents in Chapter VI). SME owners and/or managers are after all individuals and, 
in the absence of research evidence to the contrary, we assume that they respond in similar ways 
to questions on business taxation as they would to questions on individual taxation. 
 
3.4.1 Age 
Amongst the most common findings in the tax evasion literature relates to the impact of the 
taxpayer’s age on compliance; the older the taxpayer, lower the evasion. Torgler and  
Schaltegger (2005, p.12) suggest that elderly people “have acquired greater social stakes over 
the years of property or social status, and thus show a stronger dependency on the reactions 
from others, so that the potential costs of sanctions increase”. Social scientists underline the fact 
that usually older members of society are more risk averse and are strongly attached to 
community (Tittle, 1980). We recall that risk characteristics of taxpayers are essential in 
assessing compliance behaviour. 
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The empirical investigation so far has supported the theoretical set up that people become more 
ethical and less inclined to be risk takers as they get older (see Vogel, 1974; Friedland et al., 
1978; Tittle, 1980; Aitken and Bonneville, 1980; Groenland and van Veldhoven, 1983; Kaplan 
and Reckers, 1985; Witte and Woodbury, 1985; Baldry, 1987; Dubin and Wilde, 1988; Feinstein, 
1991; Grasmick et al., 1991; Alm, et. al. 1992; Hanno and Violette, 1996; Pommerehne and 
Weck- Hannemann, 1996). Ruegger and King (1992) found that ethical differences are present 
within various age groups. McGee and Tyler (2007) found that people become more opposed to 
tax evasion as they get older. The same conclusion was reached by Alm and Torgler (2004). 
Devos (2005) using a survey of 470 tertiary taxation students finds a statistically significant and 
negative relationship between age and tax evasion. Ritsema et al. (2003) based on the 1997 
Arkansas tax penalty amnesty programme also find that age is a factor for intentional evaders, 
with younger taxpayers being less complaint. Ipek et al. (2012) in their study of Turkish 
taxpayers report similar results.  
The empirical investigation on the relationship between age and tax morale has also concluded 
similar relationship: in Torgler (2004) for Asian Countries; Torgler and Murphy (2004) for 
Australia, Torgler (2005a); Gavira (2007) and Daude and Melguizo (2010) for Latin America; 
Torgler (2007b) for Central and Eastern European Countries; Torgler et al. (2008) for Turkey; 
Hug and Spori (2011) for Eastern Europe; Torgler (2005b) investigating the relationship between 
tax morale and direct democracy; Torgler and Schalteger (2005) investigating the relationship 
between tax morale and fiscal policy; Torgler (2007a) investigating the relationship between tax 
morale and tax compliance; Torgler and Shneider (2007a) investigating determinants of tax 
morale; and Torgler et al. (2010) investigating the relationship between compliance, morale and 
governance. 
Contrary to the common findings, Clotfelter (1983) found a curvilinear relationship between age 
and compliance. His empirical investigation using data from TCMP in US suggested that the 
youngest and the oldest had the highest degrees of compliance, with the middle age group being 
most evasive. Jackson and Milliron (1986) question the representativeness of the database used 
by Clotefelter (1983). Their argument is that young taxpayers who are not subject of 
withholdings are less likely to file taxes. If so, then this group was underrepresented in the IRS 
database. 
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Table 3.7 Age and Tax Evasion 
        
Determinant Theory Empirics Reference 
Age 
 
NEGATIVE 
Vogel, (1974) 
Friedland et al. (1978) 
Aitken and Bonneville (1980) 
Groenland and Veldhoven (1983) 
Kaplan and Reckers (1985) 
NEGATIVE  
People become 
more ethical and 
less risk takers as 
they get old, hence 
evade less 
Witte and Woodbury (1985) 
Baldry (1987) 
Dubin and Wilde (1988) 
Feinstein (1991) 
Grasmick et al. (1991) 
Alm, et. al. (1992) 
Ruegger and King (1992) 
Hanno and Violette (1996) 
Pommerehne and Weck (1996) 
Ritsema et al. (2003) 
Torgler (2004) 
Torgler and Murphy (2004) 
Devos (2005)  
Torgler and  Schaltegger (2005) 
Torgler (2005a) 
Torgler (2005b) 
Gaviria (2007) 
McGee and Tyler (2007) 
Torgler (2007a) 
Torgler and Schaffner (2007) 
Torgler and Shneider (2007a) 
Torgler and Shneider (2007b) 
Torgler et. al (2008)  
Ipek et al. (2009) 
Torgler et al. (2010) 
Daude and Melguizo (2011) 
Torgler (2011) 
CURVLINEAR Clotfeter (1983) 
NO EFFECT 
Spicer (1974) 
Minor (1978) 
Song and Yarbrough (1978) 
Spicer and Becker (1980) 
Yankelovich and White (1984) 
Jackson and Jones (1985) 
Mason and Calvin (1984) 
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There are a few studies that report no influence of age on tax compliance (for survey results, see 
Spicer, 1974; Minor, 1978; Song and Yarbrough, 1978; Yankelovich and White 1984; Mason 
and Calvin, 1984; for experiments, see Spicer and Becker, 1980; Jackson and Jones, 1985). 
Tabke 3.7 provides a summary of studies treating the impact of age on evasion; with vast 
majority supporting a negative relationship. 
 
3.4.2 Gender 
In addition to economic, legal, philosophical, political, psychological, sociological, 
anthropological, and historic perspectives, gender differences have been studied specifically also 
in regards to tax evasion (Mc Gee, 2012). The argument with respect to gender differences is 
similar to the one related to the age; with female taxpayers being more risk averse and having 
higher social considerations. Tittle (1980) argues that “women are less self-reliant” and more 
averse to risks, hence tend to show higher levels of compliance. Gilligan (1993) on the other 
hand suggests that men and women may differ in moral development, with the former having 
higher levels. 
Wide tax research provides a strong support for gender differences in tax compliance (for survey 
studies see, e.g., Vogel 1974, Mason and Calvin 1978, Minor 1978, Aitken and Bonneville 1980, 
Tittle 1980; for experiments, Spicer and Becker 1980, Spicer and Hero 1985, Baldry 1987). 
Torgler and Valev (2006) while analysing the WVS for the period 1981-1984, established strong 
gender differences with women being significantly less likely to agree that corruption and 
cheating on taxes can be justified. In particular, a comprehensive study conducted by Oxley 
(1993) in New Zealand reported that women were more often compliers in comparison with men 
and less often tax evaders. In a survey of American taxpayers Hite (1997) focused on the 
interaction between gender and education. Female respondents with college degrees tended to be 
more tolerant of evasion than females without college degrees. In contrast, males tended to be 
less tolerant of non-compliance as their education levels increased.  
Jackson and Jaouen (1989) through their experiments compared the effect of communicating 
either a sanction threat or a conscience appeal to prospective jurors’ tax compliance attitudes. 
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They found that females were more responsive to conscience appeals than to sanction threats; 
and within the conscience appeal group, females were significantly more responsive than males. 
Friendly persuasion, in contrast to deterrent measures like tax audits and penalties on 
underreported taxes, is also found to be more significant amongst female respondents in Chung 
and Trivedi (2003). Women in the friendly persuasion group reported significantly higher 
income compared to men in the same group.  
Sour (2009) using experimental evidence show that gender is the most significant socio-
demographic variable that explains evasion of personal income tax in Mexico.   
Kastlunger et al. (2010) used decision-making experiments to investigate the tax evasion of 
women. In 60 experimental periods, participants were endowed with a certain amount of money 
representing income upon which they had to pay taxes. They were audited with a certain 
probability and fined in the case of detected evasion. Both demographic sex and gender-role 
orientation were significantly related to tax evasion. Women and “less male-typical individuals” 
were more compliant than men and “more male-typical individuals”. Women and men also 
differed regarding their taxpaying strategies. Whereas for men audits increased subsequent 
evasion, women’s tax payments were less affected by prior audits. Traditionally females have 
been identified with conforming rates, moral restrictions and more conservative life patterns.  
Glosser (1984) offered empirical evidence that indicated that a new generation of independent 
non-traditional woman may be closing the compliance gap with men. Today, findings support 
the idea of a very narrow gap between man and woman taxpayers, although this can be less true 
for transition countries. Some studies even report the opposite. The study by Houston and Tran 
(2001) indicates a higher proportion of tax evasion committed by women than men. Ahmad et al. 
(2010) on the other side, studying Malaysian taxpayers, found that gender is not a factor that 
influences tax compliance behaviours. Both genders in their approach showed a high level of 
compliance. They argue that when women make up a major portion of the community, they 
become more self-confident, which turns attitudes that are used to be labelled as passive into 
attitudes that are usually possessed by men.  
A positive relationship between male (as compared to female) respondents and tax morale is 
established in: Torgler (2004) for Asian Countries; Torgler and Murphy (2004) for Australia; 
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Gerxhani and Kuiper (2004); Torgler (2005a) for Latin America; Torgler (2011) for Europe; 
Torgler (2007b) in Central and Eastern European Countries; McGee and Bose (2008) in Egypt, 
Iran and Jordan; Torgler and Schaltegger (2005) investigating the relationship between tax 
morale and fiscal policy; Torgler (2007a) investigating the relationship between tax morale and 
tax compliance;  Torgler et al. (2008) investigating tax morale in Turkey; Torgler et al. (2010) 
investigating the relationship between compliance, morale and governance; and Daude and 
Melguizo (2010) investigating links between representation and compliance. 
Table 3.8 Gender and Tax Evasion 
        
Determinant Theory Empirics Reference 
Female 
 
NEGATIVE 
Spicer and Becker (1980) 
NEGATIVE 
Female taxpayers 
have higher rates of 
risk averseness and 
higher social 
considerations, henc 
evade less 
Glosser (1984)  
Spicer and Hero (1985) 
Baldry (1987) 
Jackson and Jaouen (1989) 
Hite (1997)  
Chung and Trivedi (2003) 
Torgler (2004)  
Torgler and Murphy (2004) 
Gerxhani and Kuiper (2004)  
Torgler (2005a) 
Torgler and Valev (2006)  
Mc Gee and Preobragenskaya (2007) 
Torgler (2007a) 
Torgler (2007b) 
Torgler and Schaffner (2007) 
Torgler et al. (2008)  
McGee and Bose (2008) 
Sour (2009) 
Kastlunger et al. (2010) 
Torgler et al. (2010)  
Daude and Melguizo (2010) 
Torgler (2011) 
McGee (2012) 
POSITIVE Houston and Tran (2001) 
SAME Ahmad et al. (2010)  
 
As can be seen from the Table 3.8, where a summary of studies treating the relationship between 
gender differences and tax evasion is presented, the overwhelming support is on the side of a 
negative relationship between female taxpayers and the decision to evade.  
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3.4.3 Education 
Amongst many factors, the tax evasion literature relates taxpayers’ ability to comprehend and 
comply with tax laws to education. Two opposing effects are observed commonly. On the one 
hand, fiscal knowledge may positively influence the practice of evasion, as more educated 
people may tend to better understand more compliance benefits. On the other hand, more 
educated people understand the importance of taxes better, which increases their level of 
voluntary compliance (Groenland and van Veldhoven, 1983). The level of education is 
particularly important at the firm level. As Vogel (1974) indicated, less educated taxpayers need 
more assistance, which in turn increases costs of compliance and thus evasive behaviour. Lewis 
(1982) also implied that well educated people know more about taxes, regulations and other 
government obligations, but at the same time they recognize more the importance of the benefits 
and services that government supplies hence have higher compliant rates. Conversely, Eriksen 
and Fallan (1996) argue in favour of the possibility that people with lower education, due to the 
lower opportunity cost of their time, have acquired a higher degree of knowledge related to 
taxation. 
The evidence on the relationship between education and tax evasion is mixed. Dubin and Wilde 
(1988) found a significant negative relation between evasion and educational level; and so did 
Eriksen and Fallan (1996). In their experiment, Song and Yarbrough (1978) included education 
as a background variable. They find that those taxpayers with more fiscal knowledge had more 
positive tax ethics scores than those with lower fiscal knowledge. The study conducted by Chan 
et al. (2000) reveal that higher education is directly linked to an increased likelihood of 
compliance. Houston and Tran (2001) also find that Australians without tertiary education tend 
to have higher evasive behaviour than their counterparts with tertiary education. Richardson 
(2006) in his cross country investigation of tax evasion reports a strong and negative relationship 
of education with evasion. A positive relationship between education and tax morale, hence a 
negative relationship with tax evasion, is found, amongst others, in Torgler (2005b), Torgler and 
Schaltegger (2005) Frey and Torgler (2007), and Torgler (2007a).  
In contrast to these findings, research by Wallschutzky (1984) and Witte and Woodbury (1985) 
show a significant and positive relationship between education and evasion, arguing that 
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educated individuals can also respond by evading if they feel tax treatment to be unfair. Their 
findings were supported by Beron et al. (1992) and Ritsema et al. (2003). Knowledge helps also 
tackle the problem of better understanding complex tax systems. Scholz and Pinney (1993) argue 
that less educated taxpayers find the complexity of tax system more difficult than others, hence 
are more likely to evade.  
To make the relationship even more ambiguous, some findings have found no correlation 
between levels of education and tax evasion (Dubin et al. 1987; Dubin et al. 1990; Wilson and 
Sheffrin, 2005). Torgler and Schaltegger (2005) conclude that “based on the opposing 
arguments, it is not surprising that the results show an ambivalent picture”. This can also be seen 
from a summary of studies treating tax evasion and education in Table 3.9 below; with no clear 
consensus being established so far. 
Table 3.9 Education and Tax Evasion 
        
Determinant Theory Empirics Reference 
Education 
AMBIGUOUS 
POSITIVE 
Wallschurzky (1984)  
On the one hand, fiscal 
knowledge may positively 
influence the practice of 
evasion, as more educated 
people may tend to better 
understand the 
opportunities for evading 
tax obligations. On the 
other hand, more educated 
people understand the 
importance of taxes better, 
which increases their level 
of voluntary compliance 
Witte and Woodbury (1985)  
Beron et al. (1992) 
Ritsema et al. (2003) 
Scholz and Pinney (1993) 
NEGATIVE 
Dubin and Wilde (1988)  
Eriksen and Fallan (1996) 
Song and Yarbrough (1978)  
Chan et al. (2000) 
Houston and Tran (2001) 
Richardson (2006) 
Torgler (2005b) 
Frey and Torgler (2007) 
Torgler (2007a) 
Torgler (2007b) 
Torgler and Schaffner (2007) 
NO EFFECT 
Dubin et al. (1987) 
Dubin et al. (1990) 
  Wilson and Sheffirin (2005) 
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3.4.4 Social Norms 
Andreoni (et al. (1998) in one of the most comprehensive tax evasion theoretical reviews, 
highlight the importance of psychological theories that are closely related to tax evasion. They 
cite Erard and Feinstein (1994) who introduce the concepts of guilt and shame into the context of 
tax compliance. They define social norms as shared understandings about actions that are 
obligatory, permitted or forbidden. Cullis et al. (2011) while citing Torgler (2003) argue that 
social norms can be mediated in two ways: one is the intrinsic value derived by being true to 
oneself; and the other one is the extrinsic value derived by conformation to others. In fact, 
conformation to others has been acknowledged by Cowell (1990) who argues that when people 
evade, there is a social stigma. The stigma effect is small if most evade and evasion is not in fact 
discouraged (first equilibrium); however, when few evade the stigma effect is great and evasion 
is discouraged (second equilibrium). Franzoni (1999) argues that the change from one 
equilibrium to the other takes the form of a “non-compliance epidemic” as, if more people start 
to cheat, the social stigma decreases and evasion spreads to an ever larger fraction of the 
population.  
The stigma effect, in fact, is closely related to peer influence. Jackson and Milliron (1986) argue 
that peers are usually taxpayers’ close associates and include friends, relatives and colleagues. 
Grasmick and Scott (1982) indicate that respondents with peers involved in non lawful activities 
are more likely to be non compliant. Torgler (2003) finds that compliance is greater in societies 
with a stronger sense of social cohesion. Andvig and Moene (1990) argue in their model that it is 
individually more costly to be honest in a country where unlawful activity is common. 
Supporting empirical evidence is found in Chau and Lung (2009), where cross-country 
behavioural and cultural differences in regards to tax evasion are also studied; and in Alm and 
Torgler (2006) when cultural differences between Europe and USA are considered for tax 
morale. Hofstede (1991) has found significant differences between US and Chinese citizens in 
terms of social values and behaviour towards tax evasion. Cummings et al. (2005) combine 
experimental and survey data from the US, Botswana, and South Africa to investigate whether 
cross-cultural differences can explain tax compliance behaviour across these countries. Their 
results indicate that the cultural differences observed in these three countries have a strong and 
significant impact on tax evasion.  
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On the other side Chan et al. (2000) indicate that the culture of the taxpayers has no impact on 
taxpayer compliance efforts. Experimental findings of Brandts et al. (1997) on voluntary 
compliance in countries like Japan, Netherlands, Spain, and the United States fail also to 
establish any cultural differences. 
Table 3.10 provides a summary of few studies that controlled for the impact of social norms on 
tax evasion.  
Table 3.10 Social Norms and Tax Evasion 
        
Determinant Theory Empirics Reference 
Social Norms 
When people evade, 
there is a social stigma. 
The stigma effect is 
small if most evade and 
evasion is not in fact 
discouraged; however 
when few evade the 
stigma effect is great and 
evasion is discouraged.  
EFFECT 
Andvig and Moene (1990) 
Hofstede (1991) 
Torgler (2003) 
Cummings et al. (2004) 
Cummings et al. (2005) 
Alm and Torgler (2006) 
Chau and Lung (2009) 
NO EFFECT 
Brandts et al. (1997) 
Chan et al. (2000) 
  
 
3.4.5 Other socio-cultural and individual characteristics 
Income level ~ Studies on individual tax evasion have, in cases, focused also on the relationship 
between taxpayer’s income level and the level of tax evasion. This relationship however, 
received much lessen attention by researchers since, at least theoretically, it was not expected to 
yield any novel relationship beyond the one established within the framework of the tax rate and 
tax evasion. After all, variations on tax rates have similar impact as variations on taxpayer’s 
income; both tax rate and income level impact the wealth of individuals in similar direction and 
with that risk behaviour and attitudes towards tax evasion. Slemrod et al. (2001) argues that rich 
people can simply afford much easily the fine imposed compared to other income groups; this in 
turn means that they are less risk averse and more evasive. In addition, they argue that 
individuals from high income groups face higher earnings per one unit of income if they decide 
to evade, although at some point the economic utility from undertaking such action declines. 
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Most empirical investigations in this regard have observed higher evasion rates amongst higher 
income earners. A positive relationship between the taxpayer’s income level and tax evasion was 
found in Slemrod (1985) analysis of the US Treasury Tax File for the year 1977; in Crane and 
Nourzad (1985) analysing US aggregate time series data for the period 1947 to 1981; the Crane 
and Nourzad (1990) analysis of amnesty data for the state of California; in the Clotfelter (1983) 
TCMP analysis for the year 1969; in Ali et al. (2001) analysing US time series for the period 
1980-1995; in Lang et al. (1997) for 33 000 West German households’ data in 1983; and in 
experimental studies by Baldry (1987) and Anderhub et al. (2001). In contrast, a negative 
relationship was found in Christian (1990), the Alm et al. (1992) experiment, Fishlow and 
Friedman (1994), Dubin et al. (1990) and Richardson and Sawyer (2001). No effect was found in 
Togler and Schreider (2007a) using WVS for Belgium, Spain and Switzerland; the Feinstein 
(1991) TCMP study for US; or in the Park and Hyun (2003) laboratory experiment for South 
Korea. Few studies have established quite interesting relationships. For instance Witte and 
Woodbury (1983) using TCMP 1969 data suggest that tax evasion is related to income in a non-
linear way, with non-compliance at its greatest at very low and very high income levels. Similar 
nonlinear results are reported by Mason and Lowry (1981). All these studies digest the 
inconsistent evidence on the link between income level and evasive behaviour; similar to the one 
between tax rate and tax evasion.  
Income source ~ is another common determinant found amongst tax compliance researchers. As 
Groves (1958) argues in one of the earliest tax studies, greater evasive opportunity mainly arises 
from self-employment and other income sources not subject to withholding taxes. Slemrod 
(2007) argues that income subject to withholding and to a lesser extent, income subject to 
information reporting has the highest compliance ratios. Similar findings were reported by 
Pissarides and Webber (1989) for the United Kingdom (UK). Vogel’s (1974) survey in Sweden 
reports that self-employed taxpayers are more likely to doubt the purpose of taxpaying. Surveys 
by Aitken and Bonneville (1980) and Groenland and Voldhoven (1983) find that taxpayers who 
are self-employed are more likely to commit various forms of tax evasion. Houston and Tran 
(2001) and Richardson (2006) also report that income source is significantly related to the tax 
evasion. Fjeldstad and Semboja (2001) while analyzing tax evasion on Tanzania find that the 
self-employed have more opportunities to hide their income compared to individuals subject to 
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withholding. Self-employed, independent traders and farmers count for the groups of lowest 
compliance ratios based from the studies of Boumeister (1982) and Wallschutzky (1984). 
Religion ~ Wide tax literature has also investigated the religious beliefs of tax payers. Anderson 
(1988) cites Adam Smith (1759) in the “Theory of Moral Sentiments”, where religiosity is 
considered to be internal moral enforcement mechanism. Torgler (2007a) on the other side cites 
Freud (1927) who sees religion as non-rational or even irrational and hence irrelevant for shaping 
moral considerations. McGee and Smith (2007) refer to studies that have linked ethical 
consideration of tax evasion in various religions. They cite Murtaza and Ghazanfar (1998), 
McGee (1998a) and McGee (1999) for Islamic literarure; Cohn (1998) and Tamari (1998) for 
Jewish literature; Gronbacher (1998), Schansberg (1998), McGee (1994) and McGee (1998b) for 
Christian literature; and Smith and Kimball (1998) for the Mormon perspective. To date 
empirical investigation, though rare, of religiosity and tax evasion has found evidence to 
consider religiosity as a relevant factor on tax morale and consequently on tax evasion. Torgler 
(2007a) used the WVS (1995–1997) covering more than 30 countries found a positive 
relationship between compliance and religiosity. Strong effects have been observed especially 
for those people who had a religious education and for those who are actively involved in 
religious organizations. Similar results were observed in Grasmick et al. (1991) for the US. 
Marital Status ~ Another predominant factor investigated within the group of tax evasion 
determinants is the marital status of taxpayer, which similarly to age and gender is believed to 
cause higher social capital and higher risk averseness (see Tittle 1980; Torgler and Schaltegger 
2005). Yet the strongest evidence comes from two US studies making use of TCMP data, 
Clotfelter (1983) and Feinstein (1991), who found that noncompliance is more common and of 
greater magnitude among married taxpayers. 
We note that some of these characteristics are common only for individual tax evasion research 
as in case of business investigation they rather become less relevant. For instance, the source of 
income or the level of income do not provide any relevant information when treating business tax 
evasion; they are important, however, when investigating individual tax compliance.  
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3.5 Macroeconomic Determinants 
In addition to the conventional, institutional, socio-cultural and demographic determinants, 
cross-country and within country time-series estimations (for both individual and business tax 
evasion) have also controlled for the impact of macroeconomic determinants on tax evasion. We 
note, however, that given the lack of time series and/or cross country data, aggregate-level 
investigations of business and individual tax evasion are scarce. Considering the intention of this 
thesis to conduct, amongst others, a cross country investigation on tax evasion, we will provide a 
brief summary of the most relevant studies that have controlled for GDP per capita, 
unemployment and inflation; as the three most important and most commonly studied 
macroeconomic determinants.  
GDP per capita ~ Most of the studies indicate that increasing income at national level increases 
also the overall economic development of a country and, with that, also compliance levels. 
Chelliah (1971) argues that higher per capita income reflects a higher level of development 
which, in turn, means not only a greater willingness to pay taxes but also a greater capacity to 
collect taxes.  Other studies suggested that those taxpayers who have better living standards tend 
to create stronger bonds with compliant attitudes towards social systems (Hinrichs, 1966, Tanzi 
1987, Ghura, 1998). Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984), moreover, argue that in countries with 
low per capita income people tend to hold more than just one job, yet tax reporting is more likely 
to be related only to the first job. Boame (2009) further argues that lower levels of per capita 
income involve reduction in cash flows which, in turn, may give rise to tax payment and 
collection problems. Sookram and Watson (2005) using data from Trinidad and Tobago for the 
period 1960-2000 found that per capita income had a negative relationship with tax evasion in 
the short run. However, in the long run this variable was not statistically significant and even had 
a positive relationship with tax evasion. Contrary to these findings, Feige and Cebula (2009), 
studying US taxpayers’ attitudes towards compliance for the period 1960-2008, find a positive 
relationship between GDP per capita and tax evasion, suggesting, contrary to the intuition, that a 
rise in per capita income increases evasion.  
Unemployment rate ~ It is widely believed that an increase in unemployment is usually 
associated with reduced income that, consequently, increases levels of tax evasion. Furthermore, 
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an increase in cash payments caused by an increase in unemployment (as individuals may switch 
to the “hidden” economy) may give rise to problems related to tax collection. Alm and Yunus 
(2009) while empirically investigating US data for the years 1979 to 1997 find a statistically 
significant and positive relationship between unemployment and the level of evasion; suggesting 
that the evasion increases in times of economic recession. They further argue that in periods with 
high unemployment rates individuals work in the underground economy for cash payments, 
which are usually not reported to tax authorities. Similar results are found in Dubin et al. (1987), 
investigating US IRS data for the years 1977 through 1985; in Jou (1992), analysing US state-
level data for the period 1976-1989; and in Cebula and Feige (2009), investigating also IRS data 
for the period 1960-2008. Contrary to expectations, Boame (2009), using aggregate 
macroeconomic time-series data from 1987 to 2003 for Canadian taxpayers, found that an 
increase in unemployment rate has a negative and statistically significant effect on tax evasion. 
Inflation ~ Views of the impact of inflation on tax evasion are summarised in two opposing 
groups. Fishburn (1981), amongst many, argues that inflation has a positive relationship with tax 
evasion, as the decision to evade can be affected by the attempt of taxpayers to restore their 
purchasing power. Tanzi (1980) on the other side argues that taxpayers’ have an incentive to 
delay tax payments for future high inflation periods, suggesting thus a negative relationship 
between inflation and tax evasion. Crane and Nourzad (1986), investigating the relationship 
between inflation and aggregate income tax evasion in US for the period 1947-1981, found that 
an increase in the inflation rate by one percentage point increases the underreported amount of 
income by more than half a billion dollars. They further argue that tax authorities should increase 
their efforts during inflationary periods. Fishlow and Friedman (1994), investigating the cases of 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile, also establish a significant and positive relationship between 
inflation and tax evasion. Das-Gupta, et al. (1995) on the other side found a negative and 
significant effect of inflation on tax evasion while empirically investigating income tax evasion 
in India.  
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3.6 Firm Characteristics 
We have already argued that business characteristics are the least observed determinants in the 
tax evasion literature. The lack of research on business tax evasion is unfortunate, especially 
given the fact that in most countries the bulk of taxes is paid by firms and firms account for the 
bulk of tax evasion too (McCaffery and Slemrod, 2004; Crocker and Slemrod, 2005; Chang and 
Lai, 2004; Nur-tegin, 2008). The purpose of this thesis is to fill this gap by investigating 
determinants of business tax evasion in transition economies. We conduct a more thorough 
review of studies investigating business tax evasion in TEs in Chapter V of this thesis. At this 
point we review the few studies that have conducted similar investigation so far in other 
countries as well. We focus on size, legal status and sectoral activities. 
Size ~ Wallace (2002) argues that smaller firms tend to be more evasive; even if small start-up 
firms act in good faith, compliance with a complex tax system might be too expensive for them. 
Slemrod (2007) while investigating businesses within the TCMP of the US provides evidence 
suggesting that the noncompliance rate for corporations relative to their size is “U-shaped”, with 
medium-sized businesses among the set of large companies having the lowest rate of evasion. 
Rice (1992) on the other side did not find any association between firm size and tax evasion in 
the US; however, he concluded that managers of corporations whose profit performance is below 
its industry norm may utilize tax evasion as a strategy to cut costs. In contrast, high-profit 
companies may take advantage of their greater ability to underreport income without being 
audited. Nur-tegin (2008), investigating business tax evasion in transition economies for the year 
2002, provides empirical findings that support the idea that smaller firms tend to comply with 
taxes to a lesser degree. The coefficient on the dummy for smaller firms in his study is positive, 
sizable in magnitude, and statistically significant at the one percent level. This result reflects the 
belief that it is easier for small firms to become “invisible” vis-à-vis tax authorities. Joulfaian 
(2009) while using the same dataset fails to find any significant relationship between size 
(measured by amount of sales instead of number of employees) and tax evasion. Perhaps the 
information used to proxy firm’s size is the main reason behind this discrepancy.  
Legal status ~ To our understanding, legal status as a determinant of business tax compliance is 
studied only in two papers; Nur-tegin (2008) and Joulfaian (2009). Both studies argue that 
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compared to individual/family owners, i.e. sole proprietorships, less evasion is reported by 
corporate owners and partnerships. The findings suggest that organizational choices are 
important for observing evasive behaviour. According to Joulfaian (2009) corporations, 
particularly those listed on an exchange or of foreign nationality, conceal less of their activities 
than do other forms of businesses. A more compliant behaviour from foreign firms is also 
observed in Nur-tegin (2008) regardless of legal status. 
Sectoral activities ~ In one of the most important reviews of tax compliance, Andreoni et al. 
(1998) cite the TCMP report of 1985, which has indicated that amongst sole proprietors, those 
who engaged in sales from fixed locations, such as automobile dealers, stores or restaurants, tend 
to understate tax liability considerably more than those in transportation, communication, 
utilities or retail sales. The last noncompliance group consists of business filers in finance, 
agriculture and trade. Differences across sectors are also established in a World Bank (2009) 
study for Ukraine, where the scope of unreported income was found to be varying within 
economic sectors; with enterprises engaged in trade being relatively more likely to underreport 
income as compared to services, construction, industry or transport. No sectoral differences are 
found in Joulfaian (2009) while investigating business tax evasion in transition economies. 
Similarly Mickiewicz et al. (2012), investigating the attitudes of Latvian businesses towards tax 
evasion, found no sectoral differences. They found that ‘other sectors’ and ‘wholesale’ categories 
become significant and positive in some of the specifications, but, according to them, this is hard 
to interpret. Given the unclear picture established so far, further investigation of sectoral 
differences becomes highly important. In Chapter V of this thesis we investigate sectoral 
differences as part of the firm characteristics. The general intuition is that sectors with higher 
amounts of cash transactions are more prone to evasion, given the inability of tax administration 
to identify properly tax obligations in such circumstances. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter we have reviewed the empirical investigations conducted in the field of tax 
evasion (mainly) from an individual perspective but also from business and cross-country 
perspectives. This was done in order to inform hypotheses and expectations for the three 
following empirical chapters. We have grouped the identified determinants of tax evasion into 
five main categories: namely traditional; institutional; socio-cultural; macroeconomic; and firm-
characteristics.  
Within the review of the first group of determinants, we found that studies on the tax rate have 
provided, as within the theory, quite controversial results with both a positive and a negative 
relationship between tax rates and tax evasion being supported. We note, however, that a slight 
preponderance (in terms of the quantity of papers, not necessarily the quality) supports a positive 
relationship, suggesting thus that an increase in tax rate is expected to kindle tax evasion. Given 
the theoretical and empirical ambiguity emphasized throughout, the empirical findings of this 
thesis (in the next three chapters), as well as their robustness, become highly important. In 
regards to audit and fine rate, the current tax literature supports generally a negative relationship 
with tax evasion; both fines and inspections make evasion more costly. 
The second group of determinants, institutional, has a clearer impact on tax evasion. The vast 
majority of the reviewed studies confirm the intuitive expectation that higher/better fairness, 
treatment, benefit, accountability and/or transparency improve significantly the trust of taxpayers 
towards their respective institutions, which in turn increases both tax morale and tax compliance. 
In addition positive perceptions towards anti-corruption policies as well as low compliance costs 
act as tools to combat evasion. Studies in these areas have mostly reached similar findings 
regardless of their context.  
When discussing institutional determinants, we also explain that we follow recent practice in 
treating tax morale as an aggregator of institutional influences on tax evasion and, hence, as an 
important independent variable in our model of tax evasion. However, we are also mindful of the 
older approach that treated tax morale attitudes more or less as a proxy for tax evasion 
behaviour. This suggests an empirical strategy whereby both tax morale and tax evasion are 
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related to one another not as independent and dependent variables – i.e. as cause and effect – but 
as correlated to one another as dependent variables in a system. In this case, the appropriate 
model would be a two-equation system of “seemingly unrelated regressions” (SUR) allowing 
both tax morale and tax evasion to be jointly determined by similar (but not necessarily the 
same) observed and unobserved determinants. For reasons of space (and time), we do not 
undertake this analysis for this thesis. However, it is a possible extension of the work presented 
in Chapter 6. 
The findings on the third group of determinants, socio-cultural, are less consistent. While 
empirical results on age and gender characteristics of taxpayers suggest homogeneously that 
male and younger taxpayer’s are more likely to exhibit undutiful activities as compared to their 
counterparts (female and elderly taxpayers respectively), findings on education are less clear. 
This is because, on the one hand, fiscal knowledge may positively influence the practice of 
evasion, as more educated people may tend to better understand the opportunities for evading tax 
obligations; on the other hand, more educated people understand the importance of taxes better, 
which increases their level of voluntary compliance. The role of social norms is equally unclear 
with studies supporting both relevance and non-relevance of common social behaviour. 
The fourth group of reviewed determinants consists of macroeconomic factors, inclusion of 
which are characteristic of cross-country investigations or within-country time series studies. 
Though rare, most studies in these areas have commonly found that per capita income reduces 
evasion and that periods/subjects with higher unemployment rates are characterized also by 
higher evasion levels. The impact of inflation on the other side is ambiguous; with both 
incentives to restore the purchasing power in times of inflation through evasion, as well as 
incentives to delay tax obligations for inflationary periods.  
Last, the review of firm characteristic determinants supported the necessity to investigate 
business determinants of tax evasion; not only for transition economies but also for other groups 
of countries. The few reviewed studies showed that smaller firms are more likely to be evasive, 
as are sole proprietorships. Findings on sectoral differences across firms are less robust and less 
clear. Following the theoretical round-up in Chapter II, as well as the empirical review in 
Chapter III, the next step is to empirically investigate the determinants of business tax evasion 
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for transition economies. We do so by introducing a cross-country investigation in Chapter IV, 
the firm-level context in Chapter V and the tax morale perspective (for Kosovo) in Chapter VI. 
The inclusion of brief summaries of empirical and theoretical reviews in subsequent chapters is 
done in order to maintain a continuity of new chapters with the present theoretical and empirical 
knowledge summarized in Chapter II and III.   
 Chapter FOUR 
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Introduction 
With taxes comes evasion (Cowell, 1990). Tax evasion imposes economic costs: it slows down 
economic growth by weakening the government’s ability to provide adequate public goods 
(Johnson et al., 2000); it diverts resources to unproductive activities such as establishing 
financial subsidiaries to cover-up evasion (Slemrod, 2007); it provides an incentive for firms to 
remain small and invisible to facilitate evasion, thereby missing opportunities from the formal 
economy (Nur-tegin, 2008); and it generates inequity between the evaders and the honest 
taxpayers by shifting the burden to the latter group, thereby creating an incentive for further 
evasion (Feinstein, 1991).  
Tax evasion is one of the major problems facing developing (Fuest and Riedel, 2009) and 
transition economies (Pirttila, 1999). The literature on the factors shaping tax evasion is fairly 
well developed (reviews include: Jackson and Milliron, 1986; Cowell, 1990; Andreoni, et.al, 
1998; Franzoni, 2008; Torgler 2011). However, most of it relates to individuals. The lack of 
research on tax evasion by businesses is unfortunate, especially given the fact that in most 
countries the bulk of taxes is paid by firms and firms account for the bulk of tax evasion too 
(McCaffery and Slemrod, 2004; Crocker and Slemrod, 2005; Chang and Lai, 2004; Nur-tegin, 
2008). Moreover, as suggested by Andreoni et al. (1998) there is a huge gap and thus a 
permanent need for international and cross country research on tax evasion; while the work in 
the context of transition countries is still less developed. This chapter aims to reduce this gap by 
introducing some empirical findings for businesses, cross-country and transition features of tax 
evasion.  
So far, cross-country investigations on tax evasion have combined country-level data with data 
aggregated from lower levels. Through this chapter we want to build upon pioneering work of 
Riahl-Belkaoiu (2004) and Richardson (2006) who have analysed individual tax evasion in 30 
respectively 45 countries. Riahl-Belkaoiu (2004) examines the international differences in tax 
evasion and relates these differences to selected determinants of tax morale. His findings show 
that tax evasion is lowest in countries characterized by high economic freedom, a developed 
equity market, effective competition laws and a low serious crime rate. Richardson (2006) on the 
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other hand advances cross-country investigation of individual tax evasion using a larger sample 
and finds that non-economic determinants have the strongest impact on tax evasion in 
comparison with economic determinants; most notably, the complexity of the tax system, 
education, income source, fairness and tax morale are highly correlated with tax compliant 
behaviour. 
We extend their approach by focusing on business instead of individual tax evasion and by 
focusing only on transition countries. This thesis contributes to the literature by using the 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) for the years 1999, 2002 
and 2005 to investigate business tax evasion in 25 transition economies. In our study, we 
incorporate institutional and macroeconomic indicators alongside tax rate and cultural influences 
on business evasion in transition economies. The aim of this study is to inform policies to 
combat tax evasion.  
To analyse the data from 25 transition economies for the years 1999, 2002 and 2005, we employ 
a conventional fixed effects approach as well as a recent innovation in fixed effect panel 
analysis, known as fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD), which hitherto has not been used 
in this context. The main benefit of this approach is that it enables us to model the effect of time-
invariant (or, at least, “slow moving”) variables, most notably proxies for institutional 
development.  
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1 we summarize briefly the existing literature on 
tax evasion. In Section 2 we describe the data used in our study and we review the major 
determinants of tax evasion. In Section 3 we outline the general form of the regression model. In 
Section 4 we focus on our approach to estimation and highlight the importance of diagnostic 
testing. Sections 5 and 6 report and discuss the empirical findings. The last section concludes.  
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4.1 Research Design 
Over four decades of research on tax evasion have given rise to an enormous amount of work (for 
reviews see Jackson and Milliron, 1986; Cowell, 1990; Andreoni, et.al, 1998; and Franzoni 2008 
and Torgler 2011). The vast majority of this work, however, has neglected three important factors. The 
first factor relates to the importance of cross-country investigations. In one of the most insightful reviews 
of tax evasion, Andreoni et al. (1998, p.855), while concluding and providing directions for future 
research, argue that “…a broadening of the empirical database will improve the power of 
statistical tests of theoretical models, and spur comparative analysis across countries ”. The 
second factor relates to the lack of studies on business tax evasion. As Torgler (2011, p.6) argues, 
“...business tax evasion in general, has received very little attention. Work in this area is 
therefore highly relevant”. Last, the context of transition economies in tax evasion studies has 
received limited attention (Pirttila, 1999). 
In this chapter we attempt to fill these gaps by introducing all three components: businesses, 
cross-country and transition. In order to do so, we start by assuming that the behaviour of 
businesses is similar to the behaviour of individuals, and that the determinants of business tax 
evasion may be similar, at least qualitatively, to the determinants of tax evasion by individuals or 
households. The decision on evasion, or compliance, is made by individual managers or 
entrepreneurs who, in essence, act as individuals (Arias, 2005). As Slemrod (2007, p.36) points 
out, the literature on business tax evasion "adapts the theory of tax evasion, which for the most 
part concerns individual decision makers, to the tax compliance decisions made by businesses”. 
This is particularly true of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) where the decision 
making entrepreneur makes compliance decisions both as an individual and as a manager.  
Ever since Allingham and Sandmo’s conventional model was introduced in 1972, theoretical and 
empirical literature on tax evasion has flourished. Advances incorporating interactions between 
institutions and taxpayers, cultural and behavioural differences as well as individual socio-
demographic characteristics have also been made. These and conventional determinants of tax 
evasion, namely the tax rate, fine rate and audit rate, have contributed profoundly to modelling 
compliance decisions.  
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As argued in Chapter II and III, in the traditional model the level of evasion of income tax is positively 
related with the probability of audit (see Section 3.2.2) by tax examiners and the level of punishment 
(see Section 3.2.3) 
 
provided by law. When analysing the impact of tax rates on compliance, the model 
predicts an ambiguous effect with the occurrence of both an income effect and a substitution effect. 
However, Yitzhaki (1974) argued that ambiguity was a result of an unrealistic assumption that the 
penalty is imposed on the amount of income evaded; if instead it is imposed on the evaded tax the 
substitution effect disappears and thus a tax rise will reduce evasion. Most of the models on business tax 
evasion have conducted comparative static analysis similar to that of the traditional model; namely, the 
firm evades less with higher probability of detection and larger fines, while the impact of tax rates is 
ambiguous (see Marelli, 1984; Martina, 1988; Virmani, 1989; Sandmo, 2004; Crocker and Slemrod, 
2005). Consistent with the theory, the empirical evidence on the impact of tax rates is quite 
controversial. While Clotfelter (1983) – and a considerable number of papers reviewed in Section 3.2.1 - 
found positive and significant effects of the marginal tax rate on evasion, Feinstein (1991), while 
employing the same data source found that the marginal tax rate has a negative relation with evasion – as 
did a number of papers reviewed in Section 3.2.1.  
As already argued, the conventional model consisting of tax rate, audit and fine rate has often been 
criticized for its simplicity. Andreoni et al. (1998) suggested the incorporation of three main groups of 
factors that are important when treating tax evasion models. The first group involves moral rules 
and sentiments that directly guide and impact the decision to comply or not. The second group 
relates to how the fairness of the tax system and its enforcement affects individuals’ willingness 
to comply. Last, the third group includes taxpayers’ evaluations of the government according to 
the prevailing standards of performance, corruption and transparency. For an extensive review of 
the studies treating these aspects see Section 3.3 of this thesis.  
Socio-cultural determinants appear also as a powerful factor in influencing evasive behaviour. 
According to Chau and Leung (2009), different social norms and ethical values create different 
incentives for tax evasion. Cultural attributes in tax evasion are also highlighted by Cummings et 
al. (2005) and Chan et al. (2000) where peer influence is seen as part of the cultural 
characteristics of specific groups of individuals or nations (see also Section 3.4.4). In addition to 
social norms, individual characteristics of taxpayers were constantly included in tax evasion 
model. Beyond age (see Section 3.4.1) and gender (see Section 3.4.1), the tax evasion literature 
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related taxpayers’ ability to comprehend and comply with tax laws to education. Two opposing 
effects are observed. On the one hand, fiscal knowledge may positively influence the practice of 
evasion, as more educated people involved in businesses may tend to better understand the 
opportunities for evading tax obligations. On the other hand, more educated people understand 
the importance of taxes better, which increases their level of voluntary compliance. The level of 
education is particularly important at the firm level (for empirical review see Section 3.4.3).  
In addition to the conventional moral, socio-cultural and demographic determinants, cross-
country and within country time-series estimations, for both individual and business tax evasion, 
have also included economic determinants.
15
 Per capita income, unemployment, inflation and 
other performance indicators are common in such studies (see Section 3.5). First, in regards to 
GDP per capita, Chelliah (1971), amongst others, argues that higher per capita income reflects a 
higher level of development which, in turn, means not only a greater willingness to pay taxes but 
also a greater capacity to collect taxes. Though most of the studies have established a negative 
relationship between per capita income and tax evasion, few have provided quite contrary results 
(see Feige and Cebula, 2009). Second, in regards to unemployment, it is widely believed that an 
increase in unemployment is usually associated with reduced income that, consequently, 
increases levels of tax evasion. Furthermore, an increase in cash payments caused by an increase 
in unemployment (as individuals may switch to the “hidden” economy) may give rise to 
problems related to tax collection. Last, in regards to the inflation, studies are summarised in two 
opposing groups. Fishburn (1981), amongst many, argues that inflation has a positive 
relationship with tax evasion as the decision to evade can be affected by the attempt of taxpayers 
to restore their purchasing power. Tanzi (1980) on the other hand argues that taxpayers delay tax 
payments to future high inflation periods, creating an overall negative relationship between 
inflation and tax evasion. 
Following the above discussion, we will attempt to estimate a model around the available data 
which combines the traditional determinants with institutional, behavioural and economic 
determinants. The following section provides a detailed description of the variables used in our 
estimations.  
                                                          
15 
Firm level studies covered also firm characteristic determinants, such as size, legal status, ownership, sector, 
performance and region amongst others.  
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4.2 Data Description 
In this chapter (and throughout the empirical investigation of this thesis), the dependent variable, 
Tax Evasion, is the most difficult to quantify.  Furthermore, as evasion is not directly observable, 
the information on which the measure of tax evasion is based is difficult to obtain, particularly 
for transition economies and especially when dealing with businesses. In order to assess the level 
of tax evasion, we use the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 
database, produced jointly by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
and the World Bank, which provides firm-level data on a broad range of variables related to the 
business environment and performance of firms for TEs. The survey was first undertaken on 
behalf of the EBRD and World Bank in 1999 – 2000, when it was administered to approximately 
4100 enterprises in 26 countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (including Turkey) to assess 
the environment for private enterprise and business development. In the second round of the 
BEEPS, the survey instrument was administered to approximately 6500 enterprises in 27 
countries (including Turkey but excluding Turkmenistan) in the year 2002. In the third round of 
the BEEPS, the survey included approximately 9,500 enterprises in 28 countries in the year 
2005. The fourth round of the BEEPS, for the period 2008-2009 is not included in our study as 
the main question on the level of tax evasion was dropped from the questionnaire. 
 
4.2.1 Tax Evasion in Transition Economies 
The question of interest for the present chapter is as follows: 
Q.48a (1999), Q.58 (2002) and Q.43a (2005) - What percentage of the sales of a typical 
firm in your area of activity would you estimate is reported to the tax authorities, bearing 
in mind difficulties with complying with taxes and other regulations? 
Although the main question does not directly measure the level of compliance by the respondent, 
it is designed to act as a reasonable substitute by taking into account the respondents’ obvious 
reluctance to reveal their own compliance. Such indirect measures of compliance (and other 
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unlawful activities) are common in survey research. For more on how to conduct evasion 
questionnaires see Breman (1980), Hanousek and Palda (2004) and Gerxhani (2006).  
For 1999, the respondents were asked to provide answers in eight categories between 0-100%. 
For each response we have taken the mid-point of the range; then we derived a country level of 
tax evasion by averaging mid-points. In the 2002 and 2005 survey’s respondents were asked to 
provide a figure (in percentages) for the proportion of sales reported to the authorities. We then 
averaged these responses by country and thus obtained a country level of business tax 
compliance. We transform the question from a measure of compliance into a measure of evasion 
by subtracting the percentage of sales reported for tax purposes from 100. 
Table 4.1 Levels of business tax evasion in transition economies 
 
  
1999 2002 2005 
1 ALBANIA 69.56 22.53 22.96 
2 ARMENIA 19.22 9.19 4.51 
3 AZERBAIJAN 32.07 13.09 13.94 
4 BELARUS 5.75 8.12 7.17 
5 BOSNIA  53.54 32.46 11.79 
6 BULGARIA 27.65 17.19 13.54 
7 CROATIA 23.77 12.69 7.58 
8 CZECH REPUBLIC 22.64 9.84 13.09 
9 ESTONIA 15.95 7.32 3.07 
10 GEORGIA 33.16 35.66 10.85 
11 HUNGARY 15.06 11.55 11.28 
12 KAZAKHSTAN 15.16 17.28 6.61 
13 KYRGYZISTAN 16.98 26.15 14.65 
14 LATVIA 24.14 12.57 7.10 
15 LITHUANIA 19.04 14.66 10.28 
16 MACEDONIA FYR 24.02 36.23 23.48 
17 MOLDOVA 18.97 20.47 10.54 
18 POLAND 14.59 9.78 10.00 
19 ROMANIA 12.04 13.36 6.55 
20 RUSSIA 23.02 18.04 15.55 
21 SLOVAK REPUBLIC 21.77 13.11 4.45 
22 SLOVENIA 3.47 17.96 7.23 
23 TAJIKISTAN 32.39 15.41 27.74 
24 UKRAINE 25.43 14.56 10.68 
25 UZBEKISTAN 20.26 10.54 2.97 
*Source: Author's aggregated data from BEEPS 99,02,05 
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Table 4.1 displays the tax evasion levels for 25 transition countries for all available years; these 
data define the extent of our panel dataset.
16
 To our knowledge, this is the largest sample of 
transition countries so far used to assess the determinants of business tax evasion. The 25 
countries included in our analysis for a three year span are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.  
While looking at the time trends of the tax evasion country level, we notice a general 
improvement over the years. The correlation coefficient between 1999 and 2002 is 0.45, between 
1999 and 2005 is 0.54 whilst between 2002 and 2005 is 0.56. These coefficients show a positive 
yet not large correlation amongst the years.  
 
4.2.2 Independent Variables 
The choice of independent variables used in our estimations derives from data limitations across 
transition economies as well as business tax evasion. For instance, tax rate is the only traditional 
determinant of tax evasion observed in this Chapter. At the present, given the data restrains, we 
fail to identify suitable proxies for remaining two traditional variables, that of audit probability 
and fine rate. We investigate though audit probability in consequent chapters of this study. Other 
independent variables were chosen from very reliable sources. Following an overview of 
independent variables is provided. 
Tax Rate – We use the Fiscal Freedom Index published by The Heritage Foundation, which 
provides a good proxy for the level of tax rates across countries of our interest. The index, for the 
years 1999, 2002 and 2005 includes top tax rates on individual and corporate incomes and the 
                                                          
16
 We had to exclude Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro because of the unavailability of data for these three countries 
over the three survey periods. For 1999 we averaged the responses of Bosnia and Republica Srpska to obtain the 
level of business tax compliance for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole. Last, as suggested by BEEPS (1999), we 
dropped country-level estimates for Lithuania and Slovakia for the year 1999, due to methodological mistakes 
committed by the survey team; instead we had to extrapolate data from the previous two years in order to get 
estimates for these two countries in the year 1999. 
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overall amount of tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. The index is presented in percentages. 
Given the theoretical and empirical ambiguity, the expected sign is of this variable with respect 
to tax evasion in this chapter is ambiguous.  
Economic Performance – measures the level and trends of economic development throughout 
transition economies. The economic performance encompasses all those economic factors that 
affect a firm’s operations but are outside firm’s ability to control and influence. We use four 
proxies to capture for health of the overall economy, notably per capita income, unemployment, 
inflation and business environment. 
GDP per capita – we use World Bank (WB) figures of real GDP per capita levels (expressed in 
constant US dollars $) for the 25 transition economies of our interest for the years 1999, 2002 
and 2005. The expected sign of per capita income with respect to tax evasion is negative. 
Unemployment – we use International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures of unemployment levels 
(expressed in percentages), for the 25 transition economies of our interest for the years 1999, 
2002 and 2005. The expected sign is negative. 
Inflation – we use the data from EBRD, Transition Report in obtaining the average annual 
percentage change of CPI for each country for the years 1999, 2002 and 2005. The expected sign 
with respect to tax evasion is ambiguous. 
Business Environment – An encouraging and sustainable economic environment is expected to 
improve the performance of businesses and with that their ability to comply with tax 
requirements. A non friendly environment on the other side can cause a series of obstacles for 
businesses, which in turn most likely reflect on their short or long-term profits. Under such 
circumstances businesses will attempt to regain their purchasing power by reducing their 
compliance levels. In order to assess the performance of general businesses environment within a 
country we use the rate of non-performing loans at commercial banks. This rate provides unique 
and consistent information about how businesses are coping in certain business environments. In 
a favourable business environment, the likelihood of returning a loan is high, contrary to a 
restrictive environment where loan non-performance is highly expected. We use the data from 
EBRD Transition Reports to obtain the measures of non-performing loans for the years 1999, 
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2002 and 2005. These loans include sub-standard, doubtful and loss classification categories of loans, 
but exclude loans transferred to a state rehabilitation agency or consolidation bank, end-of-year. The 
expected sign is positive. 
Institutions - One of the most important factors affecting tax evasion is the nature of institutions and 
institutional development within a country. The institutional framework may be defined in a number of 
ways but it would include such dimensions as the presence reforms, effective law enforcement, the 
prevalence of trust in government, fair and respectable treatments of taxpayers and so forth. In this study, 
we will explore the impact of corruption and institutional reforms in transition economies.   
Corruption – To begin with, we consider the prevalence of corruption as an important indicator of 
institutional development. We use the Control of Corruption Index from World Governance Indicators. 
Control of Corruption Index is an aggregation of various indicators that measure the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
"capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Index ranges from -2.5 (for very poor performance) 
to +2.5 (for excellent performance).The expected sign with respect to tax evasion is negative. 
Transition Index – The particular institutional reform within a country profoundly influences the 
relationship and trust between/of citizens and/to government. We use the EBRD Transition Index as a 
proxy to measure institutional change and reforms from central economy to market economy. Reformist 
governments steer positive perceptions and positive attitudes by taxpayers, which in turn will increase 
voluntary compliance. The Transition Index is an average of six standard EBRD transition 
indicator measuring progress in transition. Progress is measured against the standards of 
industrialised market economies, while recognising that there is neither a “pure” market 
economy nor a unique end-point for transition. Index ranges from 1 to 4+, where 1 represents 
little or no change from a rigid centrally planned economy and 4+ represents the standards of an 
industrialised market economy. The expected sign with respect to tax evasion is negative.  
 
Culture - We proxy socio-cultural differences by capturing social norms and educational levels 
within each country. Other social factors such as age or region could not be included in this part 
of research given the lack of firm level data. Aggregation and usage of other individual data for 
business research requires strong assumptions. Amongst many the ratio between male and 
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female population or labour force does not necessarily represent the gender structure of 
businesses in transition economies given the evident disproportions in gender ownership 
structure.  
Social Norms - Different social norms and ethical values will create different incentives for tax 
evasion. Social studies acknowledge the process turning an unlawful behaviour into a social 
norm if the unlawful behaviour is repeated and sustained over the time. In this matter, a 
continuous refusal of a specific system by its citizens becomes at some stage a common practice 
for all other systems. To proxy for social norms we use electricity losses and stealing to assess 
whether the refusal of systems, in our case the tax system, is more than just a decision under 
uncertainty. We attempt to investigate whether such behaviour is correlated with other refusals; 
i.e. is a common way of how people in different cultural groups live. We use the percentage of 
electric power losses and stealing in relation to the total amount of produced electricity for the 
years 1999, 2002 and 2005; a set of data produced by World Bank under World Development 
Indicators. The expected sign is positive 
Education – is a measure of education level within a country. We use the rate of progression to 
secondary school from World Bank, World Development Indicators, for the years 1999, 2002 
and 2005, to assess the level of education within a country. Progression to secondary school 
refers to the number of new entrants to the first grade of secondary school in a given year as a 
percentage of the number of students enrolled in the final grade of primary school in the previous 
year. More educated nations have a tendency to increase the progression ratio. Assumption built 
here is that individual levels of education can be used also as a proxy for assessing the 
educational level of businesses. Given the previous empirical contradiction, the expected sign is 
ambiguous. 
Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in our model from a panel of 25 
transition economies. We note that there are no missing observations; hence, econometric 
estimation proceeds using a fully balanced panel. Table 4.3 presents the list of variables together 
with their description, expected effects with respect to tax evasion (derived from the literature 
review above, which refers to the inverse of tax evasion, i.e. tax compliance) and the data source.  
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
      
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
TaxEvasion 75 17.02 11.08 2.97 69.56 
TaxRate 75 71.9 11.81 44.9 91.5 
GDPpercapita 75 3538 3586 177.3 17908 
Unemployment 75 12.58 8.29 0.3 37.25 
Inflation 75 13.11 35.5 -8.5 293.7 
BusinessEnv 75 13.67 15.42 0.1 84.2 
TranIndex 75 3.20 0.59 1.55 3.99 
Corruption 75 -0.34 0.65 -1.21 1.29 
SocialNorms 75 16.08 9.04 3.43 48.8 
Education 75 98.12 1.57 92.2 99.93 
Year 2002 75 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Year 2005 75 0.33 0.47 0 1 
    Source: STATA 2011 
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Table 4.3 Summary of variables 
 
 
  
Variable Description Expected Sign  Source 
TaxEvasion 
 
Q.48 a, Q.58 and Q.43a – Recognising the 
difficulties that many firms face in fully 
complying with taxes and regulations, what per 
cent of total annual sales would you estimate 
the typical firm in your area of business reports 
for tax purposes? 
 
 
BEEPS                                
1999,2002,2005 
TaxRate 
The level of tax rates across countries, proxied 
by the Fiscal Freedom Index, an element of the 
Index of Economic Freedom for the years 
1999, 2002 and 2005. The Index combines the 
top tax rates on individual and corporate 
incomes and the overall amount of tax revenue 
as a percentage of GDP. The index is presented 
in percentages. 
 
Ambiguous 
The Heritage 
Foundation                 
1999, 2002, 2005 
Real GDP per 
capita 
GDP per capita expressed in constant US 
dollars ($). 
Negative 
World Bank1999, 
2002, 2005 
Unemployment Unemployment rate expressed in percentages Positive 
International Monetary 
Fund 1999, 2002, 2005 
Inflation 
Average annual percentage change in the 
Consumer Price Index  
Ambiguous 
Transition Report                               
1999, 2002, 2005 
Business 
Environment 
 
Business environment across countries proxied 
by the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans of commercial banks. Non-performing 
loans include categories of loans classified as 
sub-standard, doubtful and loss making, but 
exclude loans transferred to a state 
rehabilitation agency or consolidation bank, 
end-of-year. 
 
Positive 
Transition Report                               
1999, 2002, 2005 
Education 
The level of education within a country, 
proxied by the number of new entrants to the 
first grade of secondary education (general 
programs only) in a given year, expressed as a 
percentage of the number of pupils enrolled in 
the final grade of primary education in the 
previous year. 
Negative 
World Bank                                               
1999, 2002, 2005 
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Variable Description Expected Sign  Source 
Social Norms 
 
Social norms, or general attitude of society 
towards systems; proxied by electric power 
transmission and distribution losses. These 
include losses in transmission between sources 
of supply and points of distribution and losses 
in the distribution to consumers, including 
pilferage. Persistent and continues refusal of 
specific system over a certain period becomes a 
common social habit for other systems as well. 
Positive 
World Development 
Indicators 1999, 2002, 
2005 
TranIndex 
 
Intensity of reforms, proxied by the Transition 
Index; an average of six standard EBRD 
transition indicators measuring progress in 
transition. Progress is measured against the 
standards of industrialised market economies, 
while recognising that there is neither a “pure” 
market economy nor a unique end-point for 
transition. The Index ranges from 1 to 4+, 
where 1 represents little or no change from a 
rigid centrally planned economy and 4+ 
represents the standards of an industrialised 
market economy.  
 
Negative 
Transition Report                               
1999, 2002, 2005 
Control of 
Corruption 
Level of corruption within a country, proxied 
by the Control of Corruption Index; an 
aggregation of various indicators that measure 
the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the 
state by elites and private interests. The Index 
ranges from -2.5 (for very poor performance) 
to +2.5 (for excellent performance).  
Negative 
World Governance 
Indicators 1999, 2002, 
2005 
Year 2002 
 
Dummy Variable for data from 2002 (1999 is 
the omitted category) 
 
Negative BEEPS 2002 
Year 2005 
Dummy Variable for data from 2005 (1999 is 
the omitted category)  
Negative BEEPS 2005 
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4.2.3 Notes on selected variables  
We acknowledge two main issues when using some of the above proxies. Both of these are 
addressed by our estimation strategy. First, the use of the World Governance Indicators (WGI) 
Control of Corruption Index has been questioned on methodological grounds and, hence, for its 
comparability across countries and over time. In response, Kaufman and Kraay (2009) point to 
the inherent difficulties in measuring something as complicated and multifaceted as governance 
across countries and over time. Moreover, if measurement errors vary much less over the 
medium term within countries than they do between countries then, in this study, their effects are 
controlled for by the country fixed effects that characterise our estimation methodology.   
 
The second concern relates to the omitted variables-type endogeneity involving corruption and 
social norms and the dependent variable, tax evasion. The perception of levels of corruption and 
actual levels of electricity losses and pilferage might also be regarded as output variables with 
shared underlying determinants, whether observed or unobserved. However, the theoretical 
support for such concerns is not well developed and there is no supporting empirical 
investigation.   Nonetheless, fixed effects estimation minimizes this type of potential endogeneity 
by controlling for all “time invariant” and/or “slowly moving” unobserved determinants of tax 
evasion, corruption and social norms. Country-level fixed effects displace such determinants 
from the error term into the estimated part of the model, thereby removing sources of potential 
endogeneity that otherwise might arise from omitted variables.  
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4.3 Basic Regression Model 
 
To investigate the determinants of tax evasion in transition economies, we estimate the following 
model: 
          it   ̂i    ̂1TaxRateit    ̂2GDPpercapitait    ̂3Unemploymentit     ̂4Inflationit   
                         ̂5BusinessEnvit    ̂6TranIndexit   ̂7ControlofCorruptionit   
                           ̂8SocialNormsit    ̂9Education it    i  
 
The subscript i refers to countries (1,..., 25) and t  to years 1999, 2002 and 2005. TaxEvasionit 
stands for the level of evasion; TaxRateit is the  tax rate levied on businesses; GDPpercapitait is 
the level of real per capita income; Unemploymentit is the unemployment rate; Inflationit  is the 
inflation rate; BusinessEnvit is the state of the business environment proxied by the share of non-
performing loans as a percentage of total loans; TranIndexit  is the EBRD’s transition index 
showing the progress of transition; ControlofCorruptionit  is the WGI Control of Corruption 
score;  SocialNormsit is the society’s attitude towards systems and compliance requirements (or 
social norms) proxied by the level of electricity losses and theft as a percentage of total output; 
while Educationit is the progression rate of students to secondary school as a percentage of total 
graduates from primary schools.  ̂i are country fixed effects that control for all time invariant – 
or, at least, slowly moving – national geographic, historical/cultural, institutional, social and 
economic influences not otherwise explicitly specified in the model.  ̂ -   are estimated 
coefficients that measure the effects of each dependent variable on tax evasion. Finally,  it is the 
usual white noise error term.  
The next section elaborates on various econometric issues related to the estimation of our model. 
 
  
(12) 
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4.4 Econometric Issues 
Our choice in using panel data sets derives from the need to address the topic of business tax 
evasion in TEs without the well-known constraints of either purely cross-sectional or purely 
time-series analysis. Panel datasets bring several advantages compared to other types of data. 
Gujarati (2002) argues that there is a certain unobserved heterogeneity in the data that relate to 
groups (i.e. individuals, firms, or countries over time); yet panel data estimation can take such 
heterogeneity explicitly into account by including individual-specific fixed effects (either as 
dummy variables in the estimated part of the model, or as a group-specific error term). In 
addition, the combination of time series with cross-section observations, gives more informative 
data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, more efficiency and more degrees of 
freedom. In several ways, panel data can enrich empirical analysis in ways that may not be 
possible by the use of either cross-sectional or time series data individually. There are, however, 
drawbacks from using panel analysis. First, time series analysis in panel context is relatively 
undeveloped; and second, several difficulties arise in diagnostic testing for panel analysis.  
Choosing between the most appropriate estimation depends on the assumptions we make and 
about the nature of our data. But in general the most commonly used econometric models for 
panel data are effects models, which assume the effect of explanatory variables to be the same 
across different ‘individuals’; namely, the Fixed Effects Model (FEM) and the Random Effects 
Model (REM).  
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4.4.1 CLRM vs. FEM vs. REM 
Hausman and Taylor (1981) argue that an important purpose in combining time-series and cross-
section data, i.e. having panel data, is to control for individual-specific unobservable effect 
which may be correlated with other explanatory variables. Analysis of time-series or cross-
section data alone can neither identify nor control for such individual effects. In panel analysis, 
one can have this individual effect, whether there is a dummy variable or a group specific error 
term, because there is more than one observation per individual. In turn, the inclusion of the 
group-specific effects, whether they are in the estimated part of the model or the error term, 
prevents the influence of unobserved variables being attributed to one or more independent 
variables. Of course if unobserved influences are correlated with one or more of independent 
variables then (by definition) there is an endogeneity problem. Here the distinction between FE 
and RE becomes important. 
With FE estimation the time-invariant unobserved influences are controlled for by group-specific 
dummy variables in the estimated part of the model. Because, therefore, the unobserved 
influences are not in the error term, they can be correlated with one or more independent 
variables. Conversely, in RE estimation, time-invariant unobserved influences are modelled as 
group-specific components of the error-term. Hence, RE estimation is legitimate only if the time-
invariant unobserved influences can be assumed to be un-correlated with all of the independent 
variables. Given that in practice this assumption can rarely (possibly never) be made with 
certainty, pure preference is for FE estimation rather than for RE. We now support this a priori 
judgment by implementing the standard testing procedure in this section. 
As argued, the separation of individual effects, in our case country effects, is a clear advantage 
that derives from panel estimation. One way to account for this country individuality is to use 
Fixed Effects where we let the intercept vary for each company and yet assume that the slope 
coefficients are constant across countries (see Wooldridge 2003). This can be written as: yit =β1i 
+ β2Xit + it, where   it capatures general ignorance of determinates of y it ,that is within individual 
error; while β1i captures specific ignorance about unit i, in our case country i. The key insight is 
that if the unobserved influences on the dependent variable do not change over time, then any 
changes in the dependent variable must be due to influences other than these fixed characteristics 
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(Stock and Watson, 2003). In the case of panel data the interpretation of the beta coefficients 
would be “…for a given country, as X varies across time by one unit, Y increases or decreases 
by β units”.  
Choosing the right model requires testing between various model types. We start initially by 
comparing Classic Linear Regression Model (CLRM) against “effect models” (see Appendix 
4.1). Software packages (like STATA) calculate the group fixed effects as deviations from the 
mean FEM and they report the mean of the group effects as the model constant (Pugh 2010, 
Lecture Notes). We reject FEM if these deviations are not jointly significant and vice-versa.  Our 
results suggest that we should choose FEM compared to CLRM estimation since: 
H0: all ui=0: 
F(24, 41) =  2.31 
Prob > F = 0.008 
Reject Ho; Estimate FE 
 
Another way of testing is by conducting Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for 
Random Effects (see Appendix 4.3). The null hypothesis of the one-way random group effect 
model is that the variance of the group-specific error term is zero. If the null hypothesis is not 
rejected, the pooled regression model is appropriate. Our results support the usage of CLRM 
compared to RE:  
H0: 2ui = 0; tests restriction that ui =  
Test: Var(u) = 0 
chi2(1) =  0.05 
Prob > chi2 = 0.81 
Fail to Reject Ho; Estimate CLRM 
 
So far our diagnostic testing has suggested that the FEM is more preferred compared to CLRM, 
and that the CLRM is preferred to REM. Our last comparison is between the two effects models. 
The generally accepted way of choosing between fixed and random effects is running a Hausman 
test, which is based on comparing two estimators. The null hypothesis in this test is that the 
preferred model is random effects vs. the alternative the fixed effects (see Greene, 2002, Chapter 
9). It implicitly tests whether the unique errors (ui) are correlated with one or more of the 
regressors and the null hypothesis is they are not; by testing whether FE and RE estimators differ 
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substantially. If they do not, it implies that RE estimates (see Appendix 4.2) are consistent, and 
therefore it is appropriate to use RE estimator. However, our results (see Appendix 4.4) show 
that we have to reject the null hypothesis and thus estimate the Fixed Effects Model: 
Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(11) = 22.07 
Prob>chi2 =0.0048  
Reject Ho; Estimate FE 
 
After conducting the above tests we conclude that FE estimation appears to be the most 
appropriate approach. Next, we move to the diagnostics testing and investigate on several 
potential problems related to panel data estimations.  
 
4.4.1 Fixed Effects Diagnostics 
Post estimation (see Appendix 4.1), we subjected our conventional FE model to a series of 
diagnostic tests. The general principle is that all econometric models exist simultaneously as 
statistical and economic models; moreover, that before economic estimates and inferences can be 
interpreted it is necessary first to ensure that the statistical assumptions of the model are 
supported by the data. In this vein, we have followed, sort of, a protocol, which is accepted 
consensually as best practice by the leading applied economic literature. Our first test is for 
cross-sectional dependence in the errors, which can be caused by spatial correlation or omitted 
unobservable components. If the unobserved components that create interdependencies across 
cross-sections are correlated with included independent variables then fixed effects estimators 
will be biased and inconsistent (Pugh, 2010 Lecture Notes). However, as noted by Wooldridge 
(2003, p.6): “For better or worse, spatial correlation is often ignored in applied work because 
correcting the problem can be difficult”. In our case, the Pesaran (2004) test for cross sectional 
dependence (see Appendix 4.5) does not indicate major presence of cross-section dependence; 
however, we include two period dummy variables for the years 2002 and 2005 to account for the 
potential effect of common shocks. With inclusion of dummies in a sense we ensure that any 
time effect is not in the residual but on the observable part of the mode. Understandably, in order 
to avoid the dummy trap we do not include a time dummy variable for the year 1999.  
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Pasaran 1 
Ho: Zero Cross Dependence 
P Test: 0.353 
Pr = 0.724 
Fail to Reject Ho  
 
Pasaran 2 (with period DV’s)  
Ho: Zero Cross Dependence 
P Test: -1.038 
Pr = 1.700 
Fail to Reject Ho 
Our second test is for Groupwise Heteroskedasticity, a problem very common while working 
with panel datasets. One of the main assumptions for the OLS regression is the homogeneity of 
variance of the residuals. If the model is well-fitted, there should be no pattern to the residuals 
plotted against the fitted values. If the variance of the residuals is non-constant then the residual 
variance is said to be heteroskedastic.  
Figure 4.1 Plotted residuals versus fitted values 
 
 
                               
Source: STATA printout                             
There are graphical and non-graphical methods for detecting heteroskedasticity. A commonly 
used graphical method is to plot the residuals versus fitted (predicted) values (Fig.4.1). Our plot 
diagram shows some presence of non homoskedastic variance. 
In order to avoid any doubt, we use modified Wald Test (Appendix 4.6) for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity in fixed effects regression modes, which essentially tests whether the variance 
is constant over cross-section units. Our tests show a large presence of heteroskedasticity.  
Modifief Wald Test 
Ho: σ(i)^2 = σ ^2 for all i; 
chi2 (25)  =   4.4e+05 
Prob>chi2 =  0.000 
Reject Ho 
Chapter Four: Business Tax Evasion in Transition Economies: A Cross-Country Investigation        Page | 131  
A solution to account for this is to report robust standard errors. To do this, we also take account 
of clustering effects in the data. Clustered standard errors (SE’s) are a very common practice 
whenever the data are nested, for instance students within universities, firms in different 
countries or households within different areas. In all these cases the lower level units are 
clustered within some higher level units and may therefore be a subject to common unobserved 
influences that can cause the error terms to be correlated within, but not between, clusters. In our 
case, we have years within countries; therefore we cluster on countries. Our clustered robust 
results are reported in Table 4.2 (and Appendix 4.7)
17
. 
Our last test for fixed effects analysis is to check for the normality of the errors. We must note 
that normality is not required in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the regression coefficients. 
It is required only for valid hypothesis testing in small samples, that is, the normality assumption 
assures that the p=values for the t-test and F-test will be valid (Gujarati 2002).  There are two 
ways to check for normality. The first one is to simply plot the residuals and check if they are 
bell shaped (Fig.4.2).  
Figure 4.2 Plotted residuals and normality 
 
 
                                 
Source: STATA printout                             
                                                          
17
 After clustering for standard errors, a next procedure would be to test for serial correlation. Again autocorrelation 
is a very common in panel analysis. Unfortunately, we are unable to perform such test as with only 3 years period 
we have insufficient observations and checking for serial correlation has no meaning. 
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The second way, which is more reliable, is by conducting the Skewness/Kurtosis Tests for 
Normality.
18
 Our results (see Appendix 4.8) show some problems with kurtosis. One way of 
correcting for non-normality in residuals is by checking for any outliers in the data. Taking a 
glance at plot of residuals we notice two outliers in the case of Albania for the year 1999 and in 
the case of Macedonia for the year 1999. Both Albania and Macedonia during 1999 were heavily 
affected by neighbouring Kosovo-Serbia war. More than 1 million Kosovo-Albanian refugees 
sheltered in Albanian inhabited regions in Albania and Macedonia; affecting thus both actual 
state functioning as well as the credibility of the collected data. Inclusion of two country 
dummies improves significantly the distribution of residuals (see Appendix 4.8). 
Post inclusion, both Skewness/Kurtosis Tests and graphical presentations how that the 
distribution of the residuals is bell shaped and that the null hypotheses of no skewness, no excess 
kurtosis and, jointly, of normality cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance; 
respectively, p=0.698, 0.095 and 0.217. 
Skewness/Kurtosis Tests 
Ho: Normality in residuals 
Pr Skewnes: 0.5591; Pr Kurtosis: 0.9734 
Joint adj chi2(2) 0.34, 
Prob>chi2 0.8427 
Do Not Reject Ho 
 
With normality check we have completed the standard diagnostic tests for FEM estimations. 
Before interpreting our final results, we introduce a recently developed alternative to 
conventional fixed effects (FE) estimation. Because it is new to the tax evasion literature, we 
present the key concepts of the Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition (FEVD) approach (Plümper 
and Troeger, 2004) and explain its application to our case. 
 
  
                                                          
18
 In STATA that is pantest2 
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4.4.2 Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition Approach (FEVD) 
In fixed effects estimation, the group-specific fixed effects (i.e., dummy variables) fully account 
for all between-group variation. From this characteristic arise both the main advantage and the 
main disadvantages of FE estimation. The great advantage is that the group-specific fixed effects 
control for all unobserved sources of time-invariant heterogeneity between groups. The 
corresponding disadvantages are two-fold: first, the group-specific fixed effects fully account 
also for all observed sources of time invariant heterogeneity between groups so that time-
invariant variables cannot be separately estimated (they are perfectly collinear with the fixed 
effects); a second but less well known corollary of the full absorption of between-group variation 
by the group-specific fixed effects, and the corresponding loss of information, is that observed 
variables with relatively little within-group variation cannot be estimated efficiently (Plümper 
and Troeger, 2007). Plümper and Troeger (2007, p.127) elaborate on the implications of this 
second disadvantage:  
... inefficiency does not just imply low levels of significance; point estimates are also 
unreliable since the influence of the error on the estimated coefficients becomes larger as 
the inefficiency of the estimator increases.  
To address both of these disadvantages, Plümper and Troeger (2007) propose their Fixed Effects 
Vector Decomposition (FEDV) estimator. This is a three-stage approach that combines fixed 
effects estimation to analyse the effect of variables with relatively high within-group variation 
and pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of both time-invariant and “rarely changing” 
(or slowly moving) variables with relatively low within-group variation (Plümper and Troeger, 
2011). With reference to our model, FEDV proceeds as follows. 
Stage One is fixed effects estimation of our preferred model specified in Equation (12) with 
additional two country dummies (for Albania 1999 and Macedonia 1999) introduced given the 
empirical considerations. This model includes several variables that are rarely changing but none 
that are completely time invariant (see Table 4.4 below). 
Stage Two is a cross-section regression of the vector of the estimated group fixed effects ( ̂ ) 
from Equation (12) on the time invariant variables and/or rarely changing explanatory variables 
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from Equation (12) - our fully-specified model includes only the latter. The Stage 2 treatment of 
slowly moving variables in FEVD estimation is necessary to address the problem that 
conventional fixed effects estimates of the effects of slowly moving variables can be imprecise, 
as noted above. A second reason arises in cases where researchers are concerned by unobserved 
correlations between the estimated group fixed effects ( ̂ ) and time varying but slowly moving 
variables, Plümper and Troeger (2007, p.136) find that “we can reduce the potential for bias of 
the estimation by including additional time-invariant or rarely changing variables into stage 2”, 
while warning that “this may reduce bias but is likely to also reduce efficiency”. In country-level 
panels covering only a short time span such correlations and corresponding estimation biases can 
be presumed to be prevalent. In such cases, fixed effects capture unobserved time invariant 
country influences, which – given the short sample period - includes broad influences associated 
with history, culture and institutions that are most likely to be correlated with one or more of the 
slowly moving variables. Accordingly, to address these potential problems in estimating our 
model, we follow the rule of thumb recommended by Plümper and Troeger (2007) for the 
inclusion of variables in the Stage 2 regression. This guideline was subsequently endorsed by 
Greene (2011, p.9):  
Strictly time invariant characteristics will obviously be included and variables with 
sufficiently low within-variance should also be included ... a between-to-within ratio of 
2.8 is sufficient to justify the inclusion of the variable in the second stage.  
Table 4 below compares the between- and within-group variation (measured by standard 
deviations) for each variable in our model and indicates those that, according to this guideline, 
are slowly moving and thus included in our Stage 2 regression.  
Accordingly, our Stage 2 FEVD regression is specified as follows: 
 ̂i=  ̂ + β̂  nemploymentit+ β̂2 ran ndexit+ β̂ ControlofCorruptionit  β̂  ocial ormsit+  i 
where  ̂  is the intercept; and  i is the unobservable part of the fixed effects (i.e. “the second 
stage residual”). This Stage 2 regression decomposes the vector of estimated group fixed effects 
from Equation (12), ( ̂ ), into two parts: the effects of the intercept β0 and the observed slowly 
moving variables (Unemployment, TranIndex, ControlofCorruption, and SocialNorms); and the 
(13) 
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unobserved group effects (the Stage 2 residual,  i). It is this decomposition that characterises the 
FEVD estimator and that integrates its FE and pooled-OLS components.  
 
Table 4.4 Identifying Slowly Changing Variables 
     
Variable Between Within 
Between/Within 
Ratio 
Slowly 
Changing* 
TaxEvasion 7.88 7.9 0.997 
 GDPpercapita 3586 3270 1.097 
 Unemployment 7.83 2.79 2.806 * 
Inflation 23.44 27.19 0.862 
 
BusinessEnv 15.42 10.32 1.494 
 
TaxRate 9.41 7.29 1.291 
 
TranIndex 0.59 0.12 4.917 * 
Corruption 0.63 0.18 3.500 * 
SocialNorm 8.79 2.55 3.447 * 
Education 1.27 0.94 1.351 
 Year 2002 5.67E-17 0.47 0.000 
 Year 2005 5.67E-17 0.47 0.000 
 AL99 5.67E-17 0.47 0.000 
 MC99 5.67E-17 0.47 0.000  
* If value > Rule of Thumb 2.8 
Source: STATA 11 
 
 
Stage Three:  Finally, the unobservable part ( i) of the estimated vector of fixed effects ( ̂ ) 
obtained in Stage 2 is substituted for the vector of unit fixed effects ( ̂ ) in Equation (12).
19
 Since 
the estimated unobservable effects   ̂ control for potential sources of omitted variable bias, and 
are - by design - not correlated with the time invariant variables (Plümper and Troeger, 2007), 
we estimate the resulting Equation (14) by pooled OLS. In this case, the final model yields 
unbiased estimates, although the standard errors must be adjusted to account for    ̂ being 
estimated in Stage 2, hence subject to error, as well as for unrepresented degrees of freedom 
                                                          
19
 If observable time invariant variables are part of the fully-specified model then these also appear in the Stage 2 
regression and are then substituted, along with the unobservable part ( i) of the estimated vector of fixed effects 
( ̂i), for the vector of unit fixed effects ( ̂i) in Equation 1.  
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(Plümper and Troger, 2007) (in a small sample, not making this adjustment will severely 
underestimate the standard errors).
20,21
 The estimated coefficient on   ̂ should be either equal to - 
or at least close to - 1.0 (Greene, 2010 and 2011), which may be regarded as a specification 
check on FEVD estimation.  
 
               ̂    ̂             ̂               ̂                  ̂              
                          ̂                ̂               ̂                        
                         ̂                 ̂                ̂                ̂                           
                           ̂            ̂                              
               
Compared to conventional fixed effects estimation, the FEVD approach has an advantage with 
respect to the estimation of slowly moving variables: because the Stage 3 regression is estimated 
by OLS, both between-group and within-group variation is taken into account, which gives 
superior efficiency (i.e., more precise estimates). OLS estimation also has the advantage of a 
widely understood range of diagnostic tests and checks on the statistical integrity of the model. 
In the case of the model specified in Equation (14), standard diagnostic tests suggest that this 
Stage 3 FEVD regression is statistically well specified with respect to homoskedasticity, normal 
distribution of the model errors and as a linear model. In addition, diagnostic checks suggest no 
undue influence from (multi) collinearity or high-leverage observations.   
A final advantage of FEVD, shared with conventional fixed effects estimation, is that it is well 
suited for the estimation of small samples, particularly because OLS has known small sample 
properties. In comparison with estimators whose properties are known only asymptotically, 
FEVD may be particularly appropriate for analysing transition and institutional processes where 
                                                          
20
 Since we include only one variable (the error term of the second stage) to account for all remaining unobservable 
country effects in the third stage regression, we adjust the degrees of freedom by ( ̂i-1), which in our case is 24. 
21
 An important practical consequence for researchers is that the appropriate Stata ado-file to implement FEVD is 
version xtfevd4.0beta.ado (the latest at the time of writing), which computes standard errors based on an 
appropriately revised variance equation. This file, which is available from Plümper and Troeger’s website, executes 
all three steps of FEVD and adjusts the variance-covariance matrix for the degrees of freedom. 
(14) 
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panel datasets are often small (Plümper and Troger, 2007; Beck, 2011). For example, the cross-
section dimension of the dataset in the present study is limited to the number of transition 
economies. FEVD estimation may have one disadvantage in short panels (for example, the three-
periods available to the present study). Monte Carlo simulations establish that the accuracy of the 
standard errors on the time invariant variables depends on the number of the time series 
observations (T) in the panel (Plümper and Troger, 2011). Although the simulation evidence 
suggests that the FEVD standard errors on the time invariant variables are most accurate when 
the number of both cross-section and time series observations (N and T) both exceed 20, no 
evidence is reported on the extent of deterioration for T<10. For this reason, we do not report 
only FEVD estimates but also those from conventional fixed effects estimation.
22
 
The three step procedure is shown in Appendices 4.11, 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14. The results of all 
these estimations and their implications are discussed in Section 4.5.  
  
                                                          
22
 One difficulty currently confronting applied researchers is that after decades of being the “workhorse” model for 
(static) panel analysis, the approach to fixed effects estimation is now being contested. Given that FEVD addresses 
the main weaknesses of FE estimation, this approach is gaining recognition in a growing body of published work. 
However, FEVD has attracted criticism (Breusch et al., 2010; Greene, 2010) as well as vigorous response (Plümper 
and Troeger, 2011). Space precludes a blow-by-blow account of this polemic. At the time of writing (June 2013), 
Greene (2011a) seems to have accepted not only the legitimacy of the FEVD approach but also its potential for 
development in new directions (Greene, 2011b). However, the critique that FEVD standard errors “were too small” 
has been conceded by Plümper and Troeger (2011, pp.3 and 33) with the consequence that a new variance equation 
has been introduced that “computes standard errors which are closer to the true sampling variance than the 
alternative suggestions”.  
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4.4.3 FEVD Diagnostics 
Before interpreting the final results, we provide a brief overview of the diagnostic checks on the 
third stage OLS estimation. At this point it is important to understand whether the model is 
statistically well specified with respect to homoskedasticity, normal distribution of the model 
errors and as a linear model. Moreover as argued by Plümper and Troger (2004) the problems of 
Heteroskedasticity and Serial-Correlation should be solved beforehand. On the first step we have 
accounted for heteroskedasticity through clustering and robusting standard errors. Cluster-robust 
standard errors also address arbitrary patterns of intra-group correlation in the residuals, 
including serial correlation (although we are unable to detect serial correlation due to insufficient 
time series depth in the data). Diagnostic test are performed post the three steep proceedure when 
Pooled OLS estimation enables us to use standard diagnostic tests.  
We start with tests related to heteroskedasticity. In this line we conduct the White’s test for 
heteroskedasticity and the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity (see 
Appendix 4.15). Both test the null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is homogenous. If 
the p-value is very small, there is a little chance of committing Type I error if we reject Ho; 
therefore we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that the variance is 
not homogenous. Results from our White test provide strong evidence in favour of homskedastic 
variance, as do test results from Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg  
White’s Test 
Ho: Homoskedasticity 
chi2(74) = 75.00; 
p=0.4457 
Fail to Reject Ho 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg  
Ho: Constant variance 
chi2(1) =  0.16 
Prob >chi2  = 0.689 
Fail to Reject Ho 
The Szroeter’s test for Homosckedasticity is also presented at Appendix 4.15. It too shows no 
problems with heteroskedasticity of the error terms. This test shows that there is no evidence of 
heteroskedasticity associated with any variable specifically. This is very encouraging as we do 
have a set of mutually consistent reasons for using the default standard errors. First there is no 
evidence of heteroskedasticity and, second, when we use the robust standard errors we discover 
some potential peculiarities as standard errors either increase only slightly or become slightly 
smaller. Angrist and Pischke (2008) argue that this might be evidence of finite sample bias in the 
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robust calculations. After all, this makes perfect sense as the theory of Robust SEs is asymptotic, 
in other words it accounts for what happens in an infinite size sample. In contrast we have a 
relatively small sample. These results suggest that the variance of the residuals in our data is 
homogenous.  
The White’s - Cameroon & Trivedi’s test in addition to heteroskedasticity also checks for 
normality in residuals. Obtained results (see Appendix 4.15) suggest with some confidence that 
we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of normal distribution.  
Cameron & Trivedi's Test 
Skewness: chi2(13) =13.81; p=0.445 
Kurtosis: chi2(1)=0.20; p=0.65 
 
Normality in residuals is also supported by Kernel Test, according to which our Kernel Density 
Estimations are in alignment with normal density.  
Figure 4.3 Kernel Test 
 
 
                                   
Source: STATA printout                             
The next step is to conduct a model specification test. A model specification error can arise when 
one or more important regressors are omitted from the model or, at the other extreme one or 
more irrelevant variables are included in the model. If relevant variables are omitted from the 
model, the common variance they share with included variables may be wrongly attributed to 
those variables, and the error term is inflated. On the other hand, if irrelevant variables are 
included in the model, the common variance they share with included variables may be wrongly 
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attributed to them. Model specification errors can substantially affect the estimate of regression 
coefficients. For that reason we use the Ramsey Test. The results (see Appendix 4. 16) show that 
we fail to reject null hypothesis of omitted variables at 1% and 5% level of significance. 
Moreover, from running the Ramsey Test using powers of the independent variables, the 
rejection is even stronger (p=0.165). The Ramsey test also supports the assumption of a linear 
relationship in the data. 
Next we check for multicollinearity. When there is a perfect linear relationship among the 
variables, the estimates for a regression model cannot be individually computed. The term 
collinearity implies that two variables are near perfect linear combinations of one another. When 
more than two variables are involved it is often called multicollinearity, although the two terms 
are often used interchangeably. The primary concern is that as the degree of multicollinearity 
increases, the regression model estimates of the coefficients become unstable and the standard 
errors for the coefficients can get wildly exaggerated. We use the Variance Inflation Factor to 
check for multicollinearity. In this test there is a rule of thumb that suggests that each variable 
whose VIF values are greater than 10 may be a subject to a further investigation. Our results (see 
Appendix 4.17) show no problem with multicollinearity for any of the variables. 
Our very last test is to check whether our data are “leveraged” by particular observations. The 
term leverage is used in order to check for any potential leverage point that has driven our 
regression in a “false” direction. These leverage points can have an effect on the estimate of 
regression coefficients. We observe two leverage points (see Appendix 4.18), that of Albania 
1999 and Macedonia 1999. The removal of these two observations does not change our 
coefficients in size and significance compared to the previous models. This means that the results 
of our preferred model are not driven by high leverage, which again is the only clear diagnostic 
failure that we found.  
To sum up, standard diagnostic tests suggest that this Stage 3 FEVD regression is statistically 
well specified with respect to homoskedasticity, normal distribution of the model errors and as a 
linear model. In addition, diagnostic checks suggest no undue influence from (multi) collinearity 
or high-leverage observations.  
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4.5 Estimation Results 
The results are presented in three columns in Table 4.5. Column 1 presents fixed effects 
estimates of the basic model (Equation 12); Column 2 presents fixed effects results using cluster-
robust standard errors (to address various sources of departure from the assumption of white 
noise error terms). Finally, the third column presents the FEVD estimates. The interpretation of 
results is based on this column. 
Most of the estimated effects are in accordance with the theory and the previous empirical 
literature. The estimates consistently suggest that TaxRate and institutions (proxied by TranIndex 
and ControlofCorruption) are the most economically influential and consistently statistically 
significant variables. The association between TaxRate and TaxEvasion is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. A one percentage change in the level of the Fiscal Freedom Index, 
that is an increase in tax burden, leads to a rise of the tax evasion level by around one third of a 
percentage point. The relationship between TranIndex and TaxEvasion is negative and 
significant at the 10% level. An increase of the Transition Index by one point, that is 
improvement in reforms, lessens the level of tax evasion by 4.73%. The relationship between 
ControlofCorruption and TaxEvasion is also negative and significant at the 10% level. An 
increase in the ControlofCorruption score by 1 unit, that is improved control of corruption, 
reduces the level of tax evasion by around 6.36%.  
The next sub-group of highly significant regressors are the dummy variables. The period 
dummies suggest that, at the 1% level of significance, compared to the base year, tax evasion 
falls in 2002 and 2005 by respectively 7 and 14 percent. These numbers are consistent with the 
unconditional statistics on business tax evasion presented in Table 1 (in which 13 of the 25 
countries display continuous improvement) and suggest an increase in compliance over time that 
is consistent with more or less general progress in institutional reform. In addition, the dummies 
for Albania for the year 1999 and Macedonia for the year 1999 both suggest strongly positive but 
temporary effects on tax evasion (see Appendix 4.14). 
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Table 4.5 Regression results 
 
 
          
    FIXED EFFECTS FIXED EFFECTS FEVD 
    1 2 3 
Dependent: Tax Evasion   Coeff  S.E Coeff 
robust 
S.E 
Coeff fevd S.E 
          
Tax Rate   0.33 *** 0.13 0.33 ** 0.16 0.33 *** 0.10 
                      
Economic Performance                     
GDP per capita   0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 
Unemployment   0.08   0.19 0.08   0.13 0.31 ** 0.15 
Inflation   -0.02   0.02 -0.02   0.01 -0.02   0.02 
Business Environment   0.03   0.05 0.03   0.09 0.03   0.05 
                      
Institutions                     
Transition Index   -14.90   11.3 -14.90   10.6 -4.75 * 2.75 
Corruption   -9.62 *** 3.26 -9.62 *** 3.13 -6.36 * 3.68 
                      
Culture                     
Social Norms   0.00   0.27 0.00   0.29 0.21   0.16 
Education   -0.32   0.70 -0.32   0.51 -0.32   0.66 
                      
Year Dummies                     
2002   -7.56 *** 2.39 -7.56   1.97 -7.56 *** 1.59 
2005   -14.75 *** 3.98 -14.75   3.73 -14.75 *** 2.54 
                      
Constant   69.8 *** 87.4 69.8   70.0 32.0   66.4 
Eta               1.00   . 
                      
R-squared   0.44     0.44     0.83     
Number of observations   75     75     75     
                      
 
*** at 1% level of significance; ** at 5% level of significance; * at 10% level of significance  
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The relationship between GDPpercapita and TaxEvasion is positive across all estimations but 
the coefficient is very small: a huge amount of extra income per capita is required to make any 
substantial difference in the level of tax evasion: around $1,000 of additional per capita income 
are needed to reduce tax evasion by a single percentage point (this is purely indicative as, strictly 
speaking, this is outside the range of a merely marginal change). In the preferred regressions, the 
relationship between Unemployment and TaxEvasion is significant at the 5% level and the sign is 
in accordance with theoretical predictions and previous empirical findings. A rise in 
unemployment rate by one percentage point will increases the level of tax evasion by 0.31 
percentage points. The other two remaining economic variables do not appear as statistically 
significant; moreover, both Inflation and BusinessEnv have very small coefficients across all of 
our estimated models.  
 
Results for cultural differences and characteristics appear to be in line with theoretical 
expectations. The percentage of electricity losses or theft used as a proxy for SocialNorms is 
positively related to tax evasion, yet statistically insignificant in FEVD and conventional FE 
estimation. Education is estimated with a consistently negative sign but is also statistically 
insignificant across all estimations. Finally, as suggested by Plümper and Troeger (2004), our 
coefficient on ωi is 1.0 in FEVD, which confirms that our FEVD model is properly estimated. 
 
4.5.1 Discussion and Interpretation 
 
One of the most important findings in this study relates to the effect of the tax rate on tax 
evasion, particularly given the theoretical and empirical ambiguity associated with this 
relationship. The robust positive relationship in all of our estimated models suggest that higher 
tax rates increase the benefits of evasion as described in the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
model. For transition economies, it seems that the substitution effect prevails over the income 
effect.  
We advance evidence that the macroeconomic environment has significant but minor effects on 
business tax evasion. The literature argues that per capita GDP acts as a proxy for the general 
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level of development within a country. If so, then in transition economies levels of business tax 
evasion can be expected to fall as overall prosperity increases. However, this effect is very small. 
Increased unemployment enables businesses to increase their informal labour force, which 
reduces their tax and pension burden. In this case, the unemployment rate is positively related to 
tax evasion as suggested by our FEVD estimate. The small size of those economic effects that 
are estimated at conventional levels of significance (per capita GDP and unemployment) together 
with the non-significance of the others (inflation and the business environment) suggests that the 
decision to evade or not must depend on other non-economic factors. 
The most important finding of our study is the impact of institutional factors on tax evasion. For 
even if a country is performing well in general economic terms, the presence of negative 
institutional phenomena (most notably corruption and lack of reforms) exert a dominant and 
immediate influence on the relationship between businesses and government. We used the 
measure of transition reforms and corruption levels to proxy the relationship between businesses 
and formal institutions. Reforms depend on the quality of state bodies which, in turn, affects 
citizens’ trust in these same bodies, while corruption gives rise to both dissatisfaction and 
opportunities. The negative effect of both the Transition Index and the Control of Corruption 
Index on tax evasion is as expected; moreover, the size of these institutional effects is 
economically substantial.  The size of the coefficients enforces the general claim in the literature 
that institutional factors do matter in accounting for tax evasion and suggests that their inclusion 
in models of tax evasion for transition economies is imperative. Our findings are consistent with 
several complementary explanations: first, if businesses feel betrayed by their government they 
may respond by non-payment of taxes as a form of revolt; secondly, corruption undermines the 
government-business relationship more broadly, thereby loosening feelings of social obligation; 
thirdly, corruption changes the risk of detection, which suggests that businesses from transition 
economies see corruption also as an opportunity to lessen their tax obligations. 
Finally, positive, large and highly significant period effects for Year 2002 and Year 2005 relative 
to 1999 suggests that tax evasion is falling over time. This again is consistent with the 
importance of transitional reforms, in particular improvements in law enforcement and other 
institutions in these countries.  
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Conclusion 
In spite of the extensive literature on tax evasion, business tax evasion in TEs has been largely 
neglected. Yet many of these economies suffer greatly from tax evasion. This study contributes to 
knowledge in this area by providing evidence from a cross-country investigation of business tax 
evasion in 25 transition economies. This is particularly important as most tax evasion is accounted for 
by the business sector. As well as conventional fixed effects estimation, we employ a recently 
developed approach known as fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD), which is particularly 
suited to small samples. At each stage particular attention has been paid to model diagnostics to 
ensure the statistical integrity of the models and, hence, the validity of our estimates.  
The major findings of this study are the importance of institutional factors and of the tax rate: 
higher corruption, slower reforms and higher tax rates all reduce substantially the amount of 
taxes paid by businesses in TEs. In addition, we identify minor effects from the macroeconomic 
environment on business tax evasion: on the one hand, falling unemployment in the short run and 
rising prosperity in the long run can be expected to reduce tax evasion.  
This study contributes to the empirical literature on tax evasion by investigating the determinants 
of business tax evasion in transition countries and by its suggestions on model specification and 
estimation. However, this chapter is subject to two main limitations. The first is the lack of data 
on and consequent non-inclusion in the model both of the penalty element and of the probability 
of audit. Indeed the lack of data for fine rate is common in almost every tax evasion study which 
relies on data gathered through surveys. The most efficient technique to capture for the impact of 
fine rate on taxpayers decision would be through actual tax measurements programmes, which 
however, apart from US – given the financial costs they entail - are not common for the most 
parts of the world. At the present, most of the research on tax evasion – especially for TEs – 
must rely on surveys. We also note that, to the extent that that these variables (fine and audit 
rate) are time invariant or “slowly changing” their influence is controlled for by the country fixed 
effects and thus is not a source of omitted variables bias. The second limitation is also related to 
the nature of the data and the fact that the proxy for tax evasion is derived from a survey. 
Surveys of tax evasion are complicated, because evasion is a criminal activity and individuals are 
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reluctant to admit such behaviour. We note that the questionnaire has taken into account the 
sensitive nature of the topic, i.e tax evasion – and consequently minimised the risk by designing 
and indirect question on tax evasion, i.e the amount of sales concealed by a firm similar to the 
respondent’s. Because of this however, the data provided in surveys related to tax evasion are 
based on perceptions about the behaviour of others; therefore the outcomes are subjective and 
subject to measurement errors. Again, given the difficulties in obtaining any alternative data, 
studies on tax evasion for TEs have to accept these deficiencies as the least deficient ones. 
Indeed, though survey data might have their weakest links, they still provide incredible 
information – especially related to perceptions and behaviour of individuals – that could not be 
observed through any other available method. 
Together, these findings have a number of policy implications for improving tax evasion in TEs. 
These act to reduce either the possibility of and/or the inclination to evade. 
 Governments should reduce the tax burden on businesses to encourage higher 
compliance. 
 Policymakers should improve the effectiveness of the tax system, which would include 
more effective tax administration, while generally improving the relationship between 
business taxpayers and institutions.  
 Governments should adopt a serious anti-corruption policy. This could reduce tax evasion 
both by increasing voluntary compliance and by better performance of enforcement 
mechanisms. 
Our findings suggest that in TEs institutional reform is the key to improving tax evasion. 
Additional institutional improvements could usefully include enhanced data collection. In 
particular, reporting data on penalties for evasion and audit practices would address one of the 
limitations of this study (and similar studies) noted above, and so better inform research and 
policy design.  
 Chapter FIVE 
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Introduction 
In the previous Chapter we investigated business tax evasion in 25 Transition Economies (TEs) 
for the years 1999, 2002 and 2005. For our panel data, we used both conventional fixed effects 
estimation together with the recently developed Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition approach.  
Our results showed that there is a positive relationship between the tax rate and tax evasion, 
while we also found that higher corruption and/or lower institutional reforms reduce substantially 
the amount of taxes paid by businesses in TEs. In addition, we identified minor effects on tax 
evasion from the macroeconomic environment.  In this Chapter, we focus on micro level 
determinants of business tax evasion. This is done in order to capture firm related determinants 
of tax evasion.  
Cowell (2003) argues that there is no specific and generalized modelling of either individual or 
business tax evasion developed so far. The starting assumption of the literature on the tax 
behaviour of businesses is that their behaviour is similar to the behaviour of individuals, and that 
the determinants of business tax evasion may be similar, at least qualitatively, to the 
determinants of tax evasion by individuals or households. The decision on evasion, or 
compliance, is made by individual managers or entrepreneurs who, in essence, act as individuals 
(Arias, 2005). As Slemrod (2007, p.36)  points out, literature on business tax evasion "adapts the 
theory of tax evasion, which for the most part concerns individual decision makers, to the tax 
compliance decisions made by businesses”. This is particularly true of small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) where the decision making entrepreneur makes compliance decisions as both 
an individual and a manager.
23
  
Several authors, however, have distinguished between business and individual compliance for 
two reasons: a) the nature of internal organizations with separation of ownership and control (and 
hence variations in risk assumptions) which in turn affect important aspects of firms’ external 
                                                          
23
 This may be different for large public companies where the compliance decision are made by one of the directors 
who is likely to be risk-neutral when it comes to tax compliance decisions (whereas the individuals are generally 
assumed to be risk averse). The directors’ compliance decisions also depend on whether their remuneration is linked 
to the after tax profit of the company. 
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activity including tax reporting; and b) the nature of the firm’s external activities in the market 
i.e the relationship between output and tax evasion. We have already elaborated the theoretical 
foundations of business tax evasion in Chapter II, and reviewed empirical investigation in 
Chapter III. Under theoretical discussion we argued that a key feature of the business tax evasion 
literature (for the latest review see Bayer and Cowell, 2009) is that their results are very 
divergent. These results depend greatly upon the assumptions made in regards not only to risk 
behaviour (averse or neutral) but also in regards to separability of evasion and output. Most of 
the business models have conducted a comparative static analysis similar in nature to that of the 
traditional model; i.e., that the firm evades less with higher probability of detection and larger 
fines, while the impact of tax rates is ambiguous (see Marelli, 1984; Martina, 1988; Virmani, 
1989; Sandmo, 2004; Crocker and Slemrod, 2005).  
The lack of data for TEs has limited considerably the scope of work for researchers interested in 
exploring empirically the nature of business tax evasion. However, BEEPS datasets provide an 
adequate measure for tax evasion. The question that fits most in measuring levels of tax evasion 
relates to the perception of a business towards compliance by other firms operating in their line 
of business. Understandably this is not the same question as the share of sales the respondent’s 
firm reported. However, as argued in previous chapters, in the absence of tax measurement 
programmes for TEs, the literature has acknowledged indirect measurement of evasion as the 
most informative available meassure (Gerxhani, 2006). Apart from BEEPS 2002 and 2005, the 
EBRD has also conducted a survey in 1999. Although inclusion of the tax evasion question was 
encouraging for macro level studies, the lack of other important variables identified so far in our 
third chapter makes those data inappropriate for our firm level study. Regrettably enough, the tax 
evasion question was dropped from the 2008/2009 round, while the panel data do not contain our 
dependent variable. Hence in this chapter we make use of survey data for the years 2002 and 
2005.  
We build on two, and to our knowledge the only, works on the micro determinants of business 
tax evasion for TEs, that of Nur-tegin (2008) and Joulfaian (2009). These works came quite late 
and they both make use of BEEPS 2002 data. In Nur-tegin (2008) the focus of the study is on the 
relationship between evasion and the main traditional and non-traditional determinants to the tax 
evasion; while Joulfaian (2009) looks closely at the impact of bribes on the level of evasion. The 
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availability of the BEEPS 2005 dataset, helps us extend the work of Nur-tegin (2008) and 
Joulfaian (2009) both in regards to sample size as well as to new determinants that were either 
not accounted for (due to 2002 data restrictions) or omitted for various reasons in one or both 
papers. By combining determinants and estimation methodology used in the one but not the other 
paper we tend to improve both model specification and empirical strategy. For instance while 
both papers use proxies for tax rate, corruption, size and legal status, the remaining determinants 
of business tax evasion are covered only partially in each respective work. Nur-tegin (2008) 
investigates in addition trust in legal system and compliance costs; while Joulfaian (2009) covers 
ownership structure and industrial sector. In this chapter we group all these determinants within 
one model specification.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews two previous works on business tax 
evasion for transition economies and sets the grounds for further extension conducted in this 
chapter. Section 2 describes the data used in our study and discusses the methodology applied to 
derive our dependent variable, tax evasion. We then discuss the independent variables used in the 
model, as well as their sources. Section 3 outlines the general form of the regression model. In 
Section 4 we focus on our approach to estimation and highlight the importance of controlling for 
sample selection bias and data censoring. In Section 5 we report and discuss the empirical 
findings for our pooled cross section analysis, while in Section 6 we analyse separately data from 
2005 in order to account for two additional variables. The last section concludes.  
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5.1 Research Design 
To our knowledge, so far there are only two papers that analyzed empirically the micro aspects 
of business tax evasion in TEs: Nur-tegin (2008) and Joulfaian (2009). These works came quite 
late and they both make use of BEEPS 2002 data. For Nur-tegin (2008) the main focus of the 
study is the relationship between the main traditional and non-traditional determinants to tax 
evasion; while Joulfaian (2009) looks closely at the impact of bribes on the level of evasion. In 
the following we present their key findings and methodology applied. This will enable us to 
build our work while concentrating on differences or areas not covered by these papers. 
Nur-tegin (2008) provides empirical evidence of a number of determinants of tax evasion by 
firms from TEs. The analysis includes two sets of determinants, both traditional, such as tax rates 
and probability of detection; and non-traditional factors, such as trust in government, compliance 
costs, and corruption. The empirical analysis was carried out using data from the 2002 Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS II). The data contain responses from 
6,367 firms in 27 TEs. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Yugoslavia and Turkey were 
excluded, primarily due to the lack of data on some key non-survey independent variables. 
Observations that had no entries for the dependent variable were also left out while missing 
entries in explanatory variables were substituted with the means of the remaining observations 
(note that missing values were not dropped in Joulfaian, 2009, and they will not be dropped in 
this chapter either). Thus, the final sample comprised 4,538 firms in 23 countries. Tax evasion 
was measured from the standard BEEPS question on percentages of sales underreported for tax 
purposes
24
. The question was then transformed from a measure of compliance to a measure of 
evasion by subtracting the percent of sales reported for tax purposes from 100. Nur-tegin (2008) 
measures the impact of tax rates on compliance by including three types of taxes: VAT (Value 
Added Tax); Social Security Contributions (SSC); and Corporate Income Tax (CIT). From all 
three measures of tax rates, only SSC appears to be significant and, contrary to widely held 
expectations, is positively related with compliance (negatively with evasion).  The result is quite 
interesting as it provides evidence that higher tax rates may not be associated with evasion. The 
                                                          
24
 Q.58 Recognizing the difficulties that many firms face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what per 
cent of total annual sales would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business reports for tax purposes? 
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coefficient on the cost of compliance, measured by the percentage of management’s time 
dedicated to application and interpretation of laws and regulations, appears to be statistically 
significant but small in size. Another important result in Nur-tegin (2008) was the impact of 
corruption on compliance. Two dimensions of corruption were considered: first tax related 
corruption (measured by the intensity of informal payments for tax purposes); and general 
corruption (measuring the percentage of sales a firm pays as a gift to public officials). The results 
provided strong empirical evidence that corruption has a positive effect on tax evasion leading to 
recommendations that, for TEs where tax rates are already low, fighting corruption should be a 
prime objective for policymakers. In addition, Nur-tegin (2008) results provided evidence that 
smaller firms tend to comply with taxes to a lesser degree; that the coefficient on firms’ trust in 
their government (statistically significant) indicates that firms tend to evade taxes less if they are 
more likely to believe that the legal system in their country is fair and impartial. Last, his 
measure of tax enforcement, the presence of accounting audit, appeared to be positively and 
statistically significant with compliance
25
.  
Joulfaian (2009) investigates the role of bribes to tax officials towards shaping compliance. Data 
used for empirical analysis were obtained from the BEEPS 2002 survey with 26 TEs (including 
Turkey). All public enterprises were excluded (927 observations) thus obtaining a final sample of 
5,740 businesses. As in Nur-tegin (2008), the dependent variable in Joulfaian’s work was tax 
evasion, measured by the fraction of sales concealed. Missing responses to this question were not 
excluded due to the possibility of endogeneity between nonresponse and firm behaviour related 
variables; instead sample selection models were applied.  Second, due to restrictions imposed by 
lack of data for audit and fine rates, the conduct of tax administration is used as a proxy to 
determine the impact the tax regime. The conduct of the tax administration is obtained from a 
question measuring the perception of businesses towards the intensity of payments/gifts made to 
deal with taxes and tax collection. In addition to tax administration, tax rates were included 
(statutory tax rates were obtained from the IBFD European Tax Handbook). Taxes were set to 
zero when the profit to sales question was answered nul or negative. Last, ownership, control, 
industrial classification, size and country dummies were included in the analysis in order to 
                                                          
25
 BEEPS data for 2005 provides a much appropriate proxy for probability of audit by measuring the number of 
visits by tax administration. We explore that in our empirical investigation. 
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control for cultural, moral and administrative differences amongst countries (Alm and Togler, 
2006). The results suggest that governance, as measured by the frequency of tax related bribes, is 
a significant determinant of compliance behaviour. Basic statistics show that, when compared to 
tax regimes with no bribes, noncompliance is larger where bribes are common. In addition, 
corporations tend to have less evasive behaviour compared to other organizational forms. The tax 
rate appears to be statistically significant, although contrary to Nur-tegin (2008), is negatively 
related to compliance (positively with evasion). Organizational choice with the underlying nature 
of the largest shareholders of the firm shows that compared to individual/family owners less 
evasion is reported by corporate owners. 
 
5.1.1 Extension  
 
The lack of data for transition economies has limited considerably the scope of work for 
researchers interested in exploring the nature of business tax evasion. However, the BEEPS 
datasets do provide an adequate measure of tax evasion. As seen from the work conducted so far, 
as well as from our methodology review in Chapter III, the question that fits most in measuring 
levels of evasion relates to the perception of a business towards compliance by other firms 
operating in their line of business. Understandably this is not the same question as the share of 
sales the respondent’s firm reported. However, as argued already, in the absence of tax 
measurement programmes for TEs, the literature has acknowledged the indirect measure of 
evasion as the most adequate (Gerxhani, 2006). The EBRD has also an earlier dataset, that of 
BEEPS 1999. Although the inclusion of the tax evasion question was encouraging for macro 
level studies, the lack of other important variables identified so far in our third chapter makes 
these data inappropriate for our firm level study. Regrettably enough, the tax evasion question 
was dropped from the BEEPS 2008/2009 round while the panel data do not contain the tax 
evasion question; thus limiting our studies to only two datasets. 
Availability of BEEPS 2005 datasets helps us to extend the work of Nur-tegin (2008) and 
Joulfaian (2009) both in regards to sample size ( in order to get more precise estimators and test 
statistics with more power) as well as to new determinants that were either not accounted for 
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(due to the 2002 data restrictions) or left out for unknown reasons. In terms of sample size, we 
extend the previous work by introducing BEEPS 2005, and by that adding around 9,000 firms to 
the previous 6,000 from BEEPS 2002. This enables us to look closely at the impact of time on 
the evasive behaviour by firms by introducing a dummy for year, as well as at the effect of 
potential changes in sample size. The year dummies are important not only as additional control 
variables, but they are also required to ensure adequate statistical specification of the model. 
Table 5.1 provides a summary of two previous works and our proposed extension. As can be 
seen from the table, the joint features of all three studies are with respect to dependent variable as 
well as to tax rate, corruption, size, and legal status. the remaining determinants of business tax 
evasion are covered partially in each respective work. Nur-tegin (2008) investigates in addition 
trust in legal system and compliance costs; while Joulfaian (2009) covers ownership structure 
and industrial sector. In this chapter we group all these determinants within one model 
specification.  
The previous two studies tend to differ substantially amongst each other. For instance, while 
investigating the relationship between tax rate and evasion, as measures of the tax rate in Nur-
tegin (2008) were used data for the Social Security Tax, Value Added Tax (VAT) and Corporate 
Tax – all obtained from various papers, while in Joulfaian (2009) Statutory Tax Rates - obtained 
from the IBFD European Tax Book, were introduced and multiplied by the amount of profit 
declared by businesses. Opposing results found on the impact of the tax rate by two papers - i.e 
negative in Nur-tegin (2008) and positive in Joulfaian (2009) - are most likely to be due to 
differences in data sources on the tax rate proxy. Countrary to both studies, we use the BEEPS 
question on the perception of tax burden by businesses. We believe that such a measure tends to 
give us a more accurate impact of tax rate on firms as first, compared to statutory taxes, it does 
account only for eligible taxes
26
, and second, it enables us to look at both 2002 and 2005 
datasets. 
                                                          
26
 We argue that by including all statutory taxes we account for an unrealistic tax burden to businesses. For instance, 
the majority of businesses in TEs are individual or non-corporations. Accounting for Corporate Tax as part of 
statutory tax, means that we are evaluating the impact of the corporate tax burden on the individual tax burden. In 
our study, we look at the respondent’s related tax burden as perceived by them. We argue that inclusion of statutory 
taxes is necessary only in the macro investigation of business tax compliance. 
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The audit probability is accounted for in Nur-tegin (2008) but not in Joulfian (2009). Regardless 
of that, we tend to disagree with Nur-tegin (2008) on the proxy used for the audit probability, 
which is a dummy variable for whether a business had an external accounting reviewer/auditor or 
not. We argue that this measure does not represent at all the perception of businesses on/or actual 
tax audit rates as assumed in theoretical considerations (Andreoni et al. 1998). Rather, it 
measures the quality of financial books and to some extent the degree of openness by firms. 
Most importantly, for most transition economies only corporations are required by law to have 
an external financial review of accounting books. BEEPS data for 2002 and 2005 account for 
only 39% and 31% respectively of businesses organized as corporations (privately held or listed). 
For the majority of respondents not having an external accounting auditor does not imply 
instantaneously lack of inspection by tax administration (and thus detection of evasion), it rather 
means that their financial statements were not examined by independent financial auditing 
bodies, which by definition have different objectives from tax inspectors. After all, financial 
auditors are not supposed to tackle evasion. To address the issue of audit probability we make 
use of BEEPS 2005 which has an impressive question; it accounts for whether a business had 
any inspection from the tax inspectorate over the past 12 months. This allows us to try and 
address empirically the impact of one of the most important and most unobservable determinants 
of tax evasion. Hence, in addition to pooled cross sectional analysis for 2002 and 2005 (without 
audit probability), we analyse separately the 2005 data and account for the audit rate. In one of 
the most profound literature reviews on tax evasion ever, Andreoni et al. (1998, p.843) argue that 
“...being audited in one year raises one’s perception of the chances of being audited in the 
future...” thus tax inspections “...may influence one’s subsequent tax compliance behaviour”. 
Involvement of audit probability in our model will contribute to understanding of the relationship 
of audit and business tax evasion in transition economies. 
 
A real handicap for all three studies, is, and will continue to be, inability to account for the Fine 
Rate (the third traditional determinant) and its impact on tax evasion. Perhaps in future data 
obtained from tax authorities actual audit and fine reports might provide more light on this very 
important relationship. Nevertheless, with both tax rate and the audit probability in our model, 
we are able to empirically investigate two out of three determinants from the Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) traditional model; and their implications for businesses in transition economies.  
 Table 5.1 Summary of business tax evasion in transition economies 
 
Variable Nur-tegin (2008) Joulfaian (2009) Our Work 
Tax Evasion 
 
BEEPS (2002) - Q.58 “Recognizing the 
difficulties that many firms face in fully 
complying with taxes and regulations, 
what per cent of total annual sales would 
you estimate the typical firm in your area 
of business reports for tax purposes"” 
 
 
BEEPS (2002) - Q.58 “Recognizing the 
difficulties that many firms face in fully 
complying with taxes and regulations, 
what per cent of total annual sales would 
you estimate the typical firm in your area 
of business reports for tax purposes"” 
 
 
BEEPS (2002 and 2005) - Q.58 and Q.43a 
“Recognizing the difficulties that many 
firms face in fully complying with taxes 
and regulations, what per cent of total 
annual sales would you estimate the 
typical firm in your area of business 
reports for tax purposes"” 
 
Tax Rate 
Social Security Tax – employer 
contribution (Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab 2000), Value Added Tax (Mitra 
& Stern 2003), & Corporate Income Tax 
(Heritage Foundation) 
 
Statutory tax rates - obtained from the 
IBFD European Tax Handbook, 
PriceWaterHouse Corporate Taxes – 
Worldwide Summaries, and various 
online sources 
 
BEEPS (2002 and 2005) -  Q.80g and 
Q.54h "Can you tell me how problematic 
are these different factors for the operation 
and growth of your business… Tax Rates". 
 
 
Audit Rate X X 
BEEPS (2005) Q.38ba1 "How many times 
in the last 12 months was your 
establishment either inspected by the 
following agencies or required to meet 
with officials from these agencies" … Tax 
Inspectorate" 
Trust in 
Government X X 
BQ.46a and Q.34a: “To what degree do 
you agree with the following statements? 
... Information on the laws & regulations 
affecting my firm is easy to obtain” 
 
Trust in Legal 
System 
BEEPS (2002) Q. 41.a “How often do 
you associate the following descriptions 
with the court system in resolving 
business disputes? – a) fair and 
impartial.” X 
BEEPS (2002 and 2005) Q.42 and Q.28 
"To what degree do you agree with this 
statement" “I am confident that the legal 
system will uphold my contract and 
property rights in business disputes”. 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Nur-tegin (2008) Joulfaian (2009) Our Work 
General 
Corruption 
 
BEEPS (2002) - Q.55 “On average, what 
percent of total annual sales do firms like 
yours typically pay in unofficial 
payments/gifts to public officials"” 
 
BEEPS (2002) Q.51 “How often is the 
following statement true" “If a 
government agent acts against the rules I 
can usually go to another official or to his 
superior and get the correct 
treatment without recourse to unofficial 
payments/gifts.” 
 
 
BEEPS (2002 and 2005) Q.51  and Q.35c 
“It is common for firms in my line of 
business to have to pay some irregular 
“additional payments/gifts” to get things 
done ” with regard to customs, taxes, 
licenses, egulations, services etc” 
 
Compliance Costs 
BEEPS (2002) - Q.50 "What percent of 
senior management’s time in 2001 was 
spent in dealing with public officials 
about the application and interpretation 
of laws and regulations and to get or to 
maintain access to public services"” 
X 
BEEPS (2002 and 2005) - Q.50 and Q.35a 
"What percent of senior management’s 
time in 2001 was spent in dealing with 
public officials about the application and 
interpretation of laws and regulations and 
to get or to maintain access to public 
services"” 
 
Size 
BEEPS (2002) screening question on the 
number of full-time employees. 
BEEPS (2002) screening question on the 
amount of sales. 
BEEPS (2002 and 2005) screening 
questions on the number of full-time 
employees. 
 
Ownership 
BEEPS (2002) screening question on 
ownership 
BEEPS (2002) screening question on 
ownership 
BEEPS (2002 and 2005) screening 
questions on ownership 
 
Legal Status 
BEEPS (2002) screening question on the 
legal organization of the company. 
BEEPS (2002) screening question on the 
legal organization of the company. 
BEEPS (2002 and 2005) screening 
questions on the legal organization of the 
company. 
 
Industrial 
Classification 
X 
BEEPS (2002) Q.2 - "What percentage of 
your sales comes from the following 
sectors in which your establishment 
operates?" 
BEEPS (2002 and 2005) - Q.2 and Q.2 
"What percentage of your sales comes 
from the following sectors in which your 
establishment operates?" 
 
Year Dummies X X 2002 and 2005 
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Corruption is central in both studies, with Joulfiain (2009) looking more deeply at relationship 
between bribes and tax evasion. We will too account for business general perception about 
corruption in our estimations. In regards to other determinants, both papers have some 
deficiencies. While Joulfaian (2009) as opposed to Nur-tegin (2008) lacks inclusion of 
compliance costs and trust variables, Nur-tegin (2008) as opposed to Joulfaian (2009) lacks 
industrial classification. Our work will tend to combine all these determinants jointly in one 
regression model, and by that improve significantly model specificiation. In regards to trust, we 
will distinguish between trust in government and trust in the judicial system. Andreoni et al. 
(1998) argue in favour of separation between the role and impact of various institutions; as 
Cowell (1990) points out, in reality government is not a single unit controlling all policies. In 
practice, it is more likely that there is a very clear distinction between governmental agencies 
that set tax rates, the probability of audit and the fine rate. For instance, tax rates and audit 
probability are set by the central government and tax administration agency, while fine rates are 
set by specific courts. Therefore, measuring the perception of businesses towards each institution 
separately is necessary. Specifically, business perception towards the quality of courts is a good 
proxy for both trust and perceived fairness. To control for country characteristics, Nurtegin 
(2008) measures also Reform Progress (but does not include country dummies), while Joulfaian 
(2009) includes dummies for country specifics. We create country level dummies. Last, we will 
control for dynamic changes by adding a year dummy. The year dummies are important not only 
as additional control variables, but they are also required to ensure adequate statistical 
specification of the model. There are two good reasons (and hence advantages) for (from) their 
inclusion: 1) they minimize the effect of cross-group – time specific – common shocks; and 2) 
they provide adequate information on how the evasive behaviour by firms has changed across the 
years. 
To sum up, our work not only trebles the sample size, but also includes commonly used 
determinants (tax rate, size, ownership, legal status, corruption) as well as determinants that are 
in one but not in the other paper. Furthermore we divide trust amongst government and courts in 
order to get a better picture of fairness and social interaction determinants. In addition, by 
introducing 2005 data, for the first time we will empirically investigate the impact of the 
probability of audit on business tax evasion in transition economies, as suggested by tax evasion 
modelling. Last, through pooled cross-sectional analysis, the time impact will be examined.  
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5.2 Data Description 
The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) is part of the ongoing 
work of the EBRD and the World Bank to investigate the extent to which government policies 
and public services facilitate or impede the environment for investment and business 
development in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (including Turkey) and the Commonwealth of 
Independent Sates (CIS). BEEPS 2002 has 6,667 enterprises in 28 transitional economies: 16 
from CEE (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FR 
Yugoslavia (*Federation of Serbia and Montenegro), FYR Macedonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey) and 12 from the CIS 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan).  
Table 5.2 BEEPS sample size for each country 
  
  Country 2002 2005     Country 2002 2005 
1 Albania 200 200 
 
14 Kazakhstan 300 585 
2 Armenia 200 320 
 
15 Kyrgyzstan 200 200 
3 Azerbaijan 200 320 
 
16 Latvia 200 200 
4 Belarus 300 300 
 
17 Lithuania 200 200 
5 Bosnia 200 200 
 
18 Moldova 200 350 
6 Bulgaria 300 300 
 
19 Poland 550 945 
7 Croatia 200 200 
 
20 Romania 300 585 
8 Czech Republic 300 300 
 
21 Russia 550 550 
9 Estonia 200 200 
 
22 Slovak Republic 200 200 
10 FR Yugoslavia 300 300 
 
23 Slovenia 200 200 
11 FYR Macedonia 200 200 
 
24 Tajikistan 200 200 
12 Georgia 200 200 
 
25 Ukraine 550 550 
13 Hungary 300 585 
 
26 Uzbekistan 300 300 
       Source: BEEPS 2002 and 2005 
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BEEPS 2005 has 9,654 enterprises in the 28 countries covered by the second round of the 
BEEPS. Our pooled cross-sectional analysis has a sample of 16,321 firms
27
. Initially, we drop 
Turkey as we want to focus only on post-communist countries i.e. transition economies, and we 
also drop Turkmenistan given the lack data for the most important questions. In addition, we 
drop public enterprises and cooperatives, in order to focus only on the private sector. Thus our 
final sample is 12,692 firms from 26 transition economies. 
Next, we present a brief description of key variables of this chapter, and their construction: 
Tax Evasion– Is a measure of the fraction of sales concealed. We derive this question from 
measuring the level of tax compliance (tax evasion = 100% – tax compliance). The question 
asked in the 2002 and 2005 surveys was as follows: 
Q.58 and Q.43a – Recognising the difficulties that many firms face in fully complying 
with taxes and regulations, what per cent of total annual sales would you estimate the 
typical firm in your area of business reports for tax purposes? 
The respondents were asked to provide a single answer on the level of reporting, measured in 
percent. The survey does not provide a direct question on compliance. However, as argued in 
Chapter 3, indirect measures of compliance (and other unlawful activities) are common for 
survey data
28
. From 12,692 observations, 896 (7%) are left blank. From 11,796 businesses who 
decided to respond on this question, around 60% have declared full compliance (100%), around 
20% are in the region of the 75-99% compliance level, 14% in the region of 50-74%, 3.5% 
answered 25-49% and around 2.5% believe that firms similar to theirs report only 1-24% of their 
sales for tax purposes; no responses are observed with 0% compliance. We transform the 
question from a measure of compliance to a measure of evasion by subtracting the percent of 
sales reported for tax purposes from 100. Under this transformation 60% of observations have 
0% values. Such a distribution shows that our dependent variable is roughly continuous over 
                                                          
27
 Nur-tegin (2008) works on a sample of 4,538, after dropping firms from Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia, Serbia and 
Turkey, due to the lack of data on non-survey independent variables. Joulfaian (2009) drops public enterprises, in 
order to focus solely on private sector, and thus is left with 5,740 businesses. 
28
 For more on how to conduct evasion questions see Brenan (1980), Hanousek and Palda (2004) and Gerxhani 
(2006) 
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strictly positive values, but is zero for a nontrivial fraction of population (Wooldridge, 2003). A 
sample in which information on the regressand is available only for some observations is known 
as a censored sample (Gujarati, 2002). 
 
5.2.1 Independent Variables 
Tax Rate – is a measure of the tax burden as perceived by businesses. As within the theory, the 
empirical evidence on the impact of tax rates is quite controversial (for this and empirical 
reviews of other determinants see Chapter 3). In regards to transition economies, Joulfaian 
(2009) found a positive and significant relationship between tax rate and evasion, while 
surprisingly enough, although using the same dataset, Nur-tegin (2008) establishes a negative 
relationship. One explanation to this discrepancy is, as elaborated earlier, the different sources of 
tax data used in their respective estimations. We define the relationship between evasion and one 
of its most important determinants by using a different proxy for the tax rate, that is the 
perceived burden from tax rates. In our macro investigation of business tax evasion for transition 
economies we found a positive and significant relationship with evasion, thus our expected sign 
is positive.  
The question asked in the 2002 and 2005 surveys is as follows: 
Q.80g and Q.54h “Can you tell me how problematic are these different factors for the 
operation and growth of your business…  ax Rates” 
Four possible answers are reported: (1) no obstacle, (2) minor obstacle, (3) moderate obstacle, 
and (4) major obstacle. The distribution of these responses shows that 2,262 (18%) are 
observations with no obstacle, 2,343 (18%) minor obstacle, 3,688 (29%) were moderate obstacle 
and 4,205 (33%) were major obstacle. Around 1.5% or 193 observations were left blank.  
General Corruption – is measure of business’ perception towards corruption in their respective 
country environment. The question asked in 2002 and 2005 surveys is as follows: 
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Q.51 and Q.35c “ t is common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some 
irregular “additional payments/gifts” to get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, 
licenses, regulations, services etc” 
Six possible answers are reported: (1) never, (2) seldom, (3) sometimes, (4) frequently, (5) 
usually, and (6) always. The distribution of these responses shows that 3,909 (30.8%) 
respondents have answered with never, 2,103 (16.6%) were seldom, 2,645 (20.8%) were 
sometimes, 1,288 (10.1%) were frequently, 938 (7.4%) were usually, and 552 (4.3%) were 
always. Around 9.9% or 1,260 observations were left blank. Corruption is expected to have a 
positive sign on tax evasion. 
Trust – is a measure of the relationship between business taxpayers and their governments. Trust 
in institutions reflects the perception of citizens towards government responsiveness and fairness 
(see Jackson and Milliron, 1986; Eriksen and Fallan, 1996; Frey 1997; and Torgler, 2003) thus 
their behaviour towards tax obligations. Torgler (2007a) argues that increased trust in 
government, tax administration and legal system tends to increase tax morale (or intrinsic 
motivation to comply) and thus taxpayers’ willingness to contribute voluntarily in tax payments. 
In measuring trust we distinguish amongst government and courts.  
Trust in Government – is one of the most widely studied determinants of tax evasion. We use 
transparency as a measure of trust towards the government. Frey (1997) recognizes the 
importance of sharing information and treatment by the authorities towards citizens. If taxpayers 
feel as partners then honesty among them will be higher compared to the case when they feel as 
subordinates. BEEPS 2002 and 2005 have a question measuring the level of transparency as 
perceived by businesses. The question is as follows: 
Q.46a and Q.34a: “ o what degree do you agree with the following statements? ... 
 nformation on the laws & regulations affecting my firm is easy to obtain” 
Six possible answers are given 1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree in most cases, (3) tend to 
disagree, (4) tend to agree, (5) agree in most cases, and (6) strongly agree. The distribution of 
these responses shows that there are 1,040 (8%) observations with strongly disagree answer, 
1,337 (11%) were disagree in some cases, 1,981 (16%) tend to disagree, 3,494 (28%) were tend 
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to agree, 2,731 (22%) agree in most cases, and 1,831 (14%) were strongly agree. Around 2% or 
281 observations were left blank. The expected sign is negative. 
Trust in the Legal System – is measured as perception of businesses towards the effectiveness of 
courts in solving various business disputes. Torgler (2007a) argues that not only trust in 
government matters, but also trust in courts and in general the legal system to essential to tax 
conformity behaviour. He further suggests that trust in the legal system leads to acceptance of 
governments’ decisions and produces the incentive to obey the rules. The question asked in 
BEEPS 2002 and 2005 surveys is as follows: 
Q.42 and Q.28: “ o what degree do you agree with this statement? “  am confident that 
the legal system will uphold my contract and property rights in business disputes”. 
Six possible answers are given 1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree in most cases, (3) tend to 
disagree, (4) tend to agree, (5) agree in most cases, and (6) strongly agree. The distribution of 
these responses shows that 1,374 (11%) respondents answered with strongly agree, 1,626 (13%) 
with disagree in some cases, 2,725 (21%) with tend to disagree, 3,510 (28%) with tend to agree, 
2,048 (16%) with agree, and 707 (6%) were always. Around 6% or 702 observations were left 
blank. The expected sign is negative. 
Compliance Costs – is a measure of amount of time that senior management spends dealing 
with various legal requirements. As elaborated in the Chapter III, various studies reveal that the 
complexity of the tax system has been associated with greater underreporting of tax. Slemrod 
(1985) argues that taxpayers may eliminate compliance costs (in the short run) by simply not 
filing returns. The question asked in BEEPS 2002 and 2005 surveys is as follows: 
Q.50 and Q.35a “What percent of senior management’s time in “2   ” (respectively 
“2   ”) was spent in dealing with public officials about the application and 
interpretation of laws and regulations and to get or to maintain access to public 
services?” 
Respondents were asked to provide a single answer on the level time spent, measured in percent. 
The expected sign is positive. 
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Industrial Classification – is a measure of the firm’s major output in a specific operating sector. 
Cowell (2003) while modelling tax evasion in a competitive market, argues that evasive 
behaviour tends to be different across industries. Sectors that are more visible to tax 
administration and are subject to non-cash payments are expected to have less evasive 
opportunities thus more dutiful behaviour. The question asked in the BEEPS 2002 and 2005 
surveys is as follows: 
Q.2 and Q.2 “What percentage of your sales comes from the following sectors in which 
your establishment operates?” 
Eight possible answers were given 1) mining and quarrying, 2) construction, 3) manufacturing, 
4) transport storage and communication, 5) wholesale, retail, repairs, 6) real estate, renting and 
business services, 7) hotel and restaurants, and 8) other. Answers with multiple percentages are 
grouped according to the one having the majority share (50% and higher). The distribution of 
answers is as follows: mining and quarrying 116 (0.9%); construction 1,379 (10.9%); 
manufacturing 4,410 (34.7%), transport, storage and communication 779 (6.1%); wholesale, 
retail and repairs (3,552 (28%); real estate, renting and business services 1,133 (8.9%); hotels 
and restaurants 706 (5.6%) and 617 (4.9%) observations are under Other category. We build a 
dummy for each sector. 
Other Determinants – include Size, as measured by the number of employees (Small up to 49; 
Medium 50-249; and Large 250 – 9999); Ownership, as measured by the origin of the main 
investor (Domestic and Foreign); Legal Status, as measured by the legal organization of 
companies (sole proprietorship, partnership and corporations); and Year, as measured by the year 
when the survey took place (2002 or 2005). Our sample consists of 9,364 (73.8%) small firms, 
2,251 (17.7%) medium, and 1,077 (8.5%) large enterprises; of which 11,020 (86.8%) are 
domestically owned and 1,672 (13.2%) have foreign owners. Of 12,692 surveyed enterprises, 
5,295 (41.7%) are registered as sole proprietorships, 3,653 (28.8%) as partnerships, while 3,744 
(29.5%) are registered as corporations. Around 36.6% (4,644 observations) belong to BEEPS 
2002; with the remaining 63.4% (8,048) belonging to BEEPS 2005. We except size to be 
negatively related with evasion, foreign firms to be more compliant, proprietorships to express 
more undutiful behaviour (Nur-tegin, 2008, and Joulfaian, 2009), and last, improvement of 
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compliance over the time. Last we include 25 country level dummies. In all our estimations we 
exclude and compare dummy results to base dummy FR Yugoslavia (*Serbia and Montegro). 
For BEEPS 2005 analysis, two determinants are added: 
Audit Probability – is a measure of whether a firm had or did not have any inspections from  
the tax inspectorate during the past twelve months. We build a dummy variable from the answers 
provided with values 1 if the firm had any inspection and zero otherwise. The question asked in 
BEEPS 2005 survey is as follows: 
Q.38ba1 “How many times in the last  2 months was your establishment either inspected 
by the following agencies or required to meet with officials from these agencies? …  ax 
 nspectorate;  nspections/meetings carried out. Yes/ o” 
Table 5.3 provides descriptive statistics for pooled cross sectional analysis. Descriptives for the 
2005 data including audit are provided later in Section 8. Table 5.4 provides a summary of the 
variables included in our regressions. 
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Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics for Pooled Cross Sectional Analysis 
 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Max Min 
Tax Evasion 11796 13.09 21.39 99 0 
Tax Rate 12498 2.79 1.10 4 1 
Trust in Government 12412 3.89 1.46 6 1 
Trust in Judicial System 11990 3.45 1.38 6 1 
General Corruption 11435 2.55 1.49 6 1 
Compliance Costs 12214 5.89 10.66 95 0 
Foreign 12692 0.13 0.34 1 0 
Medium 12692 0.18 0.38 1 0 
Large 12692 0.08 0.28 1 0 
Individual 12692 0.29 0.46 1 0 
Partnership 12692 0.29 0.45 1 0 
Mining 12692 0.01 0.10 1 0 
Construction 12692 0.11 0.31 1 0 
Manufacturing 12692 0.35 0.48 1 0 
Transportation 12692 0.06 0.24 1 0 
Wholesale and Retail 12692 0.28 0.45 1 0 
Real Estate 12692 0.09 0.29 1 0 
Hotels and Restaurants 12692 0.06 0.23 1 0 
Dummy Year 12692 0.63 0.48 1 0 
          Source: STATA 2011   
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Table 5.4 Summary of variables 
 
Variable Description Question Unit of measurement 
Tax Evasion 
measure of the 
fraction of sales 
concealed 
 
 
Q.58 and Q.43a – Recognizing the 
difficulties that many firms face in 
fully complying with taxes and 
regulations, what per cent of total 
annual sales would you estimate 
the typical firm in your area of 
business reports for tax purposes? 
 
 
In Percentage (%) 
Tax Rate 
measure of tax 
burden as 
perceived by 
businesses 
Q.80g and Q.54h “Can you tell me 
how problematic are these 
different factors for the operation 
and growth of your business…  ax 
Rates” 
 
 
1) no obstacle, (2) minor 
obstacle, (3) moderate 
obstacle, and (4) major 
obstacle 
Audit 
Probability 
measure of 
whether a firm 
had or not any 
inspections 
Q. 8ba  “How many times in the 
last 12 months was your 
establishment either inspected by 
the following agencies or required 
to meet with officials from these 
agencies? …  ax  nspectorate; 
Inspections/meetings carried out. 
Yes/ o” 
 
 
Dummy: Yes and No (base 
dummy) 
Trust in 
Government 
measure of 
sharing 
information by 
central 
government 
Q. 6a and Q.  a: “ o what 
degree do you agree with the 
following statements? ... 
Information on the laws & 
regulations affecting my firm is 
easy to obtain” 
1) strongly disagree, (2) 
disagree in most cases, (3) 
tend to disagree, (4) tend to 
agree, (5) agree in most cases, 
and (6) strongly agree.  
Trust in 
Legal System 
 
measure of 
perception of 
businesses 
towards 
effectiveness of 
courts in 
solving various 
business 
disputes 
 
 
Q. 2 and Q.28: “ o what degree 
do you agree with this statement? 
“  am confident that the legal 
system will uphold my contract 
and property rights in business 
disputes”. 
1) strongly dis 
agree, (2) disagree in most 
cases, (3) tend to disagree, (4) 
tend to agree, (5) agree in 
most cases, and (6) strongly 
agree 
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Variable Description Question Unit of measurement 
General 
Corruption 
measure of 
business’ 
perception 
towards 
corruption 
 
 
Q.5   and Q. 5c “ t is common for 
firms in my line of business to have 
to pay some irregular “additional 
payments/gifts” to get things done 
” with regard to customs, taxes, 
licenses, regulations, services etc” 
 
(1) never, (2) seldom, (3) 
sometimes, (4) frequently, (5) 
usually, and (6) always. 
Compliance 
Costs 
 
measure of 
amount of time 
that senior 
management 
spends dealing 
with various 
legal 
requirements 
 
 
Q.5  and Q. 5a “What percent of 
senior management’s time in 2    
was spent in dealing with public 
officials about the application and 
interpretation of laws and 
regulations and to get or to 
maintain access to public 
services?” 
In Percentage (%) 
Industrial 
Classification 
measure of 
firm’s major 
output in 
specific 
operating sector 
Q.2 and Q.2 “What percentage of 
your sales comes from the 
following sectors in which your 
establishment operates?” 
Dummy for: 1) mining and 
quarrying, 2) construction, 3) 
manufacturing, 4) transport 
storage and communication, 
5) wholesale, retail, repairs, 
6) real estate, renting and 
business services, 7) hotel and 
restaurants, and 8) other (base 
dummy) 
Size 
number of 
employees 
 .  “How many full-time 
employees work for this 
company?”  
 
 
Dummy for: Small 2-49 (base 
dummy); Medium 50-249; 
and Large 250 – 9999 
Ownership 
origin of main 
investor 
 . c and  .5 “What percentage of 
your firm is owned by:” 
 
 
Dummy for: Domestic (base 
dummy) and Foreign 
Legal Status 
legal 
organization 
 .2 “What is the legal 
organization of this company?” 
 
 
Dummy for: Single 
Proprietorship, Partnership 
and corporations (base 
dummy) 
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5.3 Basic Regression Model 
To investigate the micro determinants of business tax evasion in transition economies, we 
estimate the following model: 
        ̂           ̂            ̂            ̂               ̂             ̂      
 ̂         ̂            ̂             ̂            ̂            
Index i refers to observations 1,...,12,692. TEi stands for the level of tax evasion for observation 
i;          is the level of the tax burden;           trust in government,           trust in courts 
and the legal system, ;                business perception about the level of corruption, 
          represents firm’s compliance costs;            is firm’s ownership type (dummy 1 
for foreign and 0 domestic);        is the size of the firm;          is legal status;          is the 
firm’s industrial classification;       is year dummy (1 for 2005 and 0 for 2002), country is 
country level dummy for 26 transition countries (FR Yugoslavia as base dummy) and  ij is the 
usual error term.  The next section elaborates on various econometric issues related to the 
estimation of our model. 
  
(15) 
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5.4 Econometric Issues 
In this section we explore the nature of our data, advantages from exploring independent cross 
sections across time, and potential problems with sample selection bias due to the nature of the 
dependent variable. We start with a brief outline of the advantages in pooling data. We explore 
minor problems arising from pooling as well as tools to solve them. On the second part we 
explore potential sample bias as well as the so far developed methods for addressing this issue. 
Last we address the issue of censored data.  
 
 
5.4.1 Pooling Independent Cross Sections across time  
 
BEEPS surveys are repeated at regular intervals of three years. Wooldridge (2003) argues that if 
a random sample is drawn at each time period, pooling the resulting random samples produces an 
independently pooled cross section; and this in turn has advantages similar to increase the sample 
size, getting more precise estimators and test statistics with more power. There are, however, 
some minor statistical complications, which mainly reflect the fact that the population may have 
different distributions at different times. Hence, inclusion of dummy variables for the year is 
required. Inclusion of dummy variable for the years 2002 and 2005 also enables us to understand 
changes in tax evasion levels over the time, after controlling for other observable factors.  
In order to check for structural breaks across time, the Chow test (which is simply an F-test) can 
be used to determine whether a multiple regression function differs across two groups. As 
Wooldridge (2003) argues, a good way to compute the Chow test for two time periods is by 
interacting each variable with a year dummy for one of the two years and testing for joint 
significance of the year dummy and all of the interaction terms. Following this suggestion, our 
results show that there is no structural break across time; hence we can pool the independent 
cross sections.  
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5.4.2 Sample Selection Bias 
The nature of the dependent variable in our study, derived from a survey, reflects a very sensitive 
issue, that of tax evasion. This in turn might restrict respondents’ choices to provide either a 
truthful or indeed any perception on the phenomenon. Hence, two sources of potential sample 
bias arise: first, nonresponse may be endogeneous to firm behaviour, therefore the exclusion of 
missing values might bias estimates (Joulfaian, 2009); and, second, since the dependent variable 
asks firms to perceive the level of evasion by other firms, a part of the responses declaring full 
compliance might be false in order to cover a common evasive behaviour by firms (Nur-tegin, 
2008). The latter does not deal with “missingness” as such; rather, some of the provided answers 
are treated as subject to varying degrees of truthfulness, which cannot be observed but which can 
be proxied by the estimated probability of external review (assumed to be positively related with 
truthfulness). 
The selection bias problem was first acknowledged by Tobin (1958), who argued that if this 
sample selection problem is not accounted for in the estimation procedure, an ordinary least 
squares estimation (OLS) will produce biased parameter estimates. Later on, Heckman (1979) 
introduced a two-step statistical approach known as Heckit, which offers a means of correcting 
for non-randomly selected samples and provides consistent, asymptotically efficient estimates 
for all parameters in the model. Both Tobit and Heckit address those cases where the impact of 
independent variables can affect both the incidence (or intensity) and propensity of an event; in 
our case it is tax evasion. Tobit assumes that there is a similar effect of independent variables on 
intensity and propensity. Heckman, on the other side, relaxes this assumption by offering a two 
step approach. In the first step (selection equation) it measures the impact of independent 
variables on the propensity. The first step is estimated through a standard Probit. From there, a 
new variable is generated – known as the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) – which is a measure of the 
propensity (in our case propensity to evade). In the second step, Heckman introduces the IMR to 
the primary regression; hence measuring the intensity (in our case of tax evasion) – conditional 
on propensity (to evade). 
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The standard Heckit procedure starts from a linear regression model (main equation): 
   β        
where Yi is the dependent variable tax evasion, Xi observed variables relating to the i’th 
observations and    is an error term. The next step in the Heckman method is to create the 
selection model which must be estimated using the Probit estimator. The Probit model assumes 
that the error term follows a standard normal distribution (Heckman 1979). The selection 
equation is: 
            
where    is a vector of exogenous variables determining the selection process or the outcome 
Wi* only when in the selection equation, Wi* crosses a specific threshold. Wi* is a dichotomous 
variable with the property that: 
   ⌊
             i   
             i   
⌋ 
When controlling for “missingness”, we investigate whether nonresponse is endogenous to firm 
behaviour determinants, by generating a dummy from the responsiveness of the dependent 
variable. Not controlling for missing values may bias the estimates in Equation (15) (Joulfaian, 
2009). Hence, Equations (17) and (18) become:  
                   
 
           ⌊
                          
                          
⌋ 
where            is a dummy variable with values 1 if respondents have answered and 0 
otherwise. Conditional upon positive responses we estimate Equation (15).  
When controlling for “truthfulness”, we are interested for the degree of openness by firms, hence 
we investigate whether the firm had its annual financial statements reviewed by external 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
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auditors
29
. In other words, if a firm was subject to review of its statements, then they have fewer 
reasons to underreport tax evasion. In this vein one can argue that their responses on zero 
evasion levels may be honest as well. The selection bias becomes an issue when 
misrepresentation by dishonest firms of their views is systematic in creating too many full 
compliance answers (Nur-tegin 2008). If, however, the misperception is random then selection 
bias is not present (Breen, 1996).  Hence, Equations (17) and (18) become: 
 
                   
 
           ⌊
                          
                          
⌋ 
where            is a dummy variable with values 1 if respondents have declared that their 
businesses had external reviewers of their financial statements and 0 otherwise. Conditional upon 
positive responses we estimate Equation (15).  
Once the Heckman selection equation is estimated, the residuals from it are used to form a new 
variable known as the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). Each observation in the study sample receives 
a value of IMR based on the residual observed for that observation. It is important to note that 
the IMR is a function not only of observed or measured variables that are included in the 
selection equation, but also of unobserved or unmeasured variables. These are captured through 
the error term or residual in the selection equation, and included through the non-linear function 
used to estimate the IMR. Hence, adding the IMR into the outcome equation introduces a term 
that attempts to capture both observed and unobserved variables that affect selection, or non-
response, so that the model is estimated conditional on some otherwise unobserved selection 
forces (Sales et al. 2004). The final step in Heckman procedure is to include the IMR as a 
separate variable in the initial regression models. The last stage then reruns the regression with 
the inverse Mills ratio included as an extra explanatory variable, thereby removing the part of the 
error term correlated with the explanatory variables and avoiding the bias. In this case, sample 
                                                          
29
 The question reflecting openness is: Q.74 and Q.49 - Does your establishment have its annual financial statement 
reviewed by an external auditor? 
(20) 
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selection bias has been corrected by the selection equation, which determines whether an 
observation makes it into the nonrandom sample.  
In both cases, the final equation, which can be estimated by OLS, can be written as: 
   β            
The conditional expectation of Yi, given that Yi is observed is: 
 [     i   ]           
  (   )
  (   )
 
where 
  (   )
  (   )
  [       ! 0  
is the inverse Mills ratio. The inverse Mills ratio, named after John P. Mills, is the ratio of the 
probability density function to the cumulative distribution function of a distribution.   denotes 
the standard normal density function, and Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function (Greene 2002). In conducting the two step procedure, Heckit estimates rho( ), which is 
the correlation of the residuals in the two equations and sigma ( ) which is the standard error of 
the residuals of the selection equation. Lambda (λ), or the coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio, 
is      . Since     > 0, the coefficient on λ can only be zero if   = 0, so testing the null that the 
coefficient on λ is zero is equivalent to testing for sample selectivity (dependent on adequate 
identifying variables)
30
. In other words, if   = 0 then      
  (   )
  (   )
 drops out. 
Wooldridge (2003) argues that Xi should be a strict subset of Zi. This has two implications. First, 
any element that appears as an explanatory variable in the main equation should also be an 
                                                          
30
 A common issue in Heckit procedure is the need to correct standard errors in the outcome equation (Golder 2010). 
This, for two main reasons: first, in the presence of selection bias, heteroscedasticity problems arise. These can be 
solved by using robust standard errors; and, second the IMR is estimated with uncertainty as  ̂ is just an estimator of  
 . For further discussion on how SE’s are corrected, see Heckman (1979), Wooldridge (2003) and Greene (2002). 
Computer packages such as STATA and LIMDEP correct automatically these standard errors. 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
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explanatory variable in the selection equation. A second major implication is that there must be 
at least one element of Zi that is not also in Xi. This means that there is a need for a variable that 
affects selection but does not have a partial effect on Y. In the absence of such an exclusion 
restriction variable the results will be usually the less than convincing. According to Wooldridge 
(2003) the reason for this is that while the inverse Mills ratio is a nonlinear function of Zi, it is 
often well-approximated by a linear function. If Zi equals Xi, then    can be highly correlated 
with the elements of Xi. Such multicollinearity can lead to very high standard errors for the β̂ . 
Furthermore, in the absence of a variable that affects selection but not Y, it is extremely difficult, 
if not impossible, to distinguish sample selection from a misspecified functional form in the main 
equation. 
Having said that, we consider two exclusion restriction variables, each for the sample selection 
sources that we address. For “missingness”, in the selection Equation (19) we use a variable with 
values 1 if the respondent was an owner and 0 otherwise. The assumption here is that such a 
proxy serves well in measuring firms’ readiness to answer on very sensitive questions, such as 
the one related to tax evasion. Owners contrary to managers and other groups of respondents are 
more likely to hide common evasive behaviour (if present) by refusing to answer. Notably, the 
nature of interviewees, i.e. whether they are owners or managers or share/do not share 
information, is theoretically insignificant as a determinant of tax evasion. Consequently, we 
argue that the inclusion of this particular exclusion restriction variable does not appear on the 
main regression on strong theoretical grounds. The expected sign of dummy variable for owner 
in the Probit selection equation is negative. 
For “truthfulness”, as a exclusion restriction variable in the selection Equation (20) we use a 
dummy variable with values 1 if firm applies International Accounting Standards (IAS), and 0 
otherwise. By doing so we assume that application of IAS’s has a considerable impact on the 
firms’ decision to have external reviewers, but not on the level of tax reporting. Here the 
expected sign of the IAS dummy in the Probit selection equation is positive. 
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An alternative to the Heckman
31
 Two-Step Probit-OLS approach is the Heckman Maximum 
Likelihood. Joulfaian (2009) applies an extended Heckman ML procedure to the estimates of 
Tobit equation conditional upon a positive response on a Probit equation (note that standard 
Heckman Two-Step estimates OLS conditional upon Probit). Given that around 60% of 
respondents in our data have declared full compliance, i.e. no evasion, the dependent variable has 
a population distribution that is spread out over a range of positive values but with a pileup at the 
value zero. Under these circumstances, the extended Heckman ML procedure with Tobit 
estimation conditional upon a positive response in the Probit selection equation seems quite 
appealing. 
Under this extended Heckman ML, procedure the correlation of the error terms across the two 
equations is corr( ,u)    . More importantly, if   = 0, then there is sufficient evidence to assume 
that there is no sample selection bias. The estimator here is a full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML) estimator. In Equation (17), a second step least squares regression is 
computed in order to obtain starting values for maximum likelihood estimates. As Greene (2002, 
p.785) argues:  
(estimates) are corrected for selection, to a degree, but they are still inconsistent. The 
results given at this point are obtained by least squares, and, as such, are inconsistent in 
the same manner as the OLS coefficients are in the basic Tobit model. As noted these are 
just starting values for iterations. The MLE is consistent and efficient.  
Note that in the second-stage Tobit estimation, there is no λ variable included, since the 
estimator is not least squares. This sample selection model is fit by maximum likelihood, hence 
there is no selection “correction” variable as in the standard Heckit procedure.  
                                                          
31 A notable issue in Heckman Two-Step approach relates to standard errors, which remain problematic for three 
reasons. As Lin (2007) argues: first, the additional variance that results from the generated regressor - namely the 
inverse Mills ratio term - must be taken into account. Second, if there is indeed selection, then there is 
heteroskedasticity. Third, spatial dependence is induced by the fact that a common β is used to construct the 
estimated inverse Mills ratio for all of the observations. Heckman (1979) includes a consistent variance estimator 
that deals with all of these problems (for more See Greene 2002 p.785). STATA produces the correct standard errors 
automatically. 
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(24) 
(25) 
Maximum-likelihood estimation is straightforward. Let f (:) and F(:) be the density function and 
the cumulative density function for Y*. Then the model implies that the probabilities of 
observing a non-zero Y and a zero Y are f(Y) and p(Y*<0)=F(0), respectively. Hence, the log-
likelihood function for the model is: 
      (∏ (  
    
) ∏ ( )
    
)  ∑    (   )  ∑    ( )
        
 
Because Y* is normally distributed (since the error terms are normally distributed), the density 
function, the cumulative density function and the log-likelihood function, can all be expressed in 
terms of the density function and the cumulative density function of the standard normal 
distribution (.) and  ( ). Hence, the log-likelihood function can be written in the familiar form:  
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Our purpose here is not to provide a full elaboration of maximum likelihood approach, but rather 
to highlight its essentials; hence, any interested reader may refer to Greene (2002) and 
Wooldridge (2003) for further exposition. 
We note that the ML approach requires stronger assumptions compared to the two-step 
procedure. For ML, we need to assume that:   ~ N(0, 2) ;  u ~ N(0, 1);  and  corr( ,u)     that is 
both error terms are normally distributed with mean 0, variances as indicated and the error terms 
are correlated, where   indicates the correlation coefficient. The variance of u is normalized to 1 
because only Wi, not Wi*, is observed. Due to such assumptions the MLE estimation is not as 
general as the Two-Step procedure. As Wooldridge (2003) notes, another drawback is that: a) it 
is less robust than the two-step procedure as relies more heavily on the functional form; and b) 
sometimes it is difficult to get it to converge. However, MLE estimation will be more efficient if 
u and   really are jointly normally distributed. In our estimations we consider and report both 
versions of the Heckman selection procedure. 
To sum up, we control for both the “missingness” and “the truthfulness” of answers in our 
dependent variable. While controlling for “missingness”, the selection variable is a dummy of 
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responses, with values 1 if a response was given and 0 otherwise. A dummy variable controlling 
for whether the respondent was the owner or not is introduced as exclusion restriction variable. 
While controlling for “truthfulness”, the selection variable is a dummy with values 1 if firms had 
an external reviewer and 0 otherwise. A dummy variable for application or not of international 
accounting standards is included as well in the selection equation an exclusion variable. We use 
the Heckman Selection Two-Step, ‘Probit in the first stage – OLS in the second’ (STATA) as 
well as ‘Probit in the first stage – Tobit in the second’ (LIMPDEP) to control for “missingness” 
and for “truthfulness”. 
 
5.4.3 Tobit Corner Solution 
Under the assumption that missing values and truthfulness in the dependent variable are random 
and present respectively, that is they do not cause any sample selection bias, our final approach 
should address the issue of data censoring. We do that by using the Tobit Corner Solution.  
According to Wooldridge (2003), optimizing behaviour often leads to corner solutions for some 
nontrivial fraction of the population; in other words it is optimal to choose zero evasion. Around 
60% of respondents in our data have declared full compliance i.e no evasion, therefore tax 
evasion has a population distribution that is spread out over a range of positive values, but with a 
pileup at the value zero. A linear model will likely lead to negative predictions for some of the 
firms, while taking the natural log is not possible because many observations are at zero. 
Therefore, the Tobit model, is explicitly designed to model corner solution dependent variables.  
The Tobit model is defined as a latent variable model: 
    β      
  |  ~ N(0, 
2
)  
Y= max (0,Y*) 
where Y* is the latent variable satisfying the classical linear model assumptions that the 
disturbance term is normally distributed and has homoscedastic variance; and that the observed 
(26) 
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variable, Y Y  when Y ≥0, but Y 0 when Y <0. Because Y  is normally distributed, Y has a 
continuous distribution over strictly positive values. 
Even though the output of OLS and Tobit are often similar, the interpretation of them differs 
since in the Tobit model we have to interpret the partial effect of independent variables (Xi) on 
E(Y*|X) where Y* is the latent variable. The variable we are interested in explaining is Y, the 
observed outcome of tax evasion.  
In Tobit models what we obtain is two partial effects on Y, the conditional marginal effect E(Y|Y 
>0, X) and the unconditional marginal effects E(Y|X). In other words, total change in tax evasion 
(Y) can be disaggregated into two parts: the change in evasion above the threshold (Y>0), i.e. the 
incidence of tax evasion, weighted by the probability of being above the threshold; and the 
change in the probability of being above the threshold, i.e. the propensity to evade, weighted by 
the expected value of tax evasion.  
The conditional effect is a measure of the incidence of tax evasion, while the unconditional effect 
is a measure of both incidence and propensity (note that Probit is a measure of only propensity). 
Given that there are two effects, various studies have failed to reach consensus in regards to 
reporting. Wooldridge (2003) recommends reporting both marginal effects. In addition, he also 
argues that one way to informally evaluate whether the Tobit model is appropriate is to estimate 
a Probit model where the binary outcome, Wi, equals one if    , and W= 0 if    ; that is 
generating a dummy with values 1 on every observation with a tax evasion level higher than 0.  
Then, Wi follows a Probit model, where the coefficient  j on some variable Xj is equal to the 
ratio of Tobit estimates (ratio between Tobit coefficient βj and Tobit estimated standard deviation 
of the residual  );  j βj/ . This means that we can estimate the ratio of βj to   by Probit for each 
observation j. If the Tobit model holds, then the Probit estimates  j should be “close” to βj/ , 
where  ̂  to  ̂ are Tobit estimates. Due to sampling error, these will never be identical; however 
the signs and sizes should be close to each other. Wooldridge (2003) also argues that there 
should be no worry about sign changes or magnitude differences on explanatory variables that 
are insignificant in both models.  
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To sum up, our empirical strategy is designed as follows (see Fig. 5.1):  
Figure 5.1 Empirical Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We estimate the Heckman Selection FIML (Probit-Tobit) model under the assumptions that there 
is sample selection bias and that our dependent variable is censored. Conversely, we estimate 
Heckman Selection Two-Step (Probit-OLS) if the presence of sample selection bias is 
established and the dependent variable is not censored. The Tobit Corner Solution is estimated in 
the presence of censored data but not bias from sample selectivity; and, last, OLS is considered if 
both selection bias in the sample censoring of the dependent variable are not present. Note that 
sample selection bias is tested for both “missingness” and “truthfulness” of the dependent 
variable. Consequently, in data with sample selection bias, both Heckman FIML and Heckman 
Two-Step are run for each assumption of biasness. For nonbiased selection samples, the standard 
model in Equation (15) is estimated32.  
In the next section, we report and discuss the empirical findings. 
 
 
                                                          
32
 Estimation of the above models is performed using STATA 11 and LIMDEP 9.0 
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5.5 Estimation Results 
Our results (for printouts see Appendix 5) show that all estimated effects are in accordance with 
theory and the previous empirical literature. Moreover, the signs of coefficients remain 
unchanged across all estimations (selection “missingness”; selection “truthfulness”; and Tobit 
corner solution), while differences in the SE’s are minor in almost all cases. This is encouraging 
given the need for robustness checks; in particular for the relationship of the tax rate and 
compliance and its theoretical ambiguity. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 provide sample selection results for 
both “missingness” and truthfulness”. Columns 1 in both tables present Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood (FIML) results of the extended two stage Heckman Selection procedure 
(Probit in the first stage, Tobit in the second) while Columns 2 in both tables present standard 
Two-Step Heckman Selection results (Probit in the first stage, OLS in the second). As argued, 
given that the dependent variable is censored, the final equation requires a Tobit estimation 
(hence FILM: Probit-Tobit); while presentation of Two-Step Heckman Selection (Probit-OLS) is 
done mainly for a robustness check both for sample selection and variable significance. In 
addition to 5.5 and 5.6, Table 5.7 presents standard Tobit results; and it will serve as the 
interpretation base if our data do not suffer from sample selection bias. 
In Table 5.5, when checking for sample selection bias from “missingness”, the indicator of 
interest is rho ( ) or the correlation of the error terms across the two equations. Its statistical 
nonsignificance shows that under the assumption of having good identifying variables, there is a 
high chance of making type one error by rejecting Ho: there is zero correlation between error 
terms; that is, sample selectivity problem arising from truthfulness is not present in the given 
data set. We do not receive such requiring results though from lambda ( ), or the coefficient on 
the inverse Mills ratio, which appears to be significant at the 5% level in our robust (Probit-OLS) 
estimation.  
Our exclusion restriction variable (respondent is owner) appears to be significant at the 5% level 
for the Two-Step Heckman Selection; and has a negative sign, supporting thus our theoretical 
consideration. This result is encouraging as it validates our assumptions in including these 
particular variables in the selection equation based on strong theoretical grounds. Results from 
Heckman FIML however, show that the exclusion restrictions have lost their significance. Note 
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that coefficients’ sizes of Probit estimations are identical in both Two-Step Heckman (estimated 
by STATA) and FIML Heckman (estimated by LIMDEP). This ensures us that the procedure is 
run correctly, however we do not know (and unfortunately no explanation is given in the manual) 
how the SE’s are calculated in LIMDEP or what is the difference between the LIMDEP SE’s and 
those estimated by STATA. Regardless of that, given the results, one can fairly conclude that 
sample selection bias caused by missingness is not an issue in our data. Our next step is to check 
for sample selection bias from “truthfulness”. 
At this point we note that our preferred model is Heckman FIML, because: 1) the dependent 
variable is censored; and 2) the Heckman Two-Step model is provided as a robustness check in 
particular of the adequacy of the identifying variable in the selection equation (suggested by the 
significance of the exclusion restriction variable in the main equation and of the coefficient in the 
Probit selection equation. Given this robustness check, it is reasonable to assure that any 
selection bias is controlled for in the Heckman FIML estimates and that the relatively large SE 
on rho ( ) does not reflect inadequate – weak – identification of the Probit selection equation. 
Table 5.6 shows Heckman results for “truthfulness”. Again the indicators of interest here are rho 
( ), or the correlation of the error terms across the two equations as well as lambda ( ), or the 
coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio; depending on whether we are using FIML Heckman ot 
Two-Step Heckman. Results from both these indicators show that even under the assumption of 
having good identifying variables, there is high chance of making type one error by rejecting Ho: 
there is zero correlation between error terms; that is, sample selectivity problem arising from 
dishonest answers is not present in the given data set. The results show that our exclusion 
restriction variable (having external reviewer/auditor) appears to be significant at the 1% level 
across both estimations; the sign is positive, supporting hence our theoretical hypothesis that 
firms which apply International Accounting Standards are more likely to have independent 
external reviewers/auditors. This result is encouraging as it validates our assumptions in 
including this particular variable in the selection equation based on strong theoretical grounds.  
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Table 5.5 Sample Selection Bias from 'Missingness' 
 
 
                            
    HECKMAN FIML HECKMAN TWO STEP 
    1 – Equation (19) 2 – Equation (20) 
    Main Selection Main Selection 
    TOBIT PROBIT OLS PROBIT 
Dependent Variable:   Tax Evasion D Response Tax Evasion D Response 
                            
    Coeff S.E Coeff S.E Coeff S.E Coeff S.E 
Tax Rate   2.61 *** 0.49 0.06 * 0.03 0.89 *** 0.23 0.06 * 0.02 
                            
Trust                           
Trust in Government   -0.74 ** 0.32 0.22   0.27 -0.34 ** 0.15 0.22   0.22 
Trust in Judicial System   -1.24 *** 0.36 0.28   0.29 -0.53 *** 0.17 0.28 * 0.02 
General Corruption   7.11 *** 0.36 0.38   0.29 2.90 *** 0.16 0.38   0.02 
Compliance Costs   0.13 *** 0.40 0.00   0.00 0.08 *** 0.02 0.00   0.00 
                            
Ownership                           
Foreign Firm   -6.37 *** 1.42 0.00   0.11 -2.51 *** 0.65 0.00   0.06 
Size                           
Medium   -7.65 *** 1.30 -0.13   0.10 -3.21 *** 0.60 -0.13 * 0.05 
Large   -10.3 *** 1.78 -0.11   0.13 -3.97 *** 0.81 -0.11   0.07 
Legal Status                           
Individual   7.01 *** 1.32 -0.04   0.10 2.84 *** 0.62 -0.04   0.06 
Partnership   2.87 ** 1.44 -0.08   0.12 0.90   0.67 -0.08   0.06 
Industry Sector                           
Mining   -9.3 * 5.49 0.06   0.46 -4.17 * 2.34 0.06   0.24 
Construction   -3.14   2.44 -0.06   0.21 -1.67   1.17 -0.06   0.11 
Manufacturing   -2.87   2.21 -0.04   0.19 -1.71   1.06 -0.04   0.10 
Transportation   -7.29 *** 2.79 -0.16   0.22 -3.53 *** 1.32 -0.16   0.12 
Wholesale and Retail   -3.38   2.19 -0.02   0.19 -1.65   1.06 -0.02   0.10 
Real Estate   -3.04   2.52 -0.16   0.20 -1.44   1.23 -0.16   0.11 
Hotels and Restaurants   4.54   2.89 -0.15   0.22 1.77   1.37 -0.15   0.12 
                            
Exclusion Restriction Variable                           
Respodent is Owner         -0.13   0.09       -0.13 ** 0.05 
                            
Constant   -14.1 ** 6.18 0.88 ** 0.36 10.1 *** 3.03 0.88 ***   
Year Dummy   -10.0 *** 2.09 0.58 *** 0.08 -2.95 *** 1.05 0.58 ***   
Country Level Dummies   Yes     Yes     Yes           
                            
Rho   0.12   0.45                   
L mbd  (λ)                18.2 **   0.19       
                            
Number of observations   10303 10303 
                            
*** at 1% level of significance; ** at 5% level of significance; * at 10% level of significance;   
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Table 5.6 Sample Selection Bias from 'Truthfulness' 
 
 
                            
    HECKMAN FIML HECKMAN TWO STEP 
    1 – Equation (19) 2 – Equation (20) 
    Main Selection Main Selection 
    TOBIT PROBIT OLS PROBIT 
Dependent Variable:   Tax Evasion Dummy External Tax Evasion Dummy External 
                            
    Coeff S.E Coeff S.E Coeff S.E Coeff S.E 
Tax Rate   3.22 *** 0.74 -0.02 * 0.01 0.80 *** 0.29 -0.02 * 0.01 
                            
Trust                           
Trust in Government   -1.81 *** 0.51 0.02 *** 0.01 -0.96 *** 0.21 0.02 *** 0.01 
Trust in Judicial System   -1.47 ** 0.57 0.00   0.01 -0.69 *** 0.23 0.00   0.01 
General Corruption   6.65 *** 0.55 0.01   0.01 2.30 *** 0.21 0.01   0.01 
Compliance Costs   0.12 * 0.06 0.00 *** 0.00 0.07 *** 0.02 0.00 *** 0.00 
                            
Ownership                           
Foreign Firm   -6.99 *** 2.14 0.40 *** 0.05 -2.55 *** 0.88 0.40 *** 0.04 
Size                           
Medium   -8.63 *** 2.47 0.60 *** 0.04 -3.27 *** 1.00 0.60 *** 0.04 
Large   -11.1 *** 3.23 0.95 *** 0.07 -3.45 ** 1.33 0.95 *** 0.06 
Legal Status                           
Individual   7.25 *** 2.50 -0.40 *** 0.04 3.26 *** 1.00 0.40 *** -0.40 
Partnership   3.87 * 2.20 -0.17 *** 0.04 1.77 ** 0.88 0.17 *** -0.17 
Industry Sector                           
Mining   -1.20   8.71 0.19   0.17 -1.60   3.12 0.19   0.19 
Construction   2.15   4.42 0.13 * 0.07 0.50   1.84 0.13   0.13 
Manufacturing   -0.31   4.11 0.19 *** 0.06 -0.75   1.71 0.19 ** 0.19 
Transportation   -8.21 * 4.88 0.15 * 0.08 -3.67 * 1.99 0.15 * 0.15 
Wholesale and Retail   -2.82   4.10 0.11 * 0.06 -1.51   1.71 0.11   0.11 
Real Estate   2.62   4.57 0.00   0.07 0.88   1.91 0.00   0.00 
Hotels and Restaurants   11.2 ** 5.06 0.00   0.08 4.35 ** 2.11 0.00   0.00 
                            
Exclusion Restriction Var.                           
International Accounting 
Standards         0.58 *** 0.04       0.58 *** 0.03 
                            
Constant   -15.3 * 8.31 -0.77 *** 0.13 15.8 *** 3.65 -0.77 *** 0.14 
Year Dummy   -9.70 *** 1.57 0.07 ** 0.03 -4.30 *** 0.64 0.75 ** 0.03 
Country Level Dummies   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     
                            
Rho   0.02   0.12                   
L mbd  (λ)               0.37   0.84       
                            
Number of observations   8818 8818 
                            
*** at 1% level of significance; ** at 5% level of significance; * at 10% level of significance  
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We also note that in terms of signs of coefficients, there is no evident difference between FIML: 
Probit-Tobit estimation and Two-Step: Probit-OLS estimation; majority of variables hold same 
signs and statistical significance – serving to our arguments for robustness results.  
As elaborated in Fig. 5.1, under the assumption of the non-existence of sample selection bias, our 
final choice is Tobit Corner Solution, given the censored nature of the dependent variable. Tobit 
results are shown in Table 5.7, with Column 1 representing standard Tobit estimations (left 
censored dependent variable). In order to evaluate whether the Tobit model is appropriate, we 
estimate a Probit with dummy variable tax evasion (1 if evasion occurs and zero otherwise). We 
then divide the Tobit coefficients by sigma (from Tobit) and obtain  j βj/  (ratio between Tobit 
coefficient βj and Tobit estimated standard deviation of the residual  ). As can be seen from 
Column 2, the relative-to-sigma  j coefficients are very close (almost identical) to Probit, 
suggesting that the choice of using Tobit is legitimate.  
For many models, including Tobit, the pseudo-R2 has no real meaning (STATA 2011). 
Wooldridge (2003, p.529) argues that: 
we should remember that the Tobit estimates are not chosen to maximize an R-squared—
they maximize the log-likelihood function—whereas the OLS estimates are the values that 
do produce the highest R-squared.  
Note that the Tobit results are almost identical with the converged FIML Heckman’ estimations. 
This is of no surprise as second stage in FIML Heckman is run using Tobit. These similarities 
serve as strong robust check that sample selection bias is not present in our data (under the 
presence of severe sample selection bias the Heckman results would be substantially different). 
For this reason, we interpret our Tobit estimates without further reference to the very similar 
FIML results. 
As argued previously, we cannot interpret straightforward the β coefficient as the effect of Xi on 
Yi, as one would do with a linear regression model. Instead, it should be interpreted as the 
combination of (1) the change in Yi of those above the limit, weighted by the probability of 
being above the limit; and (2) the change in the probability of being above the limit, weighted by 
the expected value of Yi if above. Hence we derive two marginal effects: conditional (Column 3) 
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Table 5.7 TOBIT estimation results 
 
          
    TOBIT Probit βj/  
Conditional 
Marginal Effects 
Unconditional 
Marginal Effects 
    1 2 3 4 
Dependent: Tax Evasion   Coeff 
Robust 
S.E 
Coeff Coeff S.E Coeff S.E 
              
Tax Rate   2.55 *** 0.73 0.08 0.07 0.81 *** 0.22 1.06 *** 0.29 
                          
Trust                         
Trust in Government   -0.76 * 0.39 -0.02 -0.02 -0.24 ** 0.12 -0.32 ** 0.16 
Trust in Judicial System   -1.27 ** 0.52 -0.03 -0.03 -0.40 ** 0.16 -0.52 ** 0.21 
General Corruption   7.08 *** 0.46 0.21 0.19 2.26 *** 0.13 2.95 *** 0.17 
Compliance Costs   0.13 *** 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 *** 0.01 0.05 *** 0.01 
                          
Ownership                         
Foreign Firm   -6.39 *** 1.55 -0.16 -0.17 -1.97 *** 0.46 -2.51 *** 0.57 
Size                         
Medium   -7.57 *** 1.34 -0.21 -0.20 -2.33 *** 0.40 -2.96 *** 0.51 
Large   -10.3 *** 2.05 -0.28 -0.27 -3.08 *** 0.57 -3.85 *** 0.69 
Legal Status                         
Individual   7.07 *** 2.06 0.19 0.19 2.28 *** 0.67 2.99 *** 0.88 
Partnership   2.95   2.16 0.09 0.08 0.95   0.70 1.24   0.93 
Industry Sector                         
Mining   -10.0 ** 4.23 -0.21 -0.27 -2.96 *** 1.14 -3.68 *** 1.33 
Construction   -3.09   1.96 -0.08 -0.08 -0.97   0.59 -1.25 * 0.75 
Manufacturing   -2.82 ** 1.38 -0.07 -0.08 -0.89 ** 0.43 -1.16 ** 0.55 
Transportation   -7.16 *** 2.15 -0.20 -0.19 -2.18 *** 0.61 -2.75 *** 0.74 
Wholesale and Retail   -3.36 ** 1.57 -0.10 -0.09 -1.06 ** 0.49 -1.37 ** 0.63 
Real Estate   -2.91   1.88 -0.14 -0.08 -0.91   0.57 -1.17   0.73 
Hotels and Restaurants   4.68 ** 2.29 0.11 0.12 1.55 ** 0.79 2.05 * 1.06 
                          
Constant   -12.8 *** 4.53 -0.62 -0.34             
Year Dummy   -10.50 *** 2.92 -0.25 -0.28 -3.45 *** 0.96 -4.55 *** 1.26 
Country Level Dummies   Yes     Yes   Yes     Yes     
                          
Pseudo R2   0.03                     
Sigma   37.6                     
Number of observations   9705                     
Left-Censored Observations   5642                     
Uncensored Observations   4063                     
Right-Censored Observations   0           
                          
*** at 1% level of significance; ** at 5% level of significance; * at 10% level of significance  
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and unconditional (Column 4). There is no clear cut recommendation on the preferable marginal 
effect but, since coefficient sizes are almost the same and since the unconditional marginal effect 
applies to the whole sample, we will interpret only Column 4. 
Our results show that the association between tax rate and tax evasion is positive and significant 
at the 1% level. An increase in the tax rate barrier by one category increases tax evasion by 1.06 
percentage points, holding other factors constant. The relationship between corruption and tax 
evasion is also positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. All other things held 
constant, a rise of perception of corruption by tax officials by one level increases tax evasion by 
2.95 percentage points. A positive relationship is observed also between Compliance costs and 
tax evasion, at the 1% level of significance, although the impact seems to be quite small.  
As expected, Trust variables are negatively related to evasive behaviour by firms. Trust in 
government is statistically significant at the 5% level. A rise in transparency by one level, 
reduces tax evasion by 0.32 percentage points. Trust on judicial system is also statistically 
significant at the 5% level and is negatively related to tax evasion; for every positive change in 
satisfaction by one category, tax evasion reduces by almost 0.52 percentage points. 
Firm related determinants, ownership, size and legal status have the highest coefficients while 
their statistical significance is strong (at 1% level)
33
. Evasion drops by around 2.51 percentage 
points if firm is owned by foreign entrepreneurs, compared with domestic owners. Compared to 
small firms, less evasion is reported by medium and large businesses. All other factors held 
constant, medium firms are more compliant than small firms by 2.96 percentage points, while 
this gap is extended (in absolute terms) with large firms to 3.85 percentage points; who evade 
around 1 percentage point less than medium. The estimates also point to higher levels of evasion 
if the firm is individual or a partnership as compared to corporate. The estimated coefficient is 
2.99 for individual, followed by an estimate of 1.24 for partnerships.  
Firms in various industry sectors tend to have different compliance behaviour. Compared to 
‘Other’ (base category), firms operating in ‘Hotels and restaurants’ appear to be most evasive 
(coefficient of 2.05 and statistically significant at 10% level), followed by firms in 
                                                          
33
 Apart from partnership variable which does not to be statistically significant. 
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‘Manufacturing’ (-1.16 and statistically significant at 5% level), ‘Real estate, renting and 
business services’ (-1.17), ‘Construction’ sector (-1.25 and statistically significant at 10% level), 
‘Wholesale, retail and repairs’ (-1.37 and statistically significant at 5% level), and ‘ ransport 
storage and communication’ (-2.75, and statistically significant at 1% level). Firms operating in 
‘Mining and quarrying’ have lowest evasive behaviour. Ceteris paribus, firms in this sector 
evade by 3.68 percentage points less than ‘Other’; the statistical significance of this category is at 
1% level.  
Last, the period dummy suggest that, at the 1% level of significance, compared to the base year 
(2002), tax evasion falls in 2005 by respectively 4.55 percentage points. The statistical 
significance of the year dummies becomes more important given the relevance for the inclusion 
of these particular variables. Results for country level dummies are included in Appendix 5.  
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5.6 Audit Rate  
In addition to pooling two independent cross sectional data sets, we conduct a separate analysis 
involving only the BEEPS 2005 dataset. This is done in order to account for one specific 
variable:  the audit probability. To our knowledge, there has been no study so far on the 
relationship between audit probability and business tax evasion in TEs, because data on actual 
inspection rates are unobservable for the most of these countries. Tax measurement programmes 
in TEs are rare, and commonly unavailable for researchers. The only attempt so far to analyse 
audit probability in business tax evasion for transition economies was made in Nur-tegin (2008); 
however, as argued in Section 5.3 we tend to disagree with the proxy used in this study, which is 
the review of end of year financial statements by accounting auditors. Instead we use actual tax 
inspections carried out by the respective tax inspectorates, as declared by businesses.  
BEEPS 2005 has 9,655 observations for 28 transition economies, including Turkey. We exclude 
Turkey in order to focus solely on post-communist countries; as well as public enterprises and 
cooperatives in order to focus only on the private sector; and we exclude Turkmenistan given the 
lack of information for some of the most important determinants. The remaining sample of 8,048 
enterprises in BEEPS 2005 includes only 325 missing values on the dependent variable. This 
relatively low rate of missing values (approximately 4%), in missing data literature is considered 
to be trivial. Samples with missing values below 5% are commonly dropped (SPSS, 2010): 
When there are few missing values (very roughly, less than 5% of the total number of 
cases) and those values can be considered to be missing at random; ... then the typical 
method of listwise deletion is relatively “safe”(p. ) 
Given the proportion of missing values, one would not expect any major changes in the results 
even if nonresponse might, in principle, cause bias. Hence, we drop all the missing values on our 
dependent variable, and thus remain with a final sample of 7,683 firms.  
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The variables of interests are already explored in Section 5.4. Once including tax audit 
probability the basic regression model (1), becomes
34
: 
        ̂           ̂        ̂            ̂             ̂               ̂           
  ̂       ̂         ̂            ̂              ̂              
Since sample selection bias from “missingness” is not an issue in the 2005 data, we are left with 
potential sample selection bias from “truthfulness”. As argued previously, the assumptions and 
identifying variables to assess and correct respectively such bias remain strongly supported.  
Here again we use the same approach as elaborated in Fig 1. We estimate a Heckman Selection 
FIML (Probit-Tobit) model and a Heckman Selection Two-Step (Probit-OLS) model. If the 
presence of sample selection bias is established, we report the Heckman results, otherwise, we 
estimate the Tobit Corner Solution to address the presence of censored data but not bias on 
sample selectivity. 
Table 5.8 reports descriptive statistics on the variables used in Equation (27). 
 
  
                                                          
34
 Note that here we also exclude year dummy as now we are treating only data from 2005. The methodology 
applied here is similar to the one elaborated in Section 5.6.  
(27) 
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Table 5.8 Descriptive Statistics for 2005 
 
 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tax Evasion 7683 10.72 18.77 0.00 98.00 
Tax Rate 7570 2.80 1.09 1.00 4.00 
Audit 5647 2.49 6.30 0.00 99.00 
Trust in Government 7522 3.89 1.45 1.00 6.00 
Trust in Judicial System 7290 3.45 1.37 1.00 6.00 
General Corruption 6851 2.44 1.47 1.00 6.00 
Compliance Costs 7478 4.97 9.91 0.00 95.00 
Foreign 7683 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Medium 7683 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Large 7683 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Individual 7683 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Partnership 7683 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Mining 7683 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Construction 7683 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Manufacturing 7683 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Transportation 7683 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Wholesale and Retail 7683 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Real Estate 7683 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Hotels and Restaurants 7683 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
 
     
    Source: BEEPS 2005 
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5.6.1 Estimation Results for 2005 
Table 5.9 represents results from sample selection techniques. Again the indicators of interest 
here are rho ( ) or the correlation of the error terms across the two equations as well as lambda 
( ), or the coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio; depending on whether we are using FIML 
Heckman ot Two-Step Heckman. Results from both these indicators show that, under the 
assumption of having good identifying variables, there is high chance of making type one error 
by rejecting Ho: there is zero correlation between error terms; that is, sample selectivity 
problem arising from dishonest answers is not present in the given data set.  
It is important to note also that our exclusion restriction variable (international accounting 
standards) appears to be significant at the 1% level for both FIML and Two-Step Heckman 
Selections; and has a positive sign, supporting thus our theoretical consideration. This result is 
encouraging as it, again, validates our assumptions in including these particular variables in the 
selection equation based on strong theoretical grounds. Given that sample selection bias is not an 
issue in BEEPS 2005 dataset we continue with Tobit estimations.  
Results for the 2005 data are shown in Table 5.10, with Column 1 representing standard Tobit 
estimations (left censored dependent variable). In order to evaluate whether the Tobit model is 
appropriate, we estimate a Probit with dummy variable tax evasion (1 if evasion occurs and zero 
otherwise). We then divide Tobit coefficients by sigma (from Tobit) and obtain  j βj/  (ratio 
between Tobit coefficient βj and Tobit estimated standard deviation of the residual  ). As can be 
seen from Column 2, the relative-to-sigma  j coefficients are very close (almost identical) to 
Probit, suggesting that the choice of using Tobit for 2005 data is adequate. As argued previously, 
we derive two marginal effects: conditional (Column 3) and unconditional (Column 4).  
The first observation from the 2005 analysis is that all estimated effects are in accordance with 
theory and the previous empirical literature. The signs of each variable in the 2005 analysis are 
the same as are the results from our pooled cross section. Moreover the size of the estimated 
coefficients is almost identical. The statistical significance of the variables generally remains the 
same. 
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Table 5.9 BEEPS 2005 Sample Selection Bias from 'Truthfulness' 
 
 
                            
    HECKMAN FIML HECKMAN TWO STEP 
    1 – Equation (19) 2 – Equation (20) 
    Main Selection Main Selection 
    TOBIT PROBIT OLS PROBIT 
Dependant Variable:   Tax Evasion Dummy External Tax Evasion Dummy External 
                            
    Coeff S.E Coeff S.E Coeff S.E Coeff S.E 
Tax Rate   3.86 *** 0.97 -0.02   0.01 1.08 *** 0.34 -0.02   0.01 
Audit Rate   -0.13 
 
0.16 0.00   0.00 -0.03   0.05 0.00   0.00 
                           
Trust                           
Trust in Government   -1.91 ***  0.64 0.03 ** 0.01 -0.91 *** 0.24 0.03 ** 0.01 
Trust in Judicial System   -1.26 * 0.70 0.00   0.01 -0.58 ** 0.26 0.00   0.01 
General Corruption   7.04 *** 0.69 0.01   0.01 2.26 *** 0.24 0.01   0.01 
Compliance Costs   0.44 
 
0.08 0.00 * 0.00 0.04   0.03 0.00 * 0.00 
                           
Ownership                           
Foreign Firm   -3.64   2.93 0.42 *** 0.07 -1.16   1.06 0.42 *** 0.06 
Size                           
Medium   -5.78 * 3.28 0.59 *** 0.05 -1.95   1.21 0.59 *** 0.05 
Large   -8.42 * 4.41 0.95 *** 0.10 -1.87   1.70 0.95 *** 0.08 
Legal Status                           
Individual   7.66 ** 3.49 -0.47 *** 0.05 3.11 ** 1.26 -0.47 *** 0.05 
Partnership   5.66 ** 2.79 -0.18 *** 0.06 2.10 ** 1.02 -0.18 *** 0.06 
Industry Sector                           
Mining   5.96 ** 10.5 0.34   0.23 2.60   3.55 0.34   0.21 
Construction   6.73   6.44 0.19 * 0.10 2.73   2.36 0.19 * 0.11 
Manufacturing   5.93   5.99 0.30 *** 0.09 2.89   2.21 0.30 *** 0.10 
Transportation   -4.01   7.05 0.25 ** 0.11 -0.74   2.51 0.25 ** 0.12 
Wholesale and Retail   1.74   6.10 0.19 * 0.09 1.37   2.23 0.19 * 0.10 
Real Estate   7.89   6.49 0.10   0.10 3.69   2.43 0.10   0.11 
Hotels and Restaurants   15.7 ** 7.02 0.14   0.11 6.65 ** 2.65 0.14   0.13 
                            
Exclusion Restriction Var.                           
Int. Accounting Standards         0.51 *** 0.05             
                            
Constant   -47.5 *** 12.1 -0.99 *** 0.16 -1.01   4.62 -1.00 *** 0.18 
Country Level Dummies   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     
                            
Rho   0.12   0.19                   
L mbd  (λ)               2.01   2.47       
                            
Number of observations   5647 5922 
                            
*** at 1% level of significance; ** at 5% level of significance; * at 10% level of significance  
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Table 5.10 BEEPS 2005 TOBIT Estimation Results 
 
 
          
    TOBIT Probit βj/  
Conditional 
Marginal Effects 
Unconditional 
Marginal Effects 
    1 2 3 4 
Dependent: Tax Evasion   Coeff 
Robust 
S.E 
Coeff Coeff S.E Coeff S.E 
              
Tax Rate   2.54 *** 0.92 0.08 0.07 0.76 *** 0.26 0.95 *** 0.33 
Audit   -0.00   0.08 -0.00 0.00 -0.00   0.02 -0.00   0.03 
                          
Trust                         
Trust in Government   -0.62   0.52 -0.02 -0.02 -0.18   0.15 -0.23   0.19 
Trust in Judicial System   -1.19   0.75 -0.02 -0.03 -0.35   0.22 -0.44   0.28 
General Corruption   7.71 *** 0.54 0.23 0.21 2.30 *** 0.14 2.87 *** 0.17 
Compliance Costs   0.03   0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01   0.01 0.01   0.02 
                          
Ownership                         
Foreign Firm   -4.82 ** 1.99 -0.12 -0.13 -1.39 ** 0.55 -1.70 ** 0.66 
Size                         
Medium   -7.41 *** 1.39 -0.20 -0.21 -2.13 *** 0.38 -2.58 *** 0.44 
Large   -8.76 *** 2.27 -0.24 -0.24 -2.46 *** 0.60 -2.93 *** 0.68 
Legal Status                         
Individual   7.76 *** 2.18 0.22 0.22 2.34 *** 0.66 2.94 *** 0.84 
Partnership   3.25   2.41 0.08 0.09 0.98   0.73 1.23   0.93 
Industry Sector                         
Mining   -6.99   7.16 -0.14 -0.19 -1.97   1.90 -2.36   2.16 
Construction   -1.04   3.37 -0.01 -0.03 -0.31   0.99 -0.38   1.22 
Manufacturing   -1.93   2.60 -0.05 -0.05 -0.57   0.77 -0.71   0.96 
Transportation   -6.09 * 3.34 -0.04 -0.17 -1.74 * 0.90 -2.10 ** 1.05 
Wholesale and Retail   -2.44   2.78 -0.07 -0.07 -0.72   0.81 -0.89   1.00 
Real Estate   -2.72   2.99 -0.13 -0.08 -0.79   0.86 -0.98   1.04 
Hotels and Restaurants   5.06   3.13 0.05 0.14 1.57   1.00 2.01   1.31 
                          
Constant   -33.9 *** 6.16 -1.17 -0.94             
Country Level Dummies   Yes     Yes   Yes     Yes     
                          
Pseudo R2   0.03                     
Sigma   35.9                     
Number of observations   6218                     
Left-Censored Observations   3856                     
Uncensored Observations   2362                     
Right-Censored Observations 0           
                          
*** at 1% level of significance; ** at 5% level of significance; * at 10% level of significance  
  
Chapter Five: Firm Level Determinants of Tax Evasion in Transition Economies       Page | 195  
Our variable of interest in 2005 is audit rate, which is estimated with a sign in line with 
theoretical expectations (both in Tobit and Heckman FIML estimation).  However, the dummy 
variable on tax inspection occurring in a firm during the past twelve months (as opposed to not) 
is not statistically significant across all estimations. Unconditional marginal effects from the 
Tobit results show that, all other things equal, firms that had no inspections are more likely to 
evade by compared to the firms that were audited. However the size of the audit coefficient 
remains low. Inability to provide a statistical significance on the audit is quite unfortunate given 
the data availability for transition countries. The sign of this variable might however, serve for 
some indication and expectancy for future research in this direction.  
Table 5.11 contains all relevant empirical results presented so far. Because of spacing we present 
only final estimations (corrected estimations for sample selection biases) as well as the standard 
Tobit results. As can be seen, the coefficients, signs and levels of statistical significance are 
quite robust and do not vary much regardless of the empirical choices we apply. This is quite 
encouraging given the need for robustness in reporting the most important determinants of tax 
evasion.  
 Table 5.11 Summary of results 
 
 
Dependent: TAX EVASION
Tax Rate 2.61 *** 0.89 *** 3.22 *** 0.80 *** 0.81 *** 1.06 *** 3.86 *** 1.08 *** 0.76 *** 0.95 ***
Audit Rate -0.13 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00
Trust
Trust in Government -0.74 ** -0.34 ** -1.81 *** -0.96 *** -0.24 ** -0.32 ** -1.91 *** -0.91 *** -0.18 -0.23
Trust in Judicial System -1.24 *** -0.53 *** -1.47 ** -0.69 *** -0.40 ** -0.52 ** -1.26 * -0.58 ** -0.35 -0.44
General Corruption 7.11 *** 2.90 *** 6.65 *** 2.30 *** 2.26 *** 2.95 *** 7.04 *** 2.26 *** 2.30 *** 2.87 ***
Compliance Costs 0.13 *** 0.08 *** 0.12 * 0.07 *** 0.04 *** 0.05 *** 0.44 0.04 0.01 0.01
Ownership
Foreign Firm -6.37 *** -2.51 *** -6.99 *** -2.55 *** -1.97 *** -2.51 *** -3.64 -1.16 -1.39 ** -1.70 **
Size
Medium -7.65 *** -3.21 *** -8.63 *** -3.27 *** -2.33 *** -2.96 *** -5.78 * -1.95 -2.13 *** -2.58 ***
Large -10.3 *** -3.97 *** -11.1 *** -3.45 ** -3.08 *** -3.85 *** -8.42 * -1.87 -2.46 *** -2.93 ***
Legal Status
Individual 7.01 *** 2.84 *** 7.25 *** 3.26 *** 2.28 *** 2.99 *** 7.66 ** 3.11 ** 2.34 *** 2.94 ***
Partnership 2.87 ** 0.90 3.87 * 1.77 ** 0.95 1.24 5.66 ** 2.10 ** 0.98 1.23
Industry Sector
Mining -9.3 * -4.17 * -1.20 -1.60 -2.96 *** -3.68 *** 5.96 ** 2.60 -1.97 -2.36
Construction -3.14 -1.67 2.15 0.50 -0.97 -1.25 * 6.73 2.73 -0.31 -0.38
Manufacturing -2.87 -1.71 -0.31 -0.75 -0.89 ** -1.16 ** 5.93 2.89 -0.57 -0.71
Transportation -7.29 *** -3.53 *** -8.21 * -3.67 * -2.18 *** -2.75 *** -4.01 -0.74 -1.74 * -2.10 **
Wholesale and Retail -3.38 -1.65 -2.82 -1.51 -1.06 ** -1.37 ** 1.74 1.37 -0.72 -0.89
Real Estate -3.04 -1.44 2.62 0.88 -0.91 -1.17 7.89 3.69 -0.79 -0.98
Hotels and Restaurants 4.54 1.77 11.2 ** 4.35 ** 1.55 ** 2.05 * 15.7 ** 6.65 ** 1.57 2.01
*** at 1% level of significance; ** at 5% level of significance; * at 10% level of significance 
1 2 4 5 6
COND UNCONFIML 2STEP 2STEP
TOBIT
9 10
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Conclusion 
The standard economic model of tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) when assessing the 
relationship between tax rate and evasion provided two counteracting effects: income and 
substitution. Business modelling, on the other side, showed that the theoretical predictions on 
this regards are very sensitive to the assumptions made, but with most studies suggesting 
ambiguity. As with the theory, the empirical evidence on the impact of tax rates is quite 
controversial. Even in works dealing with TEs, when the same datasets were used (BEEPS 
2002), the established results were opposing. While Nur-tegin (2008) finds a negative 
relationship between tax rate and evasion, Joulfaian (200) finds a positive relationship. In our 
study the impact of tax rate on tax evasion is positive and this result remains robust regardless of 
differences in the models estimated. Moreover, the impact of the tax rate on evasion is highly 
significant for both Tobit estimations of pooled cross section and separately for the 2005 
analysis. These results suggest that increasing taxes for businesses in transition economies leads 
to higher levels of tax evasion. 
Evasive behaviour becomes more understandable once institutional variables are included. 
Firm’s decisions are largely impacted by the treatment they receive from respective governments 
and courts. As expected, trust in government and courts remains negatively related with tax 
evasion. Corruption findings are in line with the Nur-tegin (2008) and Joulfaian (2009) results, 
suggesting that for TEs fighting corruption is a close substitute for fighting tax evasion. 
Compliance costs remain an important theoretical factor behind the choice to evade. In our 
estimations, although significant at 1% and positively related to tax evasion in all estimations, 
the impact of this variable remains minor as the coefficient is generally small.  
One of the most important findings of this study is that a firm’s characteristics determine largely 
its tax evasion. Our results show that a firm’s size matters; the larger the firm the smaller the 
evasion. A general reflection can be drawn from the fact that in the majority of TEs, tax 
inspectorates are more concerned with large businesses than with small ones. Given the 
deficiencies in tax administrations, the allocation of human resources requires a strategy that 
optimizes revenues collected. Hence, large firms, due to their higher turnovers (and so potential 
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returns from detection of evasion), are more attractive, leaving thus small firms less observed. In 
addition, foreign firms are generally more compliant. This is understandable as foreign investors 
tend to be more risk averse given the unfamiliarity of a foreign business environment. Similarly, 
corporations and partnerships are more compliant than individual firms. This result suggests that 
involvement of more people in decision-making reduces unlawful activities; after all activities 
such as tax evasion are more likely in the cases of full discretion by lone decisionmakers.     
Several interesting results are derived from the industrial differences amongst firms in TEs. A 
general impression from our estimations is that sectors that involve higher cash transactions 
and/or activities less visible to tax administration are more evasive. In this regards, hotels and 
restaurants record the highest evasion. Similarly, firms in construction, real estate or wholesale 
and retail are more evasive compared to others. The lowest evasive behaviour is observed in 
mining and transportation. These results indicate the need for more presence of tax inspectors in 
high cash transaction businesses. In cases where human resources are insufficient, tax incentives 
for buyers (such as tax deductions for all invoice collections by consumers) could be adequate. 
Further, several TEs have practiced tax incentives for non-cash transactions.  
Last, positive, large and highly significant period effects for Year 2005 relative to Year 2002 
suggests that tax evasion seems to fall over time. This again is consistent with the importance of 
transitional reforms, in particular improvements in law enforcement and other institutions in 
these countries.  
Together, our findings suggest some policy guidelines for improving tax evasion in transitional 
economies (for extended policy implications see Chapter VII). These act to reduce either the 
possibility and/or the inclination to evade. 
 Governments in transition countries should promote tax rate cuts in order to reduce the 
tax burden and increase compliance levels. The tax burden should be reduced also by 
eliminating all excessive compliance costs.  
 Government should focus their audit strategies according to firm characteristics in order 
to tackle evaders amongst small firms, domestic firms and/or sole proprietorships.  
 Governments should also tackle sectors that involve higher cash transactions in order to 
reduce opportunities for tax evasion. 
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 Governments should engage in a serious fight against corruption, in order to both 
improve their relationship with taxpayers, and to reduce opportunities for evasion through 
corrupted tax officials. 
 Governments should improve their performance, transparency and accountability, and 
with that their relationship with business taxpayers.   
Findings in this chapter reinforce findings from Chapter IV, suggesting that in transitional 
economies institutional reforms are the key to increasing the fight against evasion and that tax 
rates are positively related to tax evasion. Moreover, observations from firm related 
characteristics provide some insights for optimizing audit strategies in order to maximise tax 
revenues. 
 Chapter SIX 
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Introduction 
Following the introduction of the traditional model of tax compliance by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972), consequent tax research has identified and brought forward various extensions in an 
attempt to solve, as Torgler (2007a) puts it, “the puzzle of tax compliance” (the term was initially 
introduced by Andreoni et al, 1998). The puzzle itself refers to a condition where levels of tax 
compliance do not correspond with the levels of enforcements. As Torgler, (2011) argues, the 
issue of tackling tax evasion is “not simply a matter of applying penalties and/or increasing the 
frequency of audits (p.  2)”. Instead, different levels of deterrence factors have produced two 
very different types of outcomes. First, when audits and fines rates were set at high extremes, 
low levels of compliance were observed. This was mainly because oppressive tax enforcement 
and harassment of taxpayers through unremitting audits and visits decreased individual 
perceptions of institutional legitimacy and so increased resistance to payment. Extreme penalties 
on the other side provided the basis for the corruption of tax officials, hence causing generally 
low levels of tax compliance. In such cases, questions as to “why people evade taxes?” were 
raised.  
Second, when audit and fine rates were set at low extremes, contrary to intuitive expectations, 
high levels of compliance were observed, hence questions as to “why people pay taxes?” were 
counter-raised. Frey (1997) argues about the importance of “intrinsic motivation” of tax 
compliance, which due to “civic virtue”, makes taxpayers comply; as opposed to “extrinsic 
motivation”, known also as deterrence impact, in which taxpayers pay because they fear the 
punishment. This “intrinsic motivation” is known today as tax morale. The investigation of tax 
morale and its impact on tax evasion for businesses in transition economies is the main objective 
of this chapter.  
Inclusion of morality in tax compliance today is customary; indeed non-inclusion would be quite 
odd. As Alm and McClellan (2012) argue, if values of taxpayers are controlled by social norms, 
values or institutions, and if these factors affect the inclinations “to pay or not to pay” taxes 
through tax morale, then tax morale is a very important factor in studying tax compliance. Not 
accounting for such an important factor in a dissertation on business tax compliance in transition 
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economies would be a severe limitation. In our case, by covering for business tax morale we 
complement previous two chapters that deal with cross-country investigation and firm level 
investigation of business tax evasion.  
The work in this chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part we explore the impact of tax 
morale on tax evasion using theoretical models provided by the recent literature (Torgler et al. 
2010; and Alm and McClellan, 2012). We will then take the research a step further by 
investigating the determinants of tax morale focusing on institutions, governance and socio-
demographic indicators (Torgler et al. 2010).  
In order to do so we develop a questionnaire and conduct a survey with 600 Small and Medium 
Sized Enterprises (SME) in Kosovo. The questionnaire is developed upon the previous work 
done so far both in the field of individual tax morale and tax evasion, and is adopted for the 
business case taking the recommendations and suggestions by recent and leading tax morale and 
tax evasion literature.  
We use Tobit Model to estimate determinants of tax evasion, most notably tax morale, deterrence 
factors as well as firm’s characteristic. Probit Model is applied to investigate determinants of tax 
morale, namely institutions and socio-cultural characteristics. A number of other specified 
regressions are run in order to capture any robust finding. Results of this chapter are in addition 
compared to the previous results investigated under Chapters IV and V, and to the theoretical and 
empirical discussion presented under Chapters II and III. 
This Chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 discusses proposed theoretical directions from 
very recent and leading studies in regards to business tax morale. Section 2 provides a detailed 
description of the survey and questionnaire developed for this study, as well as a set of 
descriptive statistics which in turn serve as indicators of some of the most important tax topics 
raised and discussed in Kosovo. In Section 3 we investigate and interpret the relationship 
between business tax evasion and tax morale. Section 4 advances research into the determinants 
of business tax morale. The last section concludes. 
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6.1 Business Tax Morale  
The role of tax morale in tax compliance has been research attractive since the 90s. Yet the 
pioneering work in the field of tax morale was done much earlier, by the Cologne School of Tax 
Psychology in the 60s, who tried to link the concept of taxation as an economic sub discipline to 
social psychology (see Strümpel, 1969 and Torgles, 2007a for more). This linkage had 
subsequent consequences on the necessity of inclusion of other factors that shape the compliance 
decisions of taxpayers, beyond the tax, audit and fine rates. Spicer and Ludstedt (1976) argue 
that the taxpayer’s choice is not made solely on the grounds of penalties and fines but also on the 
grounds of attitudes, values and norms. Long and Swinger (1991) have argued that it is natural to 
expect cases when taxpayers are simply predisposed not to evade; hence they are predisposed to 
not even search for ways to cheat on taxes. Andreoni et al. (1998, p.850) have argued in favour of 
incorporation of morals and social dynamics, beyond traditional determinants: “...it has been suggested 
that factors such as a moral obligation to be truthful, or the social consequences of being a 
known cheater, may add further enforcement incentives that are not accounted for in our 
models”. Further they elaborated three main groups of factors that are important when treating 
tax evasive models that are beyond the range of tax, audit and penalty rates. The first group 
involves moral rules and sentiments that directly guide and impact decisions to comply or not. 
Morality in tax compliance has attracted the attention of tax researchers quite recently (for an 
extensive review see Torgler 2007a). Torgler et al. (2010) when discussing moral rules and 
sentiments summarize also a set of views that take into account even an altruistic approach; such 
an individual’s behaviour that is interested not only about his/her own welfare but also in the 
general welfare. Other views are related to a ‘Kantian’ morality approach, and they see taxpayers 
as having anxiety, guilt or even inferiority if their share of taxes paid is lower than what is 
defined as fair. 
The second group proposed by Andreoni et al. (1998) relates to the fairness of the tax system, 
enforcement of which affects extensively individuals’ willingness to comply. Jackson and 
Milliron (1986, p.137) argued that tax fairness consists of at least two different dimensions: “One 
dimension appears to involve the equity of the trade - the benefits received for the tax dollars 
given...” as defined by effectiveness, “...the other dimension appears to involve the equity of the 
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taxpayers’ burden in reference to that of other individuals”. Unfair and unequal tax treatment 
will eventually backfire through attempts at non-compliance. 
Last, the third group, includes taxpayer’s evaluations of government within the standards of 
performance, corruption and transparency. Hanousek and Palda (2004) looked at tax evasion as a 
form of legitimate protest by citizens against their governments; perception towards which were 
negative. Tirole (1996) explains that when taxpayers see their government as corrupt and 
irresponsible, evasion is seen as a “vote of dissent” on the government.  
Today the evidence of impact of tax morale in tax compliance is overwhelming. Torgler (2007a) 
provides a very thorough empirical review and contribution on the relationship between tax 
morale in compliance. His work in Transition Economies, Europe, Asia, Latin America, and 
Australia, and practically every other country within these regions, has concluded robustly that 
when considering tax compliance, the moral dimension impacted by governance, political 
system, legal structure, property rights, regulatory restraints, bureaucratic procedures, corruption, 
transparency, accountability, fairness, respect, treatment, social norms, social capital, social 
interactions, gender, education, age, region, religion and even marital status must be taken into 
account.  
However, regardless of the substantial engagement in identifying the determinants of tax morale 
from various authors and various studies, in various countries and various cultures, surprisingly 
enough one can hardly identify tax morale research that is not focused solely on personal income 
tax i.e individuals. As Torgler (2011, p.55) argues:  
In general, in most of the studies on tax morale and tax compliance, research has focused 
on personal income tax. Business tax evasion has received very little attention. This is a 
surprise taking into account the economic importance of the business sector and the 
importance of business taxation for tax administrations. Work in this area is therefore 
highly relevant for transition economies... 
In a very recent attempt to provide some evidence on whether values, social norms and attitudes 
have measurable effects on the economic behaviour of firms, most notably on tax compliance, 
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Alm and McClellan (2012, p.6) while stating that up to their work there was “no evidence on tax 
morale of firms” argue that:  
The potential importance of firm tax morale has been ignored, perhaps because of the 
absence of firm level information that would allow a firm’s tax morale to be measured ... 
To our knowledge, Alm and McClellan (2012) is one out of two, and only, studies that 
empirically addressed the issue of morality and tax compliance for firms. The second study, 
Mickiewicz et al. (2012), relates to Latvian business. 
The attempt by Alm and McClellan (2012) to investigate tax morale in 34 countries, however, as 
acknowledged by authors, does not have a standard measure of tax morale as the related 
literature suggests (we discuss the measurement technique of tax morale variable in sections 
below). The variable is instead derived from the firm’s perception on tax burden; i.e how firm 
consider taxes in their business environment. High “taxes as obstacles” represents heavy burden 
imposed by tax rates and vice-versa. Such indirect measurement of tax morale generally assumes 
that firms with antipathy towards paying taxes consider “taxes as obstacles” also as high; which, 
again as argued by authors themselves, is a strong assumption. There might be cases when firms 
even while having sympathy towards tax payments can and do consider “taxes as obstacle” also 
high because they simply are high. Having that in mind, we argue that the assumption of a 
positive relationship between taxes as an obstacle and tax morale is too strong; and despite the 
limitations in data availability, it does not optimally contribute to the investigation of either the 
impact of tax morale in tax compliance on the determinants of tax morale – all that from the 
firm’s perspective. 
Upon previous work done so far in the field of tax morale and tax compliance, taking into 
consideration the strong recommendations cited above, building on Alm and McClellan (2012) 
firm perspective work and the Torgler et al. (2010) individual perspective work, we will attempt 
to develop an empirical investigation of business tax morale and tax compliance. In order to do 
so we devise a questionnaire to capture most variables of interest, as underlined by both 
theoretical considerations and sufficient empirical work on individual tax compliance. We then 
conduct a face-to-face survey with 600 SMEs in Kosovo to finally provide some contribution on 
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the impact of business tax morale on business tax evasion as well as on the nature of factors that 
shape business tax morale itself. 
We build our research in two complementary stages. In the first part we explore the impact of tax 
morale on tax evasion using theoretical models provided by Alm and McClellan (2012) from a 
business perspective and Torgler et al. (2010) from an individual one. By designing and 
conducting a survey specifically for theoretical frameworks constructed by leading authors in the 
field of tax morale and compliance, we will attempt for the first time to investigate the 
relationship between business tax morale and tax evasion in Kosovo.   
Once investigating the above mentioned relationship, we will then take the research a step 
further by investigating the determinants of tax morale, independently focusing on institutions, 
governance and socio-demographic indicators as suggested by Torgler et al. (2010). Tax morale, 
unlike tax evasion, measures not individual behaviour but individual attitudes. It represents a 
moral obligation to pay taxes, a belief in contributing to society by doing so (Torgler, 2007a). 
Focusing on determinants of business tax morale is essential; as Feld and Frey (2002, p.88) point 
out:  
Most studies treat ‘tax morale’ as a black box without discussing or even considering 
how it might arise or how it might be maintained. It is usually perceived as being part of 
the meta-preferences of taxpayers and used as the residuum in the analysis capturing 
unknown influences to tax evasion. The more interesting question then is which factors 
shape the emergence and maintenance of tax morale.  
While the factors have been largely defined and robustly estimated for the context of individual 
taxpayers, estimation within a business context is scarce. Again, by using a survey to obtain 
information on the main determinants of tax morale, we will attempt for the first time to 
investigate factors that shape business tax morale in Kosovo. 
The following section provides a detailed overview of research design, questionnaire, survey, 
data collection and statistical interpretation. 
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6.2 Research Design  
For the purpose of this chapter, and with the aim of further contributing in the topic of business 
tax morale,  a major in person (face-to-face) survey of 600 SMEs was conducted throughout 
Kosovo; the last European country to enter the transition process. The main purpose of the 
survey was to collect data that would best explain both the relationship of tax morale with tax 
compliance and the determinants of tax morale from the business perspective in a transition 
economy. Following we provide a detailed description of questionnaire design, data collection 
procedures and protocol, and descriptive statistics of data obtained. 
 
6.2.1 Questionnaire Design 
 
The first step of the data collection process was to develop a questionnaire (for complete 
questionnaire see Appendix 6.22) containing questions that would give raise to variables 
measuring the determinants of interest. Questions related to tax compliance and tax morale were 
of special interest. For the first, following the arguments used in the previous chapters when 
discussing the methodology and technique of obtaining tax compliance data (which we 
intentionally do not repeat here), we created a question that would ask business respondents to 
provide a single answer (measured in percent) on the level of reporting of sales in firms similar 
to theirs: 
Q.15 - Recognising the difficulties that many firms face in fully complying with taxes and 
regulations, what per cent of total annual sales would you estimate the typical firm in 
your area of business reports for tax purposes?  
We then subtract the answers from 100% to obtain a measure of tax evasion (tax evasion=100-
tax compliance). 
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For the second, tax morale, we replicated what by now is the touchstone question on estimating 
the level of tax morale, which uses the justifiability of tax evasion as a proxy for tax morale 
(Torgler 2007). In our case, the question which origins from the World Values Survey (WVS), 
ask respondents to provide a four scale answer:   
Q.17 - Please tell me whether you think that cheating on taxes if you have a chance, is: a) 
completely justified, b) partly justified, c) partly unjustified, or d) completely unjustified? 
We then grouped responses a, b and c to form a dummy variable with values 0 if respondents 
justify tax evasion and 1 otherwise (answered under d). Treating tax morale through dummies is 
a common practice in tax morale literature. Nevertheless for robustness check we report both 
standard and ordered Probit estimations; given the ordered structure of dependent variable. As 
argued under section 6.1, lower tax morale is expected to have a positive relationship with tax 
evasion. 
In order to estimate the impact of tax rate, the first traditional variable from the Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) model, firm perceptions in regards to the level of tax rates were evaluated. 
Question: Q.18 - Please tell me, how do you consider tax rates relevant to your business?  had 
five possible answers: (1) very low, (2) low, (3) moderate (4) high, and (5) very high. Theoretical 
and empirical relationship between tax rate and tax evasion has been already argued under 
Chapter IV and V. We found strong and significant positive relationship between tax rates and 
tax evasion in both cross-country (Chapter IV) and firm level (Chapter V) investigations. Indeed 
tax rate appeared so far to be the most robust and statistically significant variable in all our 
estimations; and this is especially important given the theoretical assumption and empirical 
investigations in the past which have led largely to ambiguity. Given the robustness of the 
findings prevailing in our investigations when treating transition economies, the expected sign of 
tax rate in tax evasion is positive. 
For the audit probability, the second traditional variable, the following question was asked: Q.16 
- Please tell me, over the past 12 months, how many times your business was inspected or was 
asked to meet with tax/custom officials/administration?. The answers were given in ‘number of 
times’. For consistency, the question measuring the audit rate in Kosovo is identical to the one 
used in the Chapter V when estimating the impact of the audit rate in tax evasion for 7,683 firms 
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in 28 transition economies. We note that in Chapter V, although the sign of audit was in 
accordance with theoretical expectations, we failed to establish a statistically significant 
relationship. The expected sign of audit rate in tax evasion is again negative. 
We note that the fine rate, or the third and last traditional determinant of tax evasion, was not 
included in this group of deterrence variables given the difficulty of obtaining such a measure 
from the survey. Non-observation of the impact of fine rate in this Chapter as well as in two 
other empirical Chapters IV and V, given the data limitations, would potentially handicap the 
study. We argue however, that if fine rates are assumed to be more or less the same for all firms, 
that is if they are systematic, then their effect should be captured, but not measured, by the 
intercept. The captured effect is even more convincing if the fine rate is assumed to be one of the 
most important determinants of tax evasion; as by being so it will dominate the intercept more 
than any other potentially omitted variable. We also note that fine rate can take two types of 
forms. It can be perceived as equal (hence systematic) to all by respondents (businesses) or it can 
be firm related. In the latter case, firms that had previously been fined could perceive the risk 
from fines at higher levels than non-fined firm. Under such assumptions, systematic presence of 
fines does not hold. For the future research in regards to the impact of fine rates in tax evasion 
we propose the use of panel analysis as fine rate specific to firms and unobservable to 
researchers is after all a firm specific effect (hence Fixed Effects). We also encourage future 
research to use tax administration measurement programmes, if existent. 
Under firm control group of variables, apart from screening questions discussed below, we make 
also a question measuring firms performance by asking respondents to declare if Q.11 Over the 
past 12 months, your sales have a) increased; b) decreased; c) remained same. We then form a 
dummy variable with values 1 if firm had fall in their sales (all answers under b) and 0 otherwise 
(answers a and c).  
Next group of questions relate to institutional variables which are constructed to investigate the 
determinants of tax morale. These questions were obtained through measuring three important 
factors, again consistent with the methodology applied in Chapter V (i.e estimation of business 
tax evasion for 12,280 firms in 28 transition economies), as well as the theoretical (Chapter II) 
and empirical (Chapter III) discussions conducted in this thesis. These factors are: a) trust in 
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government; b) effectiveness of the courts (rule of law); and c) perception about presence of 
corruption. In order to measure trust in government, question Q.19 - Please tell me, how much do 
you trust the government? was constructed, with five possible answers: (1) always, (2) often, (3) 
neutral, (4) rarely, (5) never. Higher coded values meant that businesses have lower levels of 
trust in the government. Hence the expected sign of “trust in government” on tax morale is 
negative.  
When measuring the effectiveness of courts, i.e. trust in legal system, the following question was 
constructed: Q.20 - To what degree do you agree with this statement: I am confident that the 
legal system will uphold my contract and property rights in business disputes? There were five 
possible answers were provided: (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neutral, (4) agree, (5) 
strongly agree. Contrary to “trust in government”, here the higher coded values meant that 
businesses have higher trust in the legal system. Hence the impact of “trust in legal system” in 
tax morale is expected to be positive.  
Lastly, perceptions of corruption were measured through six complementary questions, answers 
of which were averaged to provide an index of business perception towards corruption in 
Kosovo. The question was constructed as follows: Q.14 - Thinking about officials, would you say 
it is common for a business similar to yours to pay “bribes/gifts” Subsequent statements were 
then given so respondents could rank them from 1 (always) to 5 (never): a) To get connected to 
and maintain public services; b) To obtain business licenses and permits; c) To obtain 
government contracts; d) to evade taxes; e) to avoid customs. Higher scores meant less 
corruption while less corruption means higher tax morale. So the relationship between corruption 
and tax morale is expected to be positive. 
Firm and socio-demographic control variables for both determinants of tax evasion and tax 
morale were constructed as screening questions. Questionnaire was designed to ask respondents 
to provide their position/occupation within the firm (note that only owners or top managers – if 
different were interviewed); legal status (individual, partnership or corporations); number of full 
time employees (hence size of the company); year of establishment; membership in business 
associations; as well as gender, age and education of respondent (which is either owner or top 
manager) According to theoretical background set under Chapter III and empirical investigation 
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related to firm characteristics under Chapter V, the expectations of screening questions are as 
follows.  
In regards to determinants of tax evasion, it is expected that larger firms show lower levels of tax 
evasion hence the relationship between size and tax evasion is negative. Partnerships and 
Corporations are expected to have also lower levels of tax evasion; hence the signs of respective 
dummy variables are expected to be negative. Firms that have more experience i.e. have more 
years in the market are expected to be more reputable, more sustainable and less likely to use tax 
evasion as a tool for increasing their purchasing power or to risk by getting caught and fined. The 
expected sign of years and tax evasion is negative. Last, firms that for the past 12 months have 
experienced fall in sales are expected to use tax evasion as an opportunity to regain the market 
power and create (unfair) competitive advantage. Hence the impact of dummy variable for firm’s 
performance measured by fall in annual turnover is expected to have a positive relationship with 
tax evasion. 
In regards to determinants of tax morale, education is expected to have two contrary effects. On 
the one side, fiscal knowledge may positively influence the practice of evasion as more educated 
people involved in businesses may tend to better understand the opportunities for evading tax 
obligations; on the other side more educated people understand better the importance of tax 
levying hence increase their levels of voluntary compliance. Therefore the sign of education in 
tax morale is ambiguous. As argued in Chapter III, Female owners are expected to have higher 
levels of tax morale, as are elderly owners, compared to their male respectively younger 
counterparts’. Last businesses that are members of business associations are expected to have 
more social capital and consequently more social responsibility, hence higher levels of tax 
morale. The expected sign of membership with tax morale is positive. 
Table 6.1 and 6.2 provides a summary of variables discussed so far and ordered according to 
models of estimations for both the relationship between business tax morale and business tax 
evasion, as well as the determinants of business tax morale.  
The next two sub-sections provide detailed information on the data collection process and 
descriptive statistics from the survey results.  
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Table 6.1 Summary of variables for MODEL 1: Tax Evasion 
 
Variable Description Question Unit of measurement 
Tax Evasion 
(Dep Var) 
measure of the fraction 
of sales concealed 
 
Q.15 – Recognizing the difficulties that many firms 
face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, 
what per cent of total annual sales would you 
estimate the typical firm in your area of business 
reports for tax purposes? 
in percentage (%) 
100% – answer 
Tax Morale 
measure of intrinsic 
motivation to comply 
 
Q.17 - Please tell me whether you think that cheating 
on taxes if you have a chance, is: a) completely 
justified, b) partly justified, c) partly unjustified, or 
d) completely unjustified? 
(1) completely justified, (2) partly justified, 
(3) partly unjustified, and (4) completely 
unjustified 
Tax Rate 
measure of tax burden 
as perceived by 
businesses 
Q.18 – Can you tell me, how do you consider tax 
rates applicable to your business? 
 
1) very low, (2) low, (3) moderate, (4) high, 
and (5) very high 
 
Audit 
Probability 
measure amount of 
inspections a firm had 
 
Q.16- Please tell me, over the past 12 months, how 
many times your business was inspected or was 
asked to meet with tax/custom 
officials/administration? 
 
 
Number of times 
 
Size number of employees 
 
 
Q.6 “How many full-time employees work for this 
company?”  
 
 
Number of employees 
 
Legal Status legal organization 
 
 
Q.5 “What is the legal organization of this 
company?” 
 
 
(1) Single Proprietorship, (2) Partnership and 
(3) Corporations. Dummy Variable: 1 if 
number of owners >1 and 0 otherwise 
Year 
Established 
measure of years since 
establishment 
 
 
Q.7“When was your business established?” 
 
 
2012 - year  of establishment 
Performance 
 
measure of percentage 
change in sales 
 
 
Q.   “Can you tell me, over the past 12 months your 
sales have a) increased, b) decreased, or c) 
remained same? 
 
 
Dummy Variable: 1 if sales decreased and 0 
otherwise 
        
 
 
  
Page | 214        Chapter Six: Understanding Business Tax Morale: The Case of Kosovo 
 
 
 
Table 6.2 Summary of variables for MODEL 2: Tax Morale 
 
Variable Description Question Unit of measurement 
Tax Morale 
(Dep Var) 
measure of intrinsic 
motivation to comply 
 
Q.17- Please tell me whether you think that cheating 
on taxes if you have a chance, is: a) completely 
justified, b) partly justified, c) partly unjustified, or d) 
completely unjustified? 
(1) completely justified, (2) partly justified, (3) 
partly unjustified, and (4) completely 
unjustified 
Trust in 
Government 
measure of trust towards 
central government 
Q.19 - Please tell me, how much do you trust the 
government? 
 
(1) always, (2) often, (3) neutral, (4) rarely, (5) 
never  
Trust in Legal 
System 
measure of perception of 
businesses towards 
effectiveness of courts in 
solving various business 
disputes 
Q20 - “ o what degree do you agree with this 
statement? “  am confident that the legal system will 
uphold my contract and property rights in business 
disputes”. 
 
 
(1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neutral, 
(4) agree, and (6) strongly agree 
General 
Corruption 
measure of business’ 
perception towards 
corruption 
 
Q.14 – “ hinking about officials, would you say it is 
common for a business similar to yours to pay 
“bribes/gifts: a)  o get connected to and maintain 
public services; b) To obtain business licenses and 
permits; c) To obtain government contracts; d) to 
evade taxes; e) to avoid customs.” 
 
(1) always, (2) often, (3) neutral, (4) rarely, (5) 
never 
Average of all answers 
Compliance 
Costs 
measure of amount of 
time that senior 
management spends 
dealing with various 
legal requirements 
 
 
Q.2  “How many days of senior management’s time 
within a week is spent in dealing with public officials 
about the application and interpretation of laws and 
regulations and to get or to maintain access to public 
services?” 
 
in percentage (%) 
Age respondents’ age Q.9 “What is your age”  
In number 
 
Education 
respondents’ level of 
education 
Q.9 “What is the level of your education?”  
Dummy for: Primary (base dummy); 
Secondary and Tertiary 
Gender respondents’ gender Q.9: Respondents’ Gender Dummy Variable: 1 if male and 0 otherwise 
Membership 
Membership in a 
Business Association 
Q. 2 “Are you a member in any business 
association?” 
Dummy Variable: 1 if member and 0 otherwise 
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6.2.2 Data collection 
 
Once the questionnaire design was completed, Riinvest Institute
35
 was engaged to implement the 
survey. Riinvest is a leading think-tank institution in Kosovo with 18 years of experience and 
over quarter million respondents interviewed so far. The author of this questionnaire was in 
charge of the team that conducted the survey through trained and experienced Riinvest Institute 
enumerators. 
The targeted population of the survey were Kosovan businesses. The Tax Administration register 
of the whole business population was initially obtained in order to identify the sample and obtain 
business addresses. Possession of this database enabled the team to better stratify the sample and 
to better identify active businesses in whole Kosovo. The Tax Administration register of 65.000 
businesses contained sufficient information on the profile of each business including: sector of 
activity; size location; address; and even phone contacts. According to the Tax Administration 
Agency database, there are around 65.000 active businesses operating in Kosovo. Based on these 
assumptions in order to provide reliable results at the 95% confidence level and with 4% margin 
of error a sample size of 600 businesses is needed. Hence a sample of 600 business respondents 
throughout Kosovo was stratified according to size, region and sector
36
.  
Once the sample was chosen, questionnaires were printed and tested, and the process of choosing 
and training enumerators began. Riinvest typically employs the best students as enumerators 
(because many of Riinvest’s staff are on the faculty then the best students can be identified as 
enumerators).  By virtue of being at the university, these individuals tend to be intelligent and to 
have respect for research.  As they are young, they tend to be unthreatening to respondents. 
Moreover, there are the dual sources of employer and lecturers for conveying to enumerators the 
necessity of a thorough and professional approach to the work. Some of the elected students 
already had experience as enumerators and Riinvest has developed training procedures for new 
recruits for every survey needed. The importance of the knowledge and controls regarding 
                                                          
35
 For more see www.riinvestinstitute.org  - Riinvest Institute has also a considerable experience in dealing with 
business surveys, after actively and professionally surveying kosovan businesses on regular annual basis since year 
2000. This survey was conducted within such standards and such experience.  
36
 Sample stratification was done according to Riinvest Institute well recognized standards. 
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enumerators cannot be overstressed. Without such controls, there is a high potential for 
improperly completed, even falsified, questionnaires. All enumerators receive training.  As part 
of this training, enumerators receive a survey-specific training manual explaining the importance 
and overall goals of the survey, how to dress and present themselves to respondents, and detailed 
explanations of the questionnaire.  Small groups (2-to-5) of enumerators work under a team 
leader. In the field, the team leader revisits 15% percent of the respondents for each enumerator, 
ostensibly to thank them for their cooperation.  During these visits, selected questions are re-
asked for verification.  These questions may include those considered most crucial to the 
research effort, as well as any for which the original responses suggested possible 
inconsistencies. This activity is part of a field control. In addition to that, from Riinvest’s offices, 
a similar verification process is carried out by phone by the research team and Project Leader for 
another 15% of randomly selected respodents. Around 30% of surveys are re-verified by the 
Riinvest team who calls respondents and ensures that 2-3 selected screening answers correspond 
to the ones filled by enumerator.  Once the questionnaires are returned they are stored at the 
Riinvest premises. A logical control is also conducted. Each questionnaire is verified by 
researchers to check if there is any irrational answer or non-fitting answers with previous claims. 
These helps detect potential defects within each survey. Once the logical failures are found, the 
Riinvest team together with enumerator call or re-visit the respondent. Logical control serves to 
identify falsely completed questionnaires by enumerators. If any detected, they are taken as 
invalid and a substitute questionnaire is set for the field. 
Survey data once collected and controlled were, customarily, encoded by experienced personnel 
using ‘Microsoft EXCEL’ spreadsheets prepared with the data fields and pop-up tables 
indicating relevant codes. After entry, two individuals, one using the questionnaire and one the 
spreadsheet, read aloud to one another to confirm the correctness of the responses. Changes are 
made as appropriate. Next, the data is analyzed using ‘SPSS’ to identify responses outside of 
expected ranges, including potential inconsistencies across variables. Changes are made as 
appropriate. At each stage, copies of the data are maintained with the individuals currently 
working on the spreadsheets and with the Project Leader. Periodic checks are made by the 
Project Leader, primarily through comparing variable means and distributions across files, to 
ensure data has not been altered, intentionally or otherwise.  The original questionnaires are 
stored for at least two years after completion of the project.  
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6.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.3 presents a summary of the variables of interest in the tax evasion model. The mean 
value of TaxEvasion, 39.87%, is of special interest for this chapter as it represents the level of tax 
evasion in Kosovo measured by conventional survey technique applied also in other TEs.  
Table 6.3 Descriptive Statistics for Tax Evasion Analysis 
      
 
Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
      Tax Evasion 551 39.5 27.2 0 98 
Tax Morale 582 3.35 1.07 1 4 
Tax Rate 562 2.32 1.3 1 5 
Audit Rate 512 4.52 9.51 1 180 
Size 590 5.01 13.5 1 200 
Partnership 599 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Corporations 599 0.01 0.13 0 1 
Years 592 9.48 8.35 0 91 
Performance 553 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Source: STATA 2011  
      
This is the very first time that business tax evasion has been measured in Kosovo, and the 
number itself becomes even more compelling if compared to country level aggregate data from 
BEEPS surveys used in Chapter IV, Table 4.1. By applying the same methodology and approach 
to measurement of tax evasion, we have obtained a comparable level that also allows us to see 
Kosovo vis-à-vis other TEs; and thus to perhaps get an approximate idea of the institutional, 
economical and political development of the country in regards to the fight against tax evasion. 
With the current level of tax evasion, Kosovo falls within the top three highest recorded levels of 
evasion in transition economies for the period 1999-2002-2005, which also happen to be 
Kosovo’s neighbouring or nearby countries; Albania 1999 (70%), Bosnia 1999 (54%) and 
Macedonia 2002 (36%) top that list. Indeed, on further investigation we notice that the average 
of Albania, Bosnia and Macedonia for the year 1999 is roughly around 50%. The average of the 
same countries for 2002, however, falls to around 30%. It seems that the current level of tax 
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evasion in Kosovo is quite similar to the average for the region, yet somewhere in-between the 
years 1999-2002. This comes as no surprise considering the recent political history of Kosovo.  
Being the last country in Europe to embark on the road to transition to a market economy the 
level of development remains significantly behind even compared to other regional countries. 
The transition process began from a very difficult starting point. Initially under the former 
Yugoslavia, Kosovo was the least developed entity and its position within the Yugoslav 
economic system was deteriorated continuously, from 47% in 1947 to less than 30% of average 
per capita output in Yugoslavia by the end of 80’s. The 90s brought further regress as Serbian 
colonial rule pushed more than 70% of Albanian employees out of their jobs. During this period 
country was facing sharp disinvestment and deindustrialization processes while, at the end of the 
decade (1997-1999), a war begun, giving Kosovo the very last economic thump (Mustafa and 
Abdixhiku, 2012). According to Riinvest (2000), a post-war survey, more than 50% of the 
resident population has been forcefully deported out of the country, housing fund was reduced by 
40%, 70% of housing equipment was stolen or destroyed while livestock was reduced for more 
than 50%. Following the NATO intervention and liberation in 1999, the United Nation Mission 
in Kosovo (UNMIK) administration was put in place. Regardless of initial progressive impact, 
the foreign aid and international technical assistance was not sequenced properly with progress 
in building absorptive capacities and, hence, Kosovo experienced “shock of aid economies” after 
initial growth. Social and political tensions confronted this status quo and finally the main actors 
involved in the Kosovo state building process understood that final political status needed to be 
addressed and determined. In 2008 Kosovo, in accordance with support from the international 
community, declared its independence.  
Today, according to official data from Statistical Office, Kosovo has an unemployment rate of 
45%, while poverty rates remain alarmingly high, with extreme poverty also prevalent among a 
significant proportion of the population. Official data show that around twelve percent of the 
population live in extreme poverty, on 1.02 Euros a day, with 34 percent below the poverty line 
of 1.55 Euros per adult per day.
37
 Presently, Kosovo’s GDP stands at about 5 billion Euros with 
                                                          
37
 Nevertheless, the level of poverty is considered to be narrow, with many people living around the poverty line. A 
slight increase or decrease in income pulls or pushes a great deal of people from or into poverty. Kosovo is reported 
as having among the worst outcomes in the region with regard to achieving the Millennium Development Goal 
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slightly more than 3000 Euros income per capita, half of that of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), 
about a third of that of Macedonia and Albania and about a quarter of that of Serbia. Moreover, 
according to World Bank estimates, Kosovo’s economy would need to grow at ten percent per 
annum for a decade to reach Albania’s income level (assuming Albania’s economy continues to 
grow by 5.5 percent annually during this period). A very recent study by Riinvest (2011) 
highlights unfair competition to be the top barrier in business environment in Kosovo. Moreover, 
according to interviews with selected businesses from the same study, tax evasion is the single 
most important factor impacting the unfair competition, in the private sector in Kosovo. Data 
from the Statistical Office of Kosovo on employment when compared to Tax Administration tax 
contributions or other official registers of pension contributions have shown considerable 
mismatches between the formal and the informal labour force; providing thus a profound base 
for accepting non-reporting of labour force and, we argue, sales, as being on considerably high 
levels. Against this background, the level of tax evasion of around 39.87% observed in our 
survey seems reasonable enough.  
The second variable of interest is Tax Morale, or the measurement of “intrinsic motivation”  to 
comply.  Fig.6.1 shows the percentage of answers according to the categories provided. Around 
13% of surveyed businesses consider cheating on taxes if they had a chance as completely 
justified; while, on the other hand, 69% of Kosovan businesses see tax evasion as completely 
unjustified in any circumstance.  
Obtained data enable us to compare business tax morale in Kosovo with individual tax morale 
worldwide, using data from World Value Surveys (WVS). Of course the assumption here is that 
individual tax morale can act as a proxy for business tax morale. Data from WVS cover surveys 
in 55 countries worldwide in periods between 2005 and 2007 (note, not all surveys were 
conducted at the same time). The question of interest for measuring the level of tax morale was 
as follows: V201.- Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can 
always be justified, never be justified, or something in between. Respondents could provide 
answers from 1 never justifiable to 10 always justifiable. Due to lack of variation in answers 
provided, individual tax literature usually groups the answers to four categories. When 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(MDG) indicators (transition into secondary school, particularly girls; life expectancy; combating tuberculosis and 
other diseases; access to safe water; child mortality and maternal mortality, among others). 
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comparing negative extremes, that is respondents stating that they always justify tax evasion, 
Kosovo with its 13% level ranks quite close with Serbia (15%), a neighbouring country. Such 
evenness could also indicate the reliability of our data. The same level puts Kosovo below India 
(9%) or Brazil (8.6%), and considerably below western countries. 
 
Figure 6.1 The level of Tax Morale in Kosovo 
 
In regards to tax rate, out of 599 respondents, 36% have considered tax rates as very low; 17% as 
low; 22% as moderate; 11% as high; and 8% as very high. Around 6% of answers were left 
blank. Around 91% of respondents were individual businesses. The remaining 6.5% and 2.5% 
were partnerships and corporations respectively. Moreover, around 88% of surveyed business 
were micro-enterprises (1-9 employees); around 10% were small firms (10-49 employees) and 
the remaining 2% were medium and large firms (>50 employees). The distribution of businesses 
according to their legal status and size is fully in accord with official data from the Tax 
Administration, again ensuring the credibility and reliability of the current data. We also note 
that the average years of businesses operating in the market is 9.4 years, suggesting as expected, 
that the majority of current businesses are relatively young and that the “year zero” for Kosovo 
begun just after the liberation in 1999. Our data also show that roughly 28% of surveyed 
businesses have declared a fall in their performance; i.e. annual turnover, suggesting thus a very 
difficult business year when the surveying occurred. 
Table 6.4 represents the remaining descriptive statistics from the determinants of tax morale. We 
start from distribution of variable Trust in Government. Out of 582 respondents, 11% have 
13% 
7% 
11% 
69% 
Completely Justified
Partly Justified
Partly Unjustified
Completely Unjustifed
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declared that they always trust their government; 48% often; 19% neutral; 16% rarely; and 4% 
stated that they never trust the government. The remaining 2%, or 11 answers, are blank.  
Table 6.4 Descriptive Statistics for Tax Morale Analysis 
      
 
Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
      Tax Morale 582 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Trust in Government 571 2.51 1.00 1 5 
Trust in Legal System 566 3.21 1.12 1 5 
Corruption 544 4.13 1.19 1 5 
Compliance Costs 435 5.2 1.86 1 7 
Secondary Education 547 0.61 0.48 0 1 
Tertiary Education 547 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Gender 582 0.87 0.33 0 1 
Age 526 40.2 10.6 20 75 
Membership 582 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Source: STATA 2011  
      
In regards to Trust in Legal System around 20% of respondents have declared that they strongly 
agree that the legal system will uphold their contract and property rights in business disputes; 
8%  have declared agree; 48% have neutral beliefs; 16% disagree; and 6% strongly disagree. 
The remaining 3% or 16 answers are blank. Corruption averages at 4.13 (paying bribes is a 
common practice: 1 always and 5 never); while the average number of days per week on which 
businesses undertake some activity corrected with public officials is 5.2, suggesting thus  a very 
high cost of compliance. The socio-cultural-demographic indicators of businesses, all related to 
owners/top-manager education, gender or age; as well as collective action and cooperation 
(measured by membership in business association) are distributed as follows. Roughly 10% of 
surveyed businesses have owners/top-managers with primary education; 57% with secondary, 
while the remaining 33% have tertiary education.  Around 85% of surveyed businesses are 
owned by males, and the average age of the respondent owner/top-manager is 40 years. Last, 
only 12% of surveyed businesses are members of any existing business association.  
Next sections discuss model and empirical setting for both estimations. 
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6.3 Tax Evasion and Tax Morale 
 
In order to investigate the impact of tax morale on tax evasion i.e. noncompliance, we will 
estimate the following model:  
 
                ̂              ̂             ̂               
 
where index i refers to observations 1,...,n.             Stands for the level of tax evasion for 
observation i;             measures two out of three traditional factors as modelled in the 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) conventional model, notably tax and audit rate. As already 
discussed, given the data restrictions we cannot include here the third factor, fine rate. 
           is the level of tax morale as declared by firms. In line with the Alm and 
McClellan (2012) theoretical discussion, the model also contains several control variables for 
firms           which include firms size; ownership type; years since establishment; and a 
dummy for firm’s changes in sales during the last year. The model itself, as proposed by very 
recent and leading literature, combines a set of traditional with non-traditional determinants; 
while controlling for firm individual characteristics.  
In the following section we discuss some of the empirical issues related to tax evasion model 
estimation. 
  
(28) 
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6.3.1 Empirical Considerations: Tobit 
 
Under Chapter V we have treated the issue of sample selection bias through controlling for both 
“missingness” and “truthfulness” of the dependent variable. We argued that the nature of the 
dependent variable in our study, derived from a survey, reflects on a very sensitive issue, that of 
tax evasion. This in turn might restrict respondents’ choice to provide either a truthful or indeed 
any perception on the phenomenon. Hence, two sources of potential sample bias could arise: 
first, nonresponse may be endogeneous to firm behaviour, therefore the exclusion of missing 
values might bias estimates (Joulfaian, 2009); and, second, since the dependent variable asks 
firms to perceive the level of evasion by other firms, a part of the responses declaring full 
compliance might be false in order to cover a common evasive behaviour by firms (Nur-tegin, 
2008). Consequently we used the standard Heckman Two-Step approach and an extended 
Heckman Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) procedure to estimate Tobit equation 
conditional upon an estimated positive response in a Probit selection equation (note that the 
standard Heckman Two-Step approach estimates OLS conditional upon Probit). The results 
however, showed robustly that our data were not suffering from either “missingness” or 
“truthfulness”. Given that the missing values or truthfulness in the dependent variable did not 
cause any sample selection bias, our final approach was directed towards addressing the issue of 
data censoring through the Tobit Corner Solution; estimations of which served as basis for 
interpretation and discussion. Tobit estimation assumes that the same variables influence, in the 
same direction, both the propensity to tax evade and the incidence of tax evasion (given that it 
occurs at all). 
In this Chapter we do not undertake any special treatment of either “missingness” or 
“truthfulness” of the dependent variable. We do not address the issue of “missingness” as the 
amount of missing data in the dependent variable when treating tax evasion is relatively small 
(49 observations out of 599). “Truthfulness” on the other hand is not addressed for three main 
reasons. First, and the most important reason, our database does not provide us with an 
identifying variable for the Probit selection equation for truthfulness. Second, the robust results 
presented in Chapter V do not suggest the presence of sample selection bias in BEEPS data. 
Hence we have more certainty in assuming that data from tax evasion surveys are not expected to 
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suffer from untruthful answers; or alternatively, even if there are untruthful answers they are not 
severe to cause any sample selection bias. Third, the practice of controlling the sample selection 
bias from truthfulness is less than common in tax evasion studies; indeed apart from Nur-tegin 
(2008) and our Chapter V; we do not find any such application. This does not mean that 
researchers should not account for truthfulness when treating survey studies of tax evasion 
whenever it is possible to do so. However in the case of data restrictions, as is the case with this 
chapter, non accounting for truthfulness does not necessarily present a major limitation. Having 
that in mind, in this chapter when treating the determinants of tax evasion we follow a standard 
Tobit estimation.  
According to Wooldridge (2003), optimizing behaviour often leads to corner solutions for some 
nontrivial fraction of the population; in other words it is optimal to choose zero evasion. Around 
20% of respondents in our data have declared full compliance i.e no evasion, therefore tax 
evasion has a population distribution that is spread out over a range of positive values, but with a 
pileup at the value zero (although this share is much lower than compared to Chapter V, where 
60% of respondents have declared zero evasion). Regardless of that, a linear model will likely 
lead to negative predictions for some of the firms, while taking the natural log is not possible 
because many observations are at zero. Therefore the Tobit model is explicitly designed to model 
corner solution dependent variables.  
The Tobit model is defined as a latent variable model: 
    β      
  |  ~ N(0, 
2
)  
Y= max (0,Y*) 
 
where Y* is the latent variable satisfying the classical linear model assumptions that the 
disturbance term is normally distributed and has homoscedastic variance; and that the observed 
variable, Y Y  when Y ≥0, but Y 0 when Y <0. Because Y  is normally distributed, Y has a 
continuous distribution over strictly positive values. 
(29) 
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Even though the output of OLS and Tobit are often similar, the interpretation of them differs 
since in the Tobit model we have to interpret the partial effect of independent variables (Xi) on 
E(Y*|X) where Y* is the latent variable. The variable we are interested in explaining is Y, the 
observed outcome of tax evasion. In Tobit models what we obtain is two partial effects on Y, the 
conditional marginal effect E(Y|Y >0, X) and the unconditional marginal effects E(Y|X).  
In other words, total change in tax evasion (Y) can be disaggregated into two parts: the change in 
evasion above the threshold (Y>0), i.e. the incidence of tax evasion, weighted by the probability 
of being above the threshold; and the change in the probability of being above the threshold, i.e. 
the propensity to evade, weighted by the expected value of tax evasion. The conditional effect is 
a measure of incidence of tax evasion, while the unconditional effect is a measure of both 
incidence and propensity (note that Probit is a measure of only propensity).  
Given that there are two effects, various studies have failed to reach consensus in regards to 
reporting. Wooldridge (2003) recommends reporting both marginal effects. In addition, he also 
argues that one way to informally evaluate whether the Tobit model is appropriate is to estimate 
a Probit model where the binary outcome, Wi, equals one if    , and W= 0 if    ; that is 
generating a dummy with values 1 on every observation with a tax evasion level higher than 0.  
Then, Wi follows a Probit model, where the coefficient  j on some variable Xj is equal to the 
ratio of Tobit estimates (ratio between Tobit coefficient βj and Tobit estimated standard deviation 
of the residual  );   j βj/ . This means that we can estimate the ratio of βj to   by Probit for each 
observation j. If the Tobit model holds, then the Probit estimates  j should be “close” to βj/ , 
where  ̂  to  ̂ are Tobit estimates. Due to sampling error, these will never be identical; however 
the signs and sizes should be close to each other. Wooldridge (2003) also argues that there 
should be no worry about sign changes or magnitude differences on explanatory variables that 
are insignificant in both models. 
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6.3.2 Tobit Estimation Results 
 
 
Table 6.7 is a summary of various Tobit estimations. Column 1 represents Tobit estimation of 
the relationship between tax evasion and tax morale as the sole independent variable. We then 
build gradually with Column 2 by adding deterrence determinants. This is done to check the 
robustness of the estimated effect of tax morale. Column 3 is a standard Tobit estimation (left 
censored dependent variable), including tax morale, deterrence factors as well as firm 
characteristics. Three columns altogether show that the relationship of both tax morale and 
deterrence factors with tax evasion is strong and significant regardless of model specification. 
The sign and sizes of the estimated coefficients remain largely unchanged and robust.  
In Tobit regression, one cannot straightforwardly interpret the β coefficient as the effect of Xi on 
Yi, as one would do in the context of linear regression. Instead, it should be interpreted as the 
combination of (1) the change in Yi of those above the zero threshold (giving the incidence of 
evasion), weighted by the probability of being above the limit; and (2) the change in the 
probability of being above the zero threshold (giving the propensity to evade), weighted by the 
expected value of Yi if above. Correspondingly, Tobit estimation yields two distinct marginal 
effects: the conditional marginal effects of changes in each independent variable on the 
incidence of evasion (Column 5); and the unconditional marginal effects, which measure the 
effects of changes in each independent variable on evasion that occur via changes both in the 
incidence of evasion and in the propensity to evade (Column 6). There is no clear cut 
recommendation on preferable marginal effect but, since coefficient sizes are similar, and since 
the unconditional marginal effect applies to the whole sample, we will interpret only Column 6 
or unconditional marginal effects (as in Chapter V). 
Tobit and Probit estimation are related: Tobit estimates the incidence of evasion, given that firms 
evade at all (conditional marginal effects) as well as the combined effect of both firms’ 
propensity to evade and – where observed – their incidence of evasion (unconditional marginal 
effects); and Probit yields estimates of the propensity to evade. This relationship is the basis of a 
useful procedure to check the validity of Tobit estimation. Namely, if the independent variables 
have a similar effect on the propensity to evade (from Probit) and on the unconditional marginal 
 Table 6.7 TOBIT estimation results 
 
 
                      
    TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT PROBIT T/P 
Conditional 
Marginal Effects 
Unconditional 
Marginal Effects 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dependent: Tax Evasion   Coeff 
Robust 
S.E 
Coeff 
Robust 
S.E 
Coeff 
Robust 
S.E 
Coeff βj/  Coeff S.E Coeff S.E 
                  
Tax Morale   -3.62 *** 1.20 -3.39 *** 1.30 -4.18 *** 1.23 -0.14 * -0.15 -3.01 *** 0.89 -3.78 *** 1.11 
                                        
Deterrence                                       
Tax Rate         3.98 *** 1.30 4.04 *** 1.25 0.36 *** 0.14 2.91 *** 0.88 3.66 *** 1.12 
Audit Rate         -0.49 ** 0.20 -0.44 *** 0.17 -0.01 ** -0.02 -0.32 *** 0.12 -0.40 *** 0.15 
                                        
Firm Control                                       
Size               -0.16   0.15 -0.00   -0.01 -0.11   0.11 -0.14   0.14 
Partnership               -10.6 * 5.49 -0.42   -0.37 -7.14 ** 3.44 -9.26 ** 4.60 
Corporations               -42.9 ** 14.4 -1.89 *** -1.49 -22.3 *** 4.97 -30.4 *** 6.58 
Years               -0.50 *** 0.19 -0.01 * -0.02 -0.36 *** 0.13 -0.45 *** 0.17 
Performance               3.05   3.37 -0.08   0.11 2.22   2.48 2.77   3.08 
                                        
Constant   49.4 *** 4.19 41.5 *** 6.00 51.4 *** 6.06 1.26 *** 1.78             
                                        
Sigma   31.8     30.8     28.8     28.8                 
Prob>F   9.07     7.62     7.26     7.26                 
Number of observations   536     431     395     395                 
Left-Censored Observations 89     69     57     57                 
Uncensored Observations   447     362     338     338                 
Right-Censored Observations 0     0     0     0         
                                        
 
*** at 1% level of significance; ** at 5% level of significance; * at 10% level of significance  
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effects (from Tobit) then the underlying assumption of Tobit estimation – i.e. that the 
independent variables act in much the same manner on both the propensity to evade and on the 
incidence of evasion – is supported by the data. Accordingly, following the procedure 
recommended by both Greene (2002) and Wooldridge (2003), to evaluate whether the Tobit 
model is appropriate, we estimate a Probit with dummy variable tax evasion (1 if evasion occurs 
and zero otherwise). We then divide the estimated Tobit coefficients (βj) by sigma ( ) (or the 
estimated standard deviation of the residual in Tobit) to obtain  j βj/ . As can be seen from 
Column 4, the relative-to-sigma  j coefficients are very close (almost identical) to the 
corresponding Probit estimates, which suggests that the choice of using Tobit is supported. For 
many models, including Tobit, the pseudo-R
2
 has no real meaning (STATA 2011).
38
   
Computation of Unconditional Marginal Effects (Column 6) as expected does not change either 
the signs or significance of the tax evasion determinants. As expected, it changes the size of 
coefficients. The results show that there is a strong and statistically significant relationship 
between tax morale and tax evasion. An increase in tax morale by one category reduces tax 
evasion by 3.8 percentage points, holding all other factors constant. Higher levels of tax morale 
significantly reduce, as predicted, the level of tax evasion. 
The second group of determinants, which is deterrence or traditional factors, shows also 
consistent and robust relationships with tax evasion. Our results show that the association 
between the tax rate and tax evasion is positive and significant at the 1% level. An increase in 
tax rate by one category increases tax evasion by 3.66 percentage points. Audit on the other hand 
is also statistically significant at the 1% level and is negatively related to tax evasion, suggesting 
that an increase of audit by one unit reduces tax evasion by 0.40 percentage points. 
The firm control group of determinants appear to have signs in accordance with theoretical 
expectations and our previous discussion. Evasion drops by around 0.14 percentage points if 
firms increases in size by one employee; however this variable is not statistically significant even 
at the 10% level (p=240). Legal status of firms appears to be statistically significant influence for 
                                                          
38
 Wooldridge, 2002, p.529 argues that ”we should remember that the Tobit estimates are not chosen to maximize an 
R-squared—they maximize the log-likelihood function—whereas the OLS estimates are the values that do produce 
the highest R-squared”, hence we do not report estimated pseudo-R2. 
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partnerships and corporations at the 5% and the 1% levels respectively. Compared to individual 
firms, less evasion is reported by partnerships and corporations. All other factors held constant, 
partnership firms are more compliant than individual firms by 9.26 percentage points; while this 
gap is extended (in absolute terms) with corporations at 30.4 percentage points, who evade 
around 20 percentage points less than do partnerships. Statistical significance at 1% level is also 
reported for years of the firms’ existence. An increase in years since operating by 1 unit (that is 
year) reduces tax evasion by almost half of a percentage point. Lastly, firms performance, 
measured by percentage change in annual turnover, appears not to be a statistically significant 
influence (p=367); however, the sign of the coefficient is in accordance with the theoretical 
discussion presented so far. Firms that have experienced a fall in their sales, evade more by 
almost 3 percentage points. 
These results are substantially in line with the previous discussions in this Chapter, and moreover 
are also in line with results identified in our empirical investigation of tax evasion for transition 
economies in Chapters IV and V. For instance the positive relationship of tax rate and tax 
evasion is again confirmed, and follows a cross-country investigation for transition economies in 
Chapter IV, as well as a firm-level investigation in Chapter V. This is particularly important 
given the previous theoretical and empirical ambiguity of published findings. Note that the 
(individual) traditional model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) predicts an ambiguous effect of 
the tax rate on tax evasion; with the occurrence of both an income effect (as tax rates rise, people 
become poorer and, in the presence of decreasing absolute risk aversion, evade less) and a 
substitution effect (rising taxes means that the return from evasion is higher, thus the taxpayer 
prefers the risky choice to the safer one). An ambiguous relationship was also established in 
business modelling (see Marelli, 1984; Martina, 1988; Virmani, 1989; Sandmo, 2004; Crocker 
and Slemrod, 2005). A positive relationship between tax rate and tax evasion was found in 
empirical investigations by Clotfelter (1983), Masson and Calvin (1984), Alm et al. (1992), 
Pommerehne and Frey (1992), Alm et al. (1993) Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996), 
Joulfaian and Rider (1996), Caroll (1998), Sillamaa and Veall (2000), Fisman and Wei (2004), 
Trehub and Krasnikova (2006), Torgler (2006), Chiarini et al. (2008), Gorodnichenko et al. 
(2009), Nur-tegin (2008), Bernasconi et al. (2013). On the other hand, a negative relationship 
was reported by Alm et.al (1990), Feinstein (1991), Christian and Gupta (1993), Alm et al. 
(1995), Kamdor (1995) and Joulfaian (2009). To make the review on the impact of tax rates even 
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more ambiguous, the works of Baldry (1987), Porcano (1988) and Joulfain and Rider (1996) 
found no effect at all on compliance from tax rates. We have already argued in favour of future 
Meta-Regression analysis to investigate the relationship between tax rate and tax evasion. Yet, at 
this point, given cross-country and firm level investigation for transition countries, as well as the 
current Kosovo study, it is with more evidence and confidence that we can claim a robust and 
positive relationship between tax rates and tax evasion; higher tax rates will lead to higher 
evasion levels. In the light of potential policy implications, which we elaborate further in the 
concluding part of this thesis, it is worth noting that countries with a high level of tax evasion 
should consider seriously lowering the tax rates for businesses. 
A particularly important finding of this Chapter is also the relationship and significance of the 
audit rate. As expected, higher audit intensities by tax officials will lead to higher compliance 
levels or lower evasive behaviour. The finding becomes particularly important given the inability 
of previous studies to find a good proxy for audit rates from survey data. In the previous Chapter, 
in addition to pooling two independent cross sectional data, we conducted a separate analysis 
involving only the BEEPS 2005 dataset. This was done in order to account for one specific 
variable:  the audit probability. We argued then that the only attempt so far to analyse audit 
probability in business tax compliance for transition economies was made by Nur-tegin (2008); 
however, as elaborated in Section 5.3 of Chapter V, we disagreed with the proxy used in this 
study, which is the review of financial statements at the end of the year from accounting auditors. 
Instead we used actual tax inspections carried out by the respective tax inspectorates, as declared 
by businesses; a measure available in BEEPS 2005 but not in BEEPS 2002 (hence, the separate 
analysis in Chapter V). We failed to establish a statistically significant relationship between audit 
and tax evasion, yet the sign of the variable was in line with theoretical expectations. We 
constructed a similar question for the survey involving 600 SMEs in Kosovo. The final result is 
robust and statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting for the first time that perceptions of 
kosovan businesses about audit rates impact the level of reporting.  
Findings from this Chapter also replicate the robust findings from firm-level determinants 
identified in Chapter V when investigating 28 transition countries. Again, firm characteristics 
matter; indeed, when related to audit findings, they might provide an interesting perspective for 
future audit policies. Note that larger firms, as well as partnership and corporations, are robustly 
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more compliant than smaller and individual firms respectively. These results are confirmed both 
from the investigation conducted in this chapter as well as the ones conducted in Chapter V. If 
the audit policies by tax inspectorates in transition countries are oriented towards larger firms, 
and/or partnerships and corporations, simply because in the vein of limited human capacities one 
has to choose strategies that maximise revenues by targeting the bulk of taxpayers (given their 
size and turnover), then it might be worth noting that the real evaders are left cosy. It might be 
worth noting also that perhaps future audit strategies in transition countries, or countries with 
similar characteristics, should orient their audit strategies towards smaller and/or individual firms 
(for more see policy implications in Chapter VII of this thesis). 
The most important finding in this Chapter is the robust relationship between tax morale and tax 
evasion; investigated for the first time in the business context. Our results show that the “intrinsic 
motivation”, or the voluntary compliance behaviour, is a very important factor when treating 
business tax evasion. The sign, significance and the size of the estimated coefficients provide 
sufficient information supporting the essential inclusion of tax morale in business tax evasion 
models; as suggested by previous theoretical literature and evidence from individual tax morale 
studies. The next section provides an empirical investigation of factors that shape business tax 
morale.   
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6.4 Determinants of Tax Morale 
 
In order to investigate the determinants of tax morale, we estimate the following model:   
 
               ̂                ̂               
 
Index i refers to observations 1,...,n.               is a vector of institutional variables, 
which measure trust in government; perceived functionality of judiciary system; perceived levels 
of corruption; as well as compliance costs. In line with Torgler et al. (2010) we also include 
control variables          , which represent levels of education, gender, age and membership 
in associations (to capture collective action and cooperation). Such a specification is in line with 
the tax morale literature. Amongst many, Alm and Torgler (2005) argue that: “...the tax morale 
is likely to be influenced by such factors as perceptions of fairness, trust in the institutions of 
government, the nature of the fiscal exchange between taxpayers and government, and a range of 
individual characteristics”. 
In the following section we discuss some of the empirical issues related to tax morale model 
estimation. 
 
 
  
(30) 
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6.4.1 Empirical Considerations: Probit 
 
In models in which the dependent variable Y has only two values, the regressand is known to be 
a binary or dichotomous variable. When Y is discrete and takes on a small number of values, it 
makes no sense to treat it as an approximately continuous variable. Discreteness of Y does not in 
itself mean that linear models are inappropriate. However, as Wooldridge (2003) argues for 
binary responses, the linear probability model has certain drawbacks. The first and most 
important drawback is that the fitted probabilities can be less than zero or greater than one. Note 
that the Linear Probability Model (LPM) is interpreted as a model that gives the probability of 
occurrence of an event (in our case would be a category of response) given a certain level of 
independent variable Xi. So as being probability E[Yi/Xi], it must fall in the interval between 0 
and 1. But in order to be so, then the fitted values should be bounded between 0 and 1. However, 
nothing constraints the predictions of the Linear Probability Model (LPM) offered by OLS from 
being either less than 0 or greater than 1, as E[Yi/Xi    β0 β1Xi  and - ∞< Xi <  ∞. As a result, 
the β0 β1Xi can take any value from the entire line; i.e - ∞< β0 β1Xi  <  ∞; meaning that - ∞< 
E[Yi/Xi]  <  ∞; hence irrational result with probability having infinite values: - ∞< Pi <  ∞. The 
second problem relates to violations of well known OLS properties, BLUE (Best Linear 
Unbiased Estimator). One of the assumptions within BLUE properties is that the variance  2 of 
the disturbance term u is constant, or  i
2
    2. This condition however is not met if the dependent 
variable is dichotomous, since it is impossible to know if the computed standard errors are either 
too large or too small. Any conclusion about the range of the population is meaningless, and 
under such condition although the OLS estimates will not be biased, the estimates of their 
standard errors will be invalid. 
These two limitations can be overcome by using Logit and Probit models. Probit models offer an 
alternative to logistic regression for modelling categorical dependent variables. Even though the 
outcomes tend to be similar, the underlying distributions are different. Gujarati (2002) argues 
that the main difference between these two quite similar models is that the logistic distribution 
has slightly fatter tails; that is to say, the conditional probability Pi approaches zero or one at a 
slower rate in Logit than in Probit. Further he argues that there is no compelling reason to choose 
one over the other and that in practice many researchers choose the Logit model because of its 
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comparative mathematical simplicity. We report both estimations, especially given the need to 
check robustness; however, we concentrate more on Probit given its frequent use in previous tax 
morale studies.  
A more advanced (as well as complicated) approach is Ordered Probit, where the dependent 
variable has more than two possible outcomes. Many survey questions have a set of categorical 
answers, as is the case with our dependent variable TaxMorale that has four categories of 
justifiability as answers. Note that similarly, the Logit method, has its own counterpart, the 
Ordered Logit. Ordered Probit usage is however less common given on the difficulty of 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients. We opt for standard Probit mainly because the 
mainstream literature of tax morale (as a dependent variable) has grouped justifiability answers 
into two groups, notably those that do not justify tax evasion at any cost (in our case values 1), 
and those that justify it in different intensities (from sometimes to always). However, we report 
both Probit and Ordered Probit, particularly given the need for robustness checks. 
A Probit model is a type of regression that constraints the estimated probabilities between 0 and 
1, and moreover it relaxes the constraint that the effect of Xi is constant across different predicted 
values of Y. The Probit model, proposed in 1934 by Chester Bliss, assumes that while one can 
observe only values of 0 and 1 for the dependent variable Y, there is a latent and unobserved 
continuous variable Y* that determines the value of Y (Nagler, 1994). This latent variable Y* 
can be specified as follows: 
Yi   β0 β1X1i β2X2i ...βkXki+ui 
where X1,X2...Xk represent a vector of random variables, and u represents a random disturbance 
term. The dependent variable Yi can take values 1 if Yi*>0; and otherwise: 
Yi = 1 if Yi*>0 
Yi=0 if Yi*=0 
In other words, the Probit model assumes that the probability of Yi=0 is equal to the probability 
of Yi*=0, or:  
Pr(Yi 1)   Pr (β0 β1X1i β2X2i ...βkXki+ui > 0) 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
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Following a set of rearrangements (for detailed explanation see Wooldridge, 2003), this equation 
becomes: 
Pr(Yi 1) Ф(Xiβ) 
where Ф is the normal cumulative distribution function (CDF) or the probability that a real-
valued variable Xi with a given probability distribution will be found at a value less than or equal 
to Xi. In other words, the purpose of the Probit model is to estimate the probability that a 
particular observation with particular characteristics will fall into one of the categories. Using 
maximum likelihood techniques, Probit computes coefficients β and corresponding standard 
errors that are asymptotically efficient. However, the β’s cannot be interpreted in a standard 
approach as they show the impact on the latent variable Y* and not the dependent variable Y 
itself. To transfer latent variable Y* into a probability estimate for Y it is required to compute the 
cumulative normal distribution of Y*. This transformation however, means that there is no linear 
relationship between the β’s and Pr(Yi=1); hence, the change in Pr(Yi=1) caused by given change 
of Xi will depend also upon the value of all other independent variables (X’s) and their 
corresponding coefficients (β’s). A more useful measure is the marginal effects. As Cameron & 
Trivedi (2009, p.333) note:  
An ME [marginal effect], or partial effect, most often measures the effect on the 
conditional mean of Y of a change in one of the regressors, say Xi. In the linear 
regression model, the ME equals the relevant slope coefficient, greatly simplifying 
analysis. For nonlinear models, this is no longer the case, leading to remarkably many 
different methods for calculating MEs.  
Marginal effects provide a good approximation to the amount of change in dependent variable Y 
that will be caused by a 1 unit change in Xi. This in turn offers the same advantage as the Linear 
Probability Model (LPM) does; yet the effect provided by ME’s are not wrong as in the case of 
LPM. 
The simplest approach used to present final Probit estimates is by setting each independent 
variable to its mean, and thus show the effect on  Pr(Yi=1) as the independent variables vary one 
at a time. This method implies the computation of the average of discrete or partial changes over 
(34) 
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all observations, yielding average marginal effects; hence, it is known as the Average Marginal 
Effects (AME). In other words, with the AME, a marginal effect is computed for each case, and 
then all the computed effects are averaged. The second approach involves computation of 
marginal effects at fixed values of independent variables; these fixed values are mostly sample 
means, hence the name Marginal Effect at the Mean (MEM).  In other words, MEM are 
computed by setting X variables at their means and then seeing how a change in one of the Xi 
variables changes P(Y=1). There is no clear cut advantage of one method compared to the other; 
however, according to Bartus (2005, p.310):  
...the main argument in favour of AME is based on the demand for realism: the sample 
means used during the calculation of MEM might refer to either nonexistent or inherently 
nonsensical observations, a problem typically encountered when there are dummies 
among the regressors...  
Moreover, Greene (2002) notes a movement towards the AME approach. To sum up, for the 
purpose of investigating the determinants of tax morale we estimate both ordered Probit and 
standard Probit models. We do so in order to provide some robustness checks on the estimated 
results. However, given the simplicity in interpretation and given the general practice in the 
previous tax morale studies, we opt to estimate marginal effects from standard Probit rather than 
from Ordered-Probit. We then choose Average Marginal Effects (AME) over Marginal Effect at 
the Mean (MEM), given the support from the literature for the former. Nevertheless we report 
both effects. In addition, given the similarities between Probit and Logit models we report also 
AME of Logit estimation. As Gujarati (2002, p.625) argues:  
...for all practical purposes, both logit and probit models give similar results. In practice, 
the choice therefore depends on the ease of computation, which is not a serious problem 
with sophisticated statistical packages that are now readily available.  
Similarity of results will again add robustness to final interpretation. Lastly, we will also report 
OLS estimations to highlight potential changes, if any, from probability models. But before we 
continue with computation and then interpretation of results, in line with good practice in 
empirical literature we investigate a set of post estimation diagnostics. We start with several 
specification tests post standard Probit estimation.  
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First, when we create a Probit model we assume that the Probit outcome is a linear combination 
of the independent variables. We also assume that the Probit function is the correct function to 
use. It could however happen that either the Probit function nor the independent variables are 
rightly chosen. Beyond theoretical explanation, inclusion of a set of independent variables 
requires a test for potentially omitted variables. STATA 11 provides a command “linktest” that 
can be used to detect specification error and it is applied once the Probit function is estimated. 
The idea behind the “linktest” is to investigate whether there are any additional independent 
variables that are statistically significant (not by chance) and that are not included in the model. 
In order to do so, ”linktest” uses the linear predicted value “hat” and also the linear predicted 
value squared, or “hatsq”. Both predicted values are used as independent variables to rebuild the 
model. The expectations here are that the variable “hat” should be statistically significant, as it is 
a predicted value from the model, suggesting thus a proper model specification. In addition, a 
properly specified model also requires “hatsq” not to be statistically significant; otherwise the 
model is suffering from omitted variable bias. Appendix 6.9 shows that the “hat” variable is 
statistically significant at the 1% level, while “hatsq” is not statistically significant even at the 
10% level (p=0.249).  
The second test is the Likelihood Ratio Test, which is the most commonly used and the most 
easily calculated. The Likelihood Ratio is applied when willing to test for exclusion restrictions, 
or when investigating whether a variable or a set of variables should be excluded from the 
model. The idea is rather simple. Since in Probit function we are maximizing the log likelihood 
function, then the excluded variables from the regression relationship should cause a fall in the 
objective function. The question here is, however, whether there is a significant fall in the log 
likelihood function value. The Likelihood Ratio Test compares the log likelihoods of the two 
models (one necessarily restrictive to the other) and tests whether this difference is statistically 
significant. If the difference is statistically significant then the model with more variables fits the 
data better. We perform Likelihood Ratio test by dropping one variable at a time in turn. Results 
from Appendix 6.10 show that from the comparison within models in various restrictive 
estimations, adding variables of interest in our model fits the data better; hence, there is no 
reason to exclude any of the specified variables as this would be to result in a model that fits the 
data less well. 
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The Wald Test, approximates the Likelihood Ratio test, but with the advantage that it only 
requires estimating one model. The Wald test works by testing that the parameters of interest are 
simultaneously equal to zero. If they are, this strongly suggests that removing them from the 
model will not substantially reduce the fit of that model, since an independent variable whose 
coefficient is very small relative to its standard error is generally not doing much to help predict 
the dependent variable. The Wald Test from standard Probit output in Appendix 6.8 shows that 
we are able to reject the null hypothesis and that the inclusion of variables in our model causes 
significant improvements in our fitted model.  
Fourth, we estimate Hosmer and Lemeshow's Goodnes of Fit test. This is similar to a chi-square 
test and again indicates the extent to which the model fits the data. The Hosmer and Lemeshow's 
(H-L) Goodness of Fit test divides subjects into deciles based on predicted probabilities. Based 
on observed and expected frequencies the H-L test computes then a chi-square statistic. Then, a 
probability value is computed from the distribution of the chi-square to test the fit of the model. 
If this test is not statistically significant then we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference between observed and model predicted values. By default the command in STATA 
works with covariate patterns. The test compares observed and fitted frequencies in each group 
using Pearson's formula and therefore the Pearson chi-squared are reported. Results from 
Appendix 6.11 show that the test indicates once more that we have a well-fitted model. We note 
however, according to the STATA manual, that in case of individual data one can find too many 
covariate patterns, especially if there are few continuous independent variables (as is the case 
with our model). In such cases one should group data; usually 10 groups are used (default level 
in STATA). Again, the post-grouping results (Appendix 6.12) show that our model is well fitted. 
The last fitting test that we apply is the classification test, which produces a crostabulation of 
observed and predicted outcomes, where one predicts a positive outcome if the probability is 
higher than 0.5; and a negative outcome otherwise. Results (Appendix 6.13) show that in our 
case the Probit model predicts around 75% of the cases correctly; a rate which is largely 
acceptable.  
These five tests, together, robustly suggest that our model is well specified and that it fits the 
data well. In the next section we present the estimated results.   
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6.4.2 Probit Estimation Results 
 
Table 6.8 presents the estimated results of our tax morale model. The first two columns report, 
respectively, Ordered Probit and standard Probit estimates. As argued already, this provides a 
robustness check by providing evidence on whether the choice of standard Probit over Ordered 
Probit has any severe implications. The coefficients, their signs and robust standard errors are 
almost identical in Columns 1 and 2. With that in mind the decision to opt for Probit over 
Ordered Probit is supported, especially given the less complicated interpretation procedure of 
Probit. From the Column 2 estimates, which is our base tax morale model, we compute the 
Average Marginal Effects (Column 3) as well the Marginal Effects at the Mean  (Column 4). 
Note that both computed marginal effects are nearly identical, making the discussion over which 
marginal effects to interpret in our case irrelevant; in both cases, the interpretation would be 
identical (the sign, size and significance of the estimated effects are mainly the same). In 
addition, Average Marginal Effects from the Logit estimation (Column 5) appear to be same as 
both marginal effects from Probit estimation; and even the OLS estimates  (Column 6) are in line 
with the marginal effects from Probit and Logit estimations. Given these circumstances we can 
interpret with more confidence the estimated results. Nevertheless for the purpose of consistency 
and given the empirical discussion in the section above, we interpret the AMEs (Column 3) from 
the standard Probit model. The results are as follows. 
The group of institutional variables appear to be the most significant determinants of tax morale 
in Kosovo. Trust in government, trust in the legal system, perceptions about corruption and 
compliance costs are all estimated with signs in accordance with theoretical expectations. Trust 
in government, as expected, is negatively related to tax morale. The predicted probability of 
never justifying tax evasion (i.e. tax morale=1) falls by 0.08 percentage points if Trust in 
Government increases by one category (i.e. trust mitigates the propensity to justify tax evasion) 
from its average point, all other variables held at their means. An alternative to this interpretation 
would be to predict all dummy variables at their values equal to 1, and hold continuous variables 
at their average values again; or potentially at any other categorical values of interest. Since such 
an interpretation would lead to multiple combinations, we opt to stick to average interpretation 
for our institutional variables.  
  
Table 6.8 PROBIT estimation results 
 
 
 
                            
    O-PROBIT PROBIT 
PROBIT Average 
Marginal Effects 
PROBIT Marginal 
Effects at Means 
LOGIT Average 
Marginal Effects 
OLS 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent: Tax Morale   Coeff 
Robust 
S.E 
Coeff 
Robust 
S.E 
Coeff 
Robust 
S.E 
Coeff 
Robust 
S.E 
Coeff 
Robust 
S.E 
Coeff 
Robust 
S.E 
                
Institutions                                       
Trust in Government   -0.26 *** 0.07 -0.24 *** 0.07 -0.08 *** 0.02 -0.08 *** 0.02 -0.08 *** 0.02 -0.08 *** 0.02 
Trust in Legal System   0.10 * 0.06 0.12 * 0.06 0.03 * 0.02 0.03 * 0.02 0.03 * 0.02 0.03 * 0.02 
Corruption   0.25 *** 0.07 0.18 ** 0.07 0.05 ** 0.02 0.05 ** 0.02 0.06 *** 0.02 0.06 *** 0.02 
Compliance Costs   -0.15 *** 0.04 -0.13 *** 0.04 -0.04 *** 0.01 -0.04 *** 0.01 -0.04 *** 0.01 -0.04 *** 0.01 
                                        
Socio-Demographics                                       
Secondary Education   -0.40 * 0.25 -0.45 * 0.24 -0.14 * 0.07 -0.15 * 0.08 -0.13 * 0.07 -0.12 ** 0.06 
Tertiary Education   -0.50 ** 0.27 -0.57 ** 0.27 -0.18 ** 0.08 -0.18 ** 0.08 -0.18 ** 0.08 -0.16 ** 0.07 
Owners Gender   -0.17   0.23 -0.16   0.25 -0.05   0.08 -0.05   0.08 -0.04   0.08 -0.04   0.06 
Owners Age   0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.02 
Membership   0.23   0.25 0.25   0.25 0.08   0.08 0.08   0.08 0.09   0.08 0.07   0.06 
                                        
Constant         1.27 ** 0.62                   0.88 *** 0.19 
                                        
Wald chi2   34.11 ***   27.19 ***                           
Number of observations   340     340 340 340 340 340 
                                        
*** at 1% level of significance; ** at 5% level of significance; * at 10% level of significance  
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The estimated marginal effect of Trust in Legal System suggests that a change by one category 
(that is trust increases) will increase the probability of never justifying tax evasion by 0.03 
percentage points; provided that the category increase starts from the average category of this 
particular variable and that the values of other variables stay unchanged at their own average
39
. 
Perception about the level of corruption is also positively related to tax morale. Again, an 
increase in corruption perception by one category will increase probability of high tax morale by 
0.05 percentage points, all other variables held at their average values. Compliance costs, as 
expected under the theoretical discussion, are negatively related to tax morale. The predicted 
probability of never justifying tax evasion (i.e. tax morale=1) falls by 0.04 percentage points if 
compliance costs increase by one day; again, conditional on the increase starting from the 
average value of the compliance cost variable, and on all other variables being held at their own 
average. 
The second group of determinants relates to socio-cultural characteristics of respondents, who 
are either the owners or top managers of the surveyed businesses. This group of determinants 
appears mainly to be statistically less significant than the institutional group; indeed apart from 
the two variables proxying different educational levels, which appear to be statistically 
significant at 10% and 5% respectively, all other variables fail to establish any statistical 
significance.  
Note that at this point we make a different interpretation of marginal results. Interpreting dummy 
variables at their means may not provide us with a rational result. Here we take computations, 
and thus interpretation, a step further. We set each of dummy variables estimated in our model at 
values 1, and then interpret the coefficient of that variable not by changing its value from its own 
average (which again in case of dummies would be irrational), but by having a value equal to 1. 
Table 6.9 provides these results. Columns 1, 2, 3 and 5 represent regressions when the respective 
dummies are set to 1; contrary to the previous interpretations when they were set at their 
averages. Column 4, when interpreting ownerage remains the same as in standard Probit 
estimation as this variable is continuous. We note however that the changes in coefficients’ size 
and significance are still minor regardless of the alternations.  
                                                          
39
 Note that when interpreting AME we assume that the change in the interpreted Xi is starting from its own average, 
and that the all other Xj’s are held at their averages as well. 
 Table 6.9 AME interpretation with dummy variables set at 1 
 
 
 
 
                  
    SEC=1; TERTIARY=0 TERTIARY=1; SEC=0 GENDER=1 
PROBIT Average 
Marginal Effects 
MEMBER=1 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent: Tax Morale   Coeff 
Robust 
S.E 
Coeff 
Robust 
S.E 
Coeff 
Robust 
S.E 
Coeff 
Robust 
S.E 
Coeff 
Robust 
S.E 
              
Institutions                                 
Trust in Government   -0.08 *** 0.02 -0.08 *** 0.02 -0.08 *** 0.02 -0.08 *** 0.02 -0.07 *** 0.02 
Trust in Legal System   0.04 * 0.02 0.04 * 0.02 0.03 * 0.02 0.03 * 0.02 0.03 * 0.01 
Corruption   0.06 ** 0.02 0.06 ** 0.02 0.05 ** 0.02 0.05 ** 0.02 0.05 ** 0.02 
Compliance Costs   -0.04 *** 0.01 -0.04 *** 0.01 -0.04 *** 0.01 -0.04 *** 0.01 -0.03 *** 0.01 
                                  
Socio-Demographics                                 
Secondary Education   -0.15 * 0.08 -0.15 * 0.08 -0.14 * 0.07 -0.14 * 0.07 -0.12 * 0.07 
Tertiary Education   -0.18 ** 0.09 -0.19 ** 0.09 -0.18 ** 0.08 -0.18 ** 0.08 -0.15 ** 0.07 
Owners Gender   -0.05   0.08 -0.05   0.08 -0.05   0.08 -0.05   0.08 -0.04   0.06 
Owners Age   0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00 
Membership   0.08   0.08 0.09   0.08 0.08   0.08 0.08   0.08 0.07   0.05 
                                  
Number of observations   340 340 340 340 340 
                                  
*** at 1% level of significance; ** at 5% level of significance; * at 10% level of significance  
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The results are as follows. If the owner has secondary education then the probability of not 
justifying tax evasion (all other variables held at their averages) falls by 0.14 percentage points. 
Note that when interpreting secondary education we set tertiary education to 0. If instead the 
owner has tertiary education then the probability of high tax morale falls by 0.19 percentage 
points; all other determinants held at their averages. We note that the sign on the education 
proxies is contrary to our findings from Chapter V; still pointing to exactly the theoretical 
ambiguity underlined in our previous discussion. The remaining estimates are not statistically 
significant and thus are interpreted with a note of due caution. If the owner/top manager of the 
business is male, then the probability of never justifying tax evasion falls by 0.05 percentage 
points; all other variables held at their own averages. The estimated marginal effect of ownerage 
suggests that the age of owners/top managers has little effect in tax morale. The coefficient of 
0.0002 is too small for any practical implications. Last, businesses that are members of 
associations have an increased probability of never justifying tax evasion by 0.07 percentage 
points. 
To round it up, the results are all in line with theoretical expectations as well as with previous 
work in individual tax morale studies. We note that when treating the issue of tax morale, and 
hereafter tax evasion, specifying models with institutional influences is essential. The robust 
statistical significance of our institutional variables shows that the perception of businesses with 
respect to institutional quality affects considerably their perception about the moral obligation of 
paying taxes. If businesses lose their trust towards their government then their evasive decision 
becomes a more common behaviour. The role of trust in tax morale investigation is also 
authenticated by the significant influence of Trust in Legal System, which again seems to have an 
important role on how businesses perceive institutional services, including property rights and 
contract enforcement. When treating institutional services, we note that the perception about the 
level of corruption is also highly significant and considerably related to perceptions towards tax 
compliance. If businesses pay the bulk of taxes then their perception of how public money is 
spent must necessarily have great relevance in any tax compliance research and investigation. 
Last, compliance costs also appear to be essential when investigating the level of tax morale. 
Firms that are constantly dealing with bureaucratic procedures are more likely to see the process 
of compliance as a pragmatic rather than as a moral and justifiable act. The institutional findings 
are generally in line with the Jackson and Milliron (1986, p.137) argument that tax compliance 
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depends on tax fairness which, in turn, consists of at least two different dimensions: “One 
dimension appears to involve the equity of the trade - the benefits received for the tax dollars 
given...”, which is captured essentially by trust and corruption variables; “...the other dimension 
appears to involve the equity of the taxpayers’ burden in reference to that of other individuals”, 
which could partly be captured by compliance costs if the bureaucratic processes are applied 
selectively and hence arbitrarily – rather than universally - increase compliance costs.  In 
addition findings about institutional variables are also in line with Hanousek and Palda (2004) 
that looked at tax evasion as a form of legitimate protest by citizens against the government; or 
with Tirole (1996), which explains that when taxpayers see their government as corrupted and 
unfair, evasion is seen as a “vote of dissent” on government activities. 
So far our results have shown that the level of business tax compliance is dependent on an 
intrinsic motivation which, in turn, is affected by general perceptions towards institutions. The 
role of institutions in tax evasion was also investigated in Chapter V; and the relationship of 
institutions with tax morale here serves to underpin the robustness of those results. At this point 
it is important to note that from the business perspective the role and the impact of institutions in 
tax morale and tax evasion remains as much important as when treating individual tax morale 
and tax evasion.  
Socio-demographic and cultural attributes of business owners/ top managers tell us also a similar 
story; namely, that the determinants of business tax morale are shaped similarly as in the case of 
individual tax morale. To start with, we observed the educational level of owners/top managers. 
Our findings showed that, at conventional significance levels across various specifications, 
education appears to have a negative relationship with tax morale. This is quite contrary to the 
general expectations; and, moreover is quite contrary to the findings reported in Chapter IV 
when treating education as a part of broader cultural attributes in a cross-country investigation. 
Still, the negative relationship with the education of owners/ top managers is in line with 
theoretical ambiguity; and perhaps the opposing findings of our two chapters prove exactly this 
ambiguity. Note that in our theoretical discussion in the beginning of this chapter, as well as 
throughout Chapter III, we reviewed literature that largely agrees that fiscal knowledge may 
positively influence the practice of evasion, as more educated people involved in businesses may 
tend to better understand the opportunities for evading tax obligations; yet, at the same time, 
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more educated people understand better the importance of tax levying, hence increasing their 
levels of voluntary compliance. In our case, the owners/top managers with higher education, 
beyond better understanding evasive opportunities, may perceive lack of proper institutions with 
higher degrees of dissatisfaction, given their a priori higher expectations about institutional 
performance; hence the evasive behaviour is justified by them as a moral act of legitimate 
protest.    
The signs of two demographic variables, gender and age, are in accordance with theoretical 
expectations and previous studies on individual tax morale. Female owners as expected are more 
compliant than their male counterparts. Tittle (1980) argued that “women are less self-reliant” 
and more aversive to risks. Gilligan (1993) has suggested that men and women may differ in 
moral development, while Torgler and Valev (2006) analysing the World Values Survey (1981-
1984) established strong gender differences with women being significantly less likely to agree 
that cheating on taxes can be justified. Age on the other side has a positive relationship with tax 
compliance, and hence is in full accordance with the most common finding in the tax compliance 
literature: that the older the taxpayer, the more compliant (see Section 3.4.1). Older people have 
more social ties and therefore are more attached to decisions made by others. Consequently their 
behaviour is negatively correlated with breaking the law. Social scientists suggest that older 
members of society are usually more risk averse and strongly attached to community; and, as 
underlined in Chapter II, increasing risk averseness increases the level of tax compliance. We 
note however that, regardless of the sign, the size of the coefficient fails to provide any 
reasonable interpretation of the impact of age on business tax morale.  
Speaking of the attachment to the community, membership in a business association, used to 
proxy for collective action and cooperation, is positively related to tax morale, and consequently 
to tax compliance. Members are more likely to exhibit compliance behaviour given their positive 
collective intention and the will to impact their business environment through memberships in 
associations. Collectivism, networking and cooperation as determinants of tax morale are also 
mentioned and observed in Alm and Gomez (2008). 
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Conclusion  
 
In this chapter we have investigated the relationship between business tax morale and business 
tax evasion. In line with theoretical modelling and suggestions provided by very recent and 
leading literature in the field of tax morale, we constructed a questionnaire and conducted a 
survey with 600 SMEs in Kosovo, the last country to enter the transition period. 
The work in this chapter was divided into two parts. In the first part we explored the impact of 
tax morale on tax evasion; and accounted for deterrence as well as firm characteristic 
determinants. The most important finding in this part was that business tax morale, as is the case 
with individuals, has a strong and negative relationship with tax evasion. Our estimates showed 
that regardless of model specification, this relationship remained robust and statistically 
significant. Improving tax morale, however, requires a systematic approach towards increasing 
the quality of institutions, their relationship with taxpayers as well as creation of social attitudes 
and norms that consider tax payment as a rightful and necessary act. In the vein of findings that 
an increase in tax morale by one category increases tax compliance by significant proportion, it 
is important to note the difficulty of policy making to make such alternations; even for one 
category in tax morale. Shifting across justifiability categories of business perceptions requires 
significant improvement in government policies towards tax collection (compliance costs or 
treatment) and budgetary spending (corruption or gains), as well as significant improvements in 
rule of law and contract enforcement.  
Strong and statistically significant effects were displayed also by the deterrence factors, the tax 
and audit rates. The positive relationship between tax rate and tax evasion is of special interest 
given the theoretical and empirical ambiguity found in the past studies; while the negative 
relationship between the audit rate and tax evasion is crucial considering that investigations of 
this factor are rare. In addition, the legal status as well as the experience of firms had significant 
effects on tax evasion.  
In the second part of the research we investigated the determinants of business tax morale 
focusing on institutions and socio-demographic characteristics of owners/top managers. 
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Institutions - proxied by trust, corruption and compliance costs - appeared to have strong and 
statistically significant effects on business tax morale in all estimations and model specifications. 
Individual characteristics of owners and/or top managers were less significant, although their 
signs were in accordance with theoretical expectations and evidence from individual tax morale 
studies. These findings and similarities suggests that the factors shaping tax morale do not differ 
between businesses and individuals; hence the investigation of business tax morale must be 
carried out in the same way as is the investigation of individual tax morale.  
Together these findings suggest a set of policy guidelines for improving the levels of tax 
compliance in Kosovo and other transition countries. These also act to increase the level of 
business tax morale as well.  
First, in regards to the deterrence factors, the tax and audit rates, governments should reduce the 
tax burden on business in order to encourage higher levels of tax compliance. This is especially 
important if tax collection capacities and mechanisms are weak and/or inefficient. In the vein of 
selective payment of taxes by business, most probably driven by audit strategies that target 
specific firms, a set of conditions determining unfair competition prevail. This, in turn, 
undermines the proper development of businesses and their capacities to add value; which, in 
turn, undermines their ability to pay taxes. 
Second, frequent tax audits will increase reporting behaviour, but these audit strategies should be 
combined with reference to firms’ characteristics; most notably tax administration should orient 
their efforts towards individual firms, smaller firms and/or male owned firms. Larger firms, 
corporations and partnerships are more likely to become at some point self-selective in the light 
of identifying tax cheaters. This is especially true if audit strategies were oriented towards these 
types of firms for longer periods, which is the case in transition economies. Note that in the light 
of limited human capacities within tax administration and taking into considerations the general 
objectives of tax inspectorates that tend to optimise collection rates given these limitations, 
concentration of audits on larger firms (which are more likely to be corporations and partnerships 
too) is very common. After all it is firms as such that create the bulk of tax revenues. According 
to tax registers from Tax Administration of Kosovo, around 75% of non-border taxes come from 
the top 25% of firms ranked by size. 
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Third, the relationship of institutions with business taxpayers is essential in establishing the level 
of intrinsic motivation to comply; i.e. tax morale. Governments, courts and other relevant 
institutions involved in the day to day life of businesses should engage substantially in improving 
their respective performances, which in turn will improve general perceptions of businesses 
towards them. It is of special interest to adopt serious anti-corruption policies that not only 
diminish opportunities to report less, but also increase incentives for business taxpayers to 
voluntarily comply; especially of those businesses with owners that have higher educational 
levels. 
Fourth, governments should introduce policies to identify individuals with low tax morale and 
improve their communication with such businesses. Governments should encourage participation 
of these businesses in business improvement efforts. This will in turn foster mutual relationships 
as well as tax compliance.   
Last, governments in transition countries should use moral obloquy (or naming and shaming) as 
a tool to improve collection rates. Tax evaders, cheaters and corrupted officials should be treated 
publicly in order to discourage shameful acts in the future. Moreover, well performing 
institutions should use public campaigns and public awareness tools that stress the importance of 
tax payments for the same taxpayers; while tax compliance should be established as a patriotic 
act. Portraying tax compliance within a broader picture of patriotism is likely to encourage social 
cohesion towards both stigmatizing cheaters as well as increasing tax morale; one of the most 
important determinants of tax evasion. 
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Introduction 
The main aim of this thesis was to investigate the determinants of business tax evasion in 
transition economies, with a focus on small and medium sized enterprises; and a special 
emphasises on Kosovo. We have started by defining the nature and history of tax evasion, as 
well as presenting the objectives of the thesis, including discussion about tax evasion in the 
transition context (Chapter I). We then summarized the existing theoretical foundations of 
business tax evasion (Chapter II), and reviewed empirical studies on the individual, business and 
cross-country determinants of tax evasion (Chapter III). Next, we conducted a cross-country 
panel investigation of business tax evasion, using the BEEPS data for the years 1999, 2002 and 
2005, for 25 transition economies through application of both the conventional fixed effects 
estimation and the recently developed Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition approach (Chapter 
IV). Then by making use of pooled cross section data for 12,960 firms in 26 transition economies 
for the years 2002 and 2005, we focused on micro analysis of business tax evasion in order to 
capture firm related determinants of tax evasion. To perform estimations, we employed the 
standard Heckman Two-Step approach and the Full Information Maximum Likelihood Heckman 
as well as the Tobit Corner Solution model (Chapter V). Lastly, in the line with recent and 
leading tax evasion literature, we constructed a questionnaire and conducted a survey with 600 
SMEs in Kosovo to explore the impact of tax morale on tax evasion as well as to investigate, for 
the first time, the determinants of business tax morale in Kosovo (Chapter VI). 
In this chapter we aim to provide an overall summary of the research conducted in all six 
chapters. We start by summarizing the main findings across the theoretical and empirical 
chapters with regards to business tax evasion in transition economies. In order to inform 
institutions in TEs and countries with similar characteristics about the tools required to tackle the 
problem of tax evasion, a set of policy recommendations is provided in Section 2. In Section 3 
we elaborate the main aspects of the contribution to knowledge provided by this work. In Section 
4 we report limitations of this work; while the last section provides directions for future research. 
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7.1 Main findings  
The first chapter of this thesis (Chapter I) provided a general introduction to the thesis by briefly 
reviewing the history of tax evasion and then discussing the aims, objectives and the context of 
this investigation. In the first chapter we underlined the need to investigate the determinants of 
business tax evasion for transition economies; an important field that has not received much 
attention from researchers. We also set-up several targets that needed to be achieved, such as the 
need for theoretical and empirical review of factors that shape tax evasion, empirical 
investigation from cross-country, firm level and tax morale perspectives and derivation of policy 
recommendations intended to reduce either the possibility and/or the inclination to evade. We 
argued that although the literature on individual tax evasion is fairly well developed, the 
investigation of business tax evasion has remained largely underdeveloped. Moreover, the 
transition context of business compliance was even less explored, while the cross-country 
analysis of businesses and studies concerned with the moral perspectives were lacking. 
Accordingly we elaborated the aims of next three empirical investigations: the first one from a 
cross-country perspective on business tax evasion in TEs; the second one investigating firm 
related determinants in TEs; and the last one focused on business tax morale, with a special focus 
on Kosovo – the last country to enter the transition process. In the first chapter we also provided 
the general context of tax evasion in transition countries. We argued that the movement from a 
system where the state made decisions over production and consumption of goods and services 
towards a market economy where such decisions are set independently by economic agents, was 
accompanied with many institutional and behavioural discrepancies, deficiencies and 
divergences. While, for instance, in centralized economies social services and benefits were 
provided by using the resources generated mainly by state-owned enterprises, hence zero tax 
evasion, in market economies the resources were required to be collected from privately owned 
enterprises. In the vein of weak institutions, insufficient collecting mechanisms, poor 
institutional performance and considerable presence of corruptive, unfair and unjust public 
treatment – all common characteristics of post-communist (transition) countries, tax evasion 
became very common.  
 
In the second chapter of this thesis (Chapter II) we presented the current theoretical knowledge 
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on the determinants of tax evasion. We start by elaborating the very basic model of tax evasion, 
presented in 1972 by Michael G. Allingham and Agnar Sandmo. These pioneers adopted and 
adapted models from the economics of criminal activities and the economics of uncertainty, to 
produce what would later become the magnum opus of tax evasion literature. Their model 
assumed that the decision over the amount of income to be evaded is made under uncertainty that 
could or could not provoke a reaction in the form of a penalty; depending on whether the 
decision maker is audited or not. Their model also assumes that the decision maker is a rational 
taxpayer who makes the tax reporting decision like any other rational consumer choice, but is 
also inclined to dishonesty, that is, his decision is assumed to be isolated from any 
environmental, community, state, regret, guilt or shameful impact; though such simplicity was 
later criticized and motivated further extensions. Most importantly, this model assumes that the 
rational taxpayer is risk averse. Under such assumptions, the level of income tax evasion is 
negatively related to the level of punishment imposed by law and the probability of audit by tax 
examiners. However, when analysing the impact of tax rates on evasion, the model predicted an 
ambiguous effect with the occurrence of both an income effect (as tax rates rise, people become 
poorer and, in the presence of decreasing absolute risk aversion, they evade less) and a 
substitution effect (rising taxes means that the return from evasion is higher, thus the taxpayer 
prefers the risky choice to the safer one). Yitzhaki (1974) argued that the ambiguity was a result 
of an unrealistic assumption of the model that the penalty is imposed on the amount of income 
not reported; if, instead, it is imposed on the evaded tax the substitution effect disappears and 
thus a tax rise will reduce evasion. Similar comparative statics were established in extended 
business modelling: namely, the firm evades less with higher probability of detection and larger 
fines, while the impact of tax rates is ambiguous; though, similar to the case of individuals, 
changing assumptions about risk preferences leads to very divergent results. For the case of 
businesses, these results depended greatly upon the assumptions made in regards not only to risk 
behaviour (averse or neutral) but also in regards to separability of evasion and output. 
Consequent tax research has identified and brought forward various extensions in an attempt to 
solve the puzzle of tax compliance, or the condition where levels of tax compliance do not 
correspond with the levels of enforcements and the levels of tax evasion are not, as the 
traditional model predicts, simply a matter of taxes, penalties and audits. Different levels of 
deterrence factors have produced two very different types of outcomes. First, when audits and 
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fines rates were set at high extremes, low levels of compliance were observed. In such cases, 
questions as to “why people evade taxes?” were raised. Second, when audit and fine rates were 
set at low extremes, contrary to intuitive expectations, high levels of compliance were observed, 
hence questions as to “why people pay taxes?” were counter-raised. In the light of such 
observations, various extensions have incorporated moral and social dynamics to the traditional 
model. As Andreoni et al. (1998) have summarized, these extensions have included:  moral rules 
and sentiments; the fairness of the tax system; and, last, taxpayer’s evaluations of government 
within the standards of performance, corruption and transparency. The theoretical set-up in this 
chapter enables us to summarize and empirically investigate in subsequent chapters the 
determinants of business tax evasion. 
In the third chapter of this thesis (Chapter III) we started by discussing the standard empirical 
methodology applied so far in the field of tax evasion. We reviewed advantages and 
disadvantages of actual tax audit programmes, laboratory experiments and survey studies. We 
argued that in the absence of data from tax records – characteristic of the US and a few 
developed countries, survey data not only acts as a decent substitute but sometimes provides 
information on taxpayers’ characteristics that could not be alternatively observed through actual 
measurement programmes. This information is specifically relevant to the observation of non-
traditional determinants acknowledged to be highly relevant in the theoretical set-up. We then 
grouped determinants of tax evasion into five categories, according to empirical investigation 
conducted in studies worldwide. These groups were: traditional; institutional; firm-
characteristics; economic and socio-cultural. Under the first category, traditional, we reviewed 
previous studies that have established positive, negative or no effect on tax rate, audit rate and 
fine rate. From a wide consensus we then set the hypothesis that audit and fine rate are 
negatively related to tax evasion, while the impact of the tax rate is ambiguous in empirical 
investigation (similar to the theoretical prediction). The theoretical and empirical ambiguity 
becomes important in subsequent chapters, once we obtain robust results on the impact of the tax 
rate in business tax evasion for TEs (all positive). The second category, institutional, included 
factors proxying the performance of different institutions and the relationship of 
businesses/individuals with those institutions. We reviewed trust, corruption, fairness and 
treatment as the most commonly estimated institutional determinants, and find that higher trust, 
lower corruption, more fairness and better treatment of taxpayers are found to be positively 
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related to tax evasion in most empirical investigations conducted so far. The third category, firm 
characteristics, grouped those few studies that have investigated firm size, legal status, and 
sectoral activates and their impact on tax evasion. The fourth category, economic environment, 
reviews similarly few studies that have conducted aggregate or cross-country investigations and 
have analyzed the impact of macroeconomic factors, such as per capita income, unemployment 
or inflation in tax evasion. In the last category, socio-cultural, we reviewed a wide range of 
studies, most commonly related to individual tax compliance (relationships of which are 
assumed to be, at least theoretically, similar to those of businesses) and summarizes negative 
relationship of tax evasion with female, older, married and religious taxpayers, the ambiguous 
effect of education as well as the necessity to account for social norms and other cultural 
characteristics.  
In the forth chapter of this thesis (Chapter IV) we used the BEEPS data for the years 1999, 2002 
and 2005 to investigate cross-country business tax evasion in 25 transition economies. We build 
initially upon pioneering work of Riahl-Belkaoiu (2004) and Richardson (2006) who have 
analysed individual tax evasion in 30 respectively 45 countries. We extend their work to 
businesses. Tax rate is the only traditional determinant of tax evasion considered in this chapter. 
Given the data constrains, we were unable to identify suitable proxies for two remaining 
traditional variables: the probability of audit; and the fine rate (we address though audit rate in 
subsequent chapters). We used The Fiscal Freedom Index to account for the tax burden across 
countries. The economic performance variables included the level and trends of economic 
development throughout transition economies. We used four proxies to capture the national 
economic environment: per capita GDP; unemployment; inflation; and non-performing loans. In 
this chapter we explored also the impact of corruption and institutional reforms in transition 
economies (as a proxy for institutional determinants) measured by Control of Corruption from 
the World Governance Indicators and the Transition Index published by the EBRD. Last, we 
used social norms and educational levels within each country to proxy for socio-cultural 
differences across TEs. To analyse the data we employed a conventional fixed effects approach 
as well as a recent innovation in fixed effect panel analysis, known as fixed effect vector 
decomposition (FEVD), which hitherto has not been used in this context. This is a three-stage 
approach that combines fixed effects estimation to analyse the effect of variables with relatively 
high within-group variation and pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of both time-
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invariant and “rarely changing” (or slowly moving) variables with relatively low within-group 
variation (Plümper and Troeger, 2011). The main benefit of this approach was that it enabled us 
to model the effect of time-invariant (or, at least, “slow moving”) variables, most notably proxies 
for institutional development. 
One of the most important findings in the fourth chapter related to the effect of the tax rate on tax 
evasion, particularly given the theoretical and empirical ambiguity associated with this 
relationship. The robust positive relationship in all of our estimated models suggested that higher 
tax rates increase the benefits of evasion as described in the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
model. For transition economies, it seemed that the substitution effect prevails over the income 
effect; potentially because business taxpayers in TEs are likely to be more risk takers, i.e. less 
risk averse. We advance evidence that the macroeconomic environment has significant but minor 
effects on business tax evasion. The literature argues that per capita GDP acts as a proxy for the 
general level of development within a country. If so, then in transition economies levels of 
business tax evasion can be expected to fall as overall prosperity increases. However, this effect 
is very small. Increased unemployment enables businesses to increase their informal labour 
force, which reduces their tax and pension burden. In this case, the unemployment rate is 
positively related to tax evasion as suggested by our FEVD estimate. The small size of those 
economic effects that are estimated at conventional levels of significance (per capita GDP and 
unemployment) together with the non-significance of the others (inflation and the business 
environment) suggested that the decision to evade or not must depend on other non-economic 
factors. The most important finding of this chapter was the impact of institutional factors on tax 
evasion, which suggested that even if a country is performing well in general economic terms, 
the presences of negative institutional phenomena (most notably corruption and lack of reforms) 
exert a dominant and immediate influence on the relationship between businesses and 
government. Since we used the measure of transition reforms and corruption levels to proxy the 
relationship between businesses and formal institutions, we argued that the reforms depend on 
the quality of state bodies which, in turn, affects citizens’ trust in these same bodies, while 
corruption gives rise to both dissatisfaction and opportunities. The negative effect of both the 
transition index and the corruption index on tax evasion is as expected; moreover, the size of 
these institutional effects is economically substantial.  The size of the coefficients enforced the 
general claim in the literature that institutional factors do matter in accounting for tax evasion 
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and suggested that their inclusion in models of tax evasion for transition economies is 
imperative. Our findings were consistent with several complementary explanations: first, if 
businesses feel betrayed by their government they may respond by non-payment of taxes as a 
form of revolt; secondly, corruption undermines the government-business relationship more 
broadly, thereby loosening feelings of social obligation; thirdly, corruption changes the risk of 
detection, which suggests that businesses from transition economies see corruption also as an 
opportunity to lessen their tax obligations. Finally, positive, large and highly significant period 
effects for the Year 2002 and the Year 2005 relative to the Year 1999 suggested that tax evasion 
is falling over time. This again was consistent with the importance of transitional reforms, in 
particular improvements in law enforcement and other institutions in these countries.  
In the fifth chapter of this thesis (Chapter V) we focused on micro level determinants of business 
tax evasion. This was done in order to capture firm related determinants of tax compliance that 
were not captured in the previous macro chapter. We made use of BEEPS firm level data, 
covering a set of 26 transition economies for the years 2002 and 2005, to investigate firm-level 
determinants of tax evasion. Our pooled cross-sectional analysis used a sample of 16,321 firms. 
Throughout the fifth chapter we built on two, and to our knowledge the only, works on the micro 
determinants of business tax compliance for TEs, those of Nur-tegin (2008) and Joulfaian 
(2009). By combining determinants and estimation methodology used in one but not the other 
paper, we tended to improve both model specification and empirical strategy. To address the 
impact of audit probability we made use of BEEPS 2005 separately, given that the BEEPS 2002 
has no adaptable question to proxy the audit rate. The independent variables investigated were 
grouped into three categories: traditional (tax and audit rate); institutional (trust in government, 
trust in legal system, corruption and compliance costs); and firm characteristics (size, ownership, 
legal status and sector). Given that the nature of the dependent variable in our study, derived 
from a survey, reflected on very sensitive issue, that of tax evasion, we devoted specific attention 
to considering respondents’ choice to provide either a truthful or indeed any perception on the 
phenomenon. In other words, in the Chapter V we addressed two sources of potential sample 
bias: first, nonresponse could be endogenous to firm behaviour, therefore the exclusion of 
missing values could have biased estimates (Joulfaian, 2009); and, second, since the dependent 
variable asks firms to perceive the level of evasion by other firms, a part of the responses 
declaring full compliance could have been false in order to cover a common evasive behaviour 
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by firms (Nur-tegin, 2008). We addressed issues with sample selection bias by employing both 
the standard Heckman Two-Stage approach as well an extended version known as the Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood Heckman approach. Results from both estimations showed 
that sample selection bias was not present in our sample, hence we used the Tobit Corner 
Solution model given the censored nature of the dependent variable. Post-estimation results 
reinforced the positive relationship between tax rate and tax evasion established in the cross-
country investigation from the Chapter V. This positive and statistically strong significant 
relationship remained robust across various estimations both in Tobit and Heckman alternatives 
and, as such, provided valuable information towards addressing the theoretical and empirical 
controversy. The robust positive relationship becomes even more important given the conflicting 
findings established in Nur-tegin (2008) and Joulfaian (2009) while using the same datasets as 
the one upon which we build our work. Another important finding in this chapter, which again 
reinforces findings from the previous cross-country chapter, was that the institutional variables 
had the most statistically significant and the most robust coefficients. We found that higher trust 
in government and higher trust in the judicial system were negatively related to tax evasion; 
moreover, higher corruption and higher compliance cost increased substantially the level of tax 
evasion. Another robust finding from this chapter came from the strong statistical significance 
and genuinely large coefficients of firm characteristics. Our results showed that, firstly, the 
firm’s size matters; the larger the firm the smaller the evasion. Secondly, foreign firms are 
generally more compliant than domestic firms. Thirdly, sole proprietor businesses tend to evade 
more than partnerships and corporations; and fourthly, although with less robustness and lesser 
statistical significance, sectors involving higher cash transactions and/or activities less visible to 
tax administration are more evasive. We also find that tax evasion falls over time. In the separate 
analysis of BEEPS 2005 round, conducted in order to capture the impact of audit rate, we did not 
establish any statistical significance; although the sign of the coefficient of audit proxy was in 
accordance with theoretical expectations. 
In the sixth chapter of this thesis (Chapter VI) we focused on what Frey (1997) defined as the 
“intrinsic motivation” of tax compliance, known as tax morale, which due to “civic virtue” 
makes taxpayers comply; as opposed to “extrinsic motivation”, known also as deterrence impact, 
in which taxpayers pay because they fear the punishment. Motivated by recommendations from 
the very recent and leading literature on tax evasion and tax morale we developed a 
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questionnaire and conducted a survey with 600 Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SME) in 
Kosovo – the last country to enter the transition process. The reasons to focus on Kosovo were 
twofold. First, because Chapter V contributed substantially more to knowledge by targeting a 
country with little or no similar research; and, second, by being the last country to enter the 
transition process, and arguably, by being still in the transition process, data collected at present 
are the only available data from an actual and ongoing transition process. The research in this 
chapter was organized in two parts. In the first part we investigated the relationship between 
business tax morale and business tax evasion, including a set of firm related determinants. We 
then advanced the research a step further by investigating the determinants of business tax 
morale. We used the Tobit Model to estimate the determinants of tax evasion, most notably tax 
morale, traditional determinants (tax and audit rate) as well as firm’s characteristics (size, legal 
status, years in operation and performance). The Probit Model was applied to investigate the 
determinants of tax morale, namely institutions (trust in government, trust in legal system, 
corruption and compliance costs) and socio-cultural characteristics (education, gender, age and 
cooperation). A number of other specified regressions were run in order to check the robustness 
of our findings. For the first part of the research, the most important finding was that business tax 
morale, as is the case with individuals, had a strong and negative relationship with tax evasion. 
Our estimates showed that regardless of model specifications, this relationship remained robust 
and statistically significant. Improving tax morale, however, requires a systematic approach 
towards increasing the quality of institutions, their relationship with taxpayers as well as creation 
of social attitudes and norms that consider tax payment as a rightful and necessary act. The 
strong relationship in this business investigation confirms also theoretical assumptions of 
applying individual modelling to business context. Traditional determinants, namely tax and 
audit rate, appeared to be robustly significant; with the tax rate being again positively related to 
tax evasion and re-confirming a similar relationship from the previous two empirical 
investigations. The impact of audit rate was also statistically and robustly significant; suggesting 
that higher audit rates reduce considerably the amount of tax evaded. Firm characteristics 
appeared to be less significant, yet the legal status of the respondents had a strong effect on tax 
evasion. This result reinforced again the findings from Chapter V, where individual companies 
appeared to exhibit more evasive behaviour as compared to partnerships and corporations. 
Lastly, we found that the younger firms are less compliant than are firms with more experience. 
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In the second part of the research we investigated the determinants of business tax morale 
focusing on institutions and socio-demographic characteristics of owners/top managers. The 
institutional category of business determinants, which on purpose was constructed identically as 
in Chapter V, appeared to be statistically significant and strongly related to the evasive decision, 
providing thus a similar relationship as in the case of the firm-level investigation carried out for 
16,321 firms in TEs. Higher trust in government, higher trust in legal system, lower level of 
corruption and lower levels of compliance costs reduce substantially the level of tax morale, and 
consequently the level of business tax evasion. Socio-cultural group of determinants appeared to 
be less significant. Apart from education of the owner no other variable showed any statistical 
significance at conventional levels; although their signs were in accordance with theoretical 
expectations. Education revealed a negative relationship with tax morale; suggesting that the 
more educated the owners/top managers of businesses are, the less inclined they were to justify 
tax payment in principle. 
To sum up, the main findings of this thesis are:  
a) Regardless of the theoretical and previous empirical ambiguity, when it comes to 
transition economies the relationship between tax rate and tax evasion is positive. Higher 
tax rates and higher tax burden will increase the likelihood of tax evasion by businesses; 
b) The macroeconomic environment has minor effects on business tax evasion, suggesting 
that the decision to evade or not must depend on other non-economic factors; 
c) Even if a country is performing well in general economic terms, the presence of negative 
institutional phenomena exert a dominant and immediate influence on the relationship 
between businesses and government;  
d) Business tax morale, as is the case with individuals, has a strong and negative 
relationship with tax evasion. Moreover, given that the same considerations on morality 
apply to both individuals and businesses, policies on individual context apply also to 
businesses;  
e) Lower corruption, higher trust and better treatment of business taxpayers improves 
significantly both tax morale and tax compliance; and, 
f) The levels of tax evasion vary across firm characteristics.  
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7.2 Policy recommendations 
The results and main findings of this study have a number of policy implications for improving 
tax evasion in transition countries. These act to reduce either the possibility of and/or the 
inclination to evade. According to findings established in our study we group policy 
recommendations into three categories; notably policies on tax burden, on audit strategy and on 
tax morale.  
On tax burden, countries with weak collecting mechanisms, should work on reducing the levels 
of tax burden in order to increase both voluntary compliance and general tax revenues, which in 
turn will target both unfair competition and supply of public goods. Note that in the presence of 
weak deterrence mechanisms, opportunities for tax evasion will be promoted, and thus principles 
of fair market competition will be distorted by giving unfair advantage to evaders. Moreover, 
such evasive practices over the long term will be transformed into social norms or common 
practices, disengagement of which requires collective transformation of behaviours and 
perceptions. Reduction of the tax burden can be done through the following proposed policies: 
- Promote tax rate cuts, where tax rates are high, in order to increase tax compliance. Tax 
cuts are also believed to increase the tax base and as a result improve general tax 
revenues within a country. Similar practices are observed in several transition economies, 
amongst which, the most acknowledged case is that of Russia. According to Ivanova et 
al. (2005), Russian tax cuts during the late 90’s have improved not only the levels of tax 
compliance (in percentage), but have also improved significantly tax revenues (in amount 
of local currency); the latter was particularly impacted by an immediate augmentation of 
the tax base of labour income tax reporting. 
- Eliminate all unnecessary compliance costs (note, no compliance has zero costs), 
especially amongst countries where bureaucratic procedures and paperwork requirements 
are excessive. Low tax rates do not necessarily reduce all tax burdens. As seen from the 
case of Kosovo, despite the average tax rate being amongst the lowest in all TEs (around 
10%), the level of tax evasion is amongst the highest (39.5%). Other sources of burden 
include reporting costs, bureaucratic costs or even treatment costs. Some of these costs 
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sometimes become transaction points; which are preserved solely for corruptive 
requirements of officials.  
- Special attention should be paid to the simplicity of laws related to reimbursable taxes, 
such as Value Added Tax. If the amount of time required for VAT reimbursement is 
sufficient to discourage taxpayer’s compliant behaviour, then regardless of the tax rate 
(low or high) evasive behaviour becomes highly likely. 
- Programme tax debt/obligation in the case of a difficult economic year. Such incentive 
would encourage businesses to avoid any intention of compensating their lost purchasing 
power in the market by evading taxes. In cases of long term-debts, tax amnesties are 
preferable when possible. Yet their timing and intensity must be chosen carefully as not 
to infuriate compliant businesses or send messages that noncompliance will eventually be 
amnestied. 
On audit strategy, countries should engage their human monitoring capacities to increase the rate 
of audits which, in turn, will increase the cost of evasion. It is important however, that the 
perceived frequency of audits should serve more as a tool to correct self-reporting of business 
taxpayers, rather than as a tool to identify wrongdoers or collect fines; especially in those 
countries where human capacities of tax administrations are largely scarce. In addition, as seen 
from the literature review, more frequent audits will increase uncertainty of taxpayers, which in 
turn does lead to taxpayers’ overestimation of the probability of being caught which, in turn, 
increases compliance. Following, there are a set of policy recommendations that act to maximize 
revenue collection through optimizing audit strategies: 
- Audit rates should not be random, as assumed to be in the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
conventional model. Given that the compliance levels differ across the firm’s size, 
ownership, legal status or sector, tax agencies should consider audits rates endogenous to 
such characteristics. Reinganum and Wilde (1985) have already argued that audit rates 
should be conditional on the level of reported tax; we advance their conclusion by 
suggesting non-randomness according to firm attributes rather than just reported income. 
Such approach would be roughly an analogy to profiling techniques found commonly in 
criminal investigations. 
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- Orient tax inspections towards smaller firms. Many countries direct their audit strategies 
towards the largest firms, in order to maximise revenue collected in the context of very 
limited tax administration capacities. By doing so they play on very safe bets. This 
however, allows a wide spectrum of smaller firms to remain invisible, hence potentially 
evasive.  
- Focus audit rates on sectors that include higher rates of cash transactions. In such sectors, 
and much more, legal obligations for possession of receipts by consumers would 
facilitate the engagement and efficiency of tax inspections. 
- Optimize audit rates as to treat equally competitors within same clusters, i.e. competitors 
with same characteristics (size, sector, or region). Equal auditing, or perceived non-
discrimination from equal treatment, will increase perceptions related to the fairness of 
tax administration and consequently increase voluntary tax compliance; or at least 
diminish unfair competition caused by selective within-group auditing. 
On tax morale, countries should make significant efforts to improve the relationship between 
taxpayers and institutions. Morality, beliefs, social norms and other ethical values lie at the heart 
of every fiscal system. A healthy relationship between those that raise taxes and those that spend 
taxes creates a synergy for a non tax evasive environment which, in turn, enforces an even 
healthier relationship. We already argued that even if a country is performing well in general 
economic terms, the presence of negative institutional phenomena (most notably corruption and 
lack of reforms) exerts a dominant and immediate influence on the relationship between 
businesses and government; suggesting thus that institutional policies tackling tax evasion should 
be independent from general economic policies. Accordingly, there are a set of policy 
recommendations that could help to improve general levels of tax morale and tax compliance: 
- Adopt and enforce serious anti-corruption policies. This could reduce tax evasion both by 
increasing voluntary compliance and by better performance of enforcement mechanisms. 
The latter is specifically important given the more direct impact on levels of tax evasion. 
Corrupted tax officials not only do not intend to prevent tax evasion but, given their 
personal benefit from evasion, they will rather reinforce it. While the question “who 
guards the guards” remains infinitely important to answer, supervision of field tax 
officials is indispensable. 
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- Beyond improving transparency and accountability, governments should also improve the 
link between revenues collected and revenues spent. This will drive positive responses of 
taxpayers towards the governments and other relevant institutions. Some countries have 
introduced even exclusive linkages between types of taxes and types of spending, say 
income tax with education or health, in order for taxpayers to understand and percept 
better their contribution to society. 
- Use moral obloquy as a tool to improve collection rates. Tax evaders, cheaters and 
corrupted officials should be treated publicly in order to discourage shameful acts in the 
future. Moreover, institutions should use public campaigns and public awareness tools 
that stress the importance of tax payments for the same taxpayers; while tax compliance 
should be established as a patriotic act. Portraying tax compliance within a broader 
context of patriotism is likely to encourage social cohesion towards both stigmatizing 
cheaters as well as sympathizing with fighters. 
- Understand better taxpayers, most importantly cheaters, through identifying the socio-
demographic characteristics of individuals with low tax morale. Identification could help 
draw strategies that would improve their relationship with institutions. 
- Improve the efficiency and modernize significantly public administration; especially that 
part of administration that is in day-to-day contact with businesses. Improvement of the 
taxpayer’s experience could be important also at the local level. Fiscal decentralization 
should be considered too. 
As underlined already in Chapter VI of this thesis, the motivation for investigating tax evasion 
and tax morale in Kosovo was threefold. First, while tax evasion affects every country, it is the 
poorer ones that suffer more; in this line treating tax evasion in Kosovo becomes of special 
interest. Second, by being the last country to enter the transition process and arguably, by being 
still in the transition process, data collected at present are the only available data from an actual 
and ongoing transition process. For the case of tax morale – which has received attention quite 
recently – this is a rare opportunity. Third, since the research in Kosovo in regards to tax evasion 
and tax morale was never conducted before, the general contribution to knowledge and policy 
recommendations derived from findings become much more important. 
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We note, however, that while the findings about Kosovo cannot be generalized to every other 
transition economy, they may be relevant to countries that have similar characteristics – most 
notably to Balkan countries – and who largely fall within the same set of economic, cultural, 
historical and behavioural characteristics. These findings can also be applicable for countries that 
have similar institutional and economical level of development as Kosovo. 
Moreover, the methodology – notably the questionnaire and survey technique, along with the 
empirical methods applied in Chapter VI of this thesis – can be easily transferred for future 
research on every other transition economy.  
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7.3 Contribution to knowledge 
This dissertation makes its contribution to knowledge by investigating the determinants of 
business tax evasion in transition economies, by investigating a broad spectrum of variables in 
the field of tax evasion, by applying advanced econometric methods, by collecting primary data 
through surveys conducted for the purpose of this thesis, and by providing a set of policy 
recommendations and proposals to promote the fight against evasion to policy makers as well as 
other interested parties in transition economies and countries with similar characteristics. The 
most important contributions are summarized in the points below.   
Firstly, given the general focus of researchers on individual tax compliance we advance the 
current knowledge on tax evasion by extending investigation to the business context as well as to 
the transition economies; two largely neglected topics in the field of tax evasion literature.   
Secondly, for the first time we conduct a cross-country analysis of business tax evasion in 
transition countries; by employing a recent innovation in fixed effect panel analysis, known as 
fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD), which hitherto has not been used in this context. 
While the cross-country studies on individual tax evasion are rare and quite recent, the context of 
business cross-country investigation has been completely unexplored. Moreover the transition 
perspective covered in a cross-country study is again novel, given the lack of interest in the past 
research. Hence empirical investigation in a cross country, business and transition context, 
combined or each separately, is one of the most important contributions of this thesis. By 
aggregating tax evasion data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS) for the years 1999, 2002 and 2005, we provide for the first time empirical findings for 
business tax evasion in 25 transition economies and for a six year time span. Usage of panel data, 
for the first time in a cross-country context of tax evasion for TEs, enables us also to engage in 
dynamic analysis and to observe potential changes over time. Our robust findings that support 
institutional performance over the macroeconomic environment was not established in any 
previous study related to business tax evasion in transition, and as such can serve to better inform 
policymakers in these countries. 
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Thirdly, by employing sample selection techniques - the standard Heckamn Two-Step approach, 
the extended Heckman FIML approach and Tobit Corner Solution - we expand on the (two) 
previous firm-level studies in TEs. By using BEEPS 2005 data, in addition to BEEPS 2002 used 
previously, we increase the sample size, which in turn provides us with more precise estimates 
and test statistics with more power, as well as allows us to observe new determinants that were 
not accounted for (due to 2002 data restrictions). In addition, by combining determinants and 
estimation methodology used in the previous works, we improve both model specification and 
empirical strategy and again reach more precise estimators. 
Fourthly, by concluding a robust and statistically significant positive relationship between the tax 
rate and tax evasion in TEs, we provide more evidence on the ambiguous theoretical and 
empirical background set so far. We enforce the belief that in transition countries higher tax rates 
will increase tax evasion. We also argue that the income effect established in the conventional 
model of tax evasion, which is assumed to work in negative relationship with evasion, could be 
less present, as businesses in transition countries are more likely to be less risk averse; hence less 
compliant.  
Fifthly, through several estimations in both transition countries as well as Kosovo, we robustly 
conclude that foreign firms, larger firms, and non-individual firms are substantially more 
compliant than domestic firms, smaller firms and partnership or corporations respectively. We 
also reinforce findings that sectors involving higher cash transactions are likely to be more 
evasive. These findings suggest designing new audit policies that are not set random but are 
endogenous to specific firm characteristics. 
Sixthly, for the purpose of this thesis, we generate primary data by designing a questionnaire and 
conducting a survey according to recent theoretical arguments put forward by the leading authors 
in the field of tax morale. The survey questionnaire is designed to proxy both determinants of 
business tax morale as well as determinants of tax evasion, as explored and investigated in the 
previous chapters. Investigation of business tax morale is one of the most important contributions 
of this thesis, given the very rare and very recent country-specific investigation of this topic. 
Seventhly, by focusing our empirical research on business tax morale in Kosovo, we investigate 
for the first time the topic of tax evasion in Kosovo. We establish for the first time the level of 
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business tax evasion in Kosovo, as measured by the most standard survey technique in the tax 
literature. We also find the level of compliance morale justifiability by kosovan businesses and 
we further investigate what shapes these beliefs. We find that the performance of kosovan 
institutions (or potentially those of any other transition and developing country) affects 
significantly and robustly the moral perception about tax obligations.  
Eighthly, we find that deterrence factors, such as tax rate and audit rate, are strongly and 
statistically significant related to the level of tax evasion in Kosovo. While higher taxes lead to 
lower levels of compliance, increased audit rates will reduce considerably evasion. Findings such 
as these for Kosovo were never established before. 
Ninthly, we advance further the empirical review of determinants of tax evasion by summarizing 
up to date studies conducted through survey, tax measurement programmes or experiments in 
various countries worldwide. We also group up to date findings in order to observe for potential 
consensuses or divergences amongst tax evasion studies. 
Lastly, with the policy implications drawn from the empirical investigation throughout the thesis, 
we inform institutions in transition economies, specifically institutions in Kosovo, in regards to 
tools required to fight one of the oldest and most common policy problems worldwide, tax 
evasion.   
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7.4 Limitations 
Although this thesis has offered several important contributions to the existing literature and 
knowledge on tax evasion, there are several constraints to be taken into account. These 
constraints are related to the availability and quality of data used throughout the research. 
Following, we list the most important limitations of our thesis.   
First, and the most important limitation relates to the qualitative nature of the self reported 
independent variable of tax evasion, used in all three empirical chapters (VI, V and VI). Lack of 
accurate and actual tax reporting data for transition economies, similar to tax measurement 
programmes available for the US, forces this work to rely entirely on perceptions; some of 
which, as is the case with every other survey, may be subjective and prone to individual 
preferences and characteristics. Surveys of tax evasion are rather more complicated, because tax 
evasion is perceived to be an unlawful activity and socially undesirable, thus making individuals 
quite reluctant to admit such behaviour. In addition, there is a fear of penalties and other 
sanctions which, in turn, induce individuals to either provide untruthful answers about their 
compliance behaviour or refuse to answer at all. Although we control for sample selection bias at 
some stage of this research, the usage of actual tax and audit databases would have increased the 
precision of our estimates.  
Second, lack of actual tax and audit programmes for TEs precludes control for the impact of the 
fine rate in tax evasion. Though we argue in Chapter VI that under the assumption of fine rates 
being systematic, the potential effect should be captured by the intercept, we fail to investigate 
and measure (given the restrictions from survey data) one of the most important determinants of 
tax evasion. A better estimation of the audit rate would have also been possible with either tax 
measurement programmes or actual audited tax returns as evidence.  
Third, given again the lack of available data for transition economies, we fail to capture the 
impact of tax morale in a cross-country or a firm level context for a broader set of countries in 
transition. The relationship of business tax morale to business tax evasion remains still largely 
unexplored; though our survey conducted for 600 SMEs in Kosovo provides some indications 
for expectations in other countries or regions as well.  
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Fourth, the lack of data for a larger time span than the maximum observed in our thesis (three 
rounds in six years in Chapter IV), could have potentially increased the quality of our 
estimations. It could have also provided more information on the potential time shocks or any 
other time-related impact on observed tax evasion levels throughout transition periods. 
Moreover, the lack of recent data for transition economies did not allow us to investigate further 
the institutional impact on compliance; especially as these countries are assumed to have 
improved their respective institutional performance continuously over the time. Though the 
inclusion of tax evasion question on BEEPS data for three datasets (1999, 2002 and 2005) was 
encouraging, the exclusion of same question from subsequent datasets has limited considerably 
the potential for time series analysis.  
Last, inability to differentiate amongst types of taxes and the impact of each tax rate on business 
tax evasion also limits the findings of this study. Lack of data for actual profit tax rates, income 
tax rate, Value Added Tax rate, or any other tax rate does not enable us to further investigate the 
divergences within the impact of tax rates on tax evasion. In most transition economies the rates 
amongst types of taxes are different and, at least theoretically, the investigation of the 
relationship between each of these taxes with compliance would have provided better policy 
recommendations.   
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7.5 Suggestions for further research 
Given the needs and importance of studying the topic of tax evasion as underlined in Chapter I of 
this thesis, in the light of the theoretical background summarized in Chapter II, building upon the 
empirical investigations conducted so far and reviewed in Chapter III, as well as upon the 
contribution provided in this thesis through empirical investigations in Chapters IV, V and VI, 
we summarize a set of points to inform direct future research in the field of business tax evasion 
in transition economies or/and countries that have similar characteristics with transition 
economies.  
First, given the theoretical and empirical ambiguity of the impact of tax rate on both individual 
and business tax evasion, a Meta Regression Analysis is highly recommended. Combining 
results from different studies would potentially provide some interesting results on patterns 
amongst tax rate results; especially for contrasting cases when using the same data-bases or 
investigating the same regions. 
Second, work in the field of business tax morale for transition countries, both at firm-level or 
from a cross-country perspective is highly recommended. While the availability of data at 
present is limited/inexistent, future studies might initiate or make use of morality data for 
businesses in transition countries.  
Third, future research studies might also initiate/make use (if possible) of actual tax and audit 
measurement programmes in order to provide more accurate estimations and/or robust current 
findings. A highly recommended research is also related to the impact of the fine rate on 
business tax evasion in transition countries; which can be obtained only through such 
measurement programmes.   
Fourth, it is important to advance the research on the relationship between various taxes and 
compliance. In particular the relationship between Value Added Tax, as the most important 
income source for transition economies, and tax evasion, is highly recommended. In such cases 
future research might also consider VAT compliance as a dependent variable and estimate it vis-
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à-vis a set of VAT characteristics, such as VAT rate, VAT grace periods, and VAT 
reimbursement practices; amongst others. 
Fifth, in order to provide policy recommendations to help design better audit policies, 
investigation of tax evasion within economic sectors and subsectors is highly recommended. 
While the relationship of several firm characteristics, such as size, legal status or even ownership 
type (foreign or domestic) is fairly established and robustly concluded, the within sectoral 
characteristics of evaders are less studied. 
Sixth, in Chapter III, Section 3.3, we explain that we follow recent practice in treating tax morale 
as an aggregator of institutional influences on tax evasion and, hence, as an important 
independent variable in our model of tax evasion. However, we are also mindful of the older 
approach that treated tax morale attitudes more or less as a proxy for tax evasion behaviour. This 
suggests an empirical strategy whereby both tax morale and tax evasion are related to one 
another not as independent and dependent variables – i.e. as cause and effect – but as correlated 
to one another as dependent variables in a system. In this case, the appropriate model would be a 
two-equation system of “seemingly unrelated regressions” (SUR) allowing both tax morale and 
tax evasion to be jointly determined by similar (but not necessarily the same) observed and 
unobserved determinants. For reasons of space (and time), we do not undertake this analysis for 
this thesis. However, it is a possible extension of the work presented in Chapter VI. 
Seventh, while the vast majority of theoretical approaches have used the expected utility theory 
to analyze the choice of taxpayers in regards to the tax reporting, we encourage future research to 
attempt elaborating tax evasion through alternative theories; most notably through principal-
agent theory (with a specific focus on the relationship of asymmetric information between the tax 
administration acting as an agent and the taxpayer acting as a principal) and prospect theory – the 
foundations of which have been briefly elaborated in Chapter II of this thesis. These alternative 
theories might provide completely new insights to the problem of tax evasion. 
Last, empirical investigation of time series data on business tax evasion will potentially uncover 
further, as yet unobserved factors that shape tax evasion.  
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4.1 Fixed Effects  
 
 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        75 
Group variable: cn                              Number of groups   =        25 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6130                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.2108                                        avg =       3.0 
       overall = 0.1877                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(9,41)            =      7.22 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9417                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  TaxEvasion |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
GDPpercapita |   .0005376   .0006547     0.82   0.416    -.0007846    .0018599 
   Education |  -2.220872   .8639098    -2.57   0.014    -3.965573   -.4761705 
   Inflation |   -.020669   .0338344    -0.61   0.545     -.088999    .0476611 
     TaxRate |   .2245493   .1399617     1.60   0.116     -.058109    .5072077 
 BusinessEnv |   .0614254   .0802896     0.77   0.449    -.1007227    .2235734 
Unemployment |   .3778789    .270782     1.40   0.170    -.1689764    .9247342 
   TranIndex |  -42.60114   10.01691    -4.25   0.000    -62.83069   -22.37158 
  Corruption |  -9.322069   4.584785    -2.03   0.049    -18.58123   -.0629077 
 SocialNorms |   .1429963   .3341811     0.43   0.671    -.5318962    .8178887 
       _cons |   342.5833   89.92745     3.81   0.000     160.9711    524.1955 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  26.211894 
     sigma_e |  6.6040352 
         rho |  .94031111   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(24, 41) =     2.31              Prob > F = 0.0089 
 
. 
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4.2 Random Effects 
 
 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        75 
Group variable: cn                              Number of groups   =        25 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4007                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.6963                                        avg =       3.0 
       overall = 0.5362                                        max =         3 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(9)       =     63.65 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  TaxEvasion |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
GDPpercapita |   .0000108   .0005058     0.02   0.983    -.0009806    .0010022 
   Education |  -2.507615    .706798    -3.55   0.000    -3.892914   -1.122317 
   Inflation |  -.0278489   .0319052    -0.87   0.383    -.0903818    .0346841 
     TaxRate |  -.0218426   .1113683    -0.20   0.845    -.2401204    .1964353 
 BusinessEnv |   .2096433    .070637     2.97   0.003     .0711974    .3480892 
Unemployment |   .1178977   .1550005     0.76   0.447    -.1858977    .4216931 
   TranIndex |  -1.613707   2.776283    -0.58   0.561    -7.055121    3.827707 
  Corruption |  -4.500568   3.267917    -1.38   0.168    -10.90557    1.904431 
 SocialNorms |   .2810102   .1559375     1.80   0.072    -.0246217    .5866421 
       _cons |   259.7253   69.39851     3.74   0.000     123.7067    395.7439 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  3.3391221 
     sigma_e |  6.6040352 
         rho |  .20359974   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.     
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4.3 Breusch and Pagan Lgrangian Multiplier Test 
 
 
xttest0 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
 
        TaxEvasion[cn,t] = Xb + u[cn] + e[cn,t] 
 
        Estimated results: 
                         |       Var     sd = sqrt(Var) 
                ---------+----------------------------- 
               TaxEvas~n |   122.9393        11.0878 
                       e |   43.61328       6.604035 
                       u |   11.14974       3.339122 
 
        Test:   Var(u) = 0 
                              chi2(1) =     0.05 
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.8166 
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4.4 Hasuman Test 
 
 
 
hausman FE RE 
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (8) does not equal the number of 
        coefficients being tested (9); be sure this is what you expect, or there may be 
        problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your estimators for anything 
        unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so that the coefficients 
        are on a similar scale. 
 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |       FE           RE         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
GDPpercapita |    .0005376     .0000108        .0005269        .0004157 
   Education |   -2.220872    -2.507615        .2867435        .4967662 
   Inflation |    -.020669    -.0278489        .0071799        .0112618 
     TaxRate |    .2245493    -.0218426        .2463919        .0847725 
 BusinessEnv |    .0614254     .2096433       -.1482179        .0381685 
Unemployment |    .3778789     .1178977        .2599812        .2220309 
   TranIndex |   -42.60114    -1.613707       -40.98743        9.624483 
  Corruption |   -9.322069    -4.500568       -4.821501        3.215738 
 SocialNorms |    .1429963     .2810102        -.138014        .2955681 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       22.07 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0048 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
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4.5 Pasaran Tests 
 
xtcsd, pesaran 
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence =     0.353, Pr = 0.7242 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xtcsd, pesaran 
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence =    -1.038, Pr = 1.7006  
Page | 306        APPENDICES 
4.6 Modified Wald Test 
 
 
xttest3 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
 
chi2 (25)  =    4.4e+05 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000  
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4.7 Clustered Standard Errors 
 
 
 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        75 
Group variable: cn                              Number of groups   =        25 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6989                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.5612                                        avg =       3.0 
       overall = 0.5721                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(11,24)           =      9.30 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6141                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 25 clusters in cn) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  TaxEvasion |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
GDPpercapita |   .0015174    .000643     2.36   0.027     .0001904    .0028444 
   Education |  -1.111625   .9271697    -1.20   0.242    -3.025209    .8019596 
   Inflation |  -.0198027   .0158351    -1.25   0.223    -.0524848    .0128793 
     TaxRate |   .3686278     .17576     2.10   0.047      .005877    .7313785 
 BusinessEnv |   .0504617      .0909     0.56   0.584    -.1371467    .2380702 
Unemployment |   .2745871   .1930366     1.42   0.168    -.1238209    .6729951 
   TranIndex |  -5.493088   12.88762    -0.43   0.674    -32.09183    21.10565 
  Corruption |   -11.3822   4.473319    -2.54   0.018    -20.61467   -2.149718 
 SocialNorms |   .5625874   .4330811     1.30   0.206    -.3312481    1.456423 
   Year_2002 |  -10.05756   2.788309    -3.61   0.001    -15.81234   -4.302769 
   Year_2005 |  -15.77409   4.147687    -3.80   0.001    -24.33449   -7.213681 
       _cons |   103.5579   99.07786     1.05   0.306    -100.9287    308.0446 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  7.4686161 
     sigma_e |  5.9726346 
         rho |  .60993599   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. 
 
 
  
Page | 308        APPENDICES 
4.8 Normality of residuals  
 
 
 
Test for serial correlation in residuals 
Null hypothesis is either that rho=0 if residuals are AR(1) 
or that lamda=0 if residuals are MA(1) 
LM= 7.9894943 
which is asy. distributed as chisq(1) under null, so: 
Probability of value greater than LM is .00470496 
LM5= 2.8265693 
which is asy. distributed as N(0,1) under null, so: 
Probability of value greater than abs(LM5) is .00235248 
 
 
Test for significance of fixed effects 
F= 1.8422856 
Probability>F= .04371992 
 
 
Test for normality of residuals 
 
                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality 
                                                         ------- joint ------ 
    Variable |    Obs   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    __00000B |     75      0.6781         0.0822         3.32         0.1905 
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4.9 Normality of residuals with Albania99 and Macedonia99  
 
 
 
Test for serial correlation in residuals 
Null hypothesis is either that rho=0 if residuals are AR(1) 
or that lamda=0 if residuals are MA(1) 
LM= 5.3104573 
which is asy. distributed as chisq(1) under null, so: 
Probability of value greater than LM is .02119779 
LM5= 2.304443 
which is asy. distributed as N(0,1) under null, so: 
Probability of value greater than abs(LM5) is .0105989 
 
 
Test for significance of fixed effects 
F= 2.8476758 
Probability>F= .00178476 
 
 
Test for normality of residuals 
 
                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality 
                                                         ------- joint ------ 
    Variable |    Obs   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    __00000B |     75      0.5591         0.9734         0.34         0.8427 
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4.10 FE estimation 
 
 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        75 
Group variable: cn                              Number of groups   =        25 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.8340                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.2705                                        avg =       3.0 
       overall = 0.4443                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(13,37)           =     14.30 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5862                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  TaxEvasion |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
GDPpercapita |   .0014504   .0005792     2.50   0.017     .0002767     .002624 
   Education |  -.3230158   .7067132    -0.46   0.650    -1.754953    1.108921 
   Inflation |   -.022634   .0235041    -0.96   0.342    -.0702578    .0249898 
     TaxRate |   .3395033   .1077175     3.15   0.003      .121247    .5577596 
 BusinessEnv |   .0305303   .0573181     0.53   0.597    -.0856071    .1466678 
Unemployment |   .0813219   .1937764     0.42   0.677    -.3113065    .4739502 
   TranIndex |  -14.90238   11.30727    -1.32   0.196    -37.81308    8.008325 
  Corruption |  -9.629685   3.262646    -2.95   0.005    -16.24043   -3.018936 
 SocialNorms |  -.0030072   .2798046    -0.01   0.991    -.5699452    .5639308 
   Year_2002 |  -7.568094   2.391919    -3.16   0.003    -12.41458   -2.721606 
   Year_2005 |  -14.75417    3.98685    -3.70   0.001     -22.8323   -6.676046 
  DAlbania99 |   28.78258   6.247629     4.61   0.000     16.12368    41.44148 
DMacedonia99 |  -20.10015   6.566888    -3.06   0.004    -33.40593   -6.794366 
       _cons |    69.8282   87.49742     0.80   0.430    -107.4584    247.1148 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  9.5265406 
     sigma_e |  4.5529705 
         rho |  .81405902   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(24, 37) =     2.70              Prob > F = 0.0032 
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4.11 FEVD Step One (robust SE) 
 
 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        75 
Group variable: cn                              Number of groups   =        25 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.8340                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.2705                                        avg =       3.0 
       overall = 0.4443                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(11,24)           =         . 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5862                        Prob > F           =         . 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 25 clusters in cn) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  TaxEvasion |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
GDPpercapita |   .0014504   .0005479     2.65   0.014     .0003195    .0025812 
   Education |  -.3230158   .5164838    -0.63   0.538    -1.388986    .7429544 
   Inflation |   -.022634   .0155353    -1.46   0.158    -.0546972    .0094292 
     TaxRate |   .3395033   .1649003     2.06   0.051    -.0008342    .6798408 
 BusinessEnv |   .0305303   .0964784     0.32   0.754    -.1685914     .229652 
Unemployment |   .0813219   .1386855     0.59   0.563     -.204911    .3675547 
   TranIndex |  -14.90238    10.6558    -1.40   0.175    -36.89487    7.090118 
  Corruption |  -9.629685   3.135479    -3.07   0.005    -16.10099   -3.158375 
 SocialNorms |  -.0030072   .2959101    -0.01   0.992    -.6137356    .6077212 
   Year_2002 |  -7.568094    1.97317    -3.84   0.001    -11.64052   -3.495671 
   Year_2005 |  -14.75417   3.739571    -3.95   0.001    -22.47227   -7.036075 
  DAlbania99 |   28.78258   3.245076     8.87   0.000     22.08507    35.48008 
DMacedonia99 |  -20.10015   4.406235    -4.56   0.000    -29.19417   -11.00612 
       _cons |    69.8282   70.06245     1.00   0.329    -74.77359      214.43 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  9.5265406 
     sigma_e |  4.5529705 
         rho |  .81405902   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. 
 
 
 
predict Fixed, u 
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4.12 FEVD Step Two 
 
 
    
    
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      75 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,    70) =   41.33 
       Model |  4590.45696     4  1147.61424           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1943.90145    70  27.7700207           R-squared     =  0.7025 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6855 
       Total |  6534.35841    74  88.3021407           Root MSE      =  5.2697 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       Fixed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Unemployment |   .2341763   .0835617     2.80   0.007     .0675178    .4008348 
   TranIndex |    10.1477   1.314117     7.72   0.000     7.526777    12.76863 
  Corruption |   3.264711   1.297266     2.52   0.014     .6773947    5.852026 
 SocialNorms |   .2148417   .0829022     2.59   0.012     .0494984    .3801849 
       _cons |  -37.79688   4.550975    -8.31   0.000    -46.87351   -28.72025 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. 
 
 
 
predict SecStageRes, residuals 
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4.13 FEVD Step Three 
 
 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      75 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 14,    60) =   46.55 
       Model |  8330.51469    14  595.036764           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  766.993016    60  12.7832169           R-squared     =  0.9157 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.8960 
       Total |  9097.50771    74  122.939293           Root MSE      =  3.5754 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  TaxEvasion |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
GDPpercapita |   .0014504   .0002573     5.64   0.000     .0009358     .001965 
   Education |  -.3230158   .3315348    -0.97   0.334    -.9861841    .3401526 
   Inflation |   -.022634    .014669    -1.54   0.128    -.0519764    .0067084 
     TaxRate |   .3395033   .0559246     6.07   0.000     .2276374    .4513692 
 BusinessEnv |   .0305303    .036068     0.85   0.401    -.0416164     .102677 
Unemployment |   .3154982    .063962     4.93   0.000     .1875552    .4434411 
   TranIndex |  -4.754675   1.105747    -4.30   0.000    -6.966498   -2.542852 
  Corruption |  -6.364975   1.433996    -4.44   0.000    -9.233393   -3.496556 
 SocialNorms |   .2118345   .0632135     3.35   0.001     .0853886    .3382804 
   Year_2002 |  -7.568094    1.13215    -6.68   0.000     -9.83273   -5.303458 
   Year_2005 |  -14.75417   1.447734   -10.19   0.000    -17.65007   -11.85827 
  DAlbania99 |   28.78258    4.16373     6.91   0.000     20.45388    37.11128 
DMacedonia99 |  -20.10015   4.172351    -4.82   0.000    -28.44609    -11.7542 
 SecStageRes |          1   .0975227    10.25   0.000     .8049255    1.195074 
       _cons |   32.03132   32.92636     0.97   0.335     -33.8312    97.89384 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. 
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4.14 FEVD Adjusted for Degrees of Freedom 
 
       
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =       37           number of obs       =       75 
mean squared error         = 10.22657           F( 15, 37)          =  13.0031 
root mean squared error    = 3.197901           Prob > F            = 4.45e-10 
Residual Sum of Squares    =  766.993           R-squared           =  .915692 
Total Sum of Squares       = 9097.508           adj. R-squared      = .8313839 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 8330.515 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
  TaxEvasion |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
GDPpercapita |   .0014504   .0006202     2.34   0.025     .0001936    .0027071 
   Inflation |   -.022634   .0233334    -0.97   0.338    -.0699119    .0246439 
     TaxRate |   .3395033   .1084904     3.13   0.003     .1196809    .5593257 
 BusinessEnv |   .0305303   .0565214     0.54   0.592    -.0839929    .1450536 
   Education |  -.3230158   .6692348    -0.48   0.632    -1.679014    1.032983 
   Year_2002 |  -7.568094    1.59272    -4.75   0.000    -10.79525   -4.340938 
   Year_2005 |  -14.75417   2.540264    -5.81   0.000    -19.90123   -9.607107 
  DAlbania99 |   28.78258   6.168599     4.67   0.000     16.28381    41.28135 
DMacedonia99 |  -20.10015   5.887588    -3.41   0.002    -32.02953   -8.170759 
Unemployment |   .3154982   .1506514     2.09   0.043     .0102495    .6207469 
   TranIndex |  -4.754675    2.75859    -1.72   0.093    -10.34411    .8347595 
  Corruption |  -6.364975   3.681237    -1.73   0.092    -13.82387    1.093921 
 SocialNorms |   .2118345   .1590658     1.33   0.191    -.1104635    .5341325 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   32.03132   66.44241     0.48   0.633    -102.5938    166.6564 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. 
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4.15 Tests for Heteroskedasticity 
 
estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of TaxEvasion 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.16 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.6894 
 
 
 
 
estat imtest, white 
 
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity 
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity 
 
         chi2(74)     =     75.00 
         Prob > chi2  =    0.4457 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      75.00     74    0.4457 
            Skewness |      13.81     14    0.4642 
            Kurtosis |       0.20      1    0.6554 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      89.01     89    0.4799 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
estat szroeter, rhs 
 
Szroeter's test for homoskedasticity 
 
    Ho: variance constant 
    Ha: variance monotonic in variable 
 
--------------------------------------- 
    Variable |      chi2   df      p  
-------------+------------------------- 
GDPpercapita |      4.09    1   0.0430 # 
   Education |      0.53    1   0.4661 # 
   Inflation |      0.32    1   0.5700 # 
     TaxRate |      0.23    1   0.6318 # 
 BusinessEnv |      2.05    1   0.1520 # 
Unemployment |      0.17    1   0.6766 # 
   TranIndex |      1.28    1   0.2578 # 
  Corruption |      2.06    1   0.1515 # 
 SocialNorms |      0.00    1   0.9997 # 
   Year_2002 |      0.64    1   0.4253 # 
   Year_2005 |      0.08    1   0.7830 # 
  DAlbania99 |      0.51    1   0.4765 # 
DMacedonia99 |      0.51    1   0.4765 # 
 SecStageRes |      1.85    1   0.1738 # 
--------------------------------------- 
                  # unadjusted p-values  
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4.16 Ramsey Test 
 
 
 
estat ovtest 
 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of TaxEvasion 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 57) =      2.48 
                  Prob > F =      0.0706 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
estat ovtest, rhs 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the independent variables 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(30, 30) =      1.43 
                  Prob > F =      0.1657 
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4.17 Variance Inflation Factor VIF 
 
 
estat vif 
 
 
Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
  Corruption |      5.07    0.197431 
GDPpercapita |      4.93    0.202950 
   Year_2005 |      2.73    0.365943 
     TaxRate |      2.53    0.395970 
   TranIndex |      2.52    0.396989 
 SocialNorms |      1.89    0.527969 
 BusinessEnv |      1.79    0.558042 
   Year_2002 |      1.67    0.598389 
Unemployment |      1.63    0.613703 
   Inflation |      1.58    0.634538 
   Education |      1.57    0.636581 
 SecStageRes |      1.45    0.691440 
DMacedonia99 |      1.34    0.744232 
  DAlbania99 |      1.34    0.747317 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.29 
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4.18 Leverage 
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5.1 Heckman Two-Step “Missingness”  
 
 
heckman taxevasion taxrate trustingovernment trustinjudicalsystem corruption1 compliancecost 
foreign medium large individual partnership miningandquarrying construction manufacturing 
transportstorageandcommunicat wholesaleretailrepairs realestaterentingandbusines 
hotelsandrestaurants dummyyear dum1 dum2 dum3 dum4 dum5 dum6 dum7 dum8 dum9 dum10 dum11 dum12 
dum13 dum14 dum15 dum16 dum17 dum18 dum19 dum20 dum21 dum22 dum23 dum24 dum25, select 
(dummyresponse = taxrate  trustingovernment  trustinjudicalsystem corruption1 compliancecost 
foreign medium large individual partnership dummyyear miningandquarrying construction 
manufacturing transportstorageandcommunicat wholesaleretailrepairs realestaterentingandbusines 
hotelsandrestaurants dummyownermanager dum1 dum2 dum3 dum4 dum5 dum6 dum7 dum8 dum9 dum10 dum11 
dum12 dum13 dum14 dum15 dum16 dum17 dum18 dum19 dum20 dum21 dum22 dum23 dum24 dum25) twostep 
 
Heckman selection model -- two-step estimates   Number of obs      =     10303 
(regression model with sample selection)        Censored obs       =       598 
                                                Uncensored obs     =      9705 
 
                                                Wald chi2(43)      =   1328.91 
                                                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
taxevasion   | 
     taxrate |   .8934944   .2335892     3.83   0.000      .435668    1.351321 
trustingov~t |  -.3454797    .158871    -2.17   0.030    -.6568612   -.0340982 
trustinjud~m |  -.5377856   .1726835    -3.11   0.002    -.8762391   -.1993321 
 corruption1 |   2.903152   .1644685    17.65   0.000       2.5808    3.225505 
compliance~t |   .0812193   .0207206     3.92   0.000     .0406077    .1218308 
     foreign |  -2.513826   .6528849    -3.85   0.000    -3.793457   -1.234195 
      medium |  -3.217647   .6043376    -5.32   0.000    -4.402127   -2.033167 
       large |  -3.977415   .8199239    -4.85   0.000    -5.584437   -2.370394 
  individual |   2.848361   .6239913     4.56   0.000     1.625361    4.071362 
 partnership |   .9068526   .6771023     1.34   0.180    -.4202435    2.233949 
miningandq~g |  -4.178606   2.340392    -1.79   0.074    -8.765691    .4084777 
construction |  -1.677226   1.179009    -1.42   0.155    -3.988042     .633589 
manufactur~g |  -1.710924   1.066449    -1.60   0.109    -3.801126    .3792773 
transports~t |  -3.539609   1.324914    -2.67   0.008    -6.136392   -.9428262 
wholesaler~s |  -1.657336   1.060344    -1.56   0.118    -3.735572    .4208996 
realestate~s |  -1.445402   1.233021    -1.17   0.241     -3.86208    .9712751 
hotelsandr~s |   1.776288   1.370634     1.30   0.195     -.910105    4.462682 
   dummyyear |  -2.954116   1.052724    -2.81   0.005    -5.017417   -.8908145 
        dum1 |   3.544839   2.004901     1.77   0.077    -.3846937    7.474372 
        dum2 |    3.24523     1.9561     1.66   0.097    -.5886552    7.079116 
        dum3 |    5.09331   1.883431     2.70   0.007     1.401853    8.784767 
        dum4 |  -6.711705   2.055278    -3.27   0.001    -10.73998   -2.683434 
        dum5 |   4.285802   2.011421     2.13   0.033     .3434891    8.228115 
        dum6 |  -3.088306   1.896055    -1.63   0.103    -6.804506    .6278936 
        dum7 |  -3.781763   1.651514    -2.29   0.022    -7.018671   -.5448542 
        dum8 |  -4.745875   1.542107    -3.08   0.002     -7.76835     -1.7234 
        dum9 |  -5.342036   1.983528    -2.69   0.007    -9.229678   -1.454393 
       dum10 |  -2.358382   1.614147    -1.46   0.144    -5.522053    .8052892 
       dum11 |  -2.245212   1.699797    -1.32   0.187    -5.576753    1.086328 
       dum12 |  -7.796747   2.096924    -3.72   0.000    -11.90664   -3.686851 
       dum13 |  -4.433595   1.679056    -2.64   0.008    -7.724484   -1.142706 
       dum14 |  -1.235078   1.686824    -0.73   0.464    -4.541193    2.071037 
       dum15 |  -1.269539   1.822457    -0.70   0.486     -4.84149    2.302411 
       dum16 |  -4.765874   2.048432    -2.33   0.020    -8.780727    -.751021 
       dum17 |  -5.830353   2.090573    -2.79   0.005      -9.9278   -1.732906 
       dum18 |  -8.950838   2.170911    -4.12   0.000    -13.20574   -4.695931 
       dum19 |   9.695967   1.957929     4.95   0.000     5.858497    13.53344 
       dum20 |  -8.537954   1.883786    -4.53   0.000    -12.23011   -4.845801 
       dum21 |  -6.084572   1.605752    -3.79   0.000    -9.231789   -2.937355 
       dum22 |  -2.405596   1.785418    -1.35   0.178    -5.904951    1.093759 
       dum23 |  -9.061991    1.82071    -4.98   0.000    -12.63052   -5.493464 
       dum24 |  -.8406625    1.52876    -0.55   0.582    -3.836978    2.155653 
       dum25 |   .0463671   1.894352     0.02   0.980    -3.666494    3.759228 
       _cons |    10.1716   3.030038     3.36   0.001     4.232836    16.11037 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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dummyrespo~e | 
     taxrate |   .0684088   .0203915     3.35   0.001     .0284423    .1083754 
trustingov~t |   .0227543    .015081     1.51   0.131    -.0068039    .0523126 
trustinjud~m |   .0291088   .0164342     1.77   0.077    -.0031017    .0613193 
 corruption1 |   .0386835    .015672     2.47   0.014      .007967    .0694001 
compliance~t |   .0012846   .0020579     0.62   0.532    -.0027488     .005318 
     foreign |  -.0022792   .0623246    -0.04   0.971    -.1244331    .1198748 
      medium |  -.1325002   .0583554    -2.27   0.023    -.2468746   -.0181257 
       large |  -.1159601   .0775378    -1.50   0.135    -.2679314    .0360111 
  individual |   -.052015   .0604268    -0.86   0.389    -.1704494    .0664194 
 partnership |  -.0829512   .0653595    -1.27   0.204    -.2110536    .0451511 
   dummyyear |   .5813822   .0442478    13.14   0.000     .4946581    .6681063 
miningandq~g |   .0665536   .2406954     0.28   0.782    -.4052008     .538308 
construction |  -.0715248   .1158213    -0.62   0.537    -.2985305    .1554808 
manufactur~g |  -.0457261   .1057478    -0.43   0.665     -.252988    .1615358 
transports~t |  -.1661801   .1251975    -1.33   0.184    -.4115627    .0792024 
wholesaler~s |  -.0318474   .1044393    -0.30   0.760    -.2365446    .1728499 
realestate~s |  -.1641252   .1154917    -1.42   0.155    -.3904848    .0622343 
hotelsandr~s |  -.1530065   .1266648    -1.21   0.227     -.401265    .0952519 
dummyowner~r |  -.1207473   .0520663    -2.32   0.020    -.2227955   -.0186992 
        dum1 |  -.2174034   .1646886    -1.32   0.187    -.5401871    .1053804 
        dum2 |   .5806161    .212624     2.73   0.006     .1638807    .9973514 
        dum3 |   .2992184   .1900007     1.57   0.115     -.073176    .6716129 
        dum4 |  -.4191292   .1540594    -2.72   0.007      -.72108   -.1171783 
        dum5 |   .0322934   .1847526     0.17   0.861    -.3298151    .3944018 
        dum6 |  -.2202448   .1544911    -1.43   0.154    -.5230417    .0825522 
        dum7 |   .6104348    .156821     3.89   0.000     .3030712    .9177983 
        dum8 |   .0888272   .1428016     0.62   0.534    -.1910588    .3687132 
        dum9 |   .8630943    .229602     3.76   0.000     .4130827    1.313106 
       dum10 |   .0952166   .1507385     0.63   0.528    -.2002255    .3906587 
       dum11 |    .111004   .1584875     0.70   0.484    -.1996258    .4216338 
       dum12 |  -.3005526   .1648973    -1.82   0.068    -.6237454    .0226402 
       dum13 |   .2013936   .1651224     1.22   0.223    -.1222403    .5250275 
       dum14 |   .1005074    .155598     0.65   0.518     -.204459    .4054738 
       dum15 |  -.1293528   .1658597    -0.78   0.435    -.4544319    .1957262 
       dum16 |   .2055844   .2015403     1.02   0.308    -.1894274    .6005961 
       dum17 |  -.3912335   .1611511    -2.43   0.015    -.7070839   -.0753831 
       dum18 |  -.3123495   .1698552    -1.84   0.066    -.6452595    .0205604 
       dum19 |   .0907243   .1763123     0.51   0.607    -.2548415    .4362901 
       dum20 |   .6876494   .2101532     3.27   0.001     .2757567    1.099542 
       dum21 |   .2010243   .1526216     1.32   0.188    -.0981085    .5001572 
       dum22 |   .3150288   .1818578     1.73   0.083     -.041406    .6714635 
       dum23 |    .407323   .1767917     2.30   0.021     .0608176    .7538283 
       dum24 |  -.0329065   .1386142    -0.24   0.812    -.3045854    .2387723 
       dum25 |    .223479   .1825742     1.22   0.221    -.1343599    .5813179 
       _cons |   .8891141   .1955911     4.55   0.000     .5057625    1.272466 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
mills        | 
      lambda |   18.24455   8.163337     2.23   0.025     2.244701    34.24439 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |    0.85952 
       sigma |  21.226487 
      lambda |  18.244548   8.163337 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
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5.2 Heckman FIML “Missingness” 
 
 
REJECT; TAXRATE=-999$ 
REJECT; TRUSTING=-999$ 
REJECT; TRUSTINJ=-999$ 
REJECT; COMPLIAN=-999$ 
REJECT; CORRUPTI=-999$ 
 
PROBIT;Lhs=DUMMYRES;Rhs=ONE,TAXRATE,TRUSTING,TRUSTINJ,CORRUPTI,COMPLIAN,FOREIGN,MEDIUM,LARGE,INDI
VIDU,PARTNERS,DUMMYYEA,MININGAN,CONSTRUC,MANUFACT,TRANSPOR,WHOLESAL,REALESTA,HOTELSAN,DUMMYOWN,DU
M1,DUM2,DUM3,DUM4,DUM5,DUM6,DUM7,DUM8,DUM9,DUM10,DUM11,DUM12,DUM13,DUM14,DUM15,DUM16,DUM17,DUM18,
DUM19,DUM20,DUM21,DUM22,DUM23,DUM24,DUM25;Hold$ 
 
Normal exit from iterations. Exit status=0. 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Binomial Probit Model                       | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Apr 19, 2013 at 02:59:00AM.| 
| Dependent variable             DUMMYRES     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations            10303     | 
| Iterations completed                  7     | 
| Log likelihood function       -2062.206     | 
| Number of parameters                 45     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =           .40905     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =           .40909     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =           .44067     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =           .41974     | 
| Restricted log likelihood     -2282.566     | 
| McFadden Pseudo R-squared      .0965404     | 
| Chi squared                    440.7198     | 
| Degrees of freedom                   44     | 
| Prob[ChiSqd > value] =         .0000000     | 
| Results retained for SELECTION model.       | 
| Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-squared =   7.10753     | 
| P-value=  .52508 with deg.fr. =       8     | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Index function for probability 
 Constant|     .88911408       .19559111     4.546   .0000 
 TAXRATE |     .06840884       .02039147     3.355   .0008   2.78433466 
 TRUSTING|     .02275433       .01508102     1.509   .1313   3.87129962 
 TRUSTINJ|     .02910880       .01643424     1.771   .0765   3.44889838 
 CORRUPTI|     .03868353       .01567199     2.468   .0136   2.56498107 
 COMPLIAN|     .00128463       .00205789      .624   .5325   6.15966223 
 FOREIGN |    -.00227915       .06232461     -.037   .9708    .13500922 
 MEDIUM  |    -.13250016       .05835538    -2.271   .0232    .18208289 
 LARGE   |    -.11596013       .07753777    -1.496   .1348    .08696496 
 INDIVIDU|    -.05201499       .06042682     -.861   .3894    .40784238 
 PARTNERS|    -.08295121       .06535954    -1.269   .2044    .29418616 
 DUMMYYEA|     .58138218       .04424780    13.139   .0000    .62787538 
 MININGAN|     .06655359       .24069542      .277   .7822    .01019121 
 CONSTRUC|    -.07152486       .11582132     -.618   .5369    .11093856 
 MANUFACT|    -.04572612       .10574781     -.432   .6654    .34504513 
 TRANSPOR|    -.16618013       .12519750    -1.327   .1844    .06289430 
 WHOLESAL|    -.03184736       .10443929     -.305   .7604    .27593905 
 REALESTA|    -.16412521       .11549169    -1.421   .1553    .09298263 
 HOTELSAN|    -.15300655       .12666482    -1.208   .2271    .05425604 
 DUMMYOWN|    -.12074733       .05206634    -2.319   .0204    .31903329 
 DUM1    |    -.21740336       .16468863    -1.320   .1868    .02290595 
 DUM2    |     .58061607       .21262398     2.731   .0063    .02717655 
 DUM3    |     .29921842       .19000066     1.575   .1153    .02727361 
 DUM4    |    -.41912916       .15405939    -2.721   .0065    .03057362 
 DUM5    |     .03229338       .18475261      .175   .8612    .01970300 
 DUM6    |    -.22024476       .15449107    -1.426   .1540    .03096186 
 DUM7    |     .61043476       .15682103     3.893   .0001    .09822382 
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 DUM8    |     .08882719       .14280160      .622   .5339    .07221198 
 DUM9    |     .86309574       .22960217     3.759   .0002    .03581481 
 DUM10   |     .09521661       .15073853      .632   .5276    .05988547 
 DUM11   |     .11100402       .15848752      .700   .4837    .04241483 
 DUM12   |    -.30055259       .16489731    -1.823   .0684    .02310007 
 DUM13   |     .20139358       .16512238     1.220   .2226    .05299427 
 DUM14   |     .10050738       .15559795      .646   .5183    .04154130 
 DUM15   |    -.12935285       .16585970     -.780   .4355    .03018538 
 DUM16   |     .20558437       .20154031     1.020   .3077    .01941182 
 DUM17   |    -.39123350       .16115115    -2.428   .0152    .02581772 
 DUM18   |    -.31234955       .16985516    -1.839   .0659    .01941182 
 DUM19   |     .09072433       .17631232      .515   .6069    .02242065 
 DUM20   |     .68764956       .21015321     3.272   .0011    .03824129 
 DUM21   |     .20102432       .15262161     1.317   .1878    .06037077 
 DUM22   |     .31502876       .18185780     1.732   .0832    .03571775 
 DUM23   |     .40732296       .17679168     2.304   .0212    .03717364 
 DUM24   |    -.03290654       .13861421     -.237   .8123    .07366786 
 DUM25   |     .22347901       .18257424     1.224   .2209    .02591478 
 
+----------------------------------------+ 
| Fit Measures for Binomial Choice Model | 
| Probit   model for variable DUMMYRES   | 
+----------------------------------------+ 
| Proportions P0= .058041   P1= .941959  | 
| N =   10303 N0=     598   N1=    9705  | 
| LogL=    -2062.206 LogL0=   -2282.566  | 
| Estrella = 1-(L/L0)^(-2L0/n) = .04399  | 
+----------------------------------------+ 
|     Efron |  McFadden  |  Ben./Lerman  | 
|    .04594 |    .09654  |       .89584  | 
|    Cramer | Veall/Zim. |     Rsqrd_ML  | 
|    .04751 |    .13360  |       .04187  | 
+----------------------------------------+ 
| Information  Akaike I.C. Schwarz I.C.  | 
| Criteria         .40905        .44067  | 
+----------------------------------------+ 
+---------------------------------------------------------+ 
|Predictions for Binary Choice Model.  Predicted value is | 
|1 when probability is greater than  .500000, 0 otherwise.| 
|Note, column or row total percentages may not sum to     | 
|100% because of rounding. Percentages are of full sample.| 
+------+---------------------------------+----------------+ 
|Actual|         Predicted Value         |                | 
|Value |       0                1        | Total Actual   | 
+------+----------------+----------------+----------------+ 
|  0   |      0 (   .0%)|    598 (  5.8%)|    598 (  5.8%)| 
|  1   |      0 (   .0%)|   9705 ( 94.2%)|   9705 ( 94.2%)| 
+------+----------------+----------------+----------------+ 
|Total |      0 (   .0%)|  10303 (100.0%)|  10303 (100.0%)| 
+------+----------------+----------------+----------------+ 
 
======================================================================= 
Analysis of Binary Choice Model Predictions Based on Threshold =  .5000 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Prediction Success 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sensitivity = actual 1s correctly predicted                    100.000% 
Specificity = actual 0s correctly predicted                       .000% 
Positive predictive value = predicted 1s that were actual 1s    94.196% 
Negative predictive value = predicted 0s that were actual 0s      .000% 
Correct prediction = actual 1s and 0s correctly predicted       94.196% 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Prediction Failure 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
False pos. for true neg. = actual 0s predicted as 1s           100.000% 
False neg. for true pos. = actual 1s predicted as 0s              .000% 
False pos. for predicted pos. = predicted 1s actual 0s           5.804% 
False neg. for predicted neg. = predicted 0s actual 1s            .000% 
False predictions = actual 1s and 0s incorrectly predicted       5.804% 
======================================================================= 
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SELECTION;Lhs=TAXEVASI;Rhs=ONE,TAXRATE,TRUSTING,TRUSTINJ,CORRUPTI,COMPLIAN,FOREIGN,MEDIUM,LARGE,I
NDIVIDU,PARTNERS,MININGAN,CONSTRUC,MANUFACT,TRANSPOR,WHOLESAL,REALESTA,HOTELSAN,DUMMYYEA,DUM1,DUM
2,DUM3,DUM4,DUM5,DUM6,DUM7,DUM8,DUM9,DUM10,DUM11,DUM12,DUM13,DUM14,DUM15,DUM16,DUM17,DUM18,DUM19,
DUM20,DUM21,DUM22,DUM23,DUM24,DUM25;MLE;Tobit$ 
 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 
| Sample Selection Model                                   | 
| Probit selection equation based on DUMMYRES              | 
| Selection rule is: Observations with DUMMYRES =  1       | 
| Results of selection:                                    | 
|                   Data points     Sum of weights         | 
| Data set             10303            10303.0            | 
| Selected sample       9705             9705.0            | 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 
 
+----------------------------------------------------+ 
| Sample Selection Model                             | 
| Two step    least squares regression               | 
| Model was estimated Apr 19, 2013 at 03:01:34AM     | 
| LHS=TAXEVASI Mean                 =   13.29500     | 
|              Standard deviation   =   21.30745     | 
| WTS=none     Number of observs.   =       9705     | 
| Model size   Parameters           =         45     | 
|              Degrees of freedom   =       9660     | 
| Residuals    Sum of squares       =   3772081.     | 
|              Standard error of e  =   19.76068     | 
| Fit          R-squared            =   .1398270     | 
|              Adjusted R-squared   =   .1359090     | 
| Model test   F[ 44,  9660] (prob) =  35.69 (.0000) | 
| Diagnostic   Log likelihood       =  -42705.00     | 
|              Restricted(b=0)      =  -43458.44     | 
|              Chi-sq [ 44]  (prob) =1506.89 (.0000) | 
| Info criter. LogAmemiya Prd. Crt. =   5.972014     | 
|              Akaike Info. Criter. =   5.972014     | 
| Not using OLS or no constant. Rsqd & F may be < 0. | 
| Standard error corrected for selection..  21.22649 | 
| Correlation of disturbance in regression           | 
| and Selection Criterion (Rho)...........    .85952 | 
+----------------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
 Constant|    10.1716011      3.03003798     3.357   .0008 
 TAXRATE |     .89349442       .23358919     3.825   .0001   2.79845440 
 TRUSTING|    -.34547971       .15887104    -2.175   .0297   3.87140649 
 TRUSTINJ|    -.53778563       .17268353    -3.114   .0018   3.45234415 
 CORRUPTI|    2.90315220       .16446851    17.652   .0000   2.57207625 
 COMPLIAN|     .08121929       .02072056     3.920   .0001   6.15456981 
 FOREIGN |   -2.51382581       .65288492    -3.850   .0001    .13353941 
 MEDIUM  |   -3.21764691       .60433756    -5.324   .0000    .18093766 
 LARGE   |   -3.97741516       .81992394    -4.851   .0000    .08603812 
 INDIVIDU|    2.84836123       .62399129     4.565   .0000    .41040701 
 PARTNERS|     .90685256       .67710227     1.339   .1805    .29386914 
 MININGAN|   -4.17860640      2.34039207    -1.785   .0742    .01030397 
 CONSTRUC|   -1.67722642      1.17900910    -1.423   .1549    .11076765 
 MANUFACT|   -1.71092447      1.06644908    -1.604   .1086    .34930448 
 TRANSPOR|   -3.53960925      1.32491364    -2.672   .0075    .06213292 
 WHOLESAL|   -1.65733601      1.06034377    -1.563   .1180    .27594024 
 REALESTA|   -1.44540245      1.23302139    -1.172   .2411    .09088099 
 HOTELSAN|    1.77628844      1.37063414     1.296   .1950    .05296239 
 DUMMYYEA|   -2.95411580      1.05272404    -2.806   .0050    .64451314 
 DUM1    |    3.54483929      2.00490066     1.768   .0770    .02153529 
 DUM2    |    3.24523035      1.95609989     1.659   .0971    .02823287 
 DUM3    |    5.09331029      1.88343108     2.704   .0068    .02802679 
 DUM4    |   -6.71170477      2.05527776    -3.266   .0011    .02771767 
 DUM5    |    4.28580202      2.01142112     2.131   .0331    .01947450 
 DUM6    |   -3.08830642      1.89605520    -1.629   .1034    .02895415 
 DUM7    |   -3.78176267      1.65151430    -2.290   .0220    .10221535 
 DUM8    |   -4.74587502      1.54210726    -3.078   .0021    .07212777 
 DUM9    |   -5.34203406      1.98352782    -2.693   .0071    .03760948 
 DUM10   |   -2.35838166      1.61414749    -1.461   .1440    .06007213 
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 DUM11   |   -2.24521210      1.69979686    -1.321   .1865    .04214323 
 DUM12   |   -7.79674682      2.09692395    -3.718   .0002    .02143225 
 DUM13   |   -4.43359527      1.67905588    -2.641   .0083    .05430191 
 DUM14   |   -1.23507789      1.68682443     -.732   .4641    .04121587 
 DUM15   |   -1.26953953      1.82245717     -.697   .4860    .02998454 
 DUM16   |   -4.76587410      2.04843209    -2.327   .0200    .01968058 
 DUM17   |   -5.83035318      2.09057269    -2.789   .0053    .02400824 
 DUM18   |   -8.95083826      2.17091070    -4.123   .0000    .01803194 
 DUM19   |    9.69596662      1.95792888     4.952   .0000    .02225657 
 DUM20   |   -8.53795364      1.88378634    -4.532   .0000    .03997939 
 DUM21   |   -6.08457153      1.60575242    -3.789   .0002    .06151468 
 DUM22   |   -2.40559563      1.78541802    -1.347   .1779    .03668212 
 DUM23   |   -9.06199048      1.82071017    -4.977   .0000    .03812468 
 DUM24   |    -.84066250      1.52876025     -.550   .5824    .07202473 
 DUM25   |     .04636715      1.89435177      .024   .9805    .02617208 
 LAMBDA  |    18.2445494      8.16333619     2.235   .0254    .11246877 
 
Maximum iterations reached. Exit iterations with status=1. 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| ML Estimates of Selection Model             | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Apr 19, 2013 at 03:02:38AM.| 
| Dependent variable             TAXEVASI     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations            10303     | 
| Iterations completed                101     | 
| Log likelihood function       -25706.15     | 
| Number of parameters                 91     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          5.00770     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          5.00786     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          5.07164     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          5.02931     | 
| LHS is CENSORED. Tobit Model fit by MLE.    | 
| FIRST 45 estimates are probit equation.     | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+ 
---------+Selection (probit) equation for DUMMYRES 
 Constant|     .88897707       .36066273     2.465   .0137 
 TAXRATE |     .06735478       .03662471     1.839   .0659 
 TRUSTING|     .02269844       .02713249      .837   .4028 
 TRUSTINJ|     .02834806       .02981066      .951   .3416 
 CORRUPTI|     .03893470       .02914702     1.336   .1816 
 COMPLIAN|     .00117409       .00384305      .306   .7600 
 FOREIGN |    -.00380159       .11174554     -.034   .9729 
 MEDIUM  |    -.13412232       .10645932    -1.260   .2077 
 LARGE   |    -.11783418       .13776642     -.855   .3924 
 INDIVIDU|    -.04905374       .10937479     -.448   .6538 
 PARTNERS|    -.08224272       .12140622     -.677   .4981 
 DUMMYYEA|     .58144237       .08717611     6.670   .0000 
 MININGAN|     .06844246       .46513203      .147   .8830 
 CONSTRUC|    -.06980868       .21188531     -.329   .7418 
 MANUFACT|    -.04296358       .19423967     -.221   .8249 
 TRANSPOR|    -.16306744       .22586458     -.722   .4703 
 WHOLESAL|    -.02894247       .19132016     -.151   .8798 
 REALESTA|    -.16011073       .20803006     -.770   .4415 
 HOTELSAN|    -.15435754       .22619279     -.682   .4950 
 DUMMYOWN|    -.13086079       .09589054    -1.365   .1724 
 DUM1    |    -.20807685       .28077830     -.741   .4586 
 DUM2    |     .56835734       .45733509     1.243   .2140 
 DUM3    |     .30864030       .38136507      .809   .4183 
 DUM4    |    -.41369019       .26429920    -1.565   .1175 
 DUM5    |     .03012563       .33227772      .091   .9278 
 DUM6    |    -.21761733       .26424145     -.824   .4102 
 DUM7    |     .62371310       .31437688     1.984   .0473 
 DUM8    |     .09699882       .25824561      .376   .7072 
 DUM9    |     .86911536       .54776186     1.587   .1126 
 DUM10   |     .10581619       .27606088      .383   .7015 
 DUM11   |     .12137578       .28426705      .427   .6694 
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 DUM12   |    -.29419673       .27909076    -1.054   .2918 
 DUM13   |     .20937316       .31530835      .664   .5067 
 DUM14   |     .10994102       .28189301      .390   .6965 
 DUM15   |    -.12563634       .30146925     -.417   .6769 
 DUM16   |     .20965577       .38907558      .539   .5900 
 DUM17   |    -.38466603       .27503534    -1.399   .1619 
 DUM18   |    -.30831337       .28944548    -1.065   .2868 
 DUM19   |     .08927026       .32503741      .275   .7836 
 DUM20   |     .68952669       .46633679     1.479   .1392 
 DUM21   |     .20180489       .28822995      .700   .4838 
 DUM22   |     .32670395       .35602750      .918   .3588 
 DUM23   |     .40716197       .34712015     1.173   .2408 
 DUM24   |    -.02474315       .24658783     -.100   .9201 
 DUM25   |     .21950420       .34282691      .640   .5220 
---------+Corrected regression, Regime 1 
 Constant|   -14.0848618      6.18163112    -2.279   .0227 
 TAXRATE |    2.61286141       .49426405     5.286   .0000 
 TRUSTING|    -.74913443       .32880441    -2.278   .0227 
 TRUSTINJ|   -1.24635901       .36386948    -3.425   .0006 
 CORRUPTI|    7.11457236       .36175626    19.667   .0000 
 COMPLIAN|     .13491039       .04086117     3.302   .0010 
 FOREIGN |   -6.37582282      1.42218836    -4.483   .0000 
 MEDIUM  |   -7.65119090      1.30879085    -5.846   .0000 
 LARGE   |   -10.3780362      1.78410956    -5.817   .0000 
 INDIVIDU|    7.01128102      1.32675282     5.285   .0000 
 PARTNERS|    2.87496359      1.44658958     1.987   .0469 
 MININGAN|   -9.93933661      5.49648848    -1.808   .0706 
 CONSTRUC|   -3.14060877      2.44991152    -1.282   .1999 
 MANUFACT|   -2.87249779      2.21097805    -1.299   .1939 
 TRANSPOR|   -7.29673221      2.79380670    -2.612   .0090 
 WHOLESAL|   -3.38284666      2.19169762    -1.543   .1227 
 REALESTA|   -3.04363269      2.52266585    -1.207   .2276 
 HOTELSAN|    4.54398685      2.82944526     1.606   .1083 
 DUMMYYEA|   -9.99561912      2.09620285    -4.768   .0000 
 DUM1    |    9.38926071      3.73678860     2.513   .0120 
 DUM2    |    3.98817326      3.77836158     1.056   .2912 
 DUM3    |    10.9556927      3.88426271     2.821   .0048 
 DUM4    |   -4.51064961      4.32235679    -1.044   .2967 
 DUM5    |    5.65069019      3.64321016     1.551   .1209 
 DUM6    |    2.50873612      3.82605746      .656   .5120 
 DUM7    |   -4.28921671      3.30741908    -1.297   .1947 
 DUM8    |   -13.0144845      2.94075872    -4.426   .0000 
 DUM9    |   -15.3392788      3.86348027    -3.970   .0001 
 DUM10   |    -.22854958      3.20694769     -.071   .9432 
 DUM11   |    2.28305452      3.41645653      .668   .5040 
 DUM12   |   -8.93393702      4.55792864    -1.960   .0500 
 DUM13   |   -8.98327254      3.43508216    -2.615   .0089 
 DUM14   |    -.58854187      3.26351888     -.180   .8569 
 DUM15   |    2.12765555      3.75625423      .566   .5711 
 DUM16   |   -8.24126025      4.29302604    -1.920   .0549 
 DUM17   |   -3.69957817      4.12759039     -.896   .3701 
 DUM18   |   -7.12381769      5.28597325    -1.348   .1778 
 DUM19   |    16.4238548      3.94696595     4.161   .0000 
 DUM20   |   -19.4201462      3.97666760    -4.884   .0000 
 DUM21   |   -15.0230598      3.14699097    -4.774   .0000 
 DUM22   |   -6.87910220      3.46854331    -1.983   .0473 
 DUM23   |   -26.2921892      3.86282263    -6.806   .0000 
 DUM24   |    -.94480640      2.90044409     -.326   .7446 
 DUM25   |     .42402764      3.67668085      .115   .9082 
 SIGMA(1)|    37.7134068       .64975820    58.042   .0000 
 RHO(1,2)|     .12335981       .45711432      .270   .7873 
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5.3 Heckman Two Step “Truthfulness” 
 
 
heckman taxevasion taxrate trustingovernment trustinjudicalsystem corruption1 compliancecost 
foreign medium large individual partnership miningandquarrying construction manufacturing 
transportstorageandcommunicat wholesaleretailrepairs realestaterentingandbusines 
hotelsandrestaurants dummyyear dum1 dum2 dum3 dum4 dum5 dum6 dum7 dum8 dum9 dum10 dum11 dum12 
dum13 dum14 dum15 dum16 dum17 dum18 dum19 dum20 dum21 dum22 dum23 dum24 dum25, select 
(externalauditor = taxrate trustingovernment trustinjudicalsystem corruption1 compliancecost 
foreign medium large individual  partnership miningandquarrying construction manufacturing 
transportstorageandcommunicat wholesaleretailrepairs realestaterentingandbusines 
hotelsandrestaurants  dummyyear intaccountingstandards dum1 dum2 dum3 dum4 dum5 dum6 dum7 dum8 
dum9 dum10 dum11 dum12 dum13 dum14 dum15 dum16 dum17 dum18 dum19 dum20 dum21 dum22 dum23 dum24 
dum25) twostep 
 
Heckman selection model -- two-step estimates   Number of obs      =      8818 
(regression model with sample selection)        Censored obs       =      4687 
                                                Uncensored obs     =      4131 
 
                                                Wald chi2(43)      =    753.65 
                                                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
taxevasion   | 
     taxrate |   .8094216   .2989993     2.71   0.007     .2233938    1.395449 
trustingov~t |  -.9675227   .2197863    -4.40   0.000    -1.398296   -.5367495 
trustinjud~m |  -.6930248    .233711    -2.97   0.003     -1.15109   -.2349597 
 corruption1 |   2.307742   .2183714    10.57   0.000     1.879742    2.735742 
compliance~t |   .0765083   .0278454     2.75   0.006     .0219323    .1310843 
     foreign |  -2.557567   .8802701    -2.91   0.004    -4.282865   -.8322692 
      medium |  -3.271967   1.008885    -3.24   0.001    -5.249345   -1.294588 
       large |  -3.455246   1.337567    -2.58   0.010    -6.076829   -.8336627 
  individual |   3.263161   1.009633     3.23   0.001     1.284317    5.242004 
 partnership |   1.776103   .8886609     2.00   0.046     .0343601    3.517847 
miningandq~g |  -1.605953   3.122749    -0.51   0.607    -7.726429    4.514523 
construction |   .5054425   1.843479     0.27   0.784     -3.10771    4.118595 
manufactur~g |  -.7574353     1.7155    -0.44   0.659    -4.119754    2.604883 
transports~t |  -3.673249   1.990375    -1.85   0.065    -7.574313    .2278144 
wholesaler~s |  -1.513416   1.716093    -0.88   0.378    -4.876897    1.850065 
realestate~s |   .8869872    1.91459     0.46   0.643     -2.86554    4.639515 
hotelsandr~s |   4.351797   2.116103     2.06   0.040     .2043105    8.499283 
   dummyyear |  -4.306893   .6436306    -6.69   0.000    -5.568386   -3.045401 
        dum1 |   5.738142   3.109864     1.85   0.065    -.3570785    11.83336 
        dum2 |  -1.821747   2.811368    -0.65   0.517    -7.331927    3.688432 
        dum3 |   3.646794   2.627603     1.39   0.165    -1.503213    8.796802 
        dum4 |  -4.599763   2.674749    -1.72   0.085    -9.842175    .6426493 
        dum5 |   7.416862   2.988012     2.48   0.013     1.560466    13.27326 
        dum6 |   .4468276   2.701603     0.17   0.869    -4.848216    5.741871 
        dum7 |  -6.468991   2.146379    -3.01   0.003    -10.67582   -2.262166 
        dum8 |  -4.795209   2.166564    -2.21   0.027    -9.041595   -.5488225 
        dum9 |  -8.189382   2.403032    -3.41   0.001    -12.89924   -3.479525 
       dum10 |   -2.64427   2.315555    -1.14   0.253    -7.182675    1.894135 
       dum11 |   .5699639   2.454419     0.23   0.816    -4.240609    5.380537 
       dum12 |  -5.312078    2.81131    -1.89   0.059    -10.82214    .1979881 
       dum13 |  -3.302947    2.50521    -1.32   0.187    -8.213068    1.607174 
       dum14 |  -2.006928   2.411774    -0.83   0.405    -6.733918    2.720062 
       dum15 |  -.4266553    3.26304    -0.13   0.896    -6.822097    5.968786 
       dum16 |  -3.830487   2.746536    -1.39   0.163    -9.213598    1.552624 
       dum17 |  -2.443622   2.654572    -0.92   0.357    -7.646488    2.759244 
       dum18 |   -6.25754    2.80289    -2.23   0.026     -11.7511   -.7639775 
       dum19 |   9.722569   2.679073     3.63   0.000     4.471683    14.97345 
       dum20 |   -9.96307   2.442909    -4.08   0.000    -14.75108   -5.175056 
       dum21 |  -9.071387   2.313259    -3.92   0.000    -13.60529   -4.537482 
       dum22 |  -.5412185   2.473285    -0.22   0.827    -5.388768    4.306331 
       dum23 |  -8.268938   2.401325    -3.44   0.001    -12.97545   -3.562427 
       dum24 |  -2.251703   2.204009    -1.02   0.307    -6.571482    2.068076 
       dum25 |   1.499411   3.185368     0.47   0.638    -4.743796    7.742618 
       _cons |   15.82377   3.652178     4.33   0.000     8.665637    22.98191 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
externalau~r | 
     taxrate |  -.0249547   .0145363    -1.72   0.086    -.0534454     .003536 
trustingov~t |   .0277363   .0106302     2.61   0.009     .0069015     .048571 
trustinjud~m |   .0080318   .0114861     0.70   0.484    -.0144807    .0305442 
 corruption1 |   .0117657   .0106986     1.10   0.271    -.0092032    .0327345 
compliance~t |   .0040778   .0014254     2.86   0.004     .0012841    .0068715 
     foreign |   .3997187   .0465819     8.58   0.000     .3084198    .4910175 
      medium |   .6071773   .0401937    15.11   0.000     .5283991    .6859554 
       large |   .9552553   .0601285    15.89   0.000     .8374056    1.073105 
  individual |  -.4047327   .0423903    -9.55   0.000    -.4878162   -.3216493 
 partnership |  -.1722183   .0456706    -3.77   0.000    -.2617311   -.0827055 
miningandq~g |   .1980186    .166153     1.19   0.233    -.1276352    .5236725 
construction |   .1304984   .0821691     1.59   0.112    -.0305501     .291547 
manufactur~g |   .1938462   .0748007     2.59   0.010     .0472396    .3404529 
transports~t |   .1529952   .0914878     1.67   0.094    -.0263177     .332308 
wholesaler~s |   .1122301     .07463     1.50   0.133    -.0340419    .2585021 
realestate~s |   .0098056   .0846719     0.12   0.908    -.1561483    .1757595 
hotelsandr~s |    .005824    .095112     0.06   0.951    -.1805922    .1922402 
   dummyyear |   .0750849   .0327849     2.29   0.022     .0108276    .1393422 
intaccount~s |   .5852748   .0382246    15.31   0.000     .5103559    .6601937 
        dum1 |    -.11879   .1395351    -0.85   0.395    -.3922739    .1546938 
        dum2 |  -.2542764   .1272255    -2.00   0.046    -.5036339    -.004919 
        dum3 |   1.393116   .1315364    10.59   0.000     1.135309    1.650923 
        dum4 |  -.2556223   .1264457    -2.02   0.043    -.5034513   -.0077933 
        dum5 |   .2758946   .1424794     1.94   0.053    -.0033599     .555149 
        dum6 |   .0002757   .1242952     0.00   0.998    -.2433385    .2438898 
        dum7 |   .2120118   .1006649     2.11   0.035     .0147122    .4093114 
        dum8 |   .1195598   .1021535     1.17   0.242    -.0806574    .3197771 
        dum9 |   .4249124    .115353     3.68   0.000     .1988247    .6510001 
       dum10 |   .9870306   .1117515     8.83   0.000     .7680017    1.206059 
       dum11 |   .1849354   .1158192     1.60   0.110     -.042066    .4119369 
       dum12 |   .3263935   .1382641     2.36   0.018     .0554009    .5973862 
       dum13 |  -.4079611   .1120553    -3.64   0.000    -.6275854   -.1883367 
       dum14 |   .2148363   .1135017     1.89   0.058    -.0076229    .4372956 
       dum15 |  -.7778453   .1286509    -6.05   0.000    -1.029996   -.5256942 
       dum16 |   .8454108   .1434449     5.89   0.000     .5642641    1.126558 
       dum17 |   .2373311   .1301862     1.82   0.068    -.0178293    .4924914 
       dum18 |   1.249949   .1752608     7.13   0.000     .9064437    1.593453 
       dum19 |   1.126775   .1380217     8.16   0.000     .8562577    1.397293 
       dum20 |   .1989823   .1122906     1.77   0.076    -.0211032    .4190679 
       dum21 |  -.1050034   .1047212    -1.00   0.316    -.3102532    .1002464 
       dum22 |   .6821171   .1162976     5.87   0.000      .454178    .9100563 
       dum23 |   .5982267   .1161302     5.15   0.000     .3706156    .8258377 
       dum24 |   .1114045   .1027988     1.08   0.278    -.0900775    .3128864 
       dum25 |  -.3229171    .128378    -2.52   0.012    -.5745334   -.0713007 
       _cons |  -.7721986   .1410199    -5.48   0.000    -1.048592   -.4958047 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
mills        | 
      lambda |   .3788884   1.909411     0.20   0.843    -3.363488    4.121265 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |    0.01994 
       sigma |  18.999327 
      lambda |  .37888845   1.909411 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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5.4 Heckman FIML “Truthfulness” 
 
 
REJECT; TAXRATE=-999$ 
REJECT; TAXEVASI=-999$ 
REJECT; TRUSTING=-999$ 
REJECT; TRUSTINJ=-999$ 
REJECT; COMPLAIN=-999$ 
REJECT; CORRUPTI=-999$ 
REJECT; FOREIGN=-999$ 
REJECT; COMPLIAN=-999$ 
REJECT; MEDIUM=-999$ 
REJECT; LARGE=-999$ 
REJECT; INTACCOU=-999$ 
REJECT; EXTERNAL=-999$ 
 
PROBIT;Lhs=EXTERNAL;Rhs=ONE,TAXRATE,TRUSTING,TRUSTINJ,CORRUPTI,COMPLIAN,FOREIGN,MEDIUM,LARGE,MINI
NGAN,CONSTRUC,MANUFACT,TRANSPOR,WHOLESAL,REALESTA,HOTELSAN,INDIVIDU,PARTNERS,INTACCOU,DUM1,DUM2,D
UM3,DUM4,DUM5,DUM6,DUM7,DUM8,DUM9,DUM10,DUM11,DUM12,DUM13,DUM14,DUM15,DUM16,DUM17,DUM18,DUM19,DUM
20,DUM21,DUM22,DUM23,DUM24,DUM25,DUMMYYEA;Hold$ 
 
Normal exit from iterations. Exit status=0. 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Binomial Probit Model                       | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Apr 19, 2013 at 04:17:34AM.| 
| Dependent variable             EXTERNAL     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             8818     | 
| Iterations completed                  5     | 
| Log likelihood function       -4895.352     | 
| Number of parameters                 45     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          1.12052     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          1.12057     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          1.15667     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          1.13283     | 
| Restricted log likelihood     -6094.632     | 
| McFadden Pseudo R-squared      .1967763     | 
| Chi squared                    2398.558     | 
| Degrees of freedom                   44     | 
| Prob[ChiSqd > value] =         .0000000     | 
| Results retained for SELECTION model.       | 
| Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-squared =  36.13683     | 
| P-value=  .00002 with deg.fr. =       8     | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Index function for probability 
 Constant|    -.77219858       .14101987    -5.476   .0000 
 TAXRATE |    -.02495466       .01453634    -1.717   .0860   2.79734634 
 TRUSTING|     .02773626       .01063015     2.609   .0091   3.87672942 
 TRUSTINJ|     .00803176       .01148615      .699   .4844   3.45214334 
 CORRUPTI|     .01176565       .01069861     1.100   .2714   2.56951690 
 COMPLIAN|     .00407781       .00142538     2.861   .0042   6.16845090 
 FOREIGN |     .39971868       .04658191     8.581   .0000    .13721932 
 MEDIUM  |     .60717726       .04019365    15.106   .0000    .18360172 
 LARGE   |     .95525528       .06012849    15.887   .0000    .08981628 
 MININGAN|     .19801864       .16615297     1.192   .2333    .01009299 
 CONSTRUC|     .13049844       .08216912     1.588   .1122    .11113631 
 MANUFACT|     .19384625       .07480069     2.592   .0096    .35257428 
 TRANSPOR|     .15299518       .09148783     1.672   .0945    .06180540 
 WHOLESAL|     .11223009       .07462996     1.504   .1326    .27421184 
 REALESTA|     .00980559       .08467191      .116   .9078    .09049671 
 HOTELSAN|     .00582402       .09511204      .061   .9512    .05284645 
 INDIVIDU|    -.40473275       .04239028    -9.548   .0000    .40927648 
 PARTNERS|    -.17221828       .04567063    -3.771   .0002    .29371740 
 INTACCOU|     .58527484       .03822464    15.311   .0000    .26559311 
 DUM1    |    -.11879003       .13953515     -.851   .3946    .01893853 
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 DUM2    |    -.25427643       .12722553    -1.999   .0456    .02721706 
 DUM3    |    1.39311596       .13153641    10.591   .0000    .02869131 
 DUM4    |    -.25562230       .12644568    -2.022   .0432    .02755727 
 DUM5    |     .27589455       .14247938     1.936   .0528    .01587662 
 DUM6    |     .00027565       .12429523      .002   .9982    .02971195 
 DUM7    |     .21201179       .10066493     2.106   .0352    .10217736 
 DUM8    |     .11955982       .10215354     1.170   .2418    .07654797 
 DUM9    |     .42491243       .11535299     3.684   .0002    .03923792 
 DUM10   |     .98703058       .11175149     8.832   .0000    .05534135 
 DUM11   |     .18493542       .11581918     1.597   .1103    .04275346 
 DUM12   |     .32639355       .13826407     2.361   .0182    .01950556 
 DUM13   |    -.40796109       .11205530    -3.641   .0003    .05284645 
 DUM14   |     .21483634       .11350171     1.893   .0584    .04241325 
 DUM15   |    -.77784530       .12865089    -6.046   .0000    .03039238 
 DUM16   |     .84541082       .14344486     5.894   .0000    .01814470 
 DUM17   |     .23733105       .13018624     1.823   .0683    .02370152 
 DUM18   |    1.24994853       .17526077     7.132   .0000    .01735087 
 DUM19   |    1.12677519       .13802168     8.164   .0000    .02381492 
 DUM20   |     .19898235       .11229063     1.772   .0764    .04286686 
 DUM21   |    -.10500340       .10472122    -1.003   .3160    .06486732 
 DUM22   |     .68211713       .11629762     5.865   .0000    .03538217 
 DUM23   |     .59822668       .11613022     5.151   .0000    .03674303 
 DUM24   |     .11140446       .10279879     1.084   .2785    .07269222 
 DUM25   |    -.32291706       .12837803    -2.515   .0119    .02755727 
 DUMMYYEA|     .07508491       .03278493     2.290   .0220    .64413699 
 
 
+----------------------------------------+ 
| Fit Measures for Binomial Choice Model | 
| Probit   model for variable EXTERNAL   | 
+----------------------------------------+ 
| Proportions P0= .531526   P1= .468474  | 
| N =    8818 N0=    4687   N1=    4131  | 
| LogL=    -4895.352 LogL0=   -6094.632  | 
| Estrella = 1-(L/L0)^(-2L0/n) = .26132  | 
+----------------------------------------+ 
|     Efron |  McFadden  |  Ben./Lerman  | 
|    .25013 |    .19678  |       .62502  | 
|    Cramer | Veall/Zim. |     Rsqrd_ML  | 
|    .24705 |    .36854  |       .23815  | 
+----------------------------------------+ 
| Information  Akaike I.C. Schwarz I.C.  | 
| Criteria        1.12052       1.15667  | 
+----------------------------------------+ 
+---------------------------------------------------------+ 
|Predictions for Binary Choice Model.  Predicted value is | 
|1 when probability is greater than  .500000, 0 otherwise.| 
|Note, column or row total percentages may not sum to     | 
|100% because of rounding. Percentages are of full sample.| 
+------+---------------------------------+----------------+ 
|Actual|         Predicted Value         |                | 
|Value |       0                1        | Total Actual   | 
+------+----------------+----------------+----------------+ 
|  0   |   3738 ( 42.4%)|    949 ( 10.8%)|   4687 ( 53.2%)| 
|  1   |   1489 ( 16.9%)|   2642 ( 30.0%)|   4131 ( 46.8%)| 
+------+----------------+----------------+----------------+ 
|Total |   5227 ( 59.3%)|   3591 ( 40.7%)|   8818 (100.0%)| 
+------+----------------+----------------+----------------+ 
 
======================================================================= 
Analysis of Binary Choice Model Predictions Based on Threshold =  .5000 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Prediction Success 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sensitivity = actual 1s correctly predicted                     63.955% 
Specificity = actual 0s correctly predicted                     79.753% 
Positive predictive value = predicted 1s that were actual 1s    73.573% 
Negative predictive value = predicted 0s that were actual 0s    71.513% 
Correct prediction = actual 1s and 0s correctly predicted       72.352% 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Prediction Failure 
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----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
False pos. for true neg. = actual 0s predicted as 1s            20.247% 
False neg. for true pos. = actual 1s predicted as 0s            36.045% 
False pos. for predicted pos. = predicted 1s actual 0s          26.427% 
False neg. for predicted neg. = predicted 0s actual 1s          28.487% 
False predictions = actual 1s and 0s incorrectly predicted      27.648% 
======================================================================= 
 
SELECTION;Lhs=TAXEVASI;Rhs=ONE,TAXRATE,TRUSTING,TRUSTINJ,COMPLIAN,CORRUPTI,FOREIGN,MEDIUM,LARGE,M
ININGAN,CONSTRUC,MANUFACT,TRANSPOR,WHOLESAL,REALESTA,HOTELSAN,INDIVIDU,PARTNERS,DUMMYYEA,DUM1,DUM
2,DUM3,DUM4,DUM5,DUM6,DUM7,DUM8,DUM9,DUM10,DUM11,DUM12,DUM13,DUM14,DUM15,DUM16,DUM17,DUM18,DUM19,
DUM20,DUM21,DUM22,DUM23,DUM24,DUM25;MLE;Tobit$ 
 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 
| Sample Selection Model                                   | 
| Probit selection equation based on EXTERNAL              | 
| Selection rule is: Observations with EXTERNAL =  1       | 
| Results of selection:                                    | 
|                   Data points     Sum of weights         | 
| Data set              8818             8818.0            | 
| Selected sample       4131             4131.0            | 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 
 
+----------------------------------------------------+ 
| Sample Selection Model                             | 
| Two step    least squares regression               | 
| Model was estimated Apr 19, 2013 at 04:18:34AM     | 
| LHS=TAXEVASI Mean                 =   11.90317     | 
|              Standard deviation   =   20.71588     | 
| WTS=none     Number of observs.   =       4131     | 
| Model size   Parameters           =         45     | 
|              Degrees of freedom   =       4086     | 
| Residuals    Sum of squares       =   1474628.     | 
|              Standard error of e  =   18.99730     | 
| Fit          R-squared            =   .1588325     | 
|              Adjusted R-squared   =   .1497744     | 
| Model test   F[ 44,  4086] (prob) =  17.53 (.0000) | 
| Diagnostic   Log likelihood       =  -18001.90     | 
|              Restricted(b=0)      =  -18381.78     | 
|              Chi-sq [ 44]  (prob) = 759.76 (.0000) | 
| Info criter. LogAmemiya Prd. Crt. =   5.899429     | 
|              Akaike Info. Criter. =   5.899428     | 
| Not using OLS or no constant. Rsqd & F may be < 0. | 
| Standard error corrected for selection..  18.99933 | 
| Correlation of disturbance in regression           | 
| and Selection Criterion (Rho)...........    .01994 | 
+----------------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
 Constant|    15.8237748      3.65217838     4.333   .0000 
 TAXRATE |     .80942163       .29899926     2.707   .0068   2.76978940 
 TRUSTING|    -.96752267       .21978628    -4.402   .0000   4.03001695 
 TRUSTINJ|    -.69302477       .23371096    -2.965   .0030   3.54829339 
 COMPLIAN|     .07650831       .02784539     2.748   .0060   6.83710966 
 CORRUPTI|    2.30774220       .21837137    10.568   .0000   2.55700799 
 FOREIGN |   -2.55756685       .88027011    -2.905   .0037    .21132898 
 MEDIUM  |   -3.27196659      1.00888517    -3.243   .0012    .25901719 
 LARGE   |   -3.45524571      1.33756691    -2.583   .0098    .15468410 
 MININGAN|   -1.60595331      3.12274918     -.514   .6071    .01282982 
 CONSTRUC|     .50544253      1.84347883      .274   .7839    .11571048 
 MANUFACT|    -.75743533      1.71550019     -.442   .6588    .38634713 
 TRANSPOR|   -3.67324911      1.99037509    -1.846   .0650    .06656984 
 WHOLESAL|   -1.51341583      1.71609316     -.882   .3778    .25538611 
 REALESTA|     .88698724      1.91459004      .463   .6432    .08206245 
 HOTELSAN|    4.35179697      2.11610342     2.057   .0397    .04647785 
 INDIVIDU|    3.26316076      1.00963260     3.232   .0012    .30065359 
 PARTNERS|    1.77610342       .88866086     1.999   .0456    .35366739 
 DUMMYYEA|   -4.30689329       .64363058    -6.692   .0000    .61776809 
 DUM1    |    5.73814230      3.10986366     1.845   .0650    .01428226 
 DUM2    |   -1.82174747      2.81136782     -.648   .5170    .02009199 
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 DUM3    |    3.64679441      2.62760293     1.388   .1652    .05083515 
 DUM4    |   -4.59976287      2.67474926    -1.720   .0855    .02517550 
 DUM5    |    7.41686235      2.98801205     2.482   .0131    .01670298 
 DUM6    |     .44682763      2.70160252      .165   .8686    .02396514 
 DUM7    |   -6.46899132      2.14637886    -3.014   .0026    .08569354 
 DUM8    |   -4.79520893      2.16656352    -2.213   .0269    .07480029 
 DUM9    |   -8.18938188      2.40303211    -3.408   .0007    .04284677 
 DUM10   |   -2.64427002      2.31555509    -1.142   .2535    .08666183 
 DUM11   |     .56996386      2.45441890      .232   .8164    .03824740 
 DUM12   |   -5.31207825      2.81131001    -1.890   .0588    .02130235 
 DUM13   |   -3.30294694      2.50521003    -1.318   .1874    .03824740 
 DUM14   |   -2.00692771      2.41177386     -.832   .4053    .03897361 
 DUM15   |    -.42665535      3.26304041     -.131   .8960    .01379811 
 DUM16   |   -3.83048682      2.74653561    -1.395   .1631    .02687001 
 DUM17   |   -2.44362164      2.65457232     -.921   .3573    .02662794 
 DUM18   |   -6.25754022      2.80288965    -2.233   .0256    .03340595 
 DUM19   |    9.72256892      2.67907253     3.629   .0003    .03969983 
 DUM20   |   -9.96307021      2.44290937    -4.078   .0000    .03873154 
 DUM21   |   -9.07138723      2.31325934    -3.921   .0001    .04914064 
 DUM22   |    -.54121854      2.47328492     -.219   .8268    .04381506 
 DUM23   |   -8.26893799      2.40132521    -3.443   .0006    .04623578 
 DUM24   |   -2.25170307      2.20400933    -1.022   .3070    .06439119 
 DUM25   |    1.49941134      3.18536819      .471   .6378    .01404018 
 LAMBDA  |     .37888845      1.90941091      .198   .8427    .67115146 
 
Maximum iterations reached. Exit iterations with status=1. 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| ML Estimates of Selection Model             | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Apr 19, 2013 at 04:18:59AM.| 
| Dependent variable             TAXEVASI     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             8818     | 
| Iterations completed                101     | 
| Log likelihood function       -14194.88     | 
| Number of parameters                 91     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          3.24016     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          3.24038     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          3.31328     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          3.26507     | 
| LHS is CENSORED. Tobit Model fit by MLE.    | 
| FIRST 45 estimates are probit equation.     | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+ 
---------+Selection (probit) equation for EXTERNAL 
 Constant|    -.77276947       .13188737    -5.859   .0000 
 TAXRATE |    -.02490555       .01409096    -1.767   .0771 
 TRUSTING|     .02776638       .01026347     2.705   .0068 
 TRUSTINJ|     .00805611       .01116569      .722   .4706 
 CORRUPTI|     .01184331       .01029629     1.150   .2500 
 COMPLIAN|     .00408871       .00142442     2.870   .0041 
 FOREIGN |     .40014894       .05202039     7.692   .0000 
 MEDIUM  |     .60726697       .04341649    13.987   .0000 
 LARGE   |     .95559644       .07532544    12.686   .0000 
 MININGAN|     .19675674       .17530604     1.122   .2617 
 CONSTRUC|     .13068803       .07618705     1.715   .0863 
 MANUFACT|     .19361270       .06833617     2.833   .0046 
 TRANSPOR|     .15343567       .08637329     1.776   .0757 
 WHOLESAL|     .11207558       .06773463     1.655   .0980 
 REALESTA|     .00974634       .07756923      .126   .9000 
 HOTELSAN|     .00600252       .08730253      .069   .9452 
 INDIVIDU|    -.40487570       .04152376    -9.750   .0000 
 PARTNERS|    -.17235931       .04660868    -3.698   .0002 
 INTACCOU|     .58468197       .04071734    14.360   .0000 
 DUM1    |    -.11847814       .12873414     -.920   .3574 
 DUM2    |    -.25419916       .11810006    -2.152   .0314 
 DUM3    |    1.39325783       .15744943     8.849   .0000 
 DUM4    |    -.25478343       .12093486    -2.107   .0351 
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 DUM5    |     .27592561       .13679789     2.017   .0437 
 DUM6    |     .00041334       .11623594      .004   .9972 
 DUM7    |     .21193887       .09385617     2.258   .0239 
 DUM8    |     .11946510       .09587078     1.246   .2127 
 DUM9    |     .42507420       .11097134     3.830   .0001 
 DUM10   |     .98722820       .11465612     8.610   .0000 
 DUM11   |     .18449375       .11021366     1.674   .0941 
 DUM12   |     .32669867       .13635125     2.396   .0166 
 DUM13   |    -.40766194       .10453787    -3.900   .0001 
 DUM14   |     .21507600       .10705777     2.009   .0445 
 DUM15   |    -.77752274       .11322707    -6.867   .0000 
 DUM16   |     .84667379       .15105114     5.605   .0000 
 DUM17   |     .23794128       .12659407     1.880   .0602 
 DUM18   |    1.25129344       .25190891     4.967   .0000 
 DUM19   |    1.12696553       .15982493     7.051   .0000 
 DUM20   |     .19959015       .10425584     1.914   .0556 
 DUM21   |    -.10463164       .09652783    -1.084   .2784 
 DUM22   |     .68199645       .11406135     5.979   .0000 
 DUM23   |     .59875969       .11520754     5.197   .0000 
 DUM24   |     .11133137       .09585763     1.161   .2455 
 DUM25   |    -.32238413       .11293382    -2.855   .0043 
 DUMMYYEA|     .07510779       .03214201     2.337   .0195 
---------+Corrected regression, Regime 1 
 Constant|   -15.3564182      8.31861667    -1.846   .0649 
 TAXRATE |    3.22646343       .74831137     4.312   .0000 
 TRUSTING|   -1.81947015       .51554577    -3.529   .0004 
 TRUSTINJ|   -1.47462998       .57729457    -2.554   .0106 
 COMPLIAN|     .12196077       .06300235     1.936   .0529 
 CORRUPTI|    6.65367280       .55601631    11.967   .0000 
 FOREIGN |   -6.99547368      2.14366676    -3.263   .0011 
 MEDIUM  |   -8.63144971      2.47377360    -3.489   .0005 
 LARGE   |   -11.1152399      3.23802325    -3.433   .0006 
 MININGAN|   -1.20999731      8.71332779     -.139   .8896 
 CONSTRUC|    2.15224105      4.42086742      .487   .6264 
 MANUFACT|    -.31807923      4.11664690     -.077   .9384 
 TRANSPOR|   -8.21388022      4.88899485    -1.680   .0929 
 WHOLESAL|   -2.82315996      4.10156584     -.688   .4913 
 REALESTA|    2.62832537      4.52780141      .580   .5616 
 HOTELSAN|    11.2940776      5.06219949     2.231   .0257 
 INDIVIDU|    7.25146104      2.50963273     2.889   .0039 
 PARTNERS|    3.87587071      2.20662815     1.756   .0790 
 DUMMYYEA|   -9.70253170      1.57589093    -6.157   .0000 
 DUM1    |    11.2301448      5.86844155     1.914   .0557 
 DUM2    |    -.95724991      5.83642040     -.164   .8697 
 DUM3    |    11.6464203      5.94282550     1.960   .0500 
 DUM4    |   -4.56768361      6.36350899     -.718   .4729 
 DUM5    |    13.8912780      5.90077601     2.354   .0186 
 DUM6    |    9.69848370      5.87874964     1.650   .0990 
 DUM7    |   -7.54913063      4.61470203    -1.636   .1019 
 DUM8    |   -12.9557419      4.39624527    -2.947   .0032 
 DUM9    |   -18.1587836      5.47199909    -3.318   .0009 
 DUM10   |     .82618640      4.97822188      .166   .8682 
 DUM11   |    8.10988304      5.18300170     1.565   .1177 
 DUM12   |   -7.06427703      6.81545807    -1.037   .3000 
 DUM13   |   -6.06702210      5.53449578    -1.096   .2730 
 DUM14   |   -1.93908981      5.11686348     -.379   .7047 
 DUM15   |    5.62993582      7.46771686      .754   .4509 
 DUM16   |   -3.12781193      6.23711140     -.501   .6160 
 DUM17   |    -.71024670      5.59389728     -.127   .8990 
 DUM18   |   -3.12013730      6.86903145     -.454   .6497 
 DUM19   |    18.7274923      6.01651399     3.113   .0019 
 DUM20   |   -18.3038306      5.76530352    -3.175   .0015 
 DUM21   |   -22.5232703      5.17729350    -4.350   .0000 
 DUM22   |     .29649375      5.35311612      .055   .9558 
 DUM23   |   -20.9282602      5.31523526    -3.937   .0001 
 DUM24   |   -3.45268514      4.50202353     -.767   .4431 
 DUM25   |    9.11275547      6.93788835     1.313   .1890 
 SIGMA(1)|    38.1089213       .86701623    43.954   .0000 
 RHO(1,2)|     .02887904       .12071540      .239   .8109 
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5.5 Tobit Corner Solution 
 
 
tobit taxevasion taxrate trustingovernment trustinjudicalsystem corruption1 compliancecost 
foreign medium large individual partnership miningandquarrying construction manufacturing 
transportstorageandcommunicat wholesaleretailrepairs realestaterentingandbusines 
hotelsandrestaurants dummyyear dum1 dum2 dum3 dum4 dum5 dum6 dum7 dum8 dum9 dum10 dum11 dum12 
dum13 dum14 dum15 dum16 dum17 dum18 dum19 dum20 dum21 dum22 dum23 dum24 dum25, ll robust cluster 
(country)  
 
Tobit regression                                  Number of obs   =       9705 
                                                  F(  19,   9662) =          . 
                                                  Prob > F        =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -23644.245                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0322 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 26 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  taxevasion |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     taxrate |   2.557377   .7336422     3.49   0.000     1.119284    3.995469 
trustingov~t |  -.7697116   .3945491    -1.95   0.051     -1.54311    .0036873 
trustinjud~m |  -1.271342   .5278755    -2.41   0.016    -2.306089   -.2365959 
 corruption1 |   7.084876   .4678346    15.14   0.000     6.167822     8.00193 
compliance~t |    .133474   .0461303     2.89   0.004     .0430489     .223899 
     foreign |  -6.391161   1.552762    -4.12   0.000    -9.434901   -3.347422 
      medium |  -7.570771   1.344277    -5.63   0.000    -10.20584   -4.935706 
       large |  -10.31266   2.052943    -5.02   0.000    -14.33686   -6.288462 
  individual |   7.072492   2.067364     3.42   0.001     3.020026    11.12496 
 partnership |   2.951762   2.167804     1.36   0.173    -1.297589    7.201113 
miningandq~g |  -10.02247   4.239158    -2.36   0.018    -18.33211   -1.712834 
construction |  -3.096372   1.969926    -1.57   0.116     -6.95784    .7650965 
manufactur~g |  -2.823763   1.381505    -2.04   0.041    -5.531802   -.1157244 
transports~t |  -7.164742   2.150486    -3.33   0.001    -11.38015   -2.949339 
wholesaler~s |  -3.365238    1.57462    -2.14   0.033    -6.451822   -.2786529 
realestate~s |  -2.910605   1.889007    -1.54   0.123    -6.613454    .7922445 
hotelsandr~s |   4.684868   2.293236     2.04   0.041     .1896444    9.180092 
   dummyyear |  -10.51115   2.929502    -3.59   0.000    -16.25358   -4.768707 
        dum1 |   9.663188   .5454474    17.72   0.000     8.593996    10.73238 
        dum2 |   3.603592    .426081     8.46   0.000     2.768384      4.4388 
        dum3 |    10.7224   .5915824    18.12   0.000      9.56277    11.88202 
        dum4 |  -4.002573    1.07435    -3.73   0.000    -6.108523   -1.896623 
        dum5 |   5.631339   .5345639    10.53   0.000     4.583482    6.679197 
        dum6 |   2.804204   1.130514     2.48   0.013     .5881595    5.020249 
        dum7 |  -4.667288   .7714141    -6.05   0.000    -6.179422   -3.155155 
        dum8 |  -13.08969   .8349504   -15.68   0.000    -14.72636   -11.45301 
        dum9 |  -15.85402   1.269422   -12.49   0.000    -18.34235   -13.36569 
       dum10 |  -.3104505   1.204986    -0.26   0.797    -2.672476    2.051575 
       dum11 |   2.220012   1.106097     2.01   0.045     .0518295    4.388194 
       dum12 |  -8.519496   1.195417    -7.13   0.000    -10.86276   -6.176229 
       dum13 |  -9.130908   1.556862    -5.86   0.000    -12.18268   -6.079132 
       dum14 |   -.663561   .5624396    -1.18   0.238    -1.766061    .4389385 
       dum15 |   2.224563   .9669704     2.30   0.021     .3290983    4.120028 
       dum16 |   -8.40875   .7899848   -10.64   0.000    -9.957286   -6.860214 
       dum17 |  -3.241448   1.388686    -2.33   0.020    -5.963563   -.5193324 
       dum18 |  -6.748247   1.241476    -5.44   0.000      -9.1818   -4.314695 
       dum19 |   16.34678   1.012338    16.15   0.000     14.36239    18.33118 
       dum20 |  -19.83728   .7490272   -26.48   0.000    -21.30553   -18.36903 
       dum21 |  -15.20296   .5589012   -27.20   0.000    -16.29852    -14.1074 
       dum22 |  -7.113487   .6072673   -11.71   0.000    -8.303859   -5.923116 
       dum23 |  -26.63161    .973144   -27.37   0.000    -28.53918   -24.72405 
       dum24 |  -.9043329   .4465191    -2.03   0.043    -1.779604   -.0290619 
       dum25 |   .2216952   .4018658     0.55   0.581    -.5660458    1.009436 
       _cons |  -12.84305   4.534406    -2.83   0.005    -21.73144   -3.954666 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /sigma |   37.66257   1.753836                      34.22468    41.10046 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Obs. summary:       5642  left-censored observations at taxevasion<=0 
                      4063     uncensored observations 
                         0 right-censored observations 
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5.6 Probit  
 
 
probit taxevasion taxrate trustingovernment trustinjudicalsystem corruption1 compliancecost 
foreign medium large individual partnership miningandquarrying construction manufacturing 
transportstorageandcommunicat wholesaleretailrepairs realestaterentingandbusines 
hotelsandrestaurants dummyyear dum1 dum2 dum3 dum4 dum5 dum6 dum7 dum8 dum9 dum10 dum11 dum12 
dum13 dum14 dum15 dum16 dum17 dum18 dum19 dum20 dum21 dum22 dum23 dum24 dum25 
 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -6597.9692   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -5890.2211   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -5889.4031   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -5889.4031   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       9705 
                                                  LR chi2(43)     =    1417.13 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -5889.4031                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1074 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  taxevasion |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     taxrate |   .0881151   .0134799     6.54   0.000     .0616949    .1145353 
trustingov~t |  -.0169217   .0097557    -1.73   0.083    -.0360426    .0021992 
trustinjud~m |  -.0291673   .0105497    -2.76   0.006    -.0498443   -.0084904 
 corruption1 |   .2183839   .0098881    22.09   0.000     .1990036    .2377642 
compliance~t |   .0028171   .0012939     2.18   0.029     .0002811    .0053531 
     foreign |  -.1694688   .0421498    -4.02   0.000    -.2520809   -.0868566 
      medium |  -.2183763   .0374894    -5.83   0.000    -.2918541   -.1448984 
       large |  -.2890491   .0528321    -5.47   0.000     -.392598   -.1855002 
  individual |   .1937114   .0390505     4.96   0.000     .1171737     .270249 
 partnership |   .0923332   .0424215     2.18   0.030     .0091886    .1754779 
miningandq~g |  -.2182746   .1523443    -1.43   0.152    -.5168639    .0803148 
construction |  -.0899744   .0739658    -1.22   0.224    -.2349448     .054996 
manufactur~g |  -.0731888   .0667796    -1.10   0.273    -.2040744    .0576968 
transports~t |    -.20396   .0826517    -2.47   0.014    -.3659543   -.0419658 
wholesaler~s |  -.1045927   .0665844    -1.57   0.116    -.2350957    .0259104 
realestate~s |  -.1447702   .0761624    -1.90   0.057    -.2940458    .0045054 
hotelsandr~s |   .1121706   .0849569     1.32   0.187    -.0543419    .2786831 
   dummyyear |  -.2544312   .0291626    -8.72   0.000    -.3115888   -.1972736 
        dum1 |   .2179216   .1210241     1.80   0.072    -.0192813    .4551246 
        dum2 |   .0664649   .1129521     0.59   0.556    -.1549172     .287847 
        dum3 |   .5546046   .1171764     4.73   0.000     .3249431    .7842661 
        dum4 |   .1117189   .1156908     0.97   0.334    -.1150309    .3384688 
        dum5 |  -.0331638   .1258375    -0.26   0.792    -.2798008    .2134731 
        dum6 |   .2919878   .1140297     2.56   0.010     .0684937     .515482 
        dum7 |   .0980717   .0925179     1.06   0.289    -.0832599    .2794034 
        dum8 |  -.4302794   .0966038    -4.45   0.000    -.6196193   -.2409395 
        dum9 |   -.339014   .1099248    -3.08   0.002    -.5544626   -.1235654 
       dum10 |   .1454501   .0998606     1.46   0.145    -.0502731    .3411732 
       dum11 |   .3040477   .1052474     2.89   0.004     .0977666    .5103289 
       dum12 |  -.0091052   .1248802    -0.07   0.942    -.2538659    .2356556 
       dum13 |  -.1229252   .1040675    -1.18   0.238    -.3268938    .0810434 
       dum14 |    .051638   .1045444     0.49   0.621    -.1532653    .2565413 
       dum15 |   .2202864   .1133582     1.94   0.052    -.0018915    .4424643 
       dum16 |  -.0941383   .1271712    -0.74   0.459    -.3433892    .1551127 
       dum17 |   .0497477   .1194764     0.42   0.677    -.1844217    .2839171 
       dum18 |   .1927606   .1303628     1.48   0.139    -.0627458     .448267 
       dum19 |   .4983576   .1249628     3.99   0.000      .253435    .7432803 
       dum20 |  -.3545915   .1076228    -3.29   0.001    -.5655284   -.1436546 
       dum21 |  -.3725617   .0990499    -3.76   0.000    -.5666959   -.1784274 
       dum22 |  -.2241824   .1076141    -2.08   0.037    -.4351022   -.0132626 
       dum23 |  -.6325138    .111781    -5.66   0.000    -.8516005    -.413427 
       dum24 |  -.0321752   .0950312    -0.34   0.735    -.2184329    .1540826 
       dum25 |    .063079   .1155217     0.55   0.585    -.1633394    .2894973 
       _cons |   -.625171   .1284125    -4.87   0.000    -.8768548   -.3734872 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.   
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5.7 Conditional Marginal Effects 
 
 
mfx compute, predict(e(0,.)) 
 
Marginal effects after tobit 
      y  = E(taxevasion|taxevasion>0) (predict, e(0,.)) 
         =   27.35197 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 taxrate |   .8187267       .2293    3.57   0.000   .369308  1.26815   2.79845 
trusti~t |  -.2464179      .12671   -1.94   0.052  -.494759  .001924   3.87141 
trusti~m |  -.4070116      .16883   -2.41   0.016  -.737913  -.07611   3.45234 
corrup~1 |   2.268175      .13741   16.51   0.000   1.99886  2.53749   2.57208 
compli~t |   .0427308      .01454    2.94   0.003   .014234  .071228   6.15457 
 foreign*|  -1.971206      .46032   -4.28   0.000  -2.87343 -1.06899   .133539 
  medium*|  -2.332676      .40617   -5.74   0.000  -3.12876 -1.53659   .180938 
   large*|  -3.085644      .57869   -5.33   0.000  -4.21985 -1.95144   .086038 
indivi~l*|   2.288587       .6725    3.40   0.001   .970515  3.60666   .410407 
partne~p*|   .9543686      .70823    1.35   0.178  -.433732  2.34247   .293869 
mining~g*|  -2.967922     1.14983   -2.58   0.010  -5.22155  -.71429   .010304 
constr~n*|   -.972332      .59935   -1.62   0.105  -2.14704  .202378   .110768 
manufa~g*|  -.8979125       .4335   -2.07   0.038  -1.74755  -.04827   .349304 
transp~t*|  -2.181919      .61308   -3.56   0.000  -3.38353 -.980309   .062133 
wholes~s*|  -1.064486       .4938   -2.16   0.031  -2.03231 -.096662    .27594 
reales~s*|  -.9141985      .57859   -1.58   0.114  -2.04822  .219824   .090881 
hotels~s*|   1.551541      .79011    1.96   0.050   .002946  3.10014   .052962 
dummyy~r*|  -3.452167      .96195   -3.59   0.000  -5.33755 -1.56678   .644513 
    dum1*|   3.335085      .19748   16.89   0.000   2.94804  3.72213   .021535 
    dum2*|     1.1858      .14238    8.33   0.000   .906744  1.46486   .028233 
    dum3*|   3.727407      .19842   18.79   0.000   3.33851  4.11631   .028027 
    dum4*|  -1.243191      .32652   -3.81   0.000  -1.88317 -.603216   .027718 
    dum5*|   1.883588      .18778   10.03   0.000   1.51555  2.25163   .019474 
    dum6*|   .9170989       .3703    2.48   0.013   .191328  1.64287   .028954 
    dum7*|  -1.450527      .23779   -6.10   0.000  -1.91659  -.98446   .102215 
    dum8*|  -3.836141      .20061  -19.12   0.000  -4.22933 -3.44295   .072128 
    dum9*|  -4.522605      .31231  -14.48   0.000  -5.13471  -3.9105   .037609 
   dum10*|  -.0991705      .38446   -0.26   0.796  -.852697  .654356   .060072 
   dum11*|   .7224751      .36282    1.99   0.046   .011365  1.43359   .042143 
   dum12*|  -2.556077      .33819   -7.56   0.000  -3.21893 -1.89323   .021432 
   dum13*|  -2.740167       .4406   -6.22   0.000  -3.60372 -1.87661   .054302 
   dum14*|  -.2113972      .17896   -1.18   0.237  -.562148  .139354   .041216 
   dum15*|   .7242956      .31893    2.27   0.023   .099196  1.34939   .029985 
   dum16*|  -2.524356      .22166  -11.39   0.000  -2.95881 -2.08991   .019681 
   dum17*|  -1.012378      .42299   -2.39   0.017  -1.84141 -.183342   .024008 
   dum18*|  -2.051143      .36923   -5.56   0.000  -2.77482 -1.32746   .018032 
   dum19*|   5.945726      .42124   14.11   0.000   5.12011  6.77134   .022257 
   dum20*|    -5.5065       .1788  -30.80   0.000  -5.85695 -5.15605   .039979 
   dum21*|  -4.382539      .14736  -29.74   0.000  -4.67137 -4.09371   .061515 
   dum22*|  -2.160765      .17829  -12.12   0.000   -2.5102 -1.81133   .036682 
   dum23*|  -7.049995      .18526  -38.05   0.000   -7.4131 -6.68689   .038125 
   dum24*|  -.2877206      .14184   -2.03   0.043  -.565726 -.009715   .072025 
   dum25*|   .0710943      .12889    0.55   0.581   -.18153  .323719   .026172 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
.  
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5.8 Unconditional Marginal Effects 
 
 
mfx compute, predict(ystar(0,.))    
 
Marginal effects after tobit 
      y  = E(taxevasion*|taxevasion>0) (predict, ystar(0,.)) 
         =  11.402314 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 taxrate |   1.066103      .29484    3.62   0.000   .488219  1.64399   2.79845 
trusti~t |  -.3208724      .16532   -1.94   0.052  -.644888  .003143   3.87141 
trusti~m |   -.529989      .21982   -2.41   0.016  -.960827 -.099151   3.45234 
corrup~1 |   2.953498       .1733   17.04   0.000   2.61383  3.29316   2.57208 
compli~t |   .0556418      .01878    2.96   0.003   .018832  .092451   6.15457 
 foreign*|  -2.511111      .57198   -4.39   0.000  -3.63218 -1.39005   .133539 
  medium*|  -2.969302      .51134   -5.81   0.000  -3.97152 -1.96709   .180938 
   large*|  -3.853171      .69313   -5.56   0.000  -5.21168 -2.49466   .086038 
indivi~l*|   2.995635      .88222    3.40   0.001   1.26652  4.72475   .410407 
partne~p*|   1.249209      .93196    1.34   0.180  -.577407  3.07583   .293869 
mining~g*|  -3.680506     1.33419   -2.76   0.006  -6.29548 -1.06553   .010304 
constr~n*|  -1.252346       .7575   -1.65   0.098  -2.73701  .232322   .110768 
manufa~g*|  -1.164774      .55815   -2.09   0.037  -2.25873 -.070813   .349304 
transp~t*|  -2.757387      .74092   -3.72   0.000  -4.20957  -1.3052   .062133 
wholes~s*|  -1.376743      .63539   -2.17   0.030  -2.62208 -.131403    .27594 
reales~s*|  -1.177634      .73423   -1.60   0.109  -2.61669  .261424   .090881 
hotels~s*|   2.055389      1.0663    1.93   0.054  -.034512  4.14529   .052962 
dummyy~r*|  -4.550184     1.26575   -3.59   0.000  -7.03101 -2.06936   .644513 
    dum1*|   4.497016      .27684   16.24   0.000   3.95442  5.03961   .021535 
    dum2*|   1.566091      .19051    8.22   0.000   1.19269  1.93949   .028233 
    dum3*|   5.039505       .2701   18.66   0.000   4.51013  5.56888   .028027 
    dum4*|    -1.5908      .41257   -3.86   0.000  -2.39941 -.782187   .027718 
    dum5*|   2.506799      .25756    9.73   0.000   2.00199  3.01161   .019474 
    dum6*|   1.207558      .48823    2.47   0.013   .250654  2.16446   .028954 
    dum7*|   -1.85668      .30338   -6.12   0.000  -2.45129 -1.26207   .102215 
    dum8*|  -4.720367      .21209  -22.26   0.000  -5.13605 -4.30468   .072128 
    dum9*|   -5.45376       .3343  -16.31   0.000  -6.10897 -4.79855   .037609 
   dum10*|  -.1289795      .49969   -0.26   0.796  -1.10835  .850395   .060072 
   dum11*|   .9489324      .47855    1.98   0.047   .010986  1.88688   .042143 
   dum12*|   -3.19857      .40732   -7.85   0.000  -3.99689 -2.40025   .021432 
   dum13*|  -3.429158      .53011   -6.47   0.000  -4.46816 -2.39015   .054302 
   dum14*|  -.2745304      .23224   -1.18   0.237  -.729716  .180655   .041216 
   dum15*|   .9515529      .42182    2.26   0.024   .124792  1.77831   .029985 
   dum16*|  -3.160171      .26664  -11.85   0.000  -3.68277 -2.63757   .019681 
   dum17*|  -1.299786      .53516   -2.43   0.015  -2.34867   -.2509   .024008 
   dum18*|  -2.589091      .45962   -5.63   0.000  -3.48993 -1.68825   .018032 
   dum19*|   8.156944      .60594   13.46   0.000   6.96932  9.34457   .022257 
   dum20*|  -6.495289       .1905  -34.10   0.000  -6.86867 -6.12191   .039979 
   dum21*|  -5.326852      .17415  -30.59   0.000  -5.66818 -4.98552   .061515 
   dum22*|  -2.726219      .22149  -12.31   0.000  -3.16034  -2.2921   .036682 
   dum23*|  -7.978962      .14189  -56.23   0.000  -8.25707 -7.70086   .038125 
   dum24*|  -.3733717      .18395   -2.03   0.042    -.7339 -.012844   .072025 
   dum25*|   .0926603      .16801    0.55   0.581  -.236631  .421951   .026172 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
.  
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5.9 BEEPS 2005 Heckman Two Step “Truthfulness”  
 
 
heckman  taxevasion taxrate  audit trustingovernment trustinjudicalsystem corruption1 
compliancecost foreign medium large  individual partnership miningandquarrying construction 
manufacturing transportstorageandcommunicat wholesaleretailrepairs realestaterentingandbusines 
hotelsandrestaurants dum1 dum3 dum4 dum5 dum6 dum7 dum8 dum9 dum10 dum11 dum12 dum13 dum14 dum15 
dum16 dum17 dum18 dum19 dum20 dum21 dum22 dum23 dum24 dum25 dum26, select ( external = taxrate  
audit trustingovernment trustinjudicalsystem corruption1 compliancecost foreign medium large  
individual partnership miningandquarrying construction manufacturing  
transportstorageandcommunicat wholesaleretailrepairs realestaterentingandbusines 
hotelsandrestaurants dum1 dum3 dum4 dum5 dum6 dum7 dum8 dum9 dum10 dum11 dum12 dum13 dum14 dum15 
dum16 dum17 dum18 dum19 dum20 dum21 dum22 dum23 dum24 dum25 dum26  intaccountingstandards) 
twostep 
 
Heckman selection model -- two-step estimates   Number of obs      =      5647 
(regression model with sample selection)        Censored obs       =      3112 
                                                Uncensored obs     =      2535 
 
                                                Wald chi2(43)      =    474.63 
                                                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
taxevasion   | 
     taxrate |   1.082361   .3453932     3.13   0.002     .4054024    1.759319 
       audit |  -.0398291   .0522976    -0.76   0.446    -.1423304    .0626723 
trustingov~t |  -.9110314    .249606    -3.65   0.000     -1.40025   -.4218127 
trustinjud~m |  -.5849976   .2642078    -2.21   0.027    -1.102835   -.0671598 
 corruption1 |   2.269378   .2486284     9.13   0.000     1.782076    2.756681 
compliance~t |   .0443287   .0337694     1.31   0.189    -.0218581    .1105155 
     foreign |   -1.16512   1.064721    -1.09   0.274    -3.251935    .9216949 
      medium |  -1.953573   1.217973    -1.60   0.109    -4.340756     .433609 
       large |  -1.878331   1.706532    -1.10   0.271    -5.223073    1.466411 
  individual |   3.112289    1.26744     2.46   0.014     .6281523    5.596425 
 partnership |   2.108325   1.029751     2.05   0.041     .0900511      4.1266 
miningandq~g |   2.613152   3.558559     0.73   0.463    -4.361495      9.5878 
construction |   2.731706   2.364248     1.16   0.248    -1.902135    7.365548 
manufactur~g |   2.891185   2.216141     1.30   0.192    -1.452373    7.234742 
transports~t |  -.7492301   2.514336    -0.30   0.766    -5.677237    4.178777 
wholesaler~s |   1.378015   2.234837     0.62   0.537    -3.002186    5.758215 
realestate~s |   3.691817   2.431404     1.52   0.129    -1.073648    8.457282 
hotelsandr~s |   6.656521   2.656185     2.51   0.012     1.450494    11.86255 
        dum1 |   10.97091   3.488148     3.15   0.002     4.134269    17.80756 
        dum3 |   13.80477   3.192148     4.32   0.000     7.548272    20.06126 
        dum4 |   2.121496   2.976494     0.71   0.476    -3.712325    7.955317 
        dum5 |   3.603861   3.428061     1.05   0.293    -3.115016    10.32274 
        dum6 |   4.673857   3.011015     1.55   0.121    -1.227623    10.57534 
        dum7 |   .9617943   2.467069     0.39   0.697    -3.873571     5.79716 
        dum8 |    1.26198   2.589085     0.49   0.626    -3.812534    6.336493 
        dum9 |   .1538692   2.867289     0.05   0.957    -5.465914    5.773652 
       dum10 |   5.364128   2.798099     1.92   0.055    -.1200457     10.8483 
       dum11 |   11.37728   2.833876     4.01   0.000     5.822985    16.93157 
       dum12 |   .7990337    3.18462     0.25   0.802    -5.442707    7.040774 
       dum13 |    3.78479   2.756252     1.37   0.170    -1.617364    9.186944 
       dum14 |   6.996191   2.795181     2.50   0.012     1.517737    12.47464 
       dum15 |   3.265609   4.287015     0.76   0.446    -5.136786      11.668 
       dum16 |   3.030264   3.127464     0.97   0.333    -3.099452    9.159981 
       dum17 |   1.792731   3.222725     0.56   0.578    -4.523693    8.109155 
       dum18 |   2.863195   3.321852     0.86   0.389    -3.647515    9.373905 
       dum19 |    7.14985   3.392616     2.11   0.035     .5004444    13.79926 
       dum20 |  -3.064164   2.755914    -1.11   0.266    -8.465657    2.337329 
       dum21 |  -4.518068   2.606912    -1.73   0.083    -9.627521    .5913858 
       dum22 |   7.151427   2.884197     2.48   0.013     1.498505    12.80435 
       dum23 |  -3.824209   2.877701    -1.33   0.184      -9.4644    1.815982 
       dum24 |   6.389724   2.528666     2.53   0.012      1.43363    11.34582 
       dum25 |   2.603916   3.409467     0.76   0.445    -4.078516    9.286348 
       dum26 |   .5415033   3.109862     0.17   0.862    -5.553714    6.636721 
       _cons |  -1.015683   4.625374    -0.22   0.826    -10.08125    8.049883 
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external     | 
     taxrate |  -.0217553   .0188255    -1.16   0.248    -.0586526     .015142 
       audit |   .0029972   .0032395     0.93   0.355    -.0033521    .0093465 
trustingov~t |   .0306914   .0135179     2.27   0.023     .0041968     .057186 
trustinjud~m |   .0096319    .014518     0.66   0.507     -.018823    .0380867 
 corruption1 |   .0173954    .013742     1.27   0.206    -.0095384    .0443291 
compliance~t |   .0036986   .0019324     1.91   0.056    -.0000888     .007486 
     foreign |   .4246407   .0634565     6.69   0.000     .3002683    .5490131 
      medium |    .595339   .0498258    11.95   0.000     .4976824    .6929957 
       large |   .9499785   .0807413    11.77   0.000     .7917285    1.108228 
  individual |  -.4745594   .0552385    -8.59   0.000    -.5828249   -.3662938 
 partnership |   -.178754   .0595997    -3.00   0.003    -.2955671   -.0619408 
miningandq~g |   .3464428   .2112387     1.64   0.101    -.0675776    .7604631 
construction |   .1923781   .1141881     1.68   0.092    -.0314265    .4161826 
manufactur~g |   .3069781   .1031147     2.98   0.003      .104877    .5090792 
transports~t |   .2571918    .123484     2.08   0.037     .0151675     .499216 
wholesaler~s |   .1930369   .1045496     1.85   0.065    -.0118766    .3979504 
realestate~s |   .1010751   .1167047     0.87   0.386     -.127662    .3298122 
hotelsandr~s |   .1429465   .1306507     1.09   0.274    -.1131241    .3990172 
        dum1 |   .1466274    .180529     0.81   0.417    -.2072028    .5004577 
        dum3 |   1.676472   .1687296     9.94   0.000     1.345768    2.007176 
        dum4 |   .2113019   .1599012     1.32   0.186    -.1020986    .5247025 
        dum5 |   .3685738   .1805097     2.04   0.041     .0147812    .7223664 
        dum6 |   .3313764    .158922     2.09   0.037     .0198949    .6428579 
        dum7 |   .3707714   .1296401     2.86   0.004     .1166814    .6248614 
        dum8 |   .2668357   .1347718     1.98   0.048     .0026879    .5309835 
        dum9 |    .583011   .1544349     3.78   0.000     .2803241    .8856979 
       dum10 |   1.349074   .1435874     9.40   0.000     1.067648      1.6305 
       dum11 |    .369973   .1495896     2.47   0.013     .0767829    .6631632 
       dum12 |   .5317204   .1772906     3.00   0.003     .1842372    .8792035 
       dum13 |  -.2319706   .1393565    -1.66   0.096    -.5051043    .0411631 
       dum14 |   .3671246   .1465603     2.50   0.012     .0798717    .6543775 
       dum15 |   -.848285   .1671207    -5.08   0.000    -1.175836   -.5207344 
       dum16 |   1.089677   .1715195     6.35   0.000     .7535054    1.425849 
       dum17 |   .1967163   .1707262     1.15   0.249    -.1379009    .5313334 
       dum18 |   1.299069   .2188641     5.94   0.000     .8701031    1.728035 
       dum19 |   1.355448   .2015424     6.73   0.000     .9604318    1.750463 
       dum20 |   .4142466   .1397879     2.96   0.003     .1402674    .6882259 
       dum21 |   .1136692   .1336845     0.85   0.395    -.1483477     .375686 
       dum22 |   1.120639   .1457686     7.69   0.000     .8349382    1.406341 
       dum23 |    .707248   .1548582     4.57   0.000     .4037315    1.010764 
       dum24 |   .3845521     .13393     2.87   0.004      .122054    .6470501 
       dum25 |    .015325     .16327     0.09   0.925    -.3046783    .3353282 
       dum26 |  -.0528246   .1602122    -0.33   0.742    -.3668347    .2611855 
intaccount~s |   .5154269   .0546864     9.43   0.000     .4082435    .6226104 
       _cons |  -1.000848   .1814274    -5.52   0.000    -1.356439   -.6452568 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
mills        | 
      lambda |   2.011209   2.470163     0.81   0.416    -2.830221    6.852639 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |    0.12088 
       sigma |  16.638501 
      lambda |  2.0112089   2.470163 
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5.10 BEEPS 2005 Heckman FIML “Truthfulness”  
 
 
 
REJECT; TAXRATE=-999$ 
REJECT; TAXEVASI=-999$ 
REJECT; TRUSTING=-999$ 
REJECT; TRUSTINJ=-999$ 
REJECT; COMPLIAN=-999$ 
REJECT; CORRUPTI=-999$ 
REJECT; FOREIGN=-999$ 
REJECT; MEDIUM=-999$ 
REJECT; LARGE=-999$ 
REJECT; INTACCOU=-999$ 
REJECT; EXTERNAL=-999$ 
REJECT; AUDIT=-999$ 
 
PROBIT;Lhs=EXTERNAL;Rhs=ONE,TAXRATE,AUDIT,TRUSTING,TRUSTINJ,CORRUPTI,COMPLIAN,FOREIGN,MEDIUM,LARG
E,INDIVIDU,PARTNERS,MININGAN,CONSTRUC,MANUFACT,TRANSPOR,WHOLESAL,REALESTA,HOTELSAN,INTACCOU,DUM1,
DUM3,DUM4,DUM5,DUM6,DUM7,DUM8,DUM9,DUM10,DUM11,DUM12,DUM13,DUM14,DUM15,DUM16,DUM17,DUM18,DUM19,DU
M20,DUM21,DUM22,DUM23,DUM24,DUM25,DUM26;Hold$ 
 
Normal exit from iterations. Exit status=0. 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| Binomial Probit Model                       | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Apr 20, 2013 at 03:00:34AM.| 
| Dependent variable             EXTERNAL     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             5647     | 
| Iterations completed                  5     | 
| Log likelihood function       -3103.576     | 
| Number of parameters                 45     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          1.11513     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          1.11526     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          1.16804     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          1.13356     | 
| Restricted log likelihood     -3884.672     | 
| McFadden Pseudo R-squared      .2010712     | 
| Chi squared                    1562.192     | 
| Degrees of freedom                   44     | 
| Prob[ChiSqd > value] =         .0000000     | 
| Results retained for SELECTION model.       | 
| Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-squared =  12.02188     | 
| P-value=  .15023 with deg.fr. =       8     | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
---------+Index function for probability 
 Constant|   -1.00084799       .18142741    -5.517   .0000 
 TAXRATE |    -.02175528       .01882550    -1.156   .2478   2.79157075 
 AUDIT   |     .00299723       .00323950      .925   .3549   2.49389056 
 TRUSTING|     .03069140       .01351790     2.270   .0232   3.88578006 
 TRUSTINJ|     .00963189       .01451805      .663   .5070   3.45369223 
 CORRUPTI|     .01739538       .01374196     1.266   .2056   2.44891093 
 COMPLIAN|     .00369863       .00193238     1.914   .0556   5.25650788 
 FOREIGN |     .42464070       .06345649     6.692   .0000    .11244909 
 MEDIUM  |     .59533904       .04982575    11.948   .0000    .19072074 
 LARGE   |     .94997846       .08074126    11.766   .0000    .07774039 
 INDIVIDU|    -.47455935       .05523853    -8.591   .0000    .43456703 
 PARTNERS|    -.17875395       .05959966    -2.999   .0027    .28298211 
 MININGAN|     .34644276       .21123874     1.640   .1010    .01027094 
 CONSTRUC|     .19237807       .11418808     1.685   .0920    .09739685 
 MANUFACT|     .30697808       .10311471     2.977   .0029    .41455640 
 TRANSPOR|     .25719177       .12348403     2.083   .0373    .05914645 
 WHOLESAL|     .19303691       .10454963     1.846   .0648    .24845050 
 REALESTA|     .10107508       .11670474      .866   .3864    .08340712 
 HOTELSAN|     .14294652       .13065069     1.094   .2739    .04816717 
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 INTACCOU|     .51542693       .05468644     9.425   .0000    .19284576 
 DUM1    |     .14662742       .18052895      .812   .4167    .01823977 
 DUM3    |    1.67647183       .16872961     9.936   .0000    .02780237 
 DUM4    |     .21130193       .15990119     1.321   .1864    .02638569 
 DUM5    |     .36857381       .18050974     2.042   .0412    .01611475 
 DUM6    |     .33137641       .15892204     2.085   .0371    .02886488 
 DUM7    |     .37077136       .12964014     2.860   .0042    .11067824 
 DUM8    |     .26683569       .13477177     1.980   .0477    .06605277 
 DUM9    |     .58301099       .15443495     3.775   .0002    .03010448 
 DUM10   |    1.34907427       .14358742     9.395   .0000    .05826102 
 DUM11   |     .36997304       .14958956     2.473   .0134    .04002125 
 DUM12   |     .53172035       .17729057     2.999   .0027    .01912520 
 DUM13   |    -.23197057       .13935648    -1.665   .0960    .06569860 
 DUM14   |     .36712460       .14656030     2.505   .0122    .04037542 
 DUM15   |    -.84828500       .16712074    -5.076   .0000    .03470869 
 DUM16   |    1.08967740       .17151945     6.353   .0000    .02036480 
 DUM17   |     .19671625       .17072617     1.152   .2492    .02036480 
 DUM18   |    1.29906880       .21886408     5.936   .0000    .01540641 
 DUM19   |    1.35544763       .20154239     6.725   .0000    .01522933 
 DUM20   |     .41424661       .13978790     2.963   .0030    .04976094 
 DUM21   |     .11366915       .13368453      .850   .3952    .07526120 
 DUM22   |    1.12063935       .14576860     7.688   .0000    .04161502 
 DUM23   |     .70724796       .15485819     4.567   .0000    .02992740 
 DUM24   |     .38455206       .13393003     2.871   .0041    .06800071 
 DUM25   |     .01532496       .16326996      .094   .9252    .02673986 
 DUM26   |    -.05282461       .16021219     -.330   .7416    .02656278 
 
+----------------------------------------+ 
| Fit Measures for Binomial Choice Model | 
| Probit   model for variable EXTERNAL   | 
+----------------------------------------+ 
| Proportions P0= .551089   P1= .448911  | 
| N =    5647 N0=    3112   N1=    2535  | 
| LogL=    -3103.576 LogL0=   -3884.672  | 
| Estrella = 1-(L/L0)^(-2L0/n) = .26571  | 
+----------------------------------------+ 
|     Efron |  McFadden  |  Ben./Lerman  | 
|    .25743 |    .20107  |       .63027  | 
|    Cramer | Veall/Zim. |     Rsqrd_ML  | 
|    .25268 |    .37419  |       .24167  | 
+----------------------------------------+ 
| Information  Akaike I.C. Schwarz I.C.  | 
| Criteria        1.11513       1.16804  | 
+----------------------------------------+ 
+---------------------------------------------------------+ 
|Predictions for Binary Choice Model.  Predicted value is | 
|1 when probability is greater than  .500000, 0 otherwise.| 
|Note, column or row total percentages may not sum to     | 
|100% because of rounding. Percentages are of full sample.| 
+------+---------------------------------+----------------+ 
|Actual|         Predicted Value         |                | 
|Value |       0                1        | Total Actual   | 
+------+----------------+----------------+----------------+ 
|  0   |   2553 ( 45.2%)|    559 (  9.9%)|   3112 ( 55.1%)| 
|  1   |    970 ( 17.2%)|   1565 ( 27.7%)|   2535 ( 44.9%)| 
+------+----------------+----------------+----------------+ 
|Total |   3523 ( 62.4%)|   2124 ( 37.6%)|   5647 (100.0%)| 
+------+----------------+----------------+----------------+ 
 
======================================================================= 
Analysis of Binary Choice Model Predictions Based on Threshold =  .5000 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Prediction Success 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sensitivity = actual 1s correctly predicted                     61.736% 
Specificity = actual 0s correctly predicted                     82.037% 
Positive predictive value = predicted 1s that were actual 1s    73.682% 
Negative predictive value = predicted 0s that were actual 0s    72.467% 
Correct prediction = actual 1s and 0s correctly predicted       72.924% 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Prediction Failure 
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----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
False pos. for true neg. = actual 0s predicted as 1s            17.963% 
False neg. for true pos. = actual 1s predicted as 0s            38.264% 
False pos. for predicted pos. = predicted 1s actual 0s          26.318% 
False neg. for predicted neg. = predicted 0s actual 1s          27.533% 
False predictions = actual 1s and 0s incorrectly predicted      27.076% 
======================================================================= 
 
 
SELECTION;Lhs=TAXEVASI;Rhs=ONE,TAXRATE,AUDIT,TRUSTING,TRUSTINJ,CORRUPTI,COMPLIAN,FOREIGN,MEDIUM,L
ARGE,INDIVIDU,PARTNERS,MININGAN,CONSTRUC,MANUFACT,TRANSPOR,WHOLESAL,REALESTA,HOTELSAN,DUM1,DUM3,D
UM4,DUM5,DUM6,DUM7,DUM8,DUM9,DUM10,DUM11,DUM12,DUM13,DUM14,DUM15,DUM16,DUM17,DUM18,DUM19,DUM20,DU
M21,DUM22,DUM23,DUM24,DUM25,DUM26;MLE;Tobit$ 
 
 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 
| Sample Selection Model                                   | 
| Probit selection equation based on EXTERNAL              | 
| Selection rule is: Observations with EXTERNAL =  1       | 
| Results of selection:                                    | 
|                   Data points     Sum of weights         | 
| Data set              5647             5647.0            | 
| Selected sample       2535             2535.0            | 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 
 
+----------------------------------------------------+ 
| Sample Selection Model                             | 
| Two step    least squares regression               | 
| Model was estimated Apr 20, 2013 at 03:03:15AM     | 
| LHS=TAXEVASI Mean                 =   9.961736     | 
|              Standard deviation   =   18.10082     | 
| WTS=none     Number of observs.   =       2535     | 
| Model size   Parameters           =         45     | 
|              Degrees of freedom   =       2490     | 
| Residuals    Sum of squares       =   683848.2     | 
|              Standard error of e  =   16.57220     | 
| Fit          R-squared            =   .1614382     | 
|              Adjusted R-squared   =   .1466203     | 
| Model test   F[ 44,  2490] (prob) =  10.89 (.0000) | 
| Diagnostic   Log likelihood       =  -10691.89     | 
|              Restricted(b=0)      =  -10937.76     | 
|              Chi-sq [ 44]  (prob) = 491.73 (.0000) | 
| Info criter. LogAmemiya Prd. Crt. =   5.633049     | 
|              Akaike Info. Criter. =   5.633045     | 
| Not using OLS or no constant. Rsqd & F may be < 0. | 
| Standard error corrected for selection..  16.63850 | 
| Correlation of disturbance in regression           | 
| and Selection Criterion (Rho)...........    .12088 | 
+----------------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| Mean of X| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+----------+ 
 Constant|   -1.01568321      4.62537400     -.220   .8262 
 TAXRATE |    1.08236059       .34539316     3.134   .0017   2.76883629 
 AUDIT   |    -.03982909       .05229757     -.762   .4463   2.82169625 
 TRUSTING|    -.91103139       .24960598    -3.650   .0003   4.04930966 
 TRUSTINJ|    -.58499759       .26420781    -2.214   .0268   3.55226824 
 CORRUPTI|    2.26937844       .24862844     9.128   .0000   2.44457594 
 COMPLIAN|     .04432866       .03376940     1.313   .1893   5.94753452 
 FOREIGN |   -1.16511981      1.06472095    -1.094   .2738    .18106509 
 MEDIUM  |   -1.95357333      1.21797257    -1.604   .1087    .27337278 
 LARGE   |   -1.87833128      1.70653238    -1.101   .2710    .13846154 
 INDIVIDU|    3.11228880      1.26743989     2.456   .0141    .31913215 
 PARTNERS|    2.10832540      1.02975072     2.047   .0406    .35897436 
 MININGAN|    2.61315245      3.55855924      .734   .4627    .01459566 
 CONSTRUC|    2.73170616      2.36424835     1.155   .2479    .10216963 
 MANUFACT|    2.89118467      2.21614132     1.305   .1920    .45246548 
 TRANSPOR|    -.74923015      2.51433556     -.298   .7657    .06193294 
 WHOLESAL|    1.37801471      2.23483721      .617   .5375    .22721893 
 REALESTA|    3.69181681      2.43140423     1.518   .1289    .07416174 
 HOTELSAN|    6.65652139      2.65618519     2.506   .0122    .04220907 
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 DUM1    |    10.9709124      3.48814768     3.145   .0017    .01459566 
 DUM3    |    13.8047673      3.19214798     4.325   .0000    .05167653 
 DUM4    |    2.12149585      2.97649389      .713   .4760    .02721893 
 DUM5    |    3.60386059      3.42806117     1.051   .2931    .01577909 
 DUM6    |    4.67385659      3.01101452     1.552   .1206    .02564103 
 DUM7    |     .96179432      2.46706866      .390   .6966    .09033531 
 DUM8    |    1.26197964      2.58908494      .487   .6260    .05798817 
 DUM9    |     .15386921      2.86728890      .054   .9572    .03353057 
 DUM10   |    5.36412792      2.79809917     1.917   .0552    .10098619 
 DUM11   |    11.3772792      2.83387585     4.015   .0001    .03353057 
 DUM12   |     .79903372      3.18462000      .251   .8019    .02169625 
 DUM13   |    3.78479041      2.75625166     1.373   .1697    .04930966 
 DUM14   |    6.99619108      2.79518077     2.503   .0123    .03589744 
 DUM15   |    3.26560928      4.28701512      .762   .4462    .01065089 
 DUM16   |    3.03026441      3.12746380      .969   .3326    .02958580 
 DUM17   |    1.79273121      3.22272458      .556   .5780    .01932939 
 DUM18   |    2.86319509      3.32185186      .862   .3887    .02998028 
 DUM19   |    7.14985023      3.39261631     2.107   .0351    .02682446 
 DUM20   |   -3.06416435      2.75591444    -1.112   .2662    .04615385 
 DUM21   |   -4.51806751      2.60691184    -1.733   .0831    .05719921 
 DUM22   |    7.15142653      2.88419677     2.480   .0132    .06035503 
 DUM23   |   -3.82420908      2.87770119    -1.329   .1839    .03392505 
 DUM24   |    6.38972441      2.52866616     2.527   .0115    .06548323 
 DUM25   |    2.60391634      3.40946680      .764   .4450    .01656805 
 DUM26   |     .54150331      3.10986205      .174   .8618    .02209073 
 LAMBDA  |    2.01120894      2.47016263      .814   .4155    .69268225 
 
Maximum iterations reached. Exit iterations with status=1. 
 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
| ML Estimates of Selection Model             | 
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates                | 
| Model estimated: Apr 20, 2013 at 03:03:32AM.| 
| Dependent variable             TAXEVASI     | 
| Weighting variable                 None     | 
| Number of observations             5647     | 
| Iterations completed                101     | 
| Log likelihood function       -8325.288     | 
| Number of parameters                 91     | 
| Info. Criterion: AIC =          2.98080     | 
|   Finite Sample: AIC =          2.98133     | 
| Info. Criterion: BIC =          3.08778     | 
| Info. Criterion:HQIC =          3.01807     | 
| LHS is CENSORED. Tobit Model fit by MLE.    | 
| FIRST 45 estimates are probit equation.     | 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+ 
|Variable| Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z]| 
+--------+--------------+----------------+--------+--------+ 
---------+Selection (probit) equation for EXTERNAL 
 Constant|    -.99886899       .16851123    -5.928   .0000 
 TAXRATE |    -.02133718       .01804459    -1.182   .2370 
 AUDIT   |     .00299630       .00343368      .873   .3829 
 TRUSTING|     .03065367       .01288411     2.379   .0174 
 TRUSTINJ|     .00926866       .01405222      .660   .5095 
 CORRUPTI|     .01741253       .01307026     1.332   .1828 
 COMPLIAN|     .00374170       .00196101     1.908   .0564 
 FOREIGN |     .42554258       .07082903     6.008   .0000 
 MEDIUM  |     .59579062       .05281045    11.282   .0000 
 LARGE   |     .95093777       .10109298     9.407   .0000 
 INDIVIDU|    -.47639172       .05439071    -8.759   .0000 
 PARTNERS|    -.18135917       .06077959    -2.984   .0028 
 MININGAN|     .33986388       .23203454     1.465   .1430 
 CONSTRUC|     .19358779       .10369483     1.867   .0619 
 MANUFACT|     .30598766       .09203951     3.325   .0009 
 TRANSPOR|     .25807391       .11287438     2.286   .0222 
 WHOLESAL|     .19252649       .09309007     2.068   .0386 
 REALESTA|     .10155871       .10463068      .971   .3317 
 HOTELSAN|     .14319340       .11831051     1.210   .2262 
 INTACCOU|     .51409423       .05898221     8.716   .0000 
 DUM1    |     .14697867       .17199902      .855   .3928 
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 DUM3    |    1.67595409       .20165859     8.311   .0000 
 DUM4    |     .21620212       .15594238     1.386   .1656 
 DUM5    |     .36962062       .17275876     2.140   .0324 
 DUM6    |     .32985724       .15106361     2.184   .0290 
 DUM7    |     .36966879       .12267597     3.013   .0026 
 DUM8    |     .26557787       .12740784     2.084   .0371 
 DUM9    |     .58186879       .14975386     3.886   .0001 
 DUM10   |    1.34804793       .15131137     8.909   .0000 
 DUM11   |     .36410659       .14303356     2.546   .0109 
 DUM12   |     .53382659       .17691826     3.017   .0025 
 DUM13   |    -.23257625       .13274505    -1.752   .0798 
 DUM14   |     .36824122       .13857441     2.657   .0079 
 DUM15   |    -.84929387       .14421538    -5.889   .0000 
 DUM16   |    1.09388436       .17657083     6.195   .0000 
 DUM17   |     .19719323       .16259162     1.213   .2252 
 DUM18   |    1.30568174       .29962319     4.358   .0000 
 DUM19   |    1.35648828       .24335007     5.574   .0000 
 DUM20   |     .41622212       .13210430     3.151   .0016 
 DUM21   |     .11369863       .12531526      .907   .3642 
 DUM22   |    1.11934548       .14711980     7.608   .0000 
 DUM23   |     .70824704       .15167238     4.670   .0000 
 DUM24   |     .38345881       .12637584     3.034   .0024 
 DUM25   |     .01855111       .14683309      .126   .8995 
 DUM26   |    -.05171453       .14921683     -.347   .7289 
---------+Corrected regression, Regime 1 
 Constant|   -47.5495239      12.1191125    -3.924   .0001 
 TAXRATE |    3.86331206       .97062834     3.980   .0001 
 AUDIT   |    -.13589448       .16812074     -.808   .4189 
 TRUSTING|   -1.91552038       .64432755    -2.973   .0030 
 TRUSTINJ|   -1.26738023       .70838694    -1.789   .0736 
 CORRUPTI|    7.04528871       .69209831    10.180   .0000 
 COMPLIAN|     .04457023       .08612601      .518   .6048 
 FOREIGN |   -3.64031196      2.93196421    -1.242   .2144 
 MEDIUM  |   -5.78997811      3.28787161    -1.761   .0782 
 LARGE   |   -8.42370423      4.41650588    -1.907   .0565 
 INDIVIDU|    7.66075617      3.49043044     2.195   .0282 
 PARTNERS|    5.66119448      2.79191564     2.028   .0426 
 MININGAN|    5.96412275      10.5220898      .567   .5708 
 CONSTRUC|    6.73600415      6.44840794     1.045   .2962 
 MANUFACT|    5.93416416      5.99464900      .990   .3222 
 TRANSPOR|   -4.01091081      7.05802717     -.568   .5698 
 WHOLESAL|    1.74179182      6.10704477      .285   .7755 
 REALESTA|    7.89747368      6.49810130     1.215   .2242 
 HOTELSAN|    15.7606934      7.02419280     2.244   .0248 
 DUM1    |    23.7783725      7.60412726     3.127   .0018 
 DUM3    |    28.6480930      8.35212033     3.430   .0006 
 DUM4    |    8.58002371      8.13987511     1.054   .2918 
 DUM5    |    9.29941138      8.61781943     1.079   .2805 
 DUM6    |    19.0256427      7.79128679     2.442   .0146 
 DUM7    |    7.74369413      6.22789930     1.243   .2137 
 DUM8    |   -1.58580045      6.33800352     -.250   .8024 
 DUM9    |   -5.91474816      7.72341518     -.766   .4438 
 DUM10   |    16.2885795      7.02907097     2.317   .0205 
 DUM11   |    26.9788212      6.75760646     3.992   .0001 
 DUM12   |     .59650352      8.94626563      .067   .9468 
 DUM13   |    8.36650585      6.95247022     1.203   .2288 
 DUM14   |    17.1532029      6.85154685     2.504   .0123 
 DUM15   |    16.7988519      11.4948949     1.461   .1439 
 DUM16   |    8.13261971      7.92250843     1.027   .3046 
 DUM17   |    3.90547977      7.90808528      .494   .6214 
 DUM18   |    16.3241627      9.40031626     1.737   .0825 
 DUM19   |    19.0945349      8.54981166     2.233   .0255 
 DUM20   |   -3.00089747      7.37658253     -.407   .6841 
 DUM21   |   -17.8834609      7.12884741    -2.509   .0121 
 DUM22   |    14.9437383      7.25995528     2.058   .0396 
 DUM23   |   -26.0214523      8.86832635    -2.934   .0033 
 DUM24   |    13.1134262      6.06644402     2.162   .0306 
 DUM25   |    12.5622624      8.92336295     1.408   .1592 
 DUM26   |    2.60963584      7.35324414      .355   .7227 
 SIGMA(1)|    35.2199789      1.19953292    29.361   .0000 
 RHO(1,2)|     .12280959       .19115401      .642   .5206 
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5.11 BEEPS 2005 Tobit Corner Solution 
 
 
 
tobit  taxevasion taxrate audit trustingovernment  trustinjudicalsystem corruption1 
compliancecost foreign medium large individual  partnership miningandquarrying construction 
manufacturing transportstorageandcommunicat wholesaleretailrepairs realestaterentingandbusines 
hotelsandrestaurants dum1 dum3 dum4 dum5 dum6 dum7 dum8 dum9 dum10 dum11 dum12 dum13 dum14 dum15 
dum16 dum17 dum18 dum19 dum20 dum21 dum22 dum23 dum24 dum25 dum26, ll robust cluster(country) 
 
Tobit regression                                  Number of obs   =       6218 
                                                  F(  19,   6175) =          . 
                                                  Prob > F        =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -13809.691                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0338 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 26 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  taxevasion |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     taxrate |   2.547028   .9215525     2.76   0.006     .7404645    4.353592 
       audit |  -.0033529    .087451    -0.04   0.969    -.1747873    .1680815 
trustingov~t |  -.6256212   .5221981    -1.20   0.231    -1.649311     .398069 
trustinjud~m |  -1.193904   .7567963    -1.58   0.115    -2.677488      .28968 
 corruption1 |   7.712147   .5493653    14.04   0.000       6.6352    8.789094 
compliance~t |   .0369278   .0590321     0.63   0.532    -.0787956    .1526512 
     foreign |  -4.828175   1.993884    -2.42   0.015    -8.736881   -.9194686 
      medium |  -7.412127   1.394213    -5.32   0.000    -10.14527   -4.678983 
       large |  -8.764426   2.278816    -3.85   0.000     -13.2317   -4.297153 
  individual |   7.769038    2.18717     3.55   0.000     3.481424    12.05665 
 partnership |   3.251064   2.415536     1.35   0.178    -1.484228    7.986356 
miningandq~g |  -6.997909   7.167731    -0.98   0.329    -21.04916     7.05334 
construction |   -1.04808   3.370546    -0.31   0.756    -7.655523    5.559364 
manufactur~g |  -1.936433   2.603906    -0.74   0.457    -7.040995    3.168129 
transports~t |  -6.094228   3.344149    -1.82   0.068    -12.64992     .461469 
wholesaler~s |  -2.440725   2.782917    -0.88   0.380     -7.89621    3.014761 
realestate~s |  -2.726097   2.998783    -0.91   0.363    -8.604757    3.152563 
hotelsandr~s |   5.061127   3.135663     1.61   0.107    -1.085864    11.20812 
        dum1 |   19.32006   .7669571    25.19   0.000     17.81656    20.82357 
        dum3 |   22.09245   1.026669    21.52   0.000     20.07982    24.10508 
        dum4 |   4.376236   .9752726     4.49   0.000     2.464362     6.28811 
        dum5 |   4.351167   .6620877     6.57   0.000     3.053244    5.649089 
        dum6 |   6.780565   1.287368     5.27   0.000     4.256876    9.304254 
        dum7 |    8.31282   .9245482     8.99   0.000     6.500384    10.12526 
        dum8 |  -4.613645   .8626196    -5.35   0.000     -6.30468    -2.92261 
        dum9 |  -4.357904   1.084488    -4.02   0.000    -6.483877    -2.23193 
       dum10 |   11.94528   1.436141     8.32   0.000     9.129944    14.76062 
       dum11 |   14.15485   1.026354    13.79   0.000     12.14283    16.16686 
       dum12 |  -4.488137   1.251416    -3.59   0.000    -6.941349   -2.034925 
       dum13 |  -.4756348   1.549509    -0.31   0.759    -3.513211    2.561942 
       dum14 |   11.43168   .8915484    12.82   0.000     9.683931    13.17942 
       dum15 |    9.76497   .8786979    11.11   0.000     8.042416    11.48752 
       dum16 |   .1550242   .6540673     0.24   0.813    -1.127175    1.437224 
       dum17 |   4.906085   1.301196     3.77   0.000     2.355287    7.456882 
       dum18 |   4.853863   1.843691     2.63   0.008     1.239586     8.46814 
       dum19 |   12.50473   1.530809     8.17   0.000     9.503814    15.50565 
       dum20 |  -11.67524   .9546973   -12.23   0.000    -13.54678   -9.803702 
       dum21 |  -11.87159   .8693175   -13.66   0.000    -13.57576   -10.16743 
       dum22 |   3.508364    .820465     4.28   0.000     1.899967    5.116761 
       dum23 |  -29.76343    1.15958   -25.67   0.000    -32.03661   -27.49025 
       dum24 |    10.2555   .5589436    18.35   0.000     9.159772    11.35122 
       dum25 |   .0173738    .668297     0.03   0.979    -1.292721    1.327469 
       dum26 |   2.797135   .5027906     5.56   0.000      1.81149     3.78278 
       _cons |  -33.90083   6.165756    -5.50   0.000    -45.98786    -21.8138 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /sigma |   35.94228   2.022317                      31.97784    39.90673 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Obs. summary:       3856  left-censored observations at taxevasion<=0 
                      2362     uncensored observations 
                         0 right-censored observations 
APPENDICES        Page | 345  
5.12 BEEPS 2005 Probit  
 
 
 
probit taxevasion taxrate audit trustingovernment  trustinjudicalsystem corruption1 
compliancecost foreign medium large individual  partnership miningandquarrying construction 
manufacturing transportstorageandcommunicat wholesaleretailrepairs realestaterentingandbusines 
hotelsandrestaurants dum1 dum3 dum4 dum5 dum6 dum7 dum8 dum9 dum10 dum11 dum12 dum13 dum14 dum15 
dum16 dum17 dum18 dum19 dum20 dum21 dum22 dum23 dum24 dum25 dum26 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -4128.7393   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -3681.197   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3679.4656   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3679.4641   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -3679.4641   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       6218 
                                                  LR chi2(43)     =     898.55 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -3679.4641                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1088 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  taxevasion |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     taxrate |   .0876338   .0175844     4.98   0.000      .053169    .1220987 
       audit |  -.0016078   .0030611    -0.53   0.599    -.0076074    .0043918 
trustingov~t |  -.0152967   .0123665    -1.24   0.216    -.0395347    .0089412 
trustinjud~m |  -.0246177    .013394    -1.84   0.066    -.0508696    .0016341 
 corruption1 |   .2380428   .0127679    18.64   0.000     .2130182    .2630673 
compliance~t |  -.0000496   .0017486    -0.03   0.977    -.0034768    .0033777 
     foreign |  -.1229585   .0589133    -2.09   0.037    -.2384265   -.0074906 
      medium |  -.2044408   .0469839    -4.35   0.000    -.2965276    -.112354 
       large |  -.2394889   .0723469    -3.31   0.001    -.3812862   -.0976916 
  individual |   .2204935   .0514382     4.29   0.000     .1196765    .3213106 
 partnership |   .0884211   .0559526     1.58   0.114     -.021244    .1980861 
miningandq~g |  -.1421312   .1956602    -0.73   0.468    -.5256182    .2413559 
construction |  -.0078471   .1003584    -0.08   0.938     -.204546    .1888517 
manufactur~g |  -.0481602   .0890572    -0.54   0.589    -.2227092    .1263887 
transports~t |  -.1351397   .1100713    -1.23   0.220    -.3508754     .080596 
wholesaler~s |  -.0763794   .0904023    -0.84   0.398    -.2535647    .1008059 
realestate~s |  -.1323894   .1022681    -1.29   0.195    -.3328312    .0680524 
hotelsandr~s |   .0567592   .1139931     0.50   0.619    -.1666631    .2801815 
        dum1 |   .4749216   .1547669     3.07   0.002      .171584    .7782593 
        dum3 |   .8594087   .1489665     5.77   0.000     .5674398    1.151378 
        dum4 |   .2740602   .1455786     1.88   0.060    -.0112685     .559389 
        dum5 |   .0415339   .1553776     0.27   0.789    -.2630005    .3460684 
        dum6 |   .3922763   .1434347     2.73   0.006     .1111493    .6734032 
        dum7 |   .4510105   .1139035     3.96   0.000     .2277638    .6742572 
        dum8 |   -.232734   .1232763    -1.89   0.059    -.4743512    .0088832 
        dum9 |  -.1867653    .147705    -1.26   0.206    -.4762619    .1027312 
       dum10 |   .4547049   .1224198     3.71   0.000     .2147664    .6946434 
       dum11 |   .5687966   .1316051     4.32   0.000     .3108555    .8267378 
       dum12 |  -.0044807   .1634595    -0.03   0.978    -.3248553     .315894 
       dum13 |    .085011   .1264052     0.67   0.501    -.1627388    .3327607 
       dum14 |   .3298041   .1308409     2.52   0.012     .0733607    .5862475 
       dum15 |   .4072904   .1359778     3.00   0.003     .1407789     .673802 
       dum16 |   .0739524   .1553904     0.48   0.634    -.2306072    .3785121 
       dum17 |   .2766815   .1531558     1.81   0.071    -.0234982    .5768613 
       dum18 |   .4967208   .1666233     2.98   0.003     .1701451    .8232965 
       dum19 |   .4005524   .1719112     2.33   0.020     .0636125    .7374922 
       dum20 |  -.1371715   .1302434    -1.05   0.292    -.3924438    .1181009 
       dum21 |  -.3004999   .1225211    -2.45   0.014     -.540637   -.0603629 
       dum22 |   .0512301   .1289979     0.40   0.691    -.2016012    .3040615 
       dum23 |  -.7304029   .1550789    -4.71   0.000    -1.034352   -.4264539 
       dum24 |   .2284742   .1191481     1.92   0.055    -.0050518    .4620002 
       dum25 |   .0851313   .1452697     0.59   0.558    -.1995921    .3698546 
       dum26 |   .0814812   .1437938     0.57   0.571    -.2003495    .3633118 
       _cons |  -1.177972   .1623015    -7.26   0.000    -1.496077   -.8598674 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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5.13 Conditional Marginal Effects 
 
 
 
mfx compute, predict(e(0,.)) 
 
Marginal effects after tobit 
      y  = E(taxevasion|taxevasion>0) (predict, e(0,.)) 
         =  24.835606 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 taxrate |     .76094      .26981    2.82   0.005   .232114  1.28977   2.78948 
   audit |  -.0010017      .02612   -0.04   0.969  -.052196  .050193   2.41605 
trusti~t |  -.1869081        .156   -1.20   0.231  -.492666   .11885   3.87874 
trusti~m |  -.3566861      .22551   -1.58   0.114  -.798681  .085308   3.45288 
corrup~1 |    2.30405      .14777   15.59   0.000   2.01443  2.59367     2.454 
compli~t |   .0110324      .01761    0.63   0.531  -.023477  .045542   5.23631 
 foreign*|  -1.397504      .55887   -2.50   0.012  -2.49287 -.302136   .108395 
  medium*|  -2.130923      .38076   -5.60   0.000  -2.87721 -1.38464   .187681 
   large*|  -2.460964      .60452   -4.07   0.000   -3.6458 -1.27613   .074622 
indivi~l*|   2.342978      .66529    3.52   0.000   1.03903  3.64692   .433741 
partne~p*|   .9829668       .7374    1.33   0.183  -.462306  2.42824   .284336 
mining~g*|  -1.974327     1.90351   -1.04   0.300  -5.70513  1.75648   .010454 
constr~n*|  -.3108991      .99151   -0.31   0.754  -2.25422  1.63242   .097137 
manufa~g*|  -.5768755      .77423   -0.75   0.456  -2.09434  .940587   .411547 
transp~t*|  -1.740769      .90937   -1.91   0.056   -3.5231  .041559   .059505 
wholes~s*|  -.7217011      .81578   -0.88   0.376  -2.32059   .87719   .248151 
reales~s*|  -.7991033      .86209   -0.93   0.354  -2.48877  .890561   .085236 
hotels~s*|   1.572069     1.00764    1.56   0.119  -.402878  3.54702   .047925 
    dum1*|   6.775751       .2329   29.09   0.000   6.31928  7.23222    .01946 
    dum3*|   7.911332      .34124   23.18   0.000   7.24251  8.58016   .026375 
    dum4*|   1.354282      .29885    4.53   0.000   .768551  1.94001   .026536 
    dum5*|    1.34684      .20724    6.50   0.000   .940664  1.75302   .020585 
    dum6*|   2.139453      .40657    5.26   0.000   1.34259  2.93631   .027501 
    dum7*|   2.625601      .29516    8.90   0.000    2.0471   3.2041   .109199 
    dum8*|  -1.332422      .23327   -5.71   0.000  -1.78961 -.875231   .061756 
    dum9*|  -1.257932      .30507   -4.12   0.000  -1.85586  -.66001   .029592 
   dum10*|   3.901268      .50834    7.67   0.000   2.90494   4.8976   .065938 
   dum11*|   4.730834      .34208   13.83   0.000   4.06036  5.40131   .039402 
   dum12*|  -1.293257      .35192   -3.67   0.000    -1.983  -.60351   .019942 
   dum13*|  -.1416065      .45971   -0.31   0.758  -1.04261  .759402   .067707 
   dum14*|   3.738429       .2703   13.83   0.000   3.20865  4.26821   .038919 
   dum15*|   3.153241      .29531   10.68   0.000   2.57445  3.73203   .034738 
   dum16*|   .0463725       .1959    0.24   0.813  -.337583  .430329   .021068 
   dum17*|   1.525511      .41542    3.67   0.000   .711308  2.33971   .020746 
   dum18*|   1.509104      .58313    2.59   0.010   .366188  2.65202   .016886 
   dum19*|   4.145818      .53914    7.69   0.000   3.08912  5.20251   .014635 
   dum20*|  -3.194833      .23403  -13.65   0.000  -3.65353 -2.73613   .045995 
   dum21*|   -3.25967      .21416  -15.22   0.000  -3.67941 -2.83993    .07028 
   dum22*|   1.076999      .25741    4.18   0.000   .572476  1.58152   .044066 
   dum23*|  -7.115183      .20721  -34.34   0.000   -7.5213 -6.70906   .032486 
   dum24*|   3.306248      .16398   20.16   0.000   2.98485  3.62765   .067063 
   dum25*|   .0051913      .19968    0.03   0.979  -.386165  .396548    .02541 
   dum26*|    .854685      .15358    5.56   0.000   .553665   1.1557    .02541 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
.  
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5.14 Unconditional Marginal Effects 
 
 
 
mfx compute, predict(ystar(0,.)) 
 
Marginal effects after tobit 
      y  = E(taxevasion*|taxevasion>0) (predict, ystar(0,.)) 
         =  9.2642287 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 taxrate |   .9500977      .33249    2.86   0.004   .298423  1.60177   2.78948 
   audit |  -.0012507      .03261   -0.04   0.969  -.065161   .06266   2.41605 
trusti~t |  -.2333705      .19481   -1.20   0.231  -.615184  .148443   3.87874 
trusti~m |  -.4453526      .28116   -1.58   0.113  -.996411  .105705   3.45288 
corrup~1 |   2.876801      .17482   16.46   0.000   2.53416  3.21944     2.454 
compli~t |   .0137749      .02196    0.63   0.530  -.029267  .056817   5.23631 
 foreign*|  -1.706233      .66621   -2.56   0.010  -3.01198 -.400483   .108395 
  medium*|  -2.588043      .44539   -5.81   0.000  -3.46099  -1.7151   .187681 
   large*|  -2.934862      .68792   -4.27   0.000  -4.28317 -1.58656   .074622 
indivi~l*|   2.942018      .84032    3.50   0.000   1.29503  4.58901   .433741 
partne~p*|    1.23693      .93368    1.32   0.185  -.593055  3.06691   .284336 
mining~g*|  -2.363797     2.16654   -1.09   0.275  -6.61013  1.88254   .010454 
constr~n*|  -.3863095     1.22491   -0.32   0.752  -2.78709  2.01447   .097137 
manufa~g*|  -.7188706      .96354   -0.75   0.456  -2.60737  1.16963   .411547 
transp~t*|  -2.104268     1.05704   -1.99   0.047  -4.17603 -.032502   .059505 
wholes~s*|  -.8947469     1.00527   -0.89   0.373  -2.86503  1.07554   .248151 
reales~s*|  -.9846866     1.04748   -0.94   0.347  -3.03771  1.06834   .085236 
hotels~s*|   2.011478     1.31478    1.53   0.126  -.565448   4.5884   .047925 
    dum1*|   9.161127      .31851   28.76   0.000   8.53686  9.78539    .01946 
    dum3*|    10.7622      .46984   22.91   0.000   9.84134  11.6831   .026375 
    dum4*|   1.729056      .37973    4.55   0.000   .984796  2.47332   .026536 
    dum5*|   1.719801      .26761    6.43   0.000    1.1953   2.2443   .020585 
    dum6*|   2.762043      .52591    5.25   0.000   1.73129   3.7928   .027501 
    dum7*|   3.390783      .38643    8.77   0.000   2.63339  4.14818   .109199 
    dum8*|  -1.624128      .27081   -6.00   0.000   -2.1549 -1.09335   .061756 
    dum9*|  -1.532792      .36508   -4.20   0.000  -2.24833 -.817249   .029592 
   dum10*|   5.125195       .6967    7.36   0.000    3.7597   6.4907   .065938 
   dum11*|    6.28075      .46112   13.62   0.000   5.37698  7.18452   .039402 
   dum12*|  -1.573782      .42084   -3.74   0.000  -2.39861 -.748952   .019942 
   dum13*|  -.1763936      .57128   -0.31   0.757  -1.29608   .94329   .067707 
   dum14*|   4.915208       .3457   14.22   0.000   4.23764  5.59277   .038919 
   dum15*|   4.120549      .39847   10.34   0.000   3.33956  4.90153   .034738 
   dum16*|   .0579487      .24501    0.24   0.813  -.422265  .538163   .021068 
   dum17*|   1.953162      .54073    3.61   0.000   .893344  3.01298   .020746 
   dum18*|   1.932037      .75424    2.56   0.010   .453748  3.41032   .016886 
   dum19*|   5.486064      .73607    7.45   0.000   4.04338  6.92874   .014635 
   dum20*|  -3.729512      .24922  -14.97   0.000  -4.21796 -3.24106   .045995 
   dum21*|   -3.81596      .23018  -16.58   0.000  -4.26711 -3.36481    .07028 
   dum22*|   1.368362      .33204    4.12   0.000   .717583  2.01914   .044066 
   dum23*|  -7.283205      .13622  -53.47   0.000   -7.5502 -7.01621   .032486 
   dum24*|   4.316297      .21134   20.42   0.000   3.90209  4.73051   .067063 
   dum25*|   .0064823      .24933    0.03   0.979  -.482188  .495153    .02541 
   dum26*|   1.082805      .19519    5.55   0.000   .700236  1.46537    .02541 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. 
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6.1 Tobit Corner Solution - with Tax Morale 
 
 
 
 
tobit taxevasion taxmorale, ll vce(robust) 
 
 
Tobit regression                                  Number of obs   =        536 
                                                  F(   1,    535) =       9.07 
                                                  Prob > F        =     0.0027 
Log pseudolikelihood = -2281.7491                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0017 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  taxevasion |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   taxmorale |  -3.627592   1.204852    -3.01   0.003    -5.994413   -1.260771 
       _cons |   49.47079   4.196897    11.79   0.000     41.22637     57.7152 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /sigma |   31.83661   1.101588                      29.67264    34.00058 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Obs. summary:         89  left-censored observations at taxevasion<=0 
                       447     uncensored observations 
                         0 right-censored observations 
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6.2 Tobit Corner Solution - with Tax Morale and Deterrence 
 
 
 
 
tobit  taxevasion taxmorale taxrate audit, ll vce(robust) 
 
 
Tobit regression                                  Number of obs   =        431 
                                                  F(   3,    428) =       7.62 
                                                  Prob > F        =     0.0001 
Log pseudolikelihood = -1831.0797                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0071 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  taxevasion |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   taxmorale |   -3.39693   1.300137    -2.61   0.009    -5.952378   -.8414814 
     taxrate |   3.988205    1.30404     3.06   0.002     1.425085    6.551325 
       audit |  -.4916104   .2060812    -2.39   0.017    -.8966677   -.0865532 
       _cons |   41.52878   6.003272     6.92   0.000     29.72922    53.32834 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /sigma |     30.878   1.143219                      28.63098    33.12503 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Obs. summary:         69  left-censored observations at taxevasion<=0 
                       362     uncensored observations 
                         0 right-censored observations 
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6.3 Tobit Corner Solution - Full 
 
 
 
 
Tobit taxevasion taxmorale taxrate audit size partn corp yrs fall, ll vce(robust) 
 
Tobit regression                                  Number of obs   =        395 
                                                  F(   8,    387) =       7.26 
                                                  Prob > F        =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -1675.7305                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0174 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  taxevasion |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   taxmorale |  -4.186252   1.237718    -3.38   0.001    -6.619745   -1.752759 
     taxrate |   4.046366   1.255296     3.22   0.001     1.578313    6.514418 
       audit |  -.4483375    .171642    -2.61   0.009     -.785805     -.11087 
        size |  -.1653065   .1564768    -1.06   0.291    -.4729576    .1423446 
       partn |  -10.61013   5.495287    -1.93   0.054    -21.41448    .1942283 
        corp |  -42.93088   14.44878    -2.97   0.003     -71.3388   -14.52295 
         yrs |  -.5008992   .1905623    -2.63   0.009    -.8755661   -.1262322 
        fall |   3.056189   3.371469     0.91   0.365    -3.572499    9.684877 
       _cons |   51.45922   6.067794     8.48   0.000     39.52925    63.38919 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /sigma |   28.89121    1.10619                      26.71631     31.0661 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Obs. summary:         57  left-censored observations at taxevasion<=0 
                       338     uncensored observations 
                         0 right-censored observations 
 
 
. 
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6.4 Probit – for Tobit Diagnostics 
 
 
 
probit  dummyte taxmorale taxrate audit size partn corp yrs fall, vce(robust) 
 
 
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -163.01644   
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -135.20379   
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood =  -134.3286   
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -134.32562   
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -134.32562   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        395 
                                                  Wald chi2(8)    =      48.90 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -134.32562                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1760 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     dummyte |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   taxmorale |  -.1488821   .0829345    -1.80   0.073    -.3114306    .0136664 
     taxrate |   .3652953   .0865835     4.22   0.000     .1955948    .5349958 
       audit |  -.0140819   .0062091    -2.27   0.023    -.0262516   -.0019123 
        size |  -.0099937   .0062551    -1.60   0.110    -.0222534     .002266 
       partn |  -.4279767   .3153213    -1.36   0.175    -1.045995    .1900418 
        corp |  -1.895707   .5304877    -3.57   0.000    -2.935443   -.8559697 
         yrs |  -.0144349   .0077561    -1.86   0.063    -.0296366    .0007668 
        fall |  -.0839415   .1916016    -0.44   0.661    -.4594738    .2915907 
       _cons |   1.265542   .3626057     3.49   0.000     .5548474    1.976236 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. 
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6.5 Tobit Conditional Marginal Effects 
 
 
 
mfx compute, predict(e(0,.)) 
 
Marginal effects after tobit 
      y  = E(taxevasion|taxevasion>0) (predict, e(0,.)) 
         =  43.262559 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
taxmor~e |  -3.015739      .89338   -3.38   0.001  -4.76673 -1.26475    3.3038 
 taxrate |   2.914966      .88884    3.28   0.001   1.17286  4.65707   2.32658 
   audit |  -.3229784      .12346   -2.62   0.009  -.564959 -.080998   4.89114 
    size |  -.1190854      .11241   -1.06   0.289  -.339407  .101236    5.5519 
   partn*|  -7.146348     3.44772   -2.07   0.038  -13.9038 -.388942   .060759 
    corp*|  -22.38612     4.97173   -4.50   0.000  -32.1305 -12.6417   .025316 
     yrs |  -.3608434      .13811   -2.61   0.009  -.631538 -.090148   10.3494 
    fall*|   2.221822     2.48215    0.90   0.371   -2.6431  7.08674   .278481 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
.   
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6.6 Tobit Unconditional Marginal Effects 
 
 
 
mfx compute, predict(ystar(0,.)) 
 
Marginal effects after tobit 
      y  = E(taxevasion*|taxevasion>0) (predict, ystar(0,.)) 
         =  39.153531 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
taxmor~e |  -3.788646      1.1195   -3.38   0.001  -5.98282 -1.59447    3.3038 
 taxrate |   3.662046     1.12534    3.25   0.001   1.45642  5.86767   2.32658 
   audit |  -.4057549      .15509   -2.62   0.009  -.709721 -.101789   4.89114 
    size |  -.1496059      .14141   -1.06   0.290   -.42676  .127548    5.5519 
   partn*|  -9.267693     4.60483   -2.01   0.044   -18.293   -.2424   .060759 
    corp*|  -30.49375      6.5846   -4.63   0.000  -43.3993 -17.5882   .025316 
     yrs |  -.4533243       .1728   -2.62   0.009  -.792009  -.11464   10.3494 
    fall*|   2.777522     3.08127    0.90   0.367  -3.26165  8.81669   .278481 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. 
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6.7 Ordered Probit  
 
 
 
oprobit taxmorale gov  legalenv corravrg  compcosts sec terciary ownergender ownerage 
memberofasc, vce(robust) 
 
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -304.60513   
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -281.93351   
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -281.75639   
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood =  -281.7563   
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood =  -281.7563   
 
Ordered probit regression                         Number of obs   =        340 
                                                  Wald chi2(9)    =      34.11 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0001 
Log pseudolikelihood =  -281.7563                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0750 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
   taxmorale |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gov |  -.2661231   .0732138    -3.63   0.000    -.4096195   -.1226267 
    legalenv |   .1071464   .0611989     1.75   0.080    -.0128011     .227094 
    corravrg |    .255984   .0773329     3.31   0.001     .1044144    .4075537 
   compcosts |  -.1551281   .0488427    -3.18   0.001    -.2508581   -.0593981 
         sec |  -.4066541   .2505181    -1.62   0.105    -.8976605    .0843524 
    terciary |  -.5098887   .2762344    -1.85   0.065    -1.051298    .0315208 
 ownergender |  -.1735304   .2351472    -0.74   0.461    -.6344105    .2873496 
    ownerage |   .0007856   .0069179     0.11   0.910    -.0127733    .0143445 
 memberofasc |   .2374481   .2516517     0.94   0.345    -.2557801    .7306764 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /cut1 |  -1.804593   .5804915                     -2.942335   -.6668507 
       /cut2 |  -1.492886   .5811834                     -2.631985   -.3537876 
       /cut3 |  -1.114378   .5794638                     -2.250107    .0213499 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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6.8 Probit  
 
 
 
probit    dummytm gov  legalenv corravrg  compcosts sec terciary ownergender ownerage  
memberofasc, vce(robust) 
 
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -202.35504   
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -185.48838   
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -185.39604   
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -185.39604   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        340 
                                                  Wald chi2(9)    =      27.19 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0013 
Log pseudolikelihood = -185.39604                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0838 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     dummytm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gov |   -.248365   .0734376    -3.38   0.001       -.3923   -.1044299 
    legalenv |   .1207974   .0658579     1.83   0.067    -.0082817    .2498764 
    corravrg |   .1811721   .0735363     2.46   0.014     .0370436    .3253006 
   compcosts |  -.1333491   .0499063    -2.67   0.008    -.2311637   -.0355346 
         sec |  -.4597072   .2470935    -1.86   0.063    -.9440016    .0245872 
    terciary |  -.5792637    .272149    -2.13   0.033    -1.112666   -.0458615 
 ownergender |  -.1625768   .2565745    -0.63   0.526    -.6654535    .3402999 
    ownerage |   .0006794   .0072586     0.09   0.925    -.0135472     .014906 
 memberofasc |    .257301   .2596702     0.99   0.322    -.2516432    .7662452 
       _cons |   1.274203   .6282801     2.03   0.043     .0427967     2.50561 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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6.9 Linktest 
 
 
 
linktest 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -202.35504   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -184.82398   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -184.7387   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -184.73866   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -184.73866   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        340 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =      35.23 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -184.73866                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0871 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     dummytm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        _hat |   1.328208   .3391164     3.92   0.000     .6635516    1.992864 
      _hatsq |  -.3000729   .2603679    -1.15   0.249    -.8103847    .2102388 
       _cons |  -.0360276   .1288077    -0.28   0.780     -.288486    .2164309 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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6.10 Likelihood Ratio Test 
 
 
 
lrdrop1 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests: drop 1 term 
probit regression 
number of obs = 340 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 dummytm     Df      Chi2      P>Chi2    -2*log ll   Res. Df   AIC 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Original Model                            370.79      330     390.79 
-gov          1     11.44      0.0007     382.23      329     400.23 
-legalenv     1      3.17      0.0749     373.96      329     391.96 
-corravrg     1      6.35      0.0118     377.14      329     395.14 
-compcosts    1      9.40      0.0022     380.20      329     398.20 
-sec          1      3.26      0.0709     374.06      329     392.06 
-terciary     1      4.21      0.0402     375.00      329     393.00 
-ownergender  1      0.38      0.5355     371.18      329     389.18 
-ownerage     1      0.01      0.9236     370.80      329     388.80 
-memberofasc  1      1.14      0.2851     371.93      329     389.93 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Terms dropped one at a time in turn. 
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6.11 Hosmer and Lemeshow’s Goodness of Fit Test 
 
 
estat gof 
 
Probit model for dummytm, goodness-of-fit test 
 
       number of observations =       340 
 number of covariate patterns =       331 
            Pearson chi2(321) =       351.03 
                  Prob > chi2 =         0.1197 
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6.12 Hosmer and Lemeshow’s Grouped 
 
 
 
estat gof, group(10) 
 
 
Probit model for dummytm, goodness-of-fit test 
 
  (Table collapsed on quantiles of estimated probabilities) 
 
       number of observations =       340 
             number of groups =        10 
      Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(8) =         7.31 
                  Prob > chi2 =         0.5034 
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6.13 Classification Test 
 
 
estat classification 
 
Probit model for dummytm 
 
              -------- True -------- 
Classified |         D            ~D  |      Total 
-----------+--------------------------+----------- 
     +     |       236            77  |        313 
     -     |         8            19  |         27 
-----------+--------------------------+----------- 
   Total   |       244            96  |        340 
 
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5 
True D defined as dummytm != 0 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)   96.72% 
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)   19.79% 
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)   75.40% 
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   70.37% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
False + rate for true ~D        Pr( +|~D)   80.21% 
False - rate for true D         Pr( -| D)    3.28% 
False + rate for classified +   Pr(~D| +)   24.60% 
False - rate for classified -   Pr( D| -)   29.63% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Correctly classified                        75.00% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
 
.   
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6.14 Probit Average Marginal Effects (AME) 
 
 
 
margins, dydx(*) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        340 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(dummytm), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : gov legalenv corravrg compcosts sec terciary ownergender ownerage 
               memberofasc 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gov |  -.0768738   .0215463    -3.57   0.000    -.1191038   -.0346438 
    legalenv |   .0373891   .0201059     1.86   0.063    -.0020177     .076796 
    corravrg |   .0560763   .0218443     2.57   0.010     .0132622    .0988904 
   compcosts |  -.0412742   .0147572    -2.80   0.005    -.0701978   -.0123506 
         sec |  -.1422884   .0761365    -1.87   0.062    -.2915131    .0069364 
    terciary |  -.1792934   .0830369    -2.16   0.031    -.3420428   -.0165441 
 ownergender |  -.0503207    .079475    -0.63   0.527    -.2060888    .1054474 
    ownerage |   .0002103   .0022471     0.09   0.925    -.0041939    .0046144 
 memberofasc |   .0796397   .0796293     1.00   0.317    -.0764309    .2357102 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. 
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6.15 Probit Marginal Effects at Mean (MEM) 
 
 
 
margins, dydx(*) atmean 
 
 
 
 
Conditional marginal effects                      Number of obs   =        340 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(dummytm), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : gov legalenv corravrg compcosts sec terciary ownergender ownerage 
               memberofasc 
at           : gov             =    2.482353 (mean) 
               legalenv        =    3.382353 (mean) 
               corravrg        =    4.288235 (mean) 
               compcosts       =    5.282353 (mean) 
               sec             =    .6294118 (mean) 
               terciary        =    .2441176 (mean) 
               ownergender     =    .8941176 (mean) 
               ownerage        =    41.02941 (mean) 
               memberofasc     =    .1382353 (mean) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gov |   -.081448   .0239641    -3.40   0.001    -.1284168   -.0344793 
    legalenv |   .0396139   .0215703     1.84   0.066    -.0026632     .081891 
    corravrg |    .059413   .0239084     2.49   0.013     .0125534    .1062727 
   compcosts |  -.0437301   .0161583    -2.71   0.007    -.0753998   -.0120604 
         sec |  -.1507549   .0811593    -1.86   0.063    -.3098243    .0083144 
    terciary |  -.1899619   .0889743    -2.14   0.033    -.3643484   -.0155755 
 ownergender |  -.0533149   .0842005    -0.63   0.527    -.2183448    .1117149 
    ownerage |   .0002228   .0023806     0.09   0.925    -.0044431    .0048887 
 memberofasc |   .0843785   .0846986     1.00   0.319    -.0816278    .2503847 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. 
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6.16 Logit Average Marginal Effects (AME) 
 
 
 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        340 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(dummytm), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : gov legalenv corravrg compcosts sec terciary ownergender ownerage 
               memberofasc 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gov |  -.0770067    .021179    -3.64   0.000    -.1185167   -.0354966 
    legalenv |   .0376953   .0200731     1.88   0.060    -.0016473    .0770378 
    corravrg |   .0589708   .0213465     2.76   0.006     .0171324    .1008092 
   compcosts |  -.0441519   .0155422    -2.84   0.005     -.074614   -.0136899 
         sec |  -.1343246   .0786508    -1.71   0.088    -.2884775    .0198282 
    terciary |  -.1790365   .0848726    -2.11   0.035    -.3453837   -.0126892 
 ownergender |  -.0430654   .0818245    -0.53   0.599    -.2034384    .1173076 
    ownerage |   .0000784   .0023045     0.03   0.973    -.0044383    .0045951 
 memberofasc |   .0974975   .0852489     1.14   0.253    -.0695872    .2645822 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.   
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6.17 OLS 
 
 
 
regress  dummytm gov  legalenv corravrg  compcosts sec terciary ownergender ownerage  
memberofasc, vce(robust) 
 
 
 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     340 
                                                       F(  9,   330) =    3.88 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0001 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0982 
                                                       Root MSE      =   .4339 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     dummytm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gov |  -.0818317   .0237036    -3.45   0.001    -.1284609   -.0352026 
    legalenv |   .0378377   .0209086     1.81   0.071    -.0032934    .0789687 
    corravrg |   .0649852   .0248572     2.61   0.009     .0160867    .1138837 
   compcosts |  -.0435682   .0145347    -3.00   0.003    -.0721606   -.0149757 
         sec |   -.125464   .0627588    -2.00   0.046    -.2489218   -.0020062 
    terciary |  -.1633283   .0718796    -2.27   0.024    -.3047284   -.0219283 
 ownergender |  -.0402784   .0693848    -0.58   0.562    -.1767708    .0962139 
    ownerage |   1.41e-07   .0023158     0.00   1.000    -.0045554    .0045557 
 memberofasc |   .0747493   .0682363     1.10   0.274    -.0594838    .2089823 
       _cons |   .8887874   .1979724     4.49   0.000     .4993403    1.278234 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. 
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6.18 Secondary=1 
 
 
 
margins, dydx(*) at(  sec=1 terciary=0) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        340 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(dummytm), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : gov legalenv corravrg compcosts sec terciary ownergender ownerage memberofasc 
at           : sec             =           1 
               terciary        =           0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gov |  -.0785539   .0218636    -3.59   0.000    -.1214057    -.035702 
    legalenv |   .0382063   .0204814     1.87   0.062    -.0019365     .078349 
    corravrg |   .0573018    .022217     2.58   0.010     .0137573    .1008464 
   compcosts |  -.0421762   .0150257    -2.81   0.005     -.071626   -.0127263 
         sec |   -.145398   .0817862    -1.78   0.075    -.3056959    .0148999 
    terciary |  -.1832118   .0861549    -2.13   0.033    -.3520723   -.0143513 
 ownergender |  -.0514204   .0812445    -0.63   0.527    -.2106568    .1078159 
    ownerage |   .0002149   .0022958     0.09   0.925    -.0042849    .0047147 
 memberofasc |   .0813802   .0806223     1.01   0.313    -.0766367     .239397 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
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6.19 Tertiary=1 
 
 
 
margins, dydx(*) at(  sec=0 terciary=1) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        340 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(dummytm), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : gov legalenv corravrg compcosts sec terciary ownergender ownerage 
               memberofasc 
at           : sec             =           0 
               terciary        =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gov |  -.0830399   .0241382    -3.44   0.001      -.13035   -.0357299 
    legalenv |   .0403882   .0218692     1.85   0.065    -.0024747     .083251 
    corravrg |   .0605742   .0239604     2.53   0.011     .0136127    .1075358 
   compcosts |  -.0445848   .0163082    -2.73   0.006    -.0765483   -.0126213 
         sec |  -.1537014   .0834165    -1.84   0.065    -.3171949     .009792 
    terciary |  -.1936747   .0976897    -1.98   0.047     -.385143   -.0022065 
 ownergender |   -.054357    .085723    -0.63   0.526    -.2223711    .1136571 
    ownerage |   .0002272   .0024275     0.09   0.925    -.0045307     .004985 
 memberofasc |   .0860277   .0868984     0.99   0.322      -.08429    .2563453 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
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6.20 Gender=1 
 
 
 
margins, dydx(*) at( ownergender=1) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        340 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(dummytm), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : gov legalenv corravrg compcosts sec terciary ownergender ownerage 
               memberofasc 
at           : ownergender     =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gov |  -.0777579   .0216008    -3.60   0.000    -.1200946   -.0354212 
    legalenv |   .0378192   .0203235     1.86   0.063    -.0020141    .0776524 
    corravrg |   .0567212   .0219461     2.58   0.010     .0137076    .0997348 
   compcosts |  -.0417488   .0148591    -2.81   0.005    -.0708722   -.0126255 
         sec |  -.1439248   .0769213    -1.87   0.061    -.2946877    .0068382 
    terciary |  -.1813554    .083824    -2.16   0.031    -.3456475   -.0170634 
 ownergender |  -.0508994   .0813251    -0.63   0.531    -.2102937    .1084949 
    ownerage |   .0002127   .0022729     0.09   0.925    -.0042421    .0046675 
 memberofasc |   .0805556   .0806304     1.00   0.318    -.0774771    .2385883 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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6.21 Member=1 
 
 
 
margins, dydx(*) at( memberofasc=1) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        340 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(dummytm), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : gov legalenv corravrg compcosts sec terciary ownergender ownerage 
               memberofasc 
at           : memberofasc     =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         gov |  -.0670503   .0222291    -3.02   0.003    -.1106185   -.0234821 
    legalenv |   .0326113    .018516     1.76   0.078    -.0036794    .0689019 
    corravrg |   .0489105   .0206788     2.37   0.018     .0083807    .0894402 
   compcosts |  -.0359998   .0139333    -2.58   0.010    -.0633086   -.0086911 
         sec |  -.1241057   .0729042    -1.70   0.089    -.2669952    .0187839 
    terciary |   -.156382   .0770706    -2.03   0.042    -.3074375   -.0053264 
 ownergender |  -.0438903   .0693964    -0.63   0.527    -.1799047    .0921241 
    ownerage |   .0001834   .0019663     0.09   0.926    -.0036704    .0040372 
 memberofasc |   .0694627   .0583976     1.19   0.234    -.0449945      .18392 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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6.22 QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
No of questionnaire 
_________________ 
Date of the survey 
_____/______/2012 
Duration of the survey 
__________ minutes 
Name of enumerator 
____________________ 
Optional comments from enumerator 
 
FOR RIINVEST ONLY 
Logical Control 
YES             NO 
Name of Controller 
_________________ 
Name of Processor 
_________________ 
 
 
Dear Entrepreneurs, 
 
Institute for Development Research RIINVEST is implementing a project with an aim to understand 
better several of the characteristics related to business environment in Kosovo; most importantly few 
issues related to tax evasion. These data will later serve to draw conclusions and policy recommendations 
that will promote a better and more sustainable business environment. Through thus survey, we aim to 
interview 600 Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in Kosovo, amongst which, your company has been 
randomly selected. 
 
We truly hope to find your understanding in answering positively to our request. Your valuable time 
dedicated to this questionnaire will enable us to obtain more credible results and hence provide better 
policy recommendations. We want to ensure you that this questionnaire will remain anonymous to the 
public, so your name or the name of your company will not, in any case and in any circumstance, be 
presented to public or any other disclosed party. Your answers, once stored and grouped with other 
answers, will be treated anonymously only for the purpose this study. 
 
Riinvest Institute and its long and credible background ensures for you and your company the highest 
standards in survey implementation and interpretation.  
  
 We thank you in advance! 
                                                                                                              RIINVEST INSTITUTE     
Prishtina, 2012 
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SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
I would like to start this survey by asking some general questions about your business. 
 
Q.1 NAME OF ENTERPRISE ____________ 
Q.2 LOCATION ____________ 
Q.3 MUNICIPALITY ____________ 
 
Q.4 
What is your job title? Please note that even if you have more than one job title we are interested in the 
title/responsibilities that you regard as the most important 
1 Chief Executive/Manager/President/Vice President □ 
2 Owner/proprietor □ 
3 Partner □ 
4 Owner and Manager □ 
5 None of the above THANK AND TERMINATE □ 
 
Q.5 What is the legal status of your business?  ONLY ONE ANSWER 
1 Single Proprietorship □ 
2 Partnership □ 
3 Corporation □ 
4 Other (Specify) ………………………… □ 
 
Q.6 How many full-time employees work for this company today, including the owner? 
1 None – 1 □ 
2 ___________________ □ 
3 10000 - more □ 
 
Q.7 What year was your firm established? WRITE YEAR 
1  
 
 
Q.8 Can you tell me the  following information about you: 
 
Gender 
Age 
Education 
M F Primary Sec Tertiary 
1 Owner / Top Manager □ □  □ □ □ 
 
APPENDICES        Page | 371  
 
  
Q.9 Can you tell me, over the past 12 months your sales have: 
1 Increased □ 
2 Decreased □ 
3 Remained same □ 
 
Q.10 What percentage of your sales comes from the following sectors in which your establishment operates? 
1 Agriculture, forestry and fishing __% 12 Real estate activities __% 
2 Mining and quarrying __% 13 
Professional, scientific and technical 
activities 
__% 
3 Manufacturing __% 14 
Administrative and support service 
activities 
__% 
4 
Electricity, gas, steam and air condition 
supply 
__% 15 
Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security 
__% 
5 
Water supply, sewerage, waste 
management and remediation activities 
__% 16 Education  __% 
6 Construction __% 17 Human health and social work activities __% 
7 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles 
__% 18 Arts, entertainment and recreation __% 
8 Transportation and storage __% 19 Other service activities __% 
9 
Accommodation and food service 
activities 
__% 20 Activities of household as employers __% 
10 Information and Communication __% 21 
Activities of extraterritorial organizations 
and bodies 
__% 
11 Financial and insurance activities __%  
 
Q.11 Is your firm a member of any business Association or Chamber? 
1 YES □ 2 NO (move to Q.14) □ 
 
Q.12 Is YES which one? 
1 
Kosovo Chamber of 
Commerce 
□ 3 American Chamber of Commerce □ 
2 
Alliance of Kosovan 
Businesses 
□ 4 Other (Specify) ………………………… □ 
 
Q.13 If YES 
 
Very 
Dissatisfied 
Dissatisfied Neutral Satisfied 
Very 
Satisfied 
1 On what scale are you satisfied with business 1 2 3 4 5 
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SECTION B: UNFAIR COMPETITION AND UNOFFICIAL PAYMENTS 
 
We are interested in your opinions in a personal capacity. We do not imply in any way that your company evades nor makes 
unofficial payments/gifts. We recognize that your company neither approves of nor condones tax evasion nor the use of 
unofficial payments/gifts. The responses that you give will be aggregated and presented in purely statistical terms; any 
comments you give me cannot be attributed to either you or your company 
 
Q.14 
Thinking about officials, would you say it is common for a business similar to yours to pay “bribes/gift” for: 
 Always Often Neutral Rarely Never 
1 
To get connected to and maintain public services  
1 2 3 4 5 
2 
To obtain business licenses and permits 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 
To obtain government contracts 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 
To evade taxes 
1 2 3 4 5 
5 
To avoid customs 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q.15 
Recognizing the difficulties that many firms face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of 
total annual sales would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business reports for tax purposes? 
1                       % 
 
Q.16 
Please tell me, over the past 12 months how many times your business was inspected or was asked to meet with 
tax/custom officials/administration?  
1 ___ times 
 
Q.17 Please tell me whether you think that cheating on taxes if you have a chance is: 
1 Completely Justified □ 
2 Partly Justified □ 
3 Partly Unjustified □ 
4 Completely Unjustified □ 
 
Q.18 Can you tell me, how do you consider tax rates applicable to your business: 
1 Very Low □ 
2 Low □ 
3 Moderate □ 
APPENDICES        Page | 373  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q.19 Please tell me, how much do you trust the government? 
1 Always □ 
2 Often □ 
3 Neutral □ 
4 Rarely □ 
5 Never □ 
 
Q.20 
   wh t degree d  y u  gree w th th    t teme t: “I am confident that the legal system will uphold my contract 
property rights in business disputes” 
1 Strongly Disagree □ 
2 Disagree □ 
3 Neutral □ 
4 Agree □ 
5 Strongly Agree □ 
 
Q.21 
H w m  y d y   f  e   r m   geme t’  t me w th     week     pe t    de l  g w th publ c  ff c  l  about the 
application and interpretation of laws and regulations, and to get or to maintain access to public services? 
1 ___ days 
 
 
THANK AND TERMINATE 
